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The following dissertation examines Marx’s conception of nature, including the
relationship between that conception and his social theory, political philosophy, and critique of
political economy. It offers an erudite defence of a novel interpretation of Marx’s philosophy of
nature while interrogating both historical and contemporary readings.
The first portion of the interpretative thesis considers his early philosophical development,
especially in relation to Hegel, Feuerbach, and Bauer. It defends the interpretation that, during
this phase in his intellectual development, Marx developed his materialist conception of history
in conjunction with an historical conception of nature and the human relation to it. Part I
demonstrates that this integral connection between philosophy of nature and his vision of human
nature is a lasting feature of his thought, one which links his ontology to his anthropology even
in his later writings.
The second part of the dissertation examines Marx’s middle and late writings, and it
analyzes the theory of the metabolism which he elaborated during those periods in his
intellectual development. Part II of the dissertation identifies important, but as of yet
unacknowledged, points of connection between his theory of the metabolism and his description
of precapitalist social life, account of the history of primitive accumulation, analysis of the
formation of capitalist relations, demystification of political economy, growing ecological
awareness, and philosophical conception of the dialectic of negativity.
The final portion of the paper assumes the form of an anti-critique. It defends the
interpretation that, in both the early and late writings, Marx’s conception of nature is not
susceptible to Frankfurt critiques of instrumental rationality and the ecological domination
associated with it. While criticizing the readings offered by Schmidt and Marcuse, the final
chapters of the dissertation elaborate a wholly original and deeply insightful interpretation of
Marx’s conception of the relationship between natural necessity and human freedom.
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For some of the very best parts of Nature: Cole, George, and Algonquin Park.
Long may we paddle our canoe together.
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1Preface
The historical materialist conception of nature has always attracted critical attention from
serious scholars of Marx, beginning almost a century ago with History and Class Consciousness.
Lukacs’ 1923 work challenged the orthodox Plekhanovian interpretation of Marx’s philosophy
of nature. For the young Lukacs, nature could no longer be treated in the dogmatic way that it
had been by Soviet metaphysics. This is because the form of nature and the mode of its
appearance are historically-constituted through practice. He had recognized that, for Marx,
nature is a ‘social category’. In departing from Feuerbach, observed Lukacs, Marx had come to
regard the nature with which humans interact as the product of that activity— at bottom, of
labour.
This new conception of nature that Lukacs alluded to was contained within what Engels later
referred to as the ‘germ’ of the new world outlook outlined in the Theses on Feuerbach, which
was first published in the mid-1880s alongside his Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical
German Philosophy. However, readers of Marx also found further confirmation of this view in
the manuscripts for The German Ideology, which only saw the light of day in the 1930s. Only
then could Marx’s intellectual relation to Feuerbach begin to be fully appreciated. In The
German Ideology, Marx and Engels broke with his unhistorical conception of nature.
Feuerbachian naturalism, they contested, applies exclusively to those virgin portions of nature
still untouched by the human hand. But all progress in the development of capitalist industry is
progress toward dissolving whatever proof remains of Feuerbach’s ‘nature’.
The dissemination and reception of the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844
and of the Grundrisse, first in Germany in the 1930s and then in the English-speaking world in
the 1960s and 1970s, also profoundly altered the topography of secondary literature on Marx’s
2philosophy of nature. The critique of estranged labour and the philosophical humanism of these
posthumously published writings pointed scholars towards what were until then largely
neglected dimensions in Marx’s thought, not least of all with respect to the category of nature in
his writings. ‘Western Marxists’ and Marxist-Humanists took-up these themes in new and
provocative ways. In contrast to Althusser, who tried to drive Hegel back into the night and right
out of Marx’s philosophy, thinkers such as Fromm and Dunayevskaya emphasized the
continuities between the early, middle and late works, including, again, in relation to the question
of nature.
The critical theorists of the Frankfurt School also reconsidered the meaning of nature in
Marxism during this period. They underwent a critical ‘settling of accounts’ with Marx and with
the part played by nature in the Marxian dialectic, although their interpretative claims about his
materialist theory of nature were sometimes deeply mistaken. Adorno and Horkheimer, for
instance, extended their critiques of the ‘instrumental’ reason of capitalist society into criticisms
of Marx’s conception of nature in a higher social formation. Were his vision of socialism
actually realized, they contend that its mastery of the metabolism would merely perpetuate, in a
new and classless form, the ‘domination’ of nature characteristic of capitalist society. Although
this anti-ecological reading of Marx was inaccurate, it was nonetheless indicative of the critical
turn in all philosophizing about nature which began to take place in 20th century thinking
influenced by Marx. Indeed, the critical theorists were right about one thing: the domination of
‘nature by man’ has, up until now, only coincided with the domination of ‘man by man’. Nature
could no longer be mastered, nor theorized, as if it were wholly ‘external’ to human society.
The most important work on Marx’s philosophy of nature emerged out of this Frankfurt
tradition. Alfred Schmidt’s The Concept of Nature in Marx is almost universally regarded— and
rightly so— as the starting-point for any discussion of the secondary literature on Marx’s
3philosophy on nature. However, while Schmidt’s work has received plenty of uncritical praise, it
has been subjected to surprisingly little criticism. Despite its original and substantive
contributions to scholarship on the subject, The Concept of Nature in Marx is replete with
contradictions— all of which are rooted in Schmidt’s uncritical relationship to Adorno, who had
supervised the dissertation project. Re-reading Adorno’s negative dialectic back onto the late
writings, he defends the mistaken thesis that there is an unacknowledged ontological break in
Marx’s philosophy of nature. According to him, Marx’s early speculations about the subject-
object identity made practicable through the humanization of nature are exchanged, in the
writings of the later period, for the inextinguishable non-identity of natural necessity. In the
Marxian dialectic, the non-identity of nature ‘triumphs’, says Schmidt, over the possibilities of
praxis and reconciliation.
In more contemporary secondary literature, most of the discussions about Marx’s concept
of nature are, in my opinion, much less interesting philosophically speaking. These discussions
often run down the rabbit-hole of the entropy debate, ignore the intellectual tradition in which
Marx’s thought was rooted, and overly romanticize his representations of nature as the ‘inorganic
body’ of precapitalist society. However, to their credit, these eco-Marxists emphasize the
ecological dimensions of Marx’s later theory of the ‘metabolism’ (Stoffwechsel) which we find
expressed in the Grundrisse and Capital. They accomplished this task more or less in conscious
opposition to all previous tendencies in secondary scholarship, which had emphasized the young
Marx’s humanism-naturalism as the most ecological moment in his intellectual development.
Burkett, Foster, and others have also illustrated that Marx’s account of primitive accumulation
and critique of the metabolic ‘rift’ was explicitly tied to his practical concerns about soil erosion,
desertification, composting, and deforestation— issues which dovetail most with those of
contemporary ecology.
4***
When I initially began to research and write about this topic, first for my Major Research
Paper and then for this dissertation, the efforts were undertaken with the definite intention of
offering a comprehensive account and critical analysis of the meaning and relevance of Marx’s
writings on nature. I have not accomplished that task. Much more could be said about his
conception of nature and, had I the time and the space, it would be a worthwhile endeavour to
say it. The limits of this dissertation— surely in content, but especially in form— are entirely of
my own making. Its shortcomings are precisely the shortcomings of its propounder, who is still
very much struggling to work-out his own intellectual development and understanding of Marx
to its fullest— and, thus, in no way indicative of any shortcomings in Marx’s philosophy of
nature itself. However, I hope that this dissertation has captured some of the significance and
insightfulness of his conception of the human relation to nature in history.
These failures on my part, if they may be excused in any way, are matched only by the
difficulty of the subject matter itself, i.e., what involves, at bottom, the assimilation of the
encyclopaedic wealth of Marx’s comments on nature. His concept of nature is multi-dimensional.
Coming to terms with it requires an interdisciplinary approach. In its various iterations,
understanding Marx’s thinking about nature requires an understanding of issues found in ancient
philosophy from Heraclitus and Anaximander to Aristotle and Epicurus; classical German
philosophy from Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel to Bauer, Feuerbach, Stirner, and Hess; the
French utopian socialism of Fourier and Saint Simon; the materialism of d'Holbach and
Helvetius; as well as the scientific advances and discoveries made by Darwin, Moltmann, and
Liebig. Marx’s theory of nature also plays into his critique of the concept of value in political
economy, especially as advanced by Physiocracy, Utilitarianism, and ‘vulgar’ forms of
economics. It is also given expression in his historical analysis of precapitalist forms of the
5metabolism, demystifying account of primitive accumulation, and criticism of the metabolic rift
characteristic of capitalism. Lastly, although changes occur in his political philosophy, Marx’s
conception of communism in the early, middle, and late writings remains predicated upon
developing a new relation to nature. Hence, his concept of nature both informs and is informed
by his anthropology, political philosophy, and sociology, just as it is an integral aspect of his
theory of history and critique of economics.
This multi-dimensional or interdisciplinary character to Marx’s concept of nature defies
any facile schematizing. Understanding his materialist conception of the human relation to nature
in history requires a serious and close reading of a whole variety of relevant texts. With Hegel,
the whole affair is actually much simpler to resolve. One need only read the Encyclopaedia of
the Philosophical Sciences in order to grasp the role which the Philosophy of Nature plays within
the dialectico-speculative system as a whole. This could be supplemented with an appreciation of
what he has to say about nature elsewhere— e.g., there are very insightful comments on nature in
the lectures on The Philosophy of History, The Philosophy of Religion, and The History of
Philosophy. Of course, Marx never wrote a standalone Philosophy of Nature, and, as we know, it
was left to Engels to complete the Dialectics of Nature. In this sense, he has no ‘philosophy of
nature’, but that is only because it is integrated into his oeuvre as a whole. Hence, I will often use
the phrase ‘philosophy of nature’ in this dissertation because I believe that a cogent conception
of nature underpins his thinking in each of the individual phases of his intellectual development,
and across his work when considered as a totality. In order to discover Marx’s philosophy of
nature, we will have to read Capital in the light of his doctoral dissertation on The Difference
between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature, we will have to examine the
Grundrisse alongside the Critique of the Gotha Programme, the Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844 alongside The Communist Manifesto, and his correspondence and articles
6for Tribune alongside his addresses to the IWMA.
Hence, that Marx never composed the Dialectics of Nature does not imply that he was
disinterested in or indifferent to questions about nature, and, less still, to the human relation to it
in time. On the contrary, such questions commanded his attention from some of the earliest to
some of the last of his writings. This is why to discover Marx’s Naturphilosophie, one has to
reassemble it piecemeal by considering his work in its totality— including, the changes which
take place across the various phases in his intellectual development. In the course of this
dissertation, I hope to show that Marx's writings are rich with underappreciated, though by no
means undertheorized, insights into the relationship between society and nature— insights which
may be of even greater relevance today than they were during his own lifetime. The
environmental crises generated by the intensified contradictions of contemporary capitalism
compel us to begin to radically rethink and retheorize our relationship to nature along with Marx.
This dissertation is a contribution to, and reflection of, the need to rediscover and recover Marx’s
‘philosophy of nature’.
***
The following dissertation is divided into three major parts. Part I, entitled ‘Bauer,
Feuerbach and the Concept of Nature in the Early Marx’, deals with the changes which take
place in Marx’s early conception of nature and the human relation to it in history. It situates
those developments within the context of his 'settling of accounts' with Hegel, the Hegelian
dialectic, and the Left Hegelians. For this reason, Part I is more of an intellectual biography than
the other portions of this dissertation. But its ultimate design is not biographical. It seeks to argue
and substantiate that the materialist conception of history which was born out of the critiques of
Bauer and Feuerbach was, from the outset of this period of ‘self-clarification’, integrally
connected to a more historical conception of nature.
7Part II of the dissertation, ‘The Original Unity and Historic Separation from the Inorganic
Body of Nature’, will turn the reader’s attention away from the earlier writings of the 1840s and
toward the theory of the metabolism which Marx articulates in the works of the 1850s and 1860s.
It focuses on his descriptions of the precapitalist and capitalist forms of this metabolism, as well
as his vision of a post-capitalist relationship to nature. Highlighting the points of connection
between his representations of precapitalist life, account of primitive accumulation, critique of
political economy, analysis of the metabolic rift and political theory, I argue that Marx both
criticized the human and ecological damage caused by the diremption from nature specific to the
bourgeois economy, but, at the same time, also regarded the phases of primitive and capitalist
accumulation as part of a necessary stage of estrangement. In a higher form of society, one made
possible by the ruthlessly universalizing tendencies and contradictions of capitalism itself,
individuals would restore their original communal bond with and ‘recognition of nature’, except,
for the first time, in a form adequate to the most complete development of human nature.
Part III of the dissertation, ‘Rationality, Necessity and Work in Socialism: Marx and the
Frankfurt School’, will consider certain critiques of Marx’s philosophy of nature— the most
significant of which are those which emerged out the Frankfurt School in the immediate pre-war
and post-war periods. The critical theorists who will be examined in Part III should be credited
with having critically reappraised the role which nature plays within the dialectic. However,
many of their interpretative claims about Marx’s own conception of nature are problematic. Their
critiques tend to conflate Marx’s idea of rationally regulating the interchange with nature with
the tradition of ‘instrumental’ rationality extending from Bacon to Bentham. For this reason,
Adorno and Horhkeimer mistakenly charge that his conception of socialism's ‘mastery’ of the
metabolism would merely perpetuate the capitalist ‘domination’ of nature in a new mode. I will
also argue that Schmidt and Marcuse misunderstood the categories of freedom and necessity in
8Marx's writings— an issue which is essential to grasping his conception of the productive
relation to nature in socialism. They interpret him as arguing that since the time and energy spent
in work could never be abolished, but only driven down to a minimum, the remaining portions of
necessary labour represent a realm of non-freedom, i.e., an ineliminable form of a nature-given
estrangement even in an emancipated society. According to this reading, nature would remain an
external and alien object in socialism, just as the social relation to it through work and need
would remain instrumental and unfree. Part III of the dissertation assumes the form of an ‘anti-
critique’ because it subjects these criticisms to scrutiny in the light of Marx's relevant writings.
9Part I
Bauer, Feuerbach & the Concept of Nature in the Early Marx
Introduction
In the 1840s, Marx's thinking underwent such a momentous transformation that he later
referred to this period of “self-clarification” as having produced the “guiding” principle for all of
his subsequent studies into politics, history, and economics. Part I of this dissertation will cast a
new light on the course of this phase in his early intellectual development by reconsidering it
within the context of the specific changes that take place in his nature-philosophy. The emphasis
is placed upon the writings composed between 1843 and 1846, in which Marx breaks away first
from Bauer, and then from Feuerbach. I will suggest that it was in and through those critiques
that he first formulated what we now know as the doctrine of historical materialism. Part I will
demonstrate that his materialist conception of history was from the outset of this process of self-
clarification developed in parallel with, and integrally connected to, a much more historical
conception of nature. It is impossible to fully comprehend Marx's early intellectual development,
and his critiques of either Bauer or Feuerbach, without at the same time comprehending these
changes that take place in his philosophy of nature. On the other hand, it is just as difficult to
fully comprehend Marx's radical rethinking of the category of nature during this period without
at the same time grasping it as a moment— and, arguably, as the most essential moment— in his
break with Bauer, Feuerbach, and the Young Hegelians.
Chapter One of Part I, ‘In the Shadow of Hegel: Bauer, Feuerbach and Marx’s Early
Philosophy of Nature’, will situate these developments in Marx's early conception of nature
within the context of his 'settling of accounts' with Hegel, the Hegelians, and the Hegelian
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dialectic— which is to say, his own “former philosophical conscience.” It argues that Marx’s
retheorization of the concept of nature during this period unfolded across two distinct stages. In
the first phase, we find him criticizing Bauer’s idealism while uncritically endorsing aspects of
Feuerbachian materialism. In the works written between 1843 and 1844, such as The Holy
Family and Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, he welcomes a ‘theoretical revolution’
which, in some ways, he has already implicitly left behind. However, the explicit rupture occurs
in the second stage, where Marx breaks decisively with the outlook provided by Feuerbachian
naturalism. The works composed from between 1845 and 1846, such as the Theses on Feuerbach
and The German Ideology, give us indications of these new directions in his thinking about
nature.
When Marx initially parted ways with Bauer in his 1843 On the Jewish Question and
Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, he did so on the basis of an appropriation of Feuerbach.
In those writings and in the writings of 1844, I will argue that he accepts, albeit in a highly
modified form, the inner-connection between humanism and naturalism, and, like Feuerbach,
conceives of human society as a part of nature. The idea of species-being and principle of
sensuousness, also inherited in a modified form from Feuerbach, constitute anthropological and
ontological cornerstones in his early conception of communism. But Marx’s subsequent
reassessment of the significance of philosophical materialism not only compelled him to
formulate a critique of it, it also compelled him to reformulate his earlier criticism of Bauer,
influenced as it was by Feuerbach. Throughout the course of the first chapter, we will find that he
comes to repudiate both Feuerbach’s contemplative materialism, ahistorical naturalism and
restricted notion of sensuousness, as well as Bauer’s hypostatization of self-consciousness,
Olympian contempt for the ‘muck of substance’ and reduction of natural necessity to a ‘stick’. In
short, Marx opposes to both Feuerbach’s abstract unity between society and nature, and Bauer’s
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abstract antithesis between nature and history, a completely new conception of nature and of the
human relation to it in history.
As Marx himself later recognized, this early period of intellectual ‘sturm und drang’ had
a deep and lasting impact upon his political theory, idea of human development in history, and,
not least of all I will argue, his philosophy of nature. The critiques of Bauer and Feuerbach
brought into focus the outlines of a whole new worldview. Chapter Two of Part I, ‘Nature, Need
and History: Marx’s Historical Conception of Nature’, contends that the materialist conception of
history which emerged out of this settling of accounts was integrally connected to the
development of a much more historical conception of nature. In Bauer’s dialectic, the self-
consciousness of the critic leaves nature behind with the progress of history, whereas, in
Feuerbach’s passive materialism, human development remains confined within an abstract
naturalism. The idealism of the one excludes nature from history; the materialism of the other
excludes history from nature. In the second chapter, I will defend the interpretation that in
opposition to both of these views, Marx recognized nature as a fundamental condition of all
history, but, at the same time, as something which is also transformed by it.
In Feuerbach’s materialism, nature is an unhistorical and homogeneous objectivity,
unmediated by the necessary human interaction with it. Marx, by juxtaposition, comes to
conceive of the nature with which humans interact as a social product. He grasps nature not
merely in the form of the object, but also as formed by objective activity. It is the introduction of
the principle of praxis into all philosophizing about nature. Yet, Marx also recognized that by
transforming nature and the human relation to it, human beings also transform themselves and
their relations with one another. This is why he charged Feuerbach with failing to be a historian
insofar as he was a materialist, and a materialist insofar as he was a historian. I will argue that the
connection which Marx identified between history and materialism necessitated the development
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of a more historical conception of nature. The second chapter will close by suggesting that this
historical conception of nature and the human relation to it also had significant implications for
Marx’s political philosophy and idea of human development. These connections arguably
achieve their most speculative form in his vision of the humanization of nature, and notion of the
convergence between natural and human history. Communism, as Marx expresses it during this
period, would represent the “completed, essential unity of man with nature”— i.e., the real
resolution to all of the hitherto merely philosophically conceived contradictions between
freedom and necessity, objectification and affirmation, essence and existence. It would mark the
end not only to the antagonism between individuals, but to the antagonism between society and
nature.
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In the Shadow of Hegel:
Bauer, Feuerbach and Marx’s Early Philosophy of Nature
Introduction: A Period of Critique and Self-Clarification
Given that a number of early works still remained unpublished at the time of Marx's death,
Engels found it necessary in the mid-1880s to set out in print a brief summary of the origins of
the political philosophy forever attached to his friend's name. In that pamphlet, Ludwig
Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, he claims that the genealogy of
Marxism had to be traced back four decades earlier to its “relation to the Hegelian philosophy”
from which it both “proceeded” and “separated” (emphases added).1 This is because Marx
underwent a philosophical moulting process in the mid-1840s, shedding the husks of Left
Hegelianism by regrounding its inherited dialectic upon a newfound “materialist basis.” The
'materialist conception of history' was the direct outcome of this critical 'settling of accounts'
with Hegel, the Hegelian dialectic, and the other Young Hegelians. Looking back upon this
crucial phase in his intellectual development over thirty years later in Capital, Marx recounted
that many of his earliest writings had therefore “criticised” the more “mystified form” or
“mystificatory side of the Hegelian dialectic...when it was still the fashion” in Germany.2 This
proves to be especially true of the works published and manuscripts written between 1843 and
1846— including, most obviously, On the Jewish Question, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of
Right, Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole, The Holy Family, Theses
on Feuerbach and The German Ideology. In these works, Marx step-by-step severs his personal,
political, and philosophical ties to the Young Hegelian movement and the increasingly parochial
1 Engels, Frederick, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, C.P. Dutt (ed.),
(International Publishers: New York; 1970), 7-8.
2 Marx, Karl, 'Postface to the Second Edition', Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. I, Ben Fowkes
(trans.), (Penguin Books: London; 1990), 100, 102-103.
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circle of 'Die Freien'.3 Bauer, Stirner, Ruge, Hess and Feuerbach— none would be spared the
stinging satire of his pen.
However, as Marx would later admit in the 'Preface' to the 1859 Contribution to the
Critique of Political Economy, his “main purpose” during these formative years was not so much
“critique,” but rather “self-clarification.”4 This is the period in his philosophical development
that, as Engels expressed it many years later, would give us the “brilliant germ of the new world
outlook.”5 This phase of intense intellectual activity produced what Marx referred to as the
“guiding thread” or “guiding principle” for all of his subsequent studies into history, politics, and
economics. And, yet, these early attempts to “settle accounts” with his own “former
philosophical conscience”— which was that of a Young Hegelian— had also necessarily
assumed the “form of a critique of post-Hegelian philosophy” and of the Hegelian dialectic.
3 For Marx's polemic on the parochial character of Young Hegelianism and 'Die Freien', see Engels,
Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the Introduction to the
Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 44, 63-65: “In Germany,
a country where only a trivial historical development is taking place, these mental developments, these glorified and
ineffective trivialities, naturally serve as a substitute for the lack of historical development, and they take root and
have to be combated. But this fight is of local importance...While the French and English at least stick to the
political illusion, which is after all closer to reality, the Germans move in the realm of 'pure spirit', and make
religious illusion the driving force of history. The Hegelian philosophy of history is the last consequence...of all this
German historiography...This whole conception of history, together with its dissolution and the scruples and qualms
resulting from it, is a purely national affair of the German...The purely national character of these questions and
solutions is moreover shown by the fact that these theorists believe in all seriousness that chimeras like 'the God-
Man', 'Man', etc., have presided over individual epochs of history (Saint Bruno even goes so far as to assert that only
'criticism and critics have made history', [Bruno Bauer in his Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs]) and when they
themselves construct historical systems, they skip over all earlier periods in the greatest haste and pass immediately
from 'Mongolism' [Max Stirner in Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum] to history 'with meaningful content', that is to
say, to the history of the Hallische and Deutsche Jahrbücher and the dissolution of the Hegelian school into a
general squabble. They forget all other nations, all real events, and the theatrum mundi is confined to the Leipzig
book fair and the mutual quarrels of 'criticism'...These pompous and arrogant hucksters of ideas, who imagine
themselves infinitely exalted above all national prejudices, are thus in practice far more national than the beer-
swilling philistines who dream of a united Germany. They do not recognise the deeds of other nations as
historical...[T]hey turn the Rhine-song into a religious hymn and conquer Alsace and Lorraine by robbing French
philosophy instead of the French state, by Germanising French ideas instead of French provinces. Herr Venedey is a
cosmopolitan compared with the Saints Bruno and Max, who, in the universal dominance of theory, proclaim the
universal dominance of Germany.”
4 Marx, Karl, 'Preface to AContribution to the Critique of Political Economy', Selected Writings, Simon H.
Lawrence (ed.), (Hackett Publishing: Indianapolis; 1994), 210, 212.
5 Engels, Frederick, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, C.P. Dutt (ed.),
(International Publishers: New York; 1970), 8.
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What emerged out of this critique was a new “conception” of history which he believed stood in
absolute antagonism to the “ideological one” presented up until then by such “German
philosophy.”6 In other words, the outcome of this period of self-clarification, the materialist
conception of history, grew organically out of this settling of accounts with the Hegelians and
with his own former philosophical conscience as a Young Hegelian. As Megill summarizes of
this period in Marx's intellectual development,
[i]n the 1859 preface Marx asserts that the unnamed manuscript that we know as The
German Ideology...fulfilled two functions for his thinking...[First, the] settling of
accounts with their “former philosophical conscience”...Historical materialism was
certainly part of this settling of accounts: it is a set of assertions designed to highlight
the general insufficiency of the thinking of the left-Hegelian philosophers from whom
Marx and Engels were taking their leave. To this degree historical materialism [also]
functioned [in a second sense], in The German Ideology, as a weapon in debate, tied up
to dismantling Feuerbach's philosophy but aimed also at Bauer and his friends.7
Hence, we must start by asking: what are the points of connection, and the points of
departure, between Hegelian and post-Hegelian philosophy on the one side, and Marx's
materialist conception of history on the other? One of the essential aims of this chapter will be to
reconsider the relationship between Marx's early philosophy of nature and the work of his
contemporaries, Bruno Bauer and Ludwig Feuerbach. As we will discover in the next chapter,
the outcome of this period of critique and self-clarification was not simply the 'materialist
conception of history', but, developed alongside and as an integral component of it, Marx's
equally 'historical conception of nature'.
Bauer, Feuerbach, Stirner, Ruge, Hess— these are names which are mentioned today
incidentally insofar as they lead up to, and are superseded by, the name of 'Marx'. As Hanfi notes
of Feuerbach, his “philosophy has been discussed almost exclusively within the context of the
6 Marx, Karl, 'Preface to AContribution to the Critique of Political Economy', Selected Writings, Simon H.
Lawrence (ed.), (Hackett Publishing: Indianapolis; 1994), 210, 212. Or see, Marx, Karl, ‘A Contribution to the
Critique of Political Economy’, Marx and Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 29, Victor Shnittke and Yuri Sdobnikov
(trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1987), 275.
7 Megill, Alan, Karl Marx: The Burden of Reason (Why Marx Rejected Politics and the Market), (Rowman
and Littlefield: Oxford; 2002), 222.
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development of historical materialism; it has been read only as a chapter in the book called Karl
Marx.”8 The general lack of scholarly interest in examining these thinkers in their own right is
reflected in the fact that many of their major works and key essays still require translation into
English over one hundred and fifty years after their composition. While this neglect is rather
troubling, it cannot, of course, be remedied by a dissertation on Marx's concept of nature.
Nonetheless, it is appropriate to note here that the failure to appreciate the rich diversity of
politically progressive and anti-theological views which made-up the Young Hegelian school has
also left historical and contemporary English-language secondary literature on Marx
impoverished of one of its most essential sources of wealth for understanding his early
intellectual development. As Boer argues, the sections in The German Ideology on “Bauer and
Stirner have languished in the doldrums of Marxist scholarship for far too long” simply because
scholars do not read and do not comment upon them. As such, Marx's relation and debt to these
thinkers has yet to be acknowledged, except, perhaps, through the repetition of a few vague
platitudes found his own polemics against them.9
However, understanding the relation of Marx to the Young Hegelian philosophy from
which he both 'proceeded' and 'separated' is actually one of the keys to unlocking that crucial
period which he later only vaguely alluded to as one of simultaneous 'critique' and 'self-
clarification'. Without situating his early intellectual development squarely within the
philosophic context in which it was immersed, we are left not only with a shallow grasp of these
supposedly minor 'epigones' in the catalogue of post-Hegelian thinkers leading up to Marx, but,
what is more, we are left unable to appreciate the politically progressive and philosophically
avant garde intellectual tradition in which Marx himself flourished and to which he himself
8 Hanfi, Zawar, 'Introduction', The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach, Zwar Hanfi (trans.),
(Verso Books: London; 2012), 2.
9 Boer, Roland, The Criticism of the Earth: Marx, Engels and Theology, (Brill: Boston; 2012), 70.
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belonged. Ironically, he and Engels may have actually contributed to this lack of understanding
of their own work today precisely because of the polemical form which their critical writings
often assumed vis-a-vis these Young Hegelians. As Rosen suggests, their satirical criticisms,
selective quotations and sometimes crude caricaturizations of their (philosophically closest)
rivals “creates the impression that [e.g.,] Bauer's views are empty of content and not worth
studying.”10 Writing in 1936, only a few years after the manuscripts for The German Ideology
were finally published, Hook could tell us with all honesty that because “Feuerbach's general
philosophy had to wait almost a century for proper recognition,” the “relationship between Marx
and Feuerbach has [only] received peripheral mention.”11
Of course, the situation is admittedly somewhat different with respect to Feuerbach today.
The unfinished 'chapter' on Feuerbach from The German Ideology is one of the most read and
commented upon writings from the early Marx— although, again, the same cannot be said of the
rest of The German Ideology and of Marx's relation to Bauer, Stirner, Grun and Hess. Yet, while
the publication of Marx's early works stimulated some renewed interest in Feuerbach over the
course of the second half of the 20th century, Hanfi shows that, far from receiving 'proper
recognition' as Hook suggests, most of the “interest it commands is determined not so much by
its own independent significance as by its relevance to the question of the specificity of Marx's
theory.”12 Because none of these thinkers— including even Feuerbach— receives much
recognition apart from being passingly mentioned as philosophical precursors to Marx, and are in
fact often only read through Marx's assertions about them, this neglect has deprived scholars on
Marx of one of the most necessary starting-points for honestly considering his early
10 Rosen, Zvi, Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx: The Influence of Bruno Bauer upon Marx's Thought, Martinus
Nijhoff (trans.), (Hague: 1977).
11 Hook, Sidney, From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual Development of Karl Marx, (Columbia
University Press: New York; 1994), 243, 272.
12 Hanfi, Zawar, 'Introduction', The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach, Zwar Hanfi (trans.),
(Verso Books: London; 2012), 1.
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philosophical development. As Breckman sees it, to ignore this intellectual milieu is to ignore the
critical philosophic background out of which Marxism itself sprung.
The trajectory that carried Marx from teenage Romanticism to Kantian Idealism to
Hegelianism was fairly typical of many young German intellectuals in the 1820s and
1830s, yet it must be emphasized that Marx came to Hegelianism when it was already in
the process of dissolution. His reception of Hegel was influenced from the outset by
critical Hegelians like Gans...By the time Marx set to work earnestly assimilating
Hegel's writings, the tension between the closed Hegelian system and the open-ended
dialectical method had become a standard theme in the writings of prominent figures
like Gans, Karl Ludwig Michelet, and Feuerbach; the controversy over Strauss' Life of
Jesus was well under way; the split between left, right, and center Hegelianism had
already been described by Strauss; and the defection of the right-wing Hegelians to
Positive Philosophy had been duly noted by Strauss and Feuerbach. By 1839, when
Marx began work on a dissertation on ancient Greek atomism, Cieszkowski had
published his call for a practical realization of philosophy, Feuerbach had written his
critique of Positive Philosophy and Hegel's speculative philosophy, and Bruno Bauer,
who became Marx's teacher and friend that year, had already begun to shift from
orthodox Hegelianism to the philosophy of self-consciousness. A very active figure
among the progressive Hegelians in Berlin until his departure in the summer of 1841,
Marx would have been aware of all these currents within Hegelianism.13
Although a comprehensive consideration of Marx’s contemporaries lies beyond the pale
of the present study of his concept of nature, Part I of this dissertation nevertheless provokes the
need for such a consideration. This is because we will discover that to comprehend the early
Marx's radical rethinking of the human relation to nature is to grasp it as an essential moment
(and, perhaps, as the most essential moment) in his critical break with the Young Hegelians and
in his development of the materialist conception of history. For instance, take his critique of
Bauer during this period of self-clarification. Marx's critique of Bauer and reconceptualization of
the category of nature prove to be impossible to articulate without connecting them together.
They were not merely mutually complementary, but inextricably intertwined with one another
and with the first formulations of the doctrine of historical materialism. In this chapter, I will
defend the interpretative position that Marx's new conception of the relation between nature and
history was actually forged in and through his progressively developed criticism of Bauer
13 Breckman, Warren, Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origins of Radical Social Theory: Dethroning the
Self, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge; 2001), 261-262.
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between 1843 to 1846. In Bauer's dialectic, self-consciousness leaves natural necessity behind in
the process of its own historical becoming, establishing an irreconcilable antithesis between
nature and history. Only through the 'death of nature' is nature-as-nature superseded and its
'resurrection' as reason possible. In contrast to this, Marx and Engels arrive at an acceptance of
nature (and the human dependence upon it) as the “fundamental condition of all history,” indeed,
as the very “ground of history” and of all human development.14 It is this recognition of nature's
continued role in the historical dialectic which, in part at least, distinguishes their mid-1840s
work from the writings of Bruno Bauer and company.
However, this rethinking of the category of nature, and the corresponding critique of
Bauer, worked itself out biphasically— although the reasons for this may have had less to do
with Marx's immediate relation to Bauer, and more to do with his changing relationship to
Feuerbach. If we restrict our attention to the developments which take place within his
philosophy of nature during the first half of the 1840s, then Marx's process of 'self-clarification'
can be said to have traversed through at least two distinct stages: at first (between 1843-44), by
going through Feuerbachian naturalism, and, later (between 1845-46), by going beyond it. In the
first phase, Marx is, in the truest sense of the term, disillusioned by Feuerbach's critique of
religious estrangement and of German idealism as a form of theology.15 For Feuerbach, all
theology is reducible to anthropology; God and Hegel’s Absolute are just fantastic projections of
the species-being of 'Man'. Marx proceeds entirely from this Feuerbachian method of 'inverting'
the religiously fetishized subject-predicate relation and already 'upside-down' dialectic in Hegel,
recognizing once and for all that nothing exists outside of humanity and nature, and, moreover,
14 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 47.
15 Marx, Karl, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Jolin and O'Malley (trans.), (Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge; 2009), 131-132: “The critique of religion disillusions man so that he will think, act, and fashion
his reality as a man who has lost his illusions and regained his senses, so that he will revolve about himself as his
own true sun.”
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that humankind is itself just a part of nature.16
In the second phase, by comparison, Marx criticizes philosophical materialism precisely
because it stops short at this criticism of religious illusions, never passing over into a
confrontation with real alienation in politics and economics.17 Thereafter, as this chapter will
show, he repudiates Feuerbach for his abandonment of the Hegelian distinction between essence
and existence, as well as his abstract humanism and ahistorical naturalism, contemplative attitude,
and occlusion of practice as a constitutive moment of 'sensuousness'. Feuerbach conceives of
sensuousness in its immediacy, as sense-certainty, and grasps reality merely in the form of the
object; he does not comprehend labour as sensuousness, does not grasp that human activity is
itself objective activity. Moreover, whenever he discovers that the harmony which he
presupposes between essence and existence is disturbed, he flees from so-called sense-certitude
into the refuge of a higher perception and into a Kant-like ideal compensation in the species in
general. He thereby lapses back into 'idealism', and ceases to be a materialist, precisely where
materialism is most needed.
This rejection of Feuerbachian materialism not only compelled Marx to once again
completely rework the category of nature into his newfound philosophy of praxis, but, in
addition to this, it also undermined the efficacy of his earlier critique(s) of Bauer, forcing him to
renegotiate its terms of reference within the architecture of the new framework that he had begun
to articulate. Hence, although Marx had already disassociated himself from his university mentor
in 1843 and 1844 with On the Jewish Question, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, The
Holy Family and the Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic, the following emphasizes the
16 Ibid., 23-24. Or see Marx, Karl, 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole', The
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International
Publishers: New York; 2009), 180-181.
17 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 254.
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importance of the 1845-46 Reply to Bruno Bauer's Anti-Critique, Theses on Feuerbach, and The
German Ideology as constituting the 'final act' in his break with Bauer, the Young Hegelians, and,
for the first time, his break with Feuerbach. The manuscripts known today as The German
Ideology are particularly significant in the context of this discussion because they are the only
textual sources which contain both an extended critique of Feuerbach and, aside from the very
short 'Reply', the only explicit rebuttal to Bauer's 1845 article 'Charakteristik Ludwig
Feuerbachs'.
This is relevant, as intimated in the above, because Marx's 1843-44 kritik of Bauer had
cheerfully “greeted the new conception” introduced into German philosophy by Feuerbachian
naturalism.18 Yet, if the original 'Critique of Critical Criticism' in The Holy Family is, at times,
essentially Feuerbachian, then the critique consummated in The German Ideology marks, along
with the Reply and Theses on Feuerbach, a qualitative rupture with this Feuerbachian outlook. In
the 1845-46 manuscripts, Marx and Engels therefore had to reformulate elements of their earlier
treatment of Bauer inasmuch as they proved to be incompatible with this newly articulated
rejection of philosophical materialism. Again, however, not only has Marx's relation to
Feuerbach and Bauer changed in all this, but, as this part of the dissertation will demonstrate in
detail, so too has his whole philosophy of nature.
Feuerbach and Marx's 1843-44 Critique of Bauer
In order to substantiate some of these interpretative claims about Marx's early intellectual
development, it would be appropriate to begin by acknowledging along with Engels that
Feuerbach, arguably more than any other “post-Hegelian” philosopher, remained his intellectual
18 Engels, Frederick, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, C.P. Dutt (ed.),
(International Publishers: New York; 1970), 18.
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anchor throughout this turbulent “period of storm and stress.”19 When Marx began his work of
self-clarification and radical reappraisal of the Hegelian dialectic in 1843, he acknowledged
Feuerbach as being the only thinker to have assumed a genuinely critical standpoint vis-a-vis the
speculative system. Between 1843-44, Feuerbach was represented as the only philosopher since
Hegel to have ushered in a theoretical revolution in German thought. In a series of letters which
he wrote to Feuerbach at the time, Marx expressed nothing but “great respect” and profound
“love” for his works— works which, “in spite of their small size, are certainly of greater weight
than the whole of contemporary German literature put together.”20
Although he would also make a similar claim about materialism more generally,21 in one
1844 letter Marx even suggested that Feuerbachian materialism provided (however
unintentionally) a “philosophical basis for socialism.”22 As Rosen notes, “Feuerbach took a
serious view of Marx's evaluation that he was a communist on the basis of Feuerbach's use of the
notion of man as the species-being.”23 In fact, Marx's assessment of the political implications of
Feuerbach's philosophy had such a pronounced impact upon Feuerbach that, in 1845, he
converted to the cause of communism. He openly reaffirmed Marx's earlier claims about his own
philosophy, acknowledging that his humanism provided an anthropological underpinning for the
socialist conception of 'Man' as a 'generic' species-being.24 Of course, this was the same year that
Marx and Engels, partly under pressure from Stirner's anti-Feuerbachian The Ego and its Own
and partly from Bauer's 'Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs', worked-out their own critique of
19 Ibid., 7-8.
20 Marx, Karl, 'To Ludwig Feuerbach, In Bruckberg. Paris; August 11, 1844.', Marx-Engels Collected Works,
Vol. III, (International Publishers: New York; 1975), 354-357.
21 Engels, Frederick, and Marx, Karl, 'The Holy Family: Or Critique of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno
Bauer and Company', Marx-Engels Collected Works, Vol. 4, (International Publishers: New York; 1975), 130.
22 Marx, Karl, 'To Ludwig Feuerbach, In Bruckberg. Paris; August 11, 1844.', Marx-Engels Collected Works,
Vol. III, (International Publishers: New York; 1975), 354-357.
23 Rosen, Zvi, Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx: The Influence of Bruno Bauer upon Marx's Thought, Martinus
Nijhoff (trans.), (Hague: 1977).
24 Feuerbach, Ludwig, '“The Essence Of Christianity” in Relation to “The Ego And Its Own”', Frederick M.
Gordon (trans.), The Philosophical Forum, Vol. 8, No. 2-3-4, (1976).
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Feuerbachian 'Man' and broke decisively with Feuerbach’s humanism.
Nonetheless, there is good reason to suspect that Marx's overly charitable comments in
the letters from 1843-44 reflected his genuine sentiments at the time, and were not merely a way
of ingratiating himself with Feuerbach (whom he was trying to coax into writing an article for
Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher). Even in posthumously published notebooks that were
composed around the same time, Marx compared quite favourably the simple intuitions of these
writings on sensuousness with the empty systematizations of abstract idealism, noting the
“striking contrast” between the dead letter of Bauer's speculative system and the “unpretentious
simplicity” of Feuerbach's unsystematized principles for the philosophy of the future. The former,
“expiring under the guise of criticism,” maintained a “completely uncritical attitude to itself” and,
as such, never underwent a “critical settling of accounts” with the “Hegelian dialectic.” Neither
did Bauer even bother to adopt a “critical” stance vis-a-vis the “Feuerbachian dialectic,” refusing
to engage with the only thinker who had attempted such a critical re-evaluation of Hegel.
In this respect, Feuerbach was regarded by Marx throughout 1843-44 as the “only one
who has a serious, critical attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and who has made genuine
discoveries in this field.”25 “Feuerbach's writings,” he asserted in other manuscripts written
during the same period, are the “only writings since Hegel's Phänomenologie and Logik to
contain a real theoretical revolution.”26 These are astonishing claims given that Marx's own
writings from the same year were already so far beyond Feuerbach's philosophy that they point
to the more explicit break that would soon follow. Nonetheless, he argued at the time that all
genuine criticism in German philosophy after Hegel descends directly from and “owes its true
25 Marx, Karl, 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole', The Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 171-
172.
26 Marx, Karl, 'Preface', The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J.
Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 64.
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foundation to the discoveries of Feuerbach.”27 It was therefore not Marx, but Feuerbach, who
Engels later credited with initially “pulveriz[ing] the contradiction” of idealism and “plac[ing]
materialism on the throne” once again.28 He was “in fact the true conqueror of the old
philosophy,” exclaimed Marx at the time, for Feuerbach was the individual who had “in principle
[already] overthrown the old dialectic and philosophy.”29As Marx and Engels expressed it in The
Holy Family
who, then, revealed the mystery of the 'system'? Feuerbach. Who annihilated the
dialectics of concepts, the war of the gods that was known to the philosophers alone?
Feuerbach....Feuerbach, and only Feuerbach. And he did more. Long ago he did away
with the very categories with which 'Criticism' now operates...Once man is recognised
as the essence, the basis of all human activity and situations, only 'Criticism' can invent
new categories...History does nothing...It is man, real, living man who does all that, who
possesses and fights; 'history' is not, as it were, a person apart, using man as a means to
achieve its own aims; history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims. If
Absolute Criticism, after Feuerbach’s brilliant expositions, still dares to reproduce all
the old trash in a new form...that fact alone is sufficient to bring the 'mystery' of
Criticism to light...After the old antithesis between spiritualism and materialism has
been fought out on all sides and overcome once and for all by Feuerbach, 'Criticism'
again makes a basic dogma of it in its most loathsome form and gives the victory to the
'Christian-Germanic spirit'.30
Struik contends that statements such as these show that Feuerbach was the most
“powerful influence on Marx during the period 1842-45.”31 Actually, notwithstanding Marx's
initially uncritical and overly enthusiastic reception to Feuerbach, we should still be much more
conservative in our estimate of his impact upon Marx's thinking during this period of intellectual
sturm und drang. To be more precise than Struik, Feuerbach was simply the most significant
post-Hegelian philosopher for Marx between 1843-1844. Even if we leave aside the ancients, we
know that having already come to Hegel through Kant between 1838 and 1842, Marx underwent
27 Ibid., fn. 3, pp. 236.
28 Engels, Frederick, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, C.P. Dutt (ed.),
(International Publishers: New York; 1970), 18.
29 Marx, Karl, 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole', The Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 171-
172.
30 Engels, Frederick, and Marx, Karl, 'The Holy Family: Or Critique of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno
Bauer and Company', Marx-Engels Collected Works, Vol. 4, (International Publishers: New York; 1975), 92-94.
31 Marx, Karl, '[Editor's] Introduction', The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan
(trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 15-18, 20, 41.
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a critical rethinking of Hegel’s dialectic through the mediation of Feuerbachian materialism from
the fall of 1843 until the winter of 1844. However, while we should refrain from
overemphasizing this Feuerbachian moment in Marx's early intellectual development, we cannot
dismiss the decisive mark of philosophical naturalism upon his first tentative critiques of Hegel
and Bauer during these few short years.
As he came under the increased influence of philosophical materialism, Marx informed
Feuerbach in 1844 that he and Bauer, despite having been “friend[s] of many years standing,”
were already “rather estranged” for a number of political, philosophical, and personal reasons
(e.g., editorial conflicts with members of Die Freien, Bauer's suspension from the university,
etc.)— some of which, admittedly, have little or nothing to do with Feuerbachian humanism or
naturalism.32 It is also just as true that Marx had already become well acquainted with
Feuerbach's work before his break with Bauer, having read the Essence of Christianity no later
than July of 1841. Whatever initial influence Feuerbachian philosophy may have had upon
Marx's thinking between 1841 and 1842, it was never so decisive as to provoke a rupture with
his 'mentor', Bruno Bauer. This is because while the Das Wesen des Christentums likely shaped
Marx's early critical view of religion (as Bauer's critique did as well), it was really Feuerbach's
subsequent work in the 1842 Preliminary Theses for the Reform of Philosophy and 1843
Principles of the Philosophy of the Future which transformed Marx's early method of critique as
a whole. According to both Megill and O'Malley, these later Feuerbachian writings were the ones
which facilitated and shaped Marx's first re-reading of Hegel, and which contained the real
Feuerbachian revolution that he would allude to in 1844.33 As Megill suspects, the relation
32 Marx, Karl, 'To Ludwig Feuerbach, In Bruckberg. Paris; August 11, 1844.', Marx-Engels Collected Works,
Vol. III, (International Publishers: New York; 1975), 354-357.
33 “Although Marx did read Feuerbach's most famous work, The Essence of Christianity, around July
1841...he did not get a theoretical revolution from it. Only in the two essays of 1843, 'Preliminary Theses' and
'Principles of the Philosophy of the Future',” did Marx come to Feuerbach once again— particularly, notes Megill, as
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between the “very early Marx” (of 1838-1842) and Feuerbach is somewhat “murky” at best; but
“his impact on Marx in 1843-44, less so.”34 McLellan also argues that it can “be shown both that
Feuerbach had a very strong influence on Marx during the years of 1843-45 and that this
influence was principally that of the 'Thesen' and the 'Grundsatze'.”35
All of the major works which Marx composed in 1843 and 1844 were stamped in the
image of Feuerbach. For instance, Feuerbach's reversal of the subject-predicate inversion, genetic
method of critique, criticism of German idealism as a form of religious estrangement, etc., are all
clearly appropriated by Marx's 1843 writings— including, more specifically, his critique of
Bauer in On the Jewish Question and Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right.36 Moreover, we
a way of re-reading and critiquing Hegel. Megill, Allan, Karl Marx and the Burden of Reason: Why Marx Rejected
Politics and the Market, (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers: Boston; 2002), 23. O'Malley actually explains what
Megill leaves unanswered here: why Marx was influenced more by Feuerbach's 1843 works. O'Malley illustrates
that Marx could not have completed his 1843 critique of Hegel's political philosophy without Feuerbach's 1843
Theses and Principles. “The missing pages...[and] loss of the cover, on which Marx probably recorded the date of
composition [for his Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right], has given rise to differences on this matter among
commentators. Two early editors, Landshut and Mayer, date the Critique from 1841-42. However, best evidence
indicates that it dates from the period March-August 1843...Marx had planned to do a critique of Hegel's Philosophy
of Right for over a year. He first mentioned the project to his editor-friend, Arnold Ruge, in a letter dated 5 March
1842...But Marx never submitted his essay on Hegel's Philosophy of Right [to Ruge's journal]; in fact, it appears that
the work as originally projected was never written...[H]is failure to write the Critique when originally planned may
have been due to his lack of a methodology suitable for a systematic criticism of Hegel's political philosophy; for as
it turned out, a key element in the methodology employed by Marx in the Critique was provided by an essay by
Feuerbach which first appeared, of all places, in Ruge's Anekdota [in 1843].” Marx, Karl, 'Editor's Introduction',
Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Jolin and O'Malley (trans.), (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge;
2009), ix-x.
34 Megill, Alan, Karl Marx: The Burden of Reason (Why Marx Rejected Politics and the Market), (Rowman
and Littlefield: Oxford; 2002), 18.
35 McLellan, David, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, (Macmillan Press: London; 1969), 101.
36 On Marx's appropriation of the genetico-critical method and inversion of subject-predicate, see Hanfi, who
argues that Marx's early works display an “enthusiastic reception of Feuerbach's method of inverting the subject-
predicate relationship in theology and speculative philosophy,” and that “Marx himself applies the Feuerbachian
method” in The Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'. Feuerbach, Ludwig, '[Editor's] Introduction', The Fiery
Brook: Selected Writings, Zawar Hanfi (trans.), (Verso Books: London; 2012), 42. As O'Malley points out in his
'Introduction' to The Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right', Feuerbach's “'Provisional Theses for the Reform of
Philosophy', which first appeared in Ruge's Anekdota and thus came into Marx's hands just before he started the
Critique,” is accepted by Marx as a form of “rational criticism,” or, a form of criticism which “shows the genesis of
the object being criticized.” Feuerbach's “inversion of the traditional theological view” unveiled religious
mystification and revealed “man to be the true subject and God to be man's projection, an objectification of man's
own essential perfections.” Feuerbach also illustrated that the “subject-predicate conversion” can be adopted as a
“general method of criticizing speculative philosophy” and that, if “one wishes to find the truths hidden in the
peculiar, theological framework of Hegel's philosophy all one need to do is systematically convert Hegel's
philosophic subjects and predicates...What theology— and in parallel fashion speculative philosophy— regards as
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can also see how the interplay between naturalism and humanism in the so-called “Feuerbachian
dialectic” is carried over into Marx's 1844 critique of Bauer in The Holy Family and into his own
understanding of nature, species-being, the humanism of nature, etc., in the manuscripts on
Estranged Labor and Private Property and Communism.37 Lastly, the basic premises of
philosophical materialism and of Feuerbach's ontology of nature— namely, that human society is
a part of nature— are retained and only developed further in Marx's Critique of the Hegelian
Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole.38
As Engels put it years later in Ludwig Feuerbach, it was during the span of these few
years that Feuerbachian naturalism entreated all the Young Hegelians to come to terms with the
fact that nature “exists independently of all philosophy,” and, moreover, that it is the very
“foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up.”39 As
Struik suggests, Marx accepted this (Feuerbachian) method of explaining the emergence of
“thought from being, mind from matter, and not the other way around.”40 After Feuerbach, wrote
Engels, only the comedians of the old philosophy— mainly, Bauer, Ruge, and Stirner— would
infinite and transcendent is actually the essence of the finite hypostatized and conceived as an independent subject.”
Marx, Karl, 'Editor's Introduction', Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Jolin and O'Malley (trans.), (Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge; 2009), xxix. Hanfi and O'Malley are quite right that Marx's 1843 and 1844 works
appropriate this Feuerbachian method of critique. In his critique of Hegel's political philosophy, for instance, Marx
writes that “Hegel makes the predicates independent and then lets them be subsequently and mysteriously converted
into their subjects...Hegel makes the predicates, the object, independent, but independent as separated from their real
independence, their subject. Subsequently, and because of this, the real subject appears to be the result; whereas one
has to start from the real subject and examine its objectification...This is the dualism: Hegel does not consider the
universal to be the actual essence of the actual, finite thing, i.e., of the existing determinate thing, nor the real Ens to
be the true subject of the infinite.” Marx, Karl, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Jolin and O'Malley (trans.),
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge; 2009), 23-24.
37 Engels, Frederick, and Marx, Karl, 'The Holy Family: Or Critique of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno
Bauer and Company', Marx-Engels Collected Works, Vol. 4, (International Publishers: New York; 1975),130. And
see Marx, Karl, 'Private Property and Communism', The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Martin
Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 135, 137, 141, 143, 145.
38 Marx, Karl, 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole', The Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 171-
172.
39 Engels, Frederick, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, C.P. Dutt (ed.),
(International Publishers: New York; 1970), 18.
40 Marx, Karl, '[Editor's] Introduction', The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan
(trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 40.
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refuse to recognize along with him that “[n]othing exists outside nature and man.”41 In The Holy
Family and Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx's recognition of nature proceeds
entirely from this Feuerbachian premise that the human being is herself a part of the being of
nature, i.e., a natural being dependent upon nature.42 From this ontological premise, he also
seems to arrive at more or less the same essential conclusion as Feuerbach: namely, that
humanism is identical to naturalism.43
Although, it should also be noted, distinctions already begin to arise in 1844 precisely
over the meaning and significance of these 'Feuerbachian' expressions. Later, in 1845-46, these
distinctions form the break between philosophical and historical materialism. Yet, even
throughout his 'Feuerbachian' phase, and as early as 1843, Marx's enthusiastic reception of
philosophical materialism was at least privately tempered by certain (largely unelaborated)
“critical reservations.”44 At first, he tells Ruge that these “critical reservations” include the
problem which arises from Feuerbach focusing “too much on nature,” and too little on
“politics.”45 In 1845-46, he will add that Feuerbach actually failed to recognize that nature is
itself political. Nature in its historically modified form is always a politically-constituted
presence, an outcome of class society, i.e., of the given forms of property and modes of
41 Engels, Frederick, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, C.P. Dutt (ed.),
(International Publishers: New York; 1970), 18. In several works, Marx ridicules the “antics” of Bauer and/or Ruge,
referring to them as the “comedians” or the “Dottore Grazzianos” of post-Feuerbachian philosophy.
42 See, for example, Marx, Karl, 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole', The
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International
Publishers: New York; 2009), 180-82.
43 See Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The Holy Family: Or, Critique of Critical Critique, (Foreign
Languages Publishing: Moscow; 1956), 130. And see Marx, Karl, 'Estranged Labor', The Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 109,
112; Marx, Karl, 'Private Property and Communism', The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Martin
Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 135, 137,140-141, 145; Marx,
Karl, 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole', The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of
1844, Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 180-182.
44 Engels, Frederick, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, C.P. Dutt (ed.),
(International Publishers: New York; 1970), 18.
45 Marx to Ruge quoted in Bloch, Ernst, The Principle of Hope, (Blackwell Press: Cambridge; 1986), 258.
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production. Nature is itself a social product of human activity in its various forms, forms
determined by this or that stage of historical development. But Marx's unspoken “critical
reservations” in The Holy Family (and arguably still more in the earlier, but only posthumously
published, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts) seem to run much deeper than many
Marxologists suspect. In any case, if he subsequently rejected Feuerbachian materialism in 1845-
46 for its contemplative attitude, abstract concept of nature, and one-sided emphasis upon 'Man'
as a sensuous object, then it is already evident that by 1844 (that is, before his explicit break with
Feuerbach) Marx's standpoint is far more revolutionary, concept of nature more historical, and
philosophy of praxis already developed to such a degree that they all point beyond Feuerbach.
These 'critical reservations', implicitly present even within Marx's more overtly
Feuerbachian works, only happen to be obscured for some readers because of the continued use
of terms, concepts, and analogies derived from Feuerbach's writings. Marx and Engels referred
to this as the old “philosophical phraseology” which they later rejected, but only because it had
allowed the “German theoreticians” to misunderstand the “real trend” that they had already set
into motion in The Holy Family. However, it should be quite obvious that the way in which Marx
had employed these terms inherited partly from Feuerbach— e.g., species-being, humanism-
naturalism, alienation, sensuousness, etc.— differs in crucial ways from the use that they find in
the latter's writings. For example, as early as 1844, I will argue that Marx's use of 'sensuousness'
goes beyond the rather 'restricted' way in which Feuerbach conceived of the principle. Marx also
breaks with Feuerbach's conception of alienation because the only estrangement which he really
knows is religious estrangement. This part of the dissertation will also illustrate that the
conception in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of the unity between the humanization
of nature and naturalization of humanity— i.e., the identity of fully-developed humanism-as-
naturalism and of fully-developed naturalism-as-humanism— is completely inconsistent with
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Feuerbach's unhistorical emphasis upon the immediate identity between the natural conditions of
existence and the species-essence of 'Man'.
For these reasons, the Feuerbachian influence upon Marx's conception of nature and
critique of Bauer seems to have more or less culminated in, and then slowly subsided after, the
composition of The Holy Family. “How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception,” and
was initially “influenced by it, one may read in The Holy Family” wrote Engels.46 Marx had even
described the proposed work (to Feuerbach directly) as an explicit and open defence of
philosophical materialism against the “covert polemic” that Bauer had begun to launch in 1843
and 1844.47 Although he admitted at the time that “Feuerbach's discoveries...still required, for
their proof at least, a critical settling of accounts with philosophical dialectic[s],” Marx regarded
his own “exposition” in The Holy Family as just such a “proof.”48 While he dismissed Bauer's
“covert” criticism as itself “proof of how difficult it is for Germans to extricate themselves” from
the “one-sidedness” of idealism, he also informed Feuerbach that he and Engels wished to
“publish a small booklet [The Holy Family] attacking this aberration of [this] criticism,” adding
that it “would be of the greatest value to me if you would let me know in advance your
opinion.”49
Bauer's 'Charakteristik' and Marx’s Break with Feuerbachian Naturalism
However, in his 'Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs', an article published in the
Wigand'sche Vierteljahrrsschrift in 1845, Bauer quickly parried Marx's 'Critique of Critical
46 Engels, Frederick, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, C.P. Dutt (ed.),
(International Publishers: New York; 1970), 18.
47 Marx, Karl, 'To Ludwig Feuerbach, In Bruckberg. Paris; August 11, 1844.', Marx-Engels Collected Works,
Vol. III, (International Publishers: New York; 1975), 354-357.
48 Marx, Karl, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik
(ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), fn. 7, pp. 238.
49 Marx, Karl, 'To Ludwig Feuerbach, In Bruckberg. Paris; August 11, 1844.', Marx-Engels Collected Works,
Vol. III, (International Publishers: New York; 1975), 354-357.
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Criticism' in The Holy Family by rebuking it for adhering blindly to the “heresy” of
philosophical materialism: that is, for treating “nature” and natural necessity as a “force...in
individuals and over individuals.”50 In the same year, Stirner joined in by attacking Marx's
Feuerbachian humanism in his The Ego and its Own. According to Stirner, Feuerbachian 'Man'
and the 'generic species-being' of Marx are just as much theological abstractions as the
hypostatized Spirit which they criticize in Hegel.51 Virtually the whole of The German Ideology
is little more than a lengthy response to the charges laid by this “Leipzig Council” of “church
fathers.” Today, it is afforded a foundational status in the early Marx's canon, i.e., as the text in
which he breaks most decisively with Young Hegelianism and in which he formulates for the
first time the 'materialist conception of history'. There is indeed a great measure of truth and
powerful persuasiveness to this interpretation. Yet, when we situate it in its proper philosophic
context, the series of manuscripts now known as The German Ideology represent just a series of
rebuttals to Bauer and Stirner's criticisms of their earlier work in The Holy Family— not in the
sense that Marx and Engels uncritically defend every aspect of the latter, but, rather, in the sense
that they reformulate their position through continued critique.
Indeed, Marx himself referred to the two-volume octavo manuscripts “on ‘the German
ideology’”— which he and Engels later abandoned to the 'gnawing of the mice' since they had
achieved their main purpose of 'self-clarification'— as nothing but a “critique of modern German
philosophy as expounded by its representatives Feuerbach, B. Bauer and Stirner, and of German
socialism as expounded by its various prophets.”52 For instance, the famous chapter on
Feuerbach should be regarded as a still fragmentary and unfinished attempt to 'settle accounts'
50 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 111.
51 Stirner, Max, The Ego and its Own, Steven T. Byington (trans.), Tucker, Publishishing: New York; 1907),
106-107, 163.
52 Marx quoted in Carver, Terrell, ‘The German Ideology Never Took Place', History of Political Thought,
Vol. 31, 107-127.
32
with the so-called Feuerbachian dialectic in light of both Bauer's post-Holy Family criticisms of
Feuerbachian naturalism in the Charakteristik, and Stirner's critique of Marx's Feuerbachian
humanism in The Ego and its Own— not to mention Marx's own (until then unelaborated)
'critical reservations' about philosophical materialism. In the other portions of The German
Ideology (chapters II and III), Marx and Engels move on to directly address Bauer's
'Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs' and Stirner's Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum in greater
detail. In fact, it has been said that the chapter on 'Saint Sancho' is longer than Stirner's collected
works! This is all the more puzzling when contrasted with the general lack of interest in English-
language secondary literature in determining the relation between Stirner's The Ego and its Own
and the writing of The German Ideology. It is also clear that crucial sections from the
manuscripts on both Feuerbach and Bauer resonate with the analysis which Marx and Engels
very briefly outlined in the 1845 'Reply to Bruno Bauer's Anti-Critique' (which was also
published in the Wigand'sche Vierteljahrrsschrift as a response to Bauer's Charakteristik).
This is why I would suggest that The German Ideology be read as little more than a
lengthy repudiation of Stirner's The Ego and its Own, a defence against Bauer's 1845 counter-
critique of The Holy Family, and a still 'incomplete' elaboration of Marx’s reservations about
Feuerbachian materialism. As Carver notes, the first half of the manuscripts known today as The
German Ideology (i.e., the 'chapters' on Feuerbach and Bauer) arose out of “polemical critiques
of Bruno Bauer, a former intellectual associate of Marx’s.” “Bauer had concerned himself in a
recently published article (‘Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs’) with the political implications of
Feuerbach’s philosophy, and very briefly with the recently published work by Engels and Marx,
The Holy Family, which had been critical of him.”53 It was in and through these critiques that
what we now know as the 'materialist conception of history' was given expression for the first
53 Ibid., 107-127.
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time. In the manuscripts of 1845-46, Marx and Engels themselves explain this context of The
German Ideology in the following tale.
In the third volume of the Wigand'sche Vierteljahrrsschrift for 1845 [where Bauer
published his 'Charakteristik' against Feuerbach] the battle of the Huns...actually takes
place...But the battle is not over earthly things. The holy war is being waged not over
protective tariffs, the constitution, potato blight, banking affairs and railways, but in the
name of the most sacred interests of the spirit, in the name of “substance,” “self-
consciousness,” “criticism,” the “unique” and the “true man.” We are attending a
council of church fathers. Here, first of all, is Saint Bruno, who is easily recognised by
his stick...His head is crowned with a halo of “pure criticism” and full of contempt for
this world, he wraps himself up in his “self-consciousness”...Opposite him stands Saint
Max, whose services to the Kingdom of God consist in asserting that he has established
and proved— on approximately 600 printed pages— his identity, that he is not just
anyone, not some “Tom, Dick or Harry,” but precisely Saint Max...These two grand
masters of the Holy Inquisition summon the heretic Feuerbach, who has to defend
himself against the grave charge of gnosticism. The heretic Feuerbach, “thunders” Saint
Bruno, is in possession of the hyle, substance, and refuses to hand it over...Self-
consciousness has to wander like a ghost until it has taken back into itself all things
which arise from it and flow into it. It has already swallowed this whole world, except
for this hyle, substance, which gnostic Feuerbach keeps under lock and key. Saint Marx
accuses the gnostic of doubting the dogma revealed by the mouth of Saint Max
himself...Beside the hearing of these important indictments, sentence is also pronounced
in the case brought by the two saints against Moses Hess and in the case brought by
Bauer against the authors of Die heilige Familie. But as these accused have been
busying themselves with “worldly affairs” and, therefore, have failed to appear before
the Santa Casa, they are sentenced in their absence to eternal banishment from the realm
of the spirit for the term of their natural life.54
According to Moggach, Bauer, whose thought had taken a decidedly 'Fichtean turn' in the
1845 'Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs', charged “Feuerbach's [and therefore Marx's]
materialism” with reproducing the same problematic “form of immanence” as Spinoza's
Substance and Schelling's nature philosophy.55 Others, such as Breckman, have actually traced
this Fichteanism within Bauer's philosophy of self-consciousness back to as early as 1841. In any
case, Bauer certainly argues in the 1845 Charakteristik that Feuerbach concedes too much
ground to nature as 'substance', and never pays the rightful dues owed to self-consciousness as a
spiritual subject. This is why Bauer summoned the “heretic Feuerbach” before the “Holy
54 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 103-
105.
55 Moggach, Douglas, The Philosophy and Politics of Bruno Bauer, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge;
2003), 44-45.
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Inquisition” of the “Leipzig Council,” and charged Marx, Engels, and Hess in absentia. This
Spinozist substance or Aristotelian hyle without predicates is just a theoretical hobgoblin, but
Marx and Engels observe in the above that it really does frighten Bauer's equally ghostly self-
consciousness. Just as the empty and indeterminate I=I of Fichte sought to subsume within itself
the antinomies raised by the Critical Philosophy of Kant, Marx and Engels suggest that Bauer
only wants Feuerbach to relinquish the 'Substance' that he has kept “under lock and key” so that
his own abstract idea of self-consciousness can finally consume it. This is why they complain
that Bauer's 1845 piece only “characterises” Feuerbach as the “knight of 'substance'” so that his
own principle of “'self-consciousness' shall stand out in stronger relief.”56
As Bauer himself explains in his typical either-or way in the 'Charakteristik Ludwig
Feuerbachs', because Hegel’s attempt to overcome the contradictions of the Critical Philosophy
of Kant and to synthesize the one-sided idealisms of Fichte and Schelling had failed, philosophy
had to once again choose between either (Bauer’s) Subject or (Feuerbach’s) Substance.
Hegel combined into one Spinoza's substance and Fichte's ego; the unity of both, the
combination of these opposing spheres, etc., constitutes the peculiar interest but, at the
same time, the weakness of Hegel's philosophy...This contradiction into which the
Hegelian system was entangled had to be resolved...Either self-consciousness had to be
burned up again in the flames of substance [as in Feuerbach's naturalism]...or it had to
be shown that personality is the creator of its own attributes and essence [i.e., as in
Bauer's own newfound Fichteanism].57
In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels argue that Bauer is here merely parodying their own
views expressed a year earlier in The Holy Family. There, they had already “represented
Hegelian philosophy as a union of Spinoza and Fichte” and, at the same time, “emphasised” the
56 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 106-
107.
57 Bauer's 'Charakteristik' quoted in Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including
Theses on Feuerbach and the Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur (trans.), (Prometheus
Books: New York; 1998), 107.
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unresolved “contradiction involved” in this unity.58 In Hegel's philosophy, they wrote in The
Holy Family, “there are three elements, Spinoza’s Substance, Fichte’s Self-Consciousness and
Hegel’s necessarily antagonistic unity of the two, the Absolute Spirit.” However, in contrast to
Bauer, The Holy Family had presented this as a “dispute within Hegelian speculation,” not a
problem for world-history. Marx regards Spinoza’s Substance and Fichte’s Subject, and Hegel’s
reconciliation between the two, as a trinity of abstractions. The first is“nature separated from
man,” the second is “spirit separated from nature,” and the third is just the “metaphysically
disguised unity of both” as separated from their real unity.59 Thus, “unlike the authors of Die
heilige Familie,” Bauer's treatment in the Charakteristik does not regard this
question of the relation of self-consciousness to substance as “a point of controversy
within Hegelian speculation,” but as a world-historic, even an absolute question. This is
58 Ibid., 107.
59 “A few quotations will show that by overcoming Spinozism Criticism ended up in Hegelian idealism, that
from “Substance” it arrived at another metaphysical monster, the “Subject”…Bauer’s self-consciousness, too, is
Substance raised to self-consciousness or self-consciousness as Substance; self-consciousness is transformed from
an attribute of man into a self-existing subject. This is the metaphysical-theological caricature of man in his
severance from nature. The being of this self-consciousness is therefore not man, but the idea of which self-
consciousness is the real existence...All human qualities are thus transformed in a mysterious way into qualities of
imaginary “infinite self-consciousness”...The dispute between Strauss and Bauer over Substance and Self-
Consciousness is a dispute within Hegelian speculation. In Hegel there are three elements, Spinoza’s Substance,
Fichte’s Self-Consciousness and Hegel’s necessarily antagonistic unity of the two, the Absolute Spirit. The first
element is metaphysically disguised nature separated from man; the second is metaphysically disguised spirit
separated from nature; the third is the metaphysically disguised unity of both, real man and the real human species.
Within the domain of theology, Strauss expounds Hegel from Spinoza’s point of view, and Bauer does so from
Fichte’s point of view, both quite consistently. They both criticised Hegel insofar as with him each of the two
elements was falsified by the other, whereas they carried each of these elements to its one-sided and hence consistent
development. Both of them therefore go beyond Hegel in their criticism, but both also remain within his speculation
and each represents only one side of his system. Feuerbach, who completed and criticised Hegel from Hegel’s point
of view by resolving the metaphysical Absolute Spirit into “real man on the basis of nature,” was the first to
complete the criticism of religion by sketching in a grand and masterly manner the basic features of the criticism of
Hegel’s speculation and hence of all metaphysics. With Herr Bauer it is, admittedly, no longer the Holy Ghost, but
nevertheless infinite self-consciousness that dictates the writings of the evangelist...Self-consciousness distinguishes
nothing real from itself. The world is, rather, only a metaphysical distinction, a phantom of its ethereal brain and an
imaginary product of the latter. Hence self-consciousness does away again with the appearance, which it conceded
for a moment, that something exists outside of it, and it recognises in what it has “produced” no real object, i.e., no
object which in reality, is distinct from it. By this movement, however, self-consciousness first produces itself as
absolute, for, the absolute idealist, in order to be an absolute idealist, must necessarily constantly go through the
sophistical process of first transforming the world outside himself into an appearance, a mere fancy of his brain, and
afterwards declaring this fantasy to be what it really is, i.e., a mere fantasy, so as finally to be able to proclaim his
sole, exclusive existence, which is no longer disturbed even by the semblance of an external world.” Engels,
Frederick, and Marx, Karl, 'The Holy Family: Or Critique of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno Bauer and Company',
Marx-Engels Collected Works, Vol. 4, (International Publishers: New York; 1975), 137-140.
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the sole form in which he is capable of expressing the conflicts of the present day. He
really believes that the triumph of [his own concept of] self-consciousness over
[Feuerbach's concept of] substance has a most essential influence not only on European
equilibrium but also on the whole further development of the Oregon problem. As to the
extent to which the abolition of the Corn Laws in England depends on it, very little has
so far transpired...Consequently, on the one hand, instead of real people...he has the
mere abstract expression: self-consciousness...On the other hand, instead of real
nature...substance.60
The surreptitious substitution of Spinoza's “substance” for “real nature” and of Fichte's
“self-consciousness” for “real people,” and, along with it, the belief that this philosophic
“controversy within Hegelian speculation” has anything to do with the real contradictions and
“conflicts of the present”— this is precisely what plagues the whole of Bauer's philosophy
according to Marx. Going over the same theme in The Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and
Philosophy as a Whole, he wrote of how Bauer's writings “still remain wholly within the
confines of the Hegelian Logic” for his “expressions do not even show any verbal divergence
from the Hegelian approach, but on the contrary repeat it word for word.” At most, Bauer’s
philosophy merely “replaces the substance of 'abstract nature'” advanced by Feuerbach with “the
'self-consciousness' of abstract man” which he himself advances.61 Marx tells us that this is
because Bauer, a “theological critic” for whom it is “quite natural that everything has to be done
by philosophy,” is completely content if he can merely demonstrate this or that “'moment' in
Hegel to be lacking in Feuerbach.”62
Indeed, the essence of Bauer's 1845 response to The Holy Family in the Charakteristik is
that the 'moment' of subjectivity is missing in Feuerbach's (and therefore Marx's) materialism.
Philosophical materialism and its conception of nature are confined by the indeterminacy of an
60 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 108.
61 Marx, Karl, 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole', The Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 170-
171.
62 Marx, Karl, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik
(ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), fn. 5, pp. 237.
37
“undifferentiated” substantiality and false universal, i.e., it is a “mysteriously” presented
dialectic incapable of explaining how it is “taken up or internalised by individual self-
consciousness.”63 He writes that “self-consciousness” is instead the “true universal” because it
sublates nature in mediated fashion, in that it ennobles it in its spiritual
existence...makes it the bearer of moral determinations; or it sets the law in motion so
that nature is drawn out of the crudity of its immediate appearance...[I]n art it elevates
the natural determinateness through form to an expression of spirit and its infinity.
Compared with this struggle with the properties of nature, with industry and art— what
can miracles signify? What comparison can there be? The expression of rash impatience,
which wants to see immediately at hand what is only given to labour and
exertion....Self-consciousness is the death of nature, but in the sense that in this death
itself it first brings about the immanent recognition of nature and its laws. Spirit
ennobles, honours, and recognises even that which it negates. If it wanted to negate
violently and externally a power whose ideality it is, it would ruin itself, for it would
destroy an essential moment of itself. Spirit does not rant, rage, rave, and roar against
nature, as it would do in miracles, in this denial of its immanent laws; but it works
through the law and brings it to consciousness. Through this certainly difficult labour it
attains a new representation, a form which it does not have in its natural immediacy. In
short, the death of nature in self-consciousness is its transfigured resurrection, but not
the maltreatment, derision and slandering of nature which it must experience in
miracles.64
This is a deeply insightful passage from a thinker who, if we accepted every aspect of Marx's
polemic against him, would be left unread. What this means, and Bauer is surely in the right here,
is that “Feuerbach's naturalism remains alien to history” for it cannot conceive of how 'substance'
is related to the subjective side of the famous Hegelian syllogism.65 In other words, the
Feuerbachian emphasis upon “natural immediacy,” or upon the passive and immediate unity
between naturalism and humanism, excludes the active transformation of this relationship
between humanity and nature in history. It ignores what Bauer refers to here as the “difficult
labour” of the “art and industry” which has historically reshaped nature into a “representation” of
itself. And the “crudity” of nature's “immediate appearance” is, after all, not something with
which self-consciousness can remain satisfied.
To be sure, there are definite parallels between Bauer's 1845 critique of, and Marx's 1846
63 Moggach, Douglas, The Philosophy and Politics of Bruno Bauer, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge;
2003), 44-45.
64 Quoted from Bauer's Charakteristik in ibid., 176.
65 Ibid., 141.
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break with, Feuerbachian materialism. As Megill notes, Marx retained elements of Bauer's
philosophical worldview even after his criticism of it.66 It is labour, industry, and art, insists
Bauer, which continually transforms nature and stamps it in the image of human civilization. In
his own subsequent critique of Feuerbach, Marx would make very much the same point by
contrasting the “pasture lands and swamps” during the time of the Campagna with the Augustan
“vineyards and villas” that once dominated the landscape, and with the factories of 19th century
Manchester. Nowhere in all this, he concluded, can we find anything resembling Feuerbach's
static conception of external nature.67 And when Bauer suggests that the Hegelian/Fichtean
'moment' of subjectivity is absent from the Feuerbachian dialectic, Marx actually concedes the
point elsewhere. In the Theses on Feuerbach, he identifies the central “defect” of philosophical
materialism as its exclusion of the historically “active side,” the “subjective” side, developed
until then (albeit only “abstractly” according to Marx) by idealism from Hegel to Bauer.68 Bauer
is certainly on to something, then, when he claims that nature is “sublate[d]” by the mediating
powers of human industry and human ingenuity, i.e., that labour works through the laws of
nature and ennobles them by realizing its own ends. Following Bauer, Marx even referred to this
possibility of mastering necessity and humanizing nature as the 'resurrection' of nature (an
allusion to the final passage from Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature).69 Marx, just as much as Bauer
then, rejected Feuerbach's treatment of the heteronomy of natural necessity as an insuperable
66 Megill, Alan, Karl Marx: The Burden of Reason (Why Marx Rejected Politics and the Market), (Rowman
and Littlefield: Oxford; 2002), 116.
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68 Marx, Karl, 'Theses on Feuerbach', Selected Writings, Simon H. Lawrence (ed.), (Hackett Publishing:
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“force” that could not be humanized.70
As Struik observes, from at least 1845 onward, Marx begins to object to Feuerbach's
“abstract humanism” and “unhistorical anthropology” because it disconnects nature and
humanity from “specific social conditions [which are] historically determined.”71 Marx's
problem with Feuerbachian materialism, as Struik elaborates it, is that the human is only
conceived of as a “species-being in nature and not in a social setting.”72 The species-essence of
Feuerbachian Man is 'at home' with itself only in the purely natural conditions of existence, and
not as a product of history. For this reason, both Bauer and Marx reject Feuerbach's anti-
Hegelian emphasis upon the immediate identity between essence and existence. Instead, they
recognized a more actively mediated relation that is only realized in and through human history.
For instance, both Bauer and Marx take exception in 1845-46 to the following passage from
Feuerbach's Principles of the Philosophy of the Future:
That which is my essence is my being. The being of the fish is its being in water, and
from this you cannot separate its essence. Only in human life does it happen, but even
here only in abnormal and unfortunate cases, that being is separated from essence; only
here does it happen that a man's essence is not where his being is...But all beings,
excepting cases contrary to nature, are glad to be where and what they are; this means
their essence is not separated from their being and their beings is not separated from
their essence.73
Forgetting the Aristotelian principle that the true 'nature' of a thing is to be found only in
its final form of development, Feuerbach would have us barter away the oak tree for the acorn as
an exchange of equivalents. Feuerbachianism reveals itself here as a shallow sort of identity-
philosophy, a simple materialistic inversion of the most monochromatic Naturphilosophie— a
'Schelling in reverse' indeed. Moreover, he falls into a fetishistic fallacy of sense-certainty which
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naturalizes all socially- and historically-determined phenomena precisely by equating species-
being with immediate being, essence with the given form of existence. Admittedly, a particular
human being is sometimes “separated” from the universal “essence” of the species, but these are
all “unfortunate cases” for Feuerbach, i.e, exceptional cases “contrary to nature.” Commenting
on this passage, Marx explains that while Feuerbach occasionally “lights on things which
contradict” and “disturb” his presupposition about the immediate “harmony of all parts of the
sensuous world and especially of man and nature,” he subsequently “remove[s] this disturbance”
by taking “refuge” in a “higher” perception. This is what it means to say that Feuerbach regards
both the human being, and the being of nature more generally, from an abstract or contemplative
attitude.74
This all amounts to an “acceptance and at the same time misunderstanding of existing
reality,” according to Marx and Engels, because it identifies “existence” with “essence” in such a
way that “every exception is expressly conceived as an unhappy chance, an an abnormality
which cannot be altered.” The practical or political implications of Feuerbach's equation of these
Hegelian categories were quite obvious for Marx: viz., if “millions of proletarians feel by no
means contented with their living conditions,” the “discontented” should suffer “quietly.”75 Geras
therefore points to the passage below from The German Ideology as an illustration of how Marx's
concept of “essential human needs” and of a historically-realized human nature differs
fundamentally from Feuerbach's abstract naturalism and ahistorical humanism.76
[T]herefore when, for example, he sees instead of healthy men a crowd of scrofulous,
overworked and consumptive starvelings, he is compelled to take refuge in the “higher
perception” and in the ideal “compensation in the species,” and thus to relapse into
idealism at the very point where the communist materialist sees the necessity, and at the
very same time the condition, of a transformation both of industry and of the social
74 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
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structure.77
Hence, this lack of “correspond[ence]” between “essence” and “existence” in the case of
estranged labour— which, for Marx, was by no means an “exception,” “abnormality,” or
“unhappy chance,” but just the systematic working-out of the law of capital itself— this lack of
“correspond[ence]” can only be replaced with “harmony” through a social “revolution” which
abolishes the actual conditions of alienation and overcomes the contradictions of capitalism.78
Instead of accepting the need for a definite revolution in the conditions of life, Feuerbach,
whenever he encounters contradictions which undermine his presupposition about the harmony
between essence and existence, flees from his sense-certainty and takes shelter in a Kant-like
'ideal compensation' in the species-being in general. It is a view which actually reaffirms the
specialized division of labour characteristic only of capitalism, and justifies the fragmentation of
the individual within modern society.
Here, however, is precisely where the continuities between Bauer and Marx's critiques of
Feuerbach also cease. Bauer's rhetoric in the previous passage about the “true universal” as the
“labour” of “industry and art”— which, while working through the “immanent laws” of nature,
“sublates nature” and “ennobles it”— ultimately stands in direct contradiction to his views on the
real process of production and situation of the actual wage-labourer— whom he dismisses
altogether as the most extreme expression of the pure “particularity” of class-interests. According
to Moggach, Bauer felt that the working-class, being bound to such particularity, would prove
absolutely incapable of overcoming the contingent determinations of “natural immediacy.”79 In
the 'Charakteristik', he argues that the paltry concerns of the proletarian consciousness (i.e., this
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'consciousness' of nothing but their animal needs) are proof enough that it “confronts only brute
nature” in its lower dialectic of mere life, whereas, in the higher dialectic afforded to the critic,
we find that genuinely “free self-consciousness belongs only to [the] intellectual creation” that
attains spiritual self-certainty and purity through the “death of nature.”80
This just means, Marx interjects, that the whole of nature for Bauer is “swallowed up in
'self-consciousness',” for, in the “place of the real production” of “life,” he “puts the religious
production of ideas.”81 In an 1844 letter to Feuerbach, Marx insisted that this sort of “criticism
thus regards itself as the only active element in history” and the “whole of humanity [is presented]
as a mass, an inert mass, which has value only as the antithesis of intellect.”82 Marx and Engels
quote Bauer’s own words in their ‘Reply to Bruno Bauer’s Anti-Critique’: Bauer regards the
“destruction and creation of criticism” as the “only historical force.” The “critic and only the
critic has smashed religion in its entirety and the state in its various manifestations.”83 Repeating
the same point elsewhere the year earlier, Marx wrote that this form of uncritical “criticism, in its
spiritual pride,” has replaced all “dogmatic antitheses” with a “single dogmatic antithesis:” viz.,
it has “reduced the whole process of history to the relation between the rest of the world and
itself,” to the contradiction between its “own cleverness and the stupidity of the world.”84 The
working “masses” that have really remade nature through industry and labour never attain any
“recognition” for it in Bauer's dialectic; instead, they remain forever “stuck in the muck of
'substance'” that the 'Critical Critic' has himself long since superseded and left behind in the
80 Quoted from Bauer's Charakteristik, see ibid., 176.
81 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
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prehistory of German philosophy.85
Needless to say, when the Holy Father himself feels the pangs of “hunger,” satirized
Marx and Engels, even he has to climb down from these “Olympian” heights in order to satisfy
that nature-given “need.”86 Even he will find that natural necessity, when unmastered and
unsatisfied, operates as a Feuerbachian force in and over individuals. In The German Ideology,
Marx and Engels elaborate that this
personified criticism, criticism as a subject, is precisely that 'critical criticism' against
which Die heilige Familie was directed. 'Criticism and the critics, as long as they have
existed, have guided and made history'. It is clear that they could not do so 'as long as
they' did not 'exist', and it is equally clear that 'as long as they have existed' they 'made
history' in their own fashion...Hence it seems that Saint Bruno himself came 'into the
world, from the world, and to the world' through 'criticism', i.e., by generatio aequivoca.
All this is, perhaps, merely another interpretation of the following passage from the
Book of Genesis: And Adam knew, i.e., criticised, Eve his wife; and she conceived.87
Between 1843 and 1846, Marx's writings display a distinct concern with trying to bring criticism
down from Bauer's “Olympian” heights by returning the dialectic to a truly earthly plane. And, in
this endeavour, they were aided by Feuerbach.
“Criticism” is transformed [by Bauer] into a transcendental being. These Berliners do
not regard themselves as men who criticise, but as critics who, incidentally, have the
misfortune of being men. They therefore acknowledge only one real need, the need of
theoretical criticism. People like Proudhon are therefore accused of having made some
“practical” “need” their point of departure. This criticism therefore lapses into a sad and
supercilious intellectualism. Consciousness or self-consciousness is regarded as the only
human quality...This criticism thus regards itself as the only active element in
history…Thus Bauer says literally: “The critic should participate neither in the
sufferings nor in the joys of society; he should know neither friendship and love, nor
hate and envy; he should be enthroned in a solitude, where only the laughter of the
Olympian Gods over the topsy-turviness of the world resounds occasionally from his
lips”...He only exposes contradictions and, satisfied with this occupation, he departs
with a contemptuous “Hm”. He declares that criticism does not give anything, it is far
too spiritual for that.88
Thus, in contrast to Feuerbach, who was later criticized by Marx for prioritizing natural
necessity in its abstract independence from human activity, Bauer is criticized here for
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prioritizing self-consciousness in its abstraction from nature. If the first culminates in an 'abstract
identity' between human and nature, we will read Marx and Engels explain that the latter
establishes an equally 'abstract antithesis' between history and nature. But both Bauer and
Feuerbach, despite moving in opposite directions philosophically, effectively circled back to the
same practical conclusion when it came to the question of working-class emancipation. Bauer's
critical criticism highlights “contradictions,” but, refusing to “participate” in the struggle to
abolish them, returns instead to its “Olympian” heights. Feuerbach's identity between immediate
existence and essence treats all political, social, economic, etc., “contradictions” as if they were
“inevitable abnormalities” produced by the otherwise consistent laws of nature, and from this
antagonism he flees into the refuge of a higher perception. Marx and Engels claim in the below
that this “does not essentially differ from the consolation which Saint Max Stirner offers to the
discontented,” and it “differs just as little from Saint Bruno’s.”
Feuerbach’s acceptance and at the same time misunderstanding of existing reality,
which he still shares with our opponents...[is to be found in] the passage in the
Philosophie der Zukunft where he develops the view that the existence of a thing or a
man is at the same time its or his essence, that the conditions of existence, the mode of
life and activity of an animal or human individual are those in which its “essence” feels
itself satisfied...The “essence” of the fish is its “being,” water— to go no further than
this one proposition...But the latter ceases to be the “essence” of the fish and is no
longer a suitable medium of existence as soon as the river is made to serve industry, as
soon as it is polluted by dyes and other waste products and navigated by steamboats, or
as soon as its water is diverted into canals where simple drainage can deprive the fish of
its medium of existence. The explanation that all such contradictions are inevitable
abnormalities does not essentially differ from the consolation which Saint Max Stirner
offers to the discontented...It differs just as little from Saint Bruno’s allegation that these
unfortunate circumstances are due to the fact that those concerned are stuck in the muck
of “substance,” have not advanced to “absolute self-consciousness and do not realise
that these adverse conditions are spirit of their spirit”...The millions of proletarians and
communists, however, think differently and will prove this in time, when they bring
their “existence” into harmony with their “essence” in a practical way, by means of a
revolution. Feuerbach, therefore, never speaks of the world of man in such cases, but
always takes refuge in external nature, and moreover in nature which has not yet been
subdued by men.89
In The Concept of Nature in Marx, the stated “aim” of Schmidt's first chapter is to
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provide his readers with an “analysis of the real connection [and distinction] between Marxist
materialism and [Feuerbach's] philosophical materialism.”90 This is because he suspects, not
without justice, that the whole “question of Marx's concept of nature necessarily extends
outwards to the question of the relationship between the materialist conception of history and
philosophical materialism in general.”91 This is true. Although it is just as true that the whole
question of the relationship between historical and philosophical materialism necessarily returns
inward to the question of the relationship between their respective conceptions of nature. More
precisely put, the very origins of Marx's “materialist conception of history” can be traced back to
this critical confrontation with Feuerbach's unhistorical conception of nature. While the
appropriation of Feuerbach's naturalism informed Marx's initial break with Bauer and the Young
Hegelians, only with the critique of philosophical materialism does he complete the transition
into what we now know as historical materialism. Only through the critique of Feuerbach's
abstract naturalism was it possible to develop a truly 'scientific' analysis of history, just as only
through the critique of Feuerbach's ahistorical humanism and abstract concept of species-being
was it possible to develop a revolutionary political theory and radical philosophy of praxis.
This in no way diminishes the impact of Feuerbach upon Marx's early intellectual
development. Rather, Marx only went 'beyond' Feuerbach by moving 'through' Feuerbach. The
road to science passed through the 'brook of fire'.92 Marx overcomes the limitations of
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Feuerbachian naturalism, and, at the same time, reappropriates the Hegelian dialectic on this
transformed basis; but he does so in such a way that he retains crucial insights from this
superseded (albeit nonetheless necessary) Feuerbachian moment, or 'intermediary' phase, in his
process of self-clarification. Even the text which most explicitly and most fully expresses the
distance which has grown between Marx and Feuerbach, The German Ideology, retains aspects
of Feuerbach's critique of religion and philosophy, his critico-genetic method, and his concept of
'inversion'. If anything, Marx has only completed the 'materialist turn' in German philosophy
which Feuerbach initiated before him.
As Carver acknowledges, the short section and fragmentary outline of the critique of
Feuerbach in the manuscripts of 1845-46 is for that reason seemingly more interesting than the
other portions of The German Ideology because it points beyond a “purely negative criticism.”93
As Boer argues, in The German Ideology the critique of Feuerbach is “far more favourable” to its
intended target than the other major sections of the work, i.e., where Marx and Engels merely
“dispense with Bauer and Stirner.” Throughout the work, they continue to employ a “central idea
from Feuerbach— the inversion.” In their critique of philosophical materialism in The German
Ideology, they acknowledge precisely where they appropriate Feuerbach, regarding him as
superior still to Bauer, Stirner, and Ruge, as well as the purely mechanical materialists of the 17th
and 18th centuries.
However, while it is true that Feuerbach is not given the same “sustained and unrelenting
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criticism” as Stirner and Bauer, it would be going much too far to conclude, as Boer does, that
“Feuerbach receives more praise than criticism” in The German Ideology!94 Incidentally, he
suggests that because Marx and Engels only praise Feuerbach, and only criticize Stirner and
Bauer, scholars frequently reference the short 'chapter' on Feuerbach, but refuse to wade into the
long-winded polemics in the subsequent sections, regarding Marx's relation to Bauer and Stirner
as unimportant. Boer is absolutely right about how Marx's relation to Bauer and Stirner is usually
treated in secondary literature. He is also right that this interpretative tendency is reinforced by
the contrast in form between Marx's more even-handed appraisal of Feuerbach and his outright
polemical attacks on Bauer or Stirner (which fail to acknowledge his real debt to them, especially
to Bauer). However, Boer is mistaken about the absence of a critique of Feuerbach in The
German Ideology. Perhaps, he arrives at this conclusion from being focused exclusively upon the
process by which Marx and Engels transformed Feuerbach's critique of religion into the 'critique
of the earth', applying Feuerbach's method of 'inversion' to politics, economics, and history.
However, when we actually turn our attention to those specific questions about politics,
economics, and history, and to the question of nature in connection with them all— that is, when
we turn our attention precisely to Marx's 'critique of the earth'— we find that Feuerbach has
already been left behind.
As Engels tells us years later after having “once again ferreted out and looked over the
old manuscript of 1845-6,” one of the reasons why the section on Feuerbach contains so little in
comparison with the much lengthier portions on Stirner and Bauer is because the “section
dealing with Feuerbach is not completed.” However, Boer's view that Feuerbach receives more
praise than criticism is unfortunately reinforced by another passing remark by Engels. According
to Engels, not only was the critique of Feuerbach 'incomplete', the manuscript “contains no
94 Boer, Roland, The Criticism of the Earth: Marx, Engels and Theology, (Brill: Boston; 2012), 70.
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criticism of Feuerbach’s doctrine” whatsoever (emphasis added)!95 Of course, both Boer and
Engels are mistaken. Even a cursory examination of the text shows precisely where he and Marx
broke with Feuerbach’s philosophical materialism. They went beyond the anthropological
abstraction of Feuerbachian 'Man' and beyond the unmediated naturalism with which it
corresponded. They broke decisively with Feuerbach's contemplative materialism and
unhistorical emphasis upon the immediate identity between essence and existence. As I will
argue later, they rejected the 'restricted' and one-sided way in which Feuerbach conceived of
'sensuousness' by ignoring the transformative powers of praxis and of 'sensuous activity'. And
they therefore refused to lapse back into the refuge of a higher perception and ideal
compensation in the species. In the end, Feuerbach was not a historian insofar as he was a
materialist, and he was not a materialist insofar as he was a historian— which is to say, he was
not a historical materialist.
Hence, it is not that Feuerbach has undergone no criticism whatsoever (as Boer following
Engels suggests). Rather, what has happened in the fragmentary text is just this: viz., that Marx
and Engels continue to appropriate Feuerbach in their critiques of Bauer, but, through critique,
also move beyond Feuerbach. Marx’s uncritical reception of Feuerbach represented an
intermediary phase in his overall process of self-clarification. Thereafter, he returns to Hegel
from a new standpoint mediated by this superseded Feuerbachian moment. Bloch actually does a
very good job summarizing this period of clarification/critique in The Principle of Hope by
emphasizing the key elements in both Marx's appropriation and rejection of Feuerbach. At the
same time, Bloch rightly observes that these elements which, in 1845-46, constitute the breaking
point between Marx and Feuerbach, were already present in 1843-44 in an implicit and
95 Engels, Frederick, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, C.P. Dutt (ed.),
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undertheorized form. Even while Marx 'enthusiastically greeted' the new conception ushered into
German philosophy by Feuerbach, he entertained many 'critical reservations' which would later
boil up to the surface.
[L]ooking back at it around fifty years later...[Engels argued that] 'we were all
momentarily Feuerbachians'. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new interpretation,
and how greatly— despite all critical reservations— he was influenced by it, we can
read in ‘The Holy Family’...Meanwhile Marx very soon detached himself from this all
too vague humanness...The separation from Feuerbach occurred with respect and in the
first place as a correction or even as a mere amendment, but the totally different, social
viewpoint is clear from the beginning. On 13th March 1843 Marx thus writes to Ruge:
‘For me Feuerbach’s aphorisms are only incorrect on one point, he refers too much to
nature and too little to politics'...The ‘Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts’...contain
another significant celebration of Feuerbach, admittedly as a contrast to the
woolgathering of Bruno Bauer; they praise above all among Feuerbach’s achievements
the ‘foundation of true materialism and of real science, in that Feuerbach likewise
makes the relationship between ‘'man and man” into the fundamental principle of his
theory’...But the ‘Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts’ are already a lot further
beyond Feuerbach than they declare. The relationship between ‘man and man’ in them
does not remain an abstract anthropological one at all, as it does in Feuerbach, instead
the critique of human self-alienation (transferred from religion to the state [in Marx's
1843 Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right]) already penetrates to the economic heart
of the alienation process...The breakthrough to political economy, i.e. away from
Feuerbach’s general idea of man, is accomplished in the first work undertaken in
collaboration with Engels, in ‘The Holy Family’, likewise in 1844, [in] the ‘Economic
and Philosophic Manuscripts’…[N]othing more of Feuerbachian humanness remains
here than its negation in capitalism...Instead of Feuerbachian generic man, with his
abstract naturalness which always remains the same, a historically changing ensemble
of social relationships now clearly appeared and above all: one that is antagonistic in
class terms...Marx was a materialist at the latest from 1843 onwards; ‘The Holy Family’
gave birth to the materialist interpretation of history in 1844, and with it scientific
socialism. And the ‘Eleven Theses’, produced between ‘The Holy Family’ of 1844/45
and ‘The German Ideology’ of 1845/46, thus represent the formulated departure from
Feuerbach, together with a highly original entry into a new original inheritance...As is
self-evident, the departure here is not a complete break. References to Feuerbach run
through large parts of Marx’s work, even after the departure of the ‘Eleven Theses’.
Closest to the abandoned land, if only for chronological reasons, stands ‘The German
Ideology’ which directly followed the theses...‘The German Ideology’ fundamentally
begins with the name of Feuerbach and criticizes, starting out from his critique of
religion, the simply inner idealistic ‘conquering’ of idealism...However, Marx stresses
on the other hand that Feuerbach ‘is to be greatly preferred to the “pure” materialists in
that he realizes that man is also a “sensory object.” In fact, the recognition cited above
indicates the importance of Feuerbach for the early development of Marxism just as
much as the critique of his abstract, ahistorical notion of the human being indicates the
un- and indeed anti-Feuerbachian character of fully developed Marxism itself. The
recognition states: without man equally being [recognized as] a ‘sensory object’ [by
Feuerbach], it would have been much more difficult [for Marx] to have worked out
human activity materialistically as the root of all social things. Feuerbach’s
anthropological materialism thus marks the facilitated possible transition from mere
mechanical to historical materialism.96
96 Bloch, Ernst, The Principle of Hope, Vol. I (Blackwell Press: Cambridge; 1986), 258.
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Bauer, Feuerbach, and Marx on Sensuousness
In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels abandon aspects of their earlier criticism of
Bauer (found in The Holy Family) because they now reject the Feuerbachian materialism upon
which it was based. The fallacy of philosophical naturalism is that it treats the objectivity of
nature as something independent of human activity, and thereby raises natural necessity into an
insuperable barrier. This was precisely Bauer’s criticism of Feuerbach in the Wigand'sche
Vierteljahrrsschrift. However, the activity which Marx and Engels had in mind was the objective
activity of real labour, not the empty theorizing of critical criticism. And, in contrast to Bauer,
they actually accepted in a qualified manner the Feuerbachian premise that the “force” of nature
is something which operates “in individuals and over individuals”— hence, why it must be
satisfied by labour, and not, like Feuerbach, idealistically posited in its abstract “independence.”
But Bauer commits the opposite error. He conceives of self-consciousness in its abstract
“independence” from nature and does not regard necessity as a “force” at all. As we have seen,
this is why Marx and Engels refute his polemic against the so-called 'particularity' of the
working-class. It is not only the wage-worker who is stuck in the 'muck' of the sensuousness of
nature; even the Holy Father himself experiences hunger as a force in the pit of his belly.
[A]s though, in our day, every inclination, every impulse, every need did not assert itself
as a force “in the individual and over the individual,” whenever circumstances hinder
their satisfaction. If the holy father Bruno experiences hunger, for example, without the
means of appeasing it, then even his stomach will become a force “in him and over
him.” Feuerbach's mistake is not that he stated this fact but that in idealistic fashion he
endowed it with independence instead of regarding it as the product of a definite and
surmountable stage of historical development [emphasis added].97
Instead of recognizing this “priority of external nature” in the 'Charakteristik Ludwig
Feuerbachs', Bauer, in his “hatred” toward the “sensuous world,” represented all of the forces of
97 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998),111.
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nature in the simple “shape of a 'stick'.”98 “Sensuousness,” mocked Marx and Engels in both the
'Reply to Bruno Bauer's Anti-Critique' and again in the The German Ideology, “do you know,
unfortunate one, what sensuousness is [to the Critical Critic]? Sensuousness is— a 'stick'.”99 At
least Feuerbach had gone so far as to recognize that the human being is a natural, objective, and
sensuous being, dependent, even in the last instance, upon the objects of nature for the
satisfaction of its own needs.100 In this respect, Bauer had merely fallen behind, and had by no
means gone beyond, Feuerbachian naturalism in his 1845 article. In fact, he ultimately
reproduced the very same problematic that he identified with philosophical naturalism, except
that with him the determinations have undergone a fantastic reversal: if the shortcoming of
Feuerbach's philosophical materialism is that it abstracts nature from history, then it is just as true
that Bauer's speculative idealism abstracts history from nature, erecting an insoluble 'antithesis'
between them.
“Truth,” Bauer was right to argue against Feuerbach’s notion of sense-certainty, cannot be
“encountered in a ready-made object.”101 On this question, Marx and Bauer were in agreement.
“This is the point at which Marx's critique of Feuerbach begins,” argues Marcuse, because here
“Marx upholds Hegel on this point, as against Feuerbach. Hegel had denied that sense-certainty
is the final criterion of the truth.”102 As Bauer put it, the highest “recognition of nature” can only
be achieved by “sublat[ing] nature in [a] mediated fashion,” i.e., by stamping it with a “form
98 Engels, Frederick, and Marx, Karl, 'A Reply to Bruno Bauer’s Anti-Critique', Marx-Engels Collected
Works, Vol. V, (International Publishers: New York; 1976), 15-16. See also Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The
German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J.
Arthur (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 47-48, 103-105, 111, 113, 115.
99 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 113.
100 Feuerbach, Ludwig, 'Principles of the Philosophy of the Future', The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of
Ludwig Feuerbach, Zwar Hanfi (trans.), (Verso Books: London; 2012), 180-182.
101 Bauer quoted in Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach
and the Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998),
112.
102 Marcuse, Herbert, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, Routledge; London; 2000),
259-260.
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which it does not have in its natural immediacy.”103 “Man [too] is a product of history, not of
nature,” Bauer wrote— and again, in principle at least, Marx would surely have agreed.104
Although Marx followed Feuerbach in regarding the human being as a “natural being,” he added
to this that the human being is not “merely a natural being,” but a “human natural being.” Hence,
“natural objects as they immediately present themselves” to Feuerbach's 'sensuous certainty' are
not necessarily “human objects,” not the human “sensuousness” of nature, just as the sense-
faculties, as “immediately” given, are not truly “human sense[s].”105
The sensory qualities and self-love, enjoyment and correctly understood personal
interest are the basis of all morality. The natural equality of human intelligences, the
unity of progress of reason and progress of industry, the natural goodness of man, and
the omnipotence of education, are the main features in this system... Just as Cartesian
materialism passes into natural science proper, the other trend of French materialism
leads directly to socialism and communism...There is no need for any great penetration
to see from the teaching of materialism on the original goodness and equal intellectual
endowment of men, the omnipotence of experience, habit and education, and the
influence of environment on man, the great significance of industry, the justification of
enjoyment, etc., how necessarily materialism is connected with communism and
socialism. If man draws all his knowledge, sensation, etc., from the world of the senses
and the experience gained in it, then what has to be done is to arrange the empirical
world in such a way that man experiences and becomes accustomed to what is truly
human in it and that he becomes aware of himself as man. If correctly understood
interest is the principle of all morality, man’s private interest must be made to coincide
with the interest of humanity...If man is shaped by environment, his environment must
be made human...[This is] the teaching of materialism as the teaching of real humanism
and the logical basis of communism...Helvétius...'Human beings are born neither good
nor bad but ready to become one or the other according as a common interest unites or
divides them.'— 'If citizens could not achieve their own particular good without
achieving the general good, there would be no vicious people except fools'...As,
according to Helvétius, it is education, by which he means not only education in the
ordinary sense but the totality of the individual’s conditions of life, which forms man, if
a reform is necessary to abolish the contradiction between particular interests and those
of society, so, on the other hand, a transformation of consciousness is necessary to carry
out such a reform:..Holbach. 'Man can only love himself in the objects he loves: he can
have affection only for himself in the other beings of his-kind'...'True morality, and true
politics as well, is that which seeks to bring men nearer to one another to make them
work by united efforts for their common happiness. Any morality which separates our
interests from those of our associates, is false, senseless, unnatural'.106
103 Quoted from Bauer's Charakteristik in Moggach, Douglas, The Philosophy and Politics of Bruno Bauer,
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge; 2003), 76.
104 Quoted from Bauer's Charakteristik in ibid., 143.
105 Marx, Karl, 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole', The Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 182.
106 Engels, Frederick, and Marx, Karl, 'The Holy Family: Or Critique of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno
Bauer and Company', Marx-Engels Collected Works, Vol. 4, (International Publishers: New York; 1975), 130.
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Despite some of the aforementioned parallels between Bauer's and Marx's critiques of
Feuerbach, the point of distinction between them is to be found in the fact that Bauer's
“vehement polemic against Feuerbach's sensuousness” does not attempt to expand the “highly
restricted way in which Feuerbach recognises sensuousness.” Instead, he tries to do away with
the sense-world altogether.107 “Sensuousness” was just a “stick” for Bauer. Yet, just as
Feuerbach's immediate “sensuousness” is not “immediately...human sense,” neither therefore is
Bauer's principle of consciousness immediately “humanely sensuous consciousness.”108 The
problem with Feuerbach is not that he conceived of the human as a 'sensuous' and 'objective
being', but that he failed to conceive of the transformative power of human activity as
'sensuously objective activity'— a failure, by the way, which applies just as much to Bauer's
philosophy of self-consciousness. As Marx and Engels put it in The German Ideology,
Feuerbach’s conception of sensuousness is limited because he “never manages to conceive of the
sensuous world as the total living sensuous activity of the individuals composing it.”109 As
Marcuse explains of the origins of Feuerbach conception of 'sensuousness':
“sensuousness” is here an ontological category within the definition of man's
essence...The concept of sensuousness here taken up by Marx (via Feuerbach and Hegel)
goes back to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. There it is said that sensuousness is the
human perception through which alone objects are given to us...Human perception and
sensuousness [thus conceived] is receptive and passive....In Feuerbach...the concept of
sensuousness originally tends in the same direction as in Kant...This accepting, passive
being with needs, dependent on given things, which finds its expression in man's
sensuousness...is the original basis for Feuerbach's attack on Hegel and his idea of man
as a purely free, creative consciousness.110
Now, the “same tendency to go back to sensuousness,” i.e., to “comprehend man's being
defined by needs and his dependence on pre-established objectivity by means of the
107 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 112-
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109 Ibid., 41.
110 Marcuse, Herbert, 'The Foundations of Historical Materialism', The Essential Marcuse, Andrew Feenberg
and William Leiss (ed.), (Beacon Press: Boston; 2007), 87.
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sensuousness in his own being,” is also “discernible in Marx.”111 But, as Marcuse goes on to
conclude, while both Marx and Feuerbach were driven (by the same contradictions of German
philosophy) to materialism, Marx's conception of 'sensuousness' developed in a completely
different direction. He abolishes the 'Kantian' element in Feuerbach's theory, or, rather, replaces
Kant with Hegel. With Marx, the Feuerbachian “concept of sensuousness” is enriched and totally
transformed by the Hegelian theory of “objectification,” and it is this which provided the
“decisive turn from classical German philosophy to the theory of revolution.” In contrast to
Feuerbach’s contemplative materialism, the passivity of sense-certitude has been replaced with
the agency of labour.
In Feuerbach man's possession of, and relation to, the world remains essentially
theoretical...In Marx, to put it briefly, labour replaces this perception...[It is] the concept
of labour in its inner connection to the definition of man as a “natural” and “sensuous”
(objective) being...[I]t is in labour that the distress and neediness, but also the
universality and freedom of man, become real.112
As Marcuse suggests in another work, Marx thereby returns to Hegel precisely through the
critique of Feuerbach's principle of sensuousness.
Hegel's point was that labor brings sense-certainty and nature into the historical process.
Because he conceived of human existence in terms of sense, Feuerbach disregarded the
material function of labor altogether...Labor transform the natural conditions of human
existence into social ones. By omitting the labor process from his philosophy of
freedom, therefore, Feuerbach omitted the decisive factor through which nature might
become the medium for freedom. His interpretation of man's development as a 'natural'
development neglected the historical conditions for liberation.113
This deepening of the concept of sensuousness was articulated with both clarity and
urgency in the first thesis on Feuerbach:
The chief defect of all previous materialism (including Feuerbach's) is that the object,
actuality, sensuousness is conceived only in the form of the object or perception...not as
sensuous human activity, practice (Praxis), not subjectively. Hence in opposition to
materialism the active side was developed by idealism— but only abstractly since
idealism naturally does not know actual, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants
sensuous objects actually different from thought objects, but he does not comprehend
111 Ibid., 87.
112 Ibid., 89.
113 Marcuse, Herbert, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, (Routledge; London;
2000), 271-272.
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human activity itself as objective.114
This reformulation of the theory of sensuousness was not only a decisive moment in Marx’s own
intellectual development; it also marks a turning-point in the history of philosophy. Suddenly, the
“question [of] whether human thinking can reach objective truth,” one of the most perennial
questions of all philosophy, becomes a “practical question,” i.e., it is in “practice” that
humankind “must prove the truth.” Obviously, the political implications of Marx’s rethinking of
the concept of sensuousness inherited from Feuerbach are summarized most clearly in the final
thesis, where, building upon Cieszkowski and Hess, he envisions philosophy being sublated by
praxis. For Marx, the internal connection between the sensuous world and the sensuous activity
of individuals can only be “comprehended” as a historical process of “revolutionary practice.”
By changing their circumstances individuals change themselves, and by changing themselves
they change their circumstances.115
To be sure, Feuerbach had grasped that “man too is an 'object of the senses',” and, in this
respect at least, he was superior to Bauer. But he did not grasp the reciprocal connection between
the sensuous world of nature and the sensuous activity of individuals dependent upon interacting
with it. He conceived of 'Man' only as an “object of the senses, not as sensuous activity,” not as
“objective activity,” and thus also failed to recognize that the “whole sensuous world” is
continually reshaped by the form-giving fires of labour.116 This is why the Theses asserts that
Feuerbach failed to appreciate that human activity (i.e., the subjective side theorized until then by
Fichte, Hegel, and Bauer) is itself objective, i.e., a real, material force at work in the world. On
the one hand, the objectivity of nature is remade through the objective activity of labour, but, on
114 Marx, Karl, 'Theses on Feuerbach', Selected Writings, Simon H. Lawrence (ed.), (Hackett Publishing:
Indianapolis; 1994), 99.
115 Ibid., 99.
116 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 45-47.
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the other, Marx also recognizes that the human develops her own capacities, confirming her own
sensibilities and faculties in the world which she has remade. He understands that the senses are
therefore not given by nature in a human form; the development of truly human sense is the work
of world-history.
Just as only music awakens in man the sense of music, and just as the most beautiful
music has no sense for the unmusical ear— is no object for it, because my object can
only be the confirmation of one of my essential powers— it can therefore only exist for
me insofar as my essential power exists for itself as a subjective capacity; because the
meaning of an object for me goes only so far as my sense goes (has only a meaning for a
sense corresponding to that object)— for this reason the senses of the social man differ
from those of the non-social man. Only through the objectively unfolded richness of
man’s essential being is the richness of subjective human sensibility (a musical ear, an
eye for beauty of form— in short, senses capable of human gratification, senses
affirming themselves as essential powers of man) either cultivated or brought into being.
For not only the five senses but also the so-called mental senses, the practical senses
(will, love, etc.), in a word, human sense, the human nature of the senses, comes to be
by virtue of its object, by virtue of humanised nature. The forming of the five senses is a
labour of the entire history of the world down to the present. The sense caught up in
crude practical need has only a restricted sense.> For the starving man, it is not the
human form of food that exists, but only its abstract existence as food. It could just as
well be there in its crudest form, and it would be impossible to say wherein this feeding
activity differs from that of animals. The care-burdened, poverty-stricken man has no
sense for the finest play; the dealer in minerals sees only the commercial value but not
the beauty and the specific character of the mineral: he has no mineralogical sense. Thus,
the objectification of the human essence, both in its theoretical and practical aspects, is
required to make man’s sense human, as well as to create the human sense
corresponding to the entire wealth of human and natural substance.117
In direct contrast to Bauer, Marx expands the principle of sensuousness which was
articulated by Feuerbach in a defective and 'restricted' way (i.e., in a way which excluded labour,
history, etc.). His theory of sensuousness, just like his overall philosophy of nature, has definite
historical dimensions to it. However, when the Marx of 1843-44 first imports these concepts
from Feuerbach, he seems unaware at times that history is altogether foreign to Feuerbach's
naturalism and emphasis upon immediate sense-certainty. It is “apparent” to Marx, but not to
Feuerbach, that the “history of industry, industry as objectively existing, is the open book of
117 See Marx, Karl, 'Private Property and Communism', The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,
Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 140-141. Or, see Marx,
Karl, 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts', Selected Writings, Lawrence H. Simon (ed.), (Hackett Publishing
Company: Indianapolis; 1994), 75.
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man’s essential powers, the observably present human psychology, which has not been thus far
grasped in its connection with man’s essential nature but only in an external utilitarian way.” For
Marx, “History itself is an actual part of natural history, of nature’s development into man.” The
“whole of history is a preparation for ‘man’ to become the object of sensuous awareness and for
the needs of ‘man as man’ to become sensuous needs.”118 These statements, although formulated
before Marx openly broke with Feuerbach, have already overcome the limits of philosophical
materialism. This concept of sensuousness developed in The Holy Family and Economic and
Philosophic Manuscripts is already so far beyond Feuerbach’s ahistorical naturalism that it
unwittingly anticipates the break that will soon follow in the Theses and The German
Ideology.119
There, Marx will state with clarity his relation to both Feuerbach and Bauer. He sees their
philosophies of nature as equally one-sided standpoints: while Feuerbach clung to the abstract
unity between humanity and nature, Bauer defended an antiquated antithesis between nature and
history. While they occupied different sides of what is really just this same abstract distinction,
Marx attempts to mediate between them in the Theses on Feuerbach, Reply to Bruno Bauer's
Anti-Critique, and The German Ideology. He tries to articulate a conception of human
development which is different from both “idealism” and “materialism” as understood Bauer and
Feuerbach, and, yet, is the “unifying truth of both” of these equally one-sided standpoints.120 Not
only has his relationship to Feuerbach and critique of Bauer changed in the 1845-46 writings, but,
consequently, so too has his whole philosophy of nature. No longer is Feuerbach the “brook of
118 See Marx, Karl, 'Private Property and Communism', The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,
Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 140-141. Or, see Marx,
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fire” through which science must be forged. No longer is Feuerbach the “purgatory” of Young
Hegelianism, or, the path to the critique of Hegel and Bauer. Since Marx and Engels were only
momentarily Feuerbachians, as their 'enthusiasm' subsided they found themselves compelled to
reformulate the earlier critique of Critical Criticism that they had presented in 1844—
“influenced” as it was by the immediate impact of the philosophical naturalism that they had by
now abandoned.121 And, it would not be going too far to speculate, Marx and Engels likely felt
compelled to reappraise the merits of Feuerbachian naturalism in light of the counter-critique
launched against them by Bauer's 1845 Charakteristk.
In fact, again, when Marx and Engels responded to Bauer's 1845 piece for the
Wigand'sche Vierteljahrsschrift in their 'Reply to Bruno Bauer's Anti-Critique' and in The
German Ideology, they openly conceded for the first time that “Feuerbach's mistake” was really
to have idealistically “endowed” the “force” of externalized nature with an insurmountable
“independence.”122 At the same time, since Bauer himself had merely committed the opposite
error by refusing to recognize the on-going presence of nature in the dialectic as anything more
than a “stick,” Marx and Engels rejected his reaffirmation of, and reversion to, what is an
altogether inadequate and antiquated “antithesis” between “nature and history.” Bauer effectively
reproduces this old antinomy because his philosophy relegates the “real production of life” to
“primeval history, while the [supposedly] truly historical” element— the Critical Critic's
Olympian “self-consciousness”— always “appears to be separated from ordinary life.”123
Conclusion
121 Engels acknowledged that they were “at once” or “momentarily Feuerbachians.” Engels, Frederick,
Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, C.P. Dutt (ed.), (International Publishers: New
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In the 1840s, Marx’s thinking underwent considerable change— a period which he
referred to as one of simultaneous critique and self-clarification. This chapter has explored those
developments within the context of the changes that took place in his philosophy of nature, and
in direct relation to the thought of Bauer and Feuerbach. It defended the interpretative position
that Marx’s early conception of nature developed biphasically through these critiques. In the first
phase, those writings composed between 1843-44, his reappraisal of the role which nature plays
within the Hegelian dialectic was carried out through the mediation of Feuerbachian naturalism.
He characterizes his initial critique of Bauer in The Holy Family as a defence of philosophical
materialism. In the second phase, by contrast, Marx breaks with Feuerbach’s contemplative
materialism, but, at the same time, also reformulates the earlier critique of Bauer on the basis of
this new worldview.
In this first chapter, we discovered just how ‘enthusiastically’ he initially greeted the
'theoretical revolution' ushered in by Feuerbach. Marx regarded the 'fiery brook' as the cauldron
in which the new science of society and philosophy of the future would be forged. After
Feuerbach, only the 'comedians' of the old philosophy would refuse to come to terms with the
fact that 'nothing exists outside of nature' and that humankind is itself a part of nature. When he
first set out to criticize his mentor, Bruno Bauer, in the 1843 On the Jewish Question and
Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Marx therefore did so on the basis provided by
Feuerbach's genetic method of critique and concept of inversion, as elaborated in the 1842
Preliminary Theses for the Reform of Philosophy and 1843 Principles of the Philosophy of the
Future. I argued that these were the Feuerbachian writings which Marx must have had in mind
when he refers to philosophical materialism as the only theoretical revolution since Hegel's Logic,
and when he claims that Feuerbach is the only thinker to have taken-up a genuinely critical
attitude toward the Hegelian dialectic.
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In the works of 1844, Marx only furthered his earlier criticism of Bauer through the
continued appropriation of Feuerbachian terms— even if the significance which he ascribes to
these terms is already far removed from the meaning which Feuerbach attached to them. He
continues to conceive of human society as a part of nature, confirming, as he sees it, the inner
connection between humanism and naturalism in Feuerbach’s philosophy of nature and
conception of species-being. In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and The Holy Family,
he even treats Feuerbachian humanism and naturalism as providing a set of ontological and
anthropological principles for his own political theory and conception of communism. However,
although he remained formally committed to the philosophical revolution sparked by Feuerbach,
we have seen that Marx also privately entertained certain 'critical reservations' which
foreshadowed the rupture that would soon follow. Indeed, I have argued that, in 1844, Marx had
already implicitly transcended the limits of philosophical materialism even though, at times, he
seems entirely unaware of it.
Having examined his relationship to Bauer and Feuerbach in the writings of 1843-44, and
having registered its impact upon his concept of nature and settling of accounts with the
Hegelian dialectic, this chapter went on to examine the break with Feuerbach which occurs in the
works of 1845-46. If the 1843-44 critiques of Bauer in On the Jewish Question, Economic and
Philosophic Manuscripts, and The Holy Family remain indebted to Feuerbachian humanism and
naturalism, even though already implicitly beyond them, then the 1845-46 critiques of Bauer in
the Reply to Bruno Bauer's Anti-Critique and The German Ideology are explicitly anti-
Feuerbachian— i.e., they contain the same elements which we also find in the Theses on
Feuerbach. In addition to harbouring his own ‘critical reservations’, I have suggested that
Bauer’s 1845 response to The Holy Family in the Charaketistik Ludwig Feuerbachs acted as a
catalyst, provoking Marx into a reconsideration of Feuerbachian naturalism. At the same time,
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this period of reappraisal also forced him to reformulate his earlier critique of Bauer, carried-out
as it was within the context of his uncritically enthusiastic reception of Feuerbach.
In the Charakteristik, Bauer offered a rebuttal of Feuerbach’s static conception of nature.
He argued that nature is elevated and ennobled by art, mediated and mastered by labour, industry,
and human ingenuity. To be sure, there are certain parallels between Bauer’s critique in the
Charakteristik and Marx’s subsequent break with Feuerbach. But, to paraphrase Marx, the only
labour which Bauer knows is mental labour, i.e., philosophy. For him, the actual wage-labourers
who really transform nature on a daily basis are stuck in the same muck of ‘substance’ as
Feuerbach’s naturalism. Instead, Bauer conceives of the consciousness of the critical critic as the
universal and active element of all history. In the end, Marx will tell us that Bauer’s critique of
Feuerbach’s concept of sensuousness in the Charakteristik in no way goes beyond Feuerbachian
naturalism, but, rather, remains fixed within the old abstract antithesis between history and
nature. Marx, by contrast, deepened and enriched the concept of sensuousness by introducing the
idea of praxis into it. He understood the sensuousness of nature not as an unmediated objectivity,
as Feuerbach did, but as something constantly reshaped by objective activity. This, as we will
discover in the next chapter, had significant implications for his materialist conception of history.
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Nature, Need and History:
Marx’s Historical Conception of Nature
Introduction: Need and Human Development in History
The critiques of Bauer and Feuerbach examined in the previous chapter were directly
related to the first formulations of the doctrine of historical materialism. This chapter argues that
the materialist conception of history was developed in parallel with what I, following Engels,
characterize as Marx’s historical conception of nature. Marx developed this historical conception
of nature (and of the human relation to it) in direct opposition to both the abstract identity
between humanism and naturalism postulated by Feuerbach, and the abstract antagonism
between history and nature in Bauer. As we discovered in the last chapter, in Bauer’s dialectic,
the sensuousness of nature and force of natural necessity is reduced to a ‘stick’ by the progress of
history. In Feuerbach’s contemplative materialism, nature is grasped as a dead objectivity,
unmediated by human activity, and his anthropological conception of the human being as a
species-being remains entirely confined within this ahistorical abstraction as well. In contrast to
both of these views, this chapter emphasizes the importance of Marx’s recognition that nature,
and the human dependence upon it, is retained as a fundamental condition of history and of all
social development, but, as such, also modified in accordance with it.
In juxtaposition to Bauer, this chapter will substantiate that Marx and Engels grounded
their materialist conception of history upon ‘natural bases’— viz., what they refer to as the ‘first
premises’ or ‘real premises’ of history. Their new conception of history proceeds from the
recognition of the simple, almost physiological, facts of life: humans must satisfy their needs
before they can begin to make their own history. They only begin to make their own history
when they begin to make their own means of production, thereby altering the nature-given
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conditions of human social life. As they satisfy their original needs, new needs emerge over time
which require means of satisfaction and forms of activity capable of satisfying them. As such,
this conception of history is predicated on the view that by changing the material circumstances
which condition their lives, individuals at the same time change themselves— e.g., they cultivate
new desires, habits, capacities, as well as relations to one another and to nature.
This underscores what I believe to be the most fundamental connection between Marx’s
materialist conception of human development in history, and his historical conception of nature
and the human relation to it. In the final section of this chapter, Part I of the dissertation
concludes with a consideration of the political implications of this internal connection between
nature and history for Marx’s early conception of socialism. Since humans are shaped by the
conditions of their life, the conditions of their life must assume a more human shape. By
objectifying himself in nature, by reshaping nature into a more human form, man at the same
time realizes his own human nature. Nature, and the socially mediated relation to it in history, is
therefore a metric by which Marx measures human development as a whole. In his vision of a
higher form of society, human and natural history would terminate in a reconciliation made
possible by such praxis— or, what he refers to as the simultaneous humanization of nature and
naturalization of humanity. Socialism, as he characterizes it during this period in his intellectual
development, is the completed unity of society and nature, i.e., completed humanism as
naturalism and completed naturalism as humanism.
The Theory of Need, Recognition of Nature and Real Premises of Materialism
In the mid-1840s, Marx set out to “settle accounts” with the Hegelian dialectic and with
his own “philosophical conscience.” Out of this phase in his early philosophical development
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emerged the “guiding thread” that would bind together all of his subsequent studies of politics,
economics and history. This period of intellectual ‘storm and stress’ provided him with the vague
outlines of a whole new worldview: historical materialism. He had inaugurated this process of
“self-clarification” by launching a “critique of post-Hegelian philosophy,” which is to say, a
critique of Bauer, Feuerbach and Stirner. At the same time, then, Marx was also seeking to
clarify to these other thinkers that his new conception of history was at odds with the uncritical
and “ideological one” which had until then prevailed within “German philosophy.” And
integrally connected to that new conception of history was a completely new conception of
nature and of the human relation to it. Secondary literature on Marx has acknowledged, but often
underemphasized, the extent to which the first formulations of the doctrine of historical
materialism rested upon such a radical rethinking of the category of nature. In fact, I would argue
that many of the essential elements of the materialist conception of history emerge only as the
outcome of Marx’s critique of the nature-philosophies of Bauer and Feuerbach.
Instead of taking the “actual germs of life” for the “point of departure” of their historical
analyses, these other post-Hegelian thinkers began from the ideological “presuppositions” of the
“previous philosophy” that Marx and Engels were themselves in the process of shedding. Since
they were initially “dealing with Germans,” from whose fantastic “speculation[s]” real material
presuppositions were entirely absent, it became all the more pressing to begin by illustrating that
their materialist conception of history was not similarly “devoid of premises.”124 Marx's
conception of history is not at all without its 'presuppositions' then. He and Engels unashamedly
disclosed these almost from the very start of their collaboration. Their “view was not without
premises,” they insist, because it “empirically observes the actual material premises” of life in
124 Ibid., 36-37, 42-43.
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their forms of social motion and historical fluidity.125
In the course of the exposition of these “real premises” of historical materialism in The
German Ideology it becomes clear that Marx's materialist conception of history is internally
related to a much more historical conception of nature. At first, however, this connection
between history and nature is present only in an unmediated form because the “first premise” of
human history is immediately identical to the “first premise” of human life. At the outset of
human history, nature is not yet modified by human activity, nor are the forms of activity which
will modify it. At this moment in development, the connection between history and nature is
therefore wholly natural, and not yet historical. After all, humans first had to “live” before they
could even begin to “make history.”126 It is upon the “natural basis” of this “first principle” of
materialism— i.e., upon the recognition of the necessary physiological connection to nature—
that Marx's constructs his whole economic interpretation of history.
The first premise of all human history, of course, is the existence of living human
individuals...[W]e must begin by stating the first premise of all human existence, and
hence of all history, the premise, namely, that men must be able to live in order to be
able “to make history.” But life involves before everything else eating and drinking,
housing, clothing and various other things.127
In his eulogy to his friend, Engels declared that if Darwin disclosed the hidden law of
natural history, then Marx must be credited with having “discovered the law of development of
human history:” namely, by starting from the “simple fact...that mankind must first of all eat,
drink, have shelter and clothing,” etc., in order to make its own history.128 Engels'
125 Ibid., 253-254.
126 See Engels, Frederick, and Marx, Karl, 'The German Ideology', Selected Writings, Lawrence H. Simon
(ed.), (Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis; 1994), 115; or Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German
Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur
(trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 47.
127 Engels, Frederick, and Marx, Karl, 'The German Ideology', Selected Writings, Lawrence H. Simon (ed.),
(Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis; 1994), 107, 115.
128 Engels, Friedrich, 'Speech at the Graveside of Marx, The Marx-Engels Reader, Robert C. Tucker (ed.),
(W.W. Norton: New York;1972), 603-604.
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characterizations of the connections between natural and social history, or, if you like, between
Darwin and Marx, oscillate between profound insightfulness and, in the case of this statement,
what borders on oversimplification. However, it is elementary that we acknowledge along with
Marx and Engels that the “first fact” of all human history— a “simple fact” that has always been
'presupposed' in practice, but never explicitly theorized as such by German philosophy— is just
the “physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of
nature.”129 The “first principle” of the materialist “theory of history” is to accept and “observe
this fundamental fact [of nature] in its entire significance and all its implications.”130
To be sure, the “implications” of this 'first premise' include its extension outward through
every stage of human history. It is a simple physiological fact of life, but, as such, it also applies
to human existence in all of its historical and possible social forms. Humans will always have to
eat, drink, etc., and, moreover, will always have to labour in order to satisfy those needs. This is
the eternal aspect of a natural necessity which can certainly be transformed and humanized, but,
of course, never abolished outright by any mode of production. Even when this natural necessity
is modified in accordance with the altered needs of the socialized individual, and mastered by the
universally-developed productive powers of society, the primacy of this first principle in Marx's
materialism remains untouched. However, insofar as we restrict our attention to this 'first
premise' not as it appears throughout the course of history, but as it was for the original condition
of human life, it applies exclusively to naturally-arisen forms of precapitalist society.
Taken in this strict sense, then, the first point of connection between the categories of
nature and history in historical materialism is purely natural and, in no way, historical. Marx's
129 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 37.
130 Engels, Frederick, and Marx, Karl, 'The German Ideology', Selected Writings, Lawrence H. Simon (ed.),
(Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis; 1994), 115.
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materialist conception of history proceeds from the recognition that nature is the “real basis” and
starting-point of all human development. As Dolowitz and Johnston emphasize, Marx's “starting-
point of human history is Man's struggle with nature to meet his immediate material means of
subsistence.”131 It follows as a corollary that the very “first historical act” must have been
completely conditioned by the “production of the means to satisfy these needs” specifically.132
The first steps into history were oriented toward the satisfaction of the purely immediate and
even animal-like needs of still undeveloped individuals— viz., needs which were not yet
products of history, but determinations given by an unmodified natural necessity. Need itself has
not yet emerged here from what Kant refers to as the 'crudity of nature'.
However, Marx and Engels claim that through a necessary dialectic the “first premise,” or
the “satisfaction of the first need,” inevitably “leads to new needs”— and the satisfaction of these
“new needs” belongs, properly speaking, to what they refer to as the “second” premise of
historical materialism.133 The important point here is that the production and satisfaction of these
social needs is the outcome of an ongoing process of human development in time.
The different forms of material life are, of course, in every case dependent on the needs
which are already developed, and the production, as well as the satisfaction, of these
needs is an historical process, which is not to be found in the case of a sheep or a
dog...although sheep and dogs in their present form certainly, but in spite of themselves,
are products of an historical process [emphasis added].134
Some scholars have problematized this transition from natural to social need in The German
Ideology's presentation of the “three premises of human existence.” Hearn, for instance, claims
that Marx and Engels depicted the “movement of humanity” away from a purely “animal”
condition “slightly confusingly” insofar as it is unclear whether need determines production, or
131 Dolowitz, David P., and Johnston, Jim, 'Marxism and Social Class', Marxism and Social Science, Gamble,
Marsh and Tant (ed.), (University of Illinois Press: Chicago; 1990), 131-132.
132 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 47.
133 Ibid., 47-48.
134 Ibid., 90-91.
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production need.135 For Marx and Engels, there is certainly a reciprocal relation between need
and labour at every stage of development, although the latter is always determinative in the ‘last
instance’. They are clear that this transition from nature-given to social need— a second nature,
to borrow Hegel's turn of phrase— is made possible by the “first historical act” of labour.136 This
is why he tells us that the “satisfaction of the first need, the action of satisfying and the
instrument of satisfaction which has been acquired, leads to new needs,” and that this “creation
of new needs” is the other side of the “first historical act.” In this respect, the first premise
clearly forms the basis for Marx’s argument that humans only really start to “distinguish
themselves from animals” when they set out to first “produce their means of subsistence”
(instead of finding them ready-made by nature).137
Only when humans begin to 'make their own history' in this way do they begin to satisfy
needs which fall outside the narrow scope of natural necessity and animal expediency. And
herein lies the philosophical significance of Marx's conception of the 'first act of history'. Human
history does not begin at this point merely because we satisfy the animal-like demands upon
human life, but, rather, because we begin to produce and satisfy new (and, eventually, truly
human) needs. As Foster explains, the initial steps into “human history proper” were not taken
135 Hearn, Jeff, ''Gender: Biology, Nature and Capitalism, The Cambridge Companion to Marx, Terrell Carver
(ed.), (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge; 1999), 222.
136 Hegel was here criticizing Rousseau's assertion that “man is free by nature, but that in society...he must
limit this natural freedom. That man is free by Nature is quite correct in one sense; viz., that he is so according to the
Idea of Humanity; but we imply thereby that he is such only in virtue of his destiny— that he has an undeveloped
power to become such... a 'second nature' as it has been justly called; for the first nature of man is his primary
merely animal existence...But the view in question imports more than this. When man is spoken of as 'free by
Nature', the mode of his existence as well as his destiny is implied...[In Rousseau] a 'state of Nature' is assumed in
which mankind at large are in the possession of their natural rights with the unconstrained exercise and enjoyment of
their freedom. This assumption is not indeed raised to the dignity of the historical fact; it would indeed be difficult,
were the attempt seriously made, to point out any such condition as actually existing, or as having ever occurred.
Examples of a savage state of life can be pointed out, but they are marked by brutal passions and deeds of violence;
while, however rude and simple their conditions, they involve social arrangements which (to use the common phrase)
restrain freedom.” Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, The Philosophy of History, J. Sibree (trans.), (Prometheus
Books: New York; 1991), 42.
137 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
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when we simply satiated the “first need[s],” which he rightly refers to as the (necessary but still
insufficient) “natural prerequisites of history.” Human history only truly begins when, after
having satisfied these original needs, production permitted for the “creation of new needs,” i.e.,
needs which eventually become “far removed from their original natural bases.” This leads
Foster to conclude that the significance of the “first historical act” is that it thereby lays down the
first foundations for the development of a “specifically human relation to nature.” Despite the
shortcomings of Foster's reading in other respects, he is nonetheless quite right to regard these
real premises as the first “integral” point of connection between the “materialist conception of
nature and history,” precisely, as he adds, because they illustrate how “[f]rom such natural
prerequisites of history...Marx and Engels proceeded to human history proper.”138
Recall Marx's critique of Feuerbach's theory of sensuousness. For Marx, sensuousness, as
it is immediately given, is not present as human sense. Truly human sensibilities are results of the
labour of history, and not gifts of nature— e.g., an 'ear for music', an ‘eye for beauty’, etc. For
the same reason, Marx’s theory of history also treats need as a product of human development in
time. For example, the need for beauty, love, fine food, for Sophocles, etc.— these are social
needs brought about by a cultural process of Bildung. Contrary to what is often suggested, he
actually envisions a socialist society as one which would not merely satisfy the basic needs of all
individuals, but, rather, would make possible for the first time a truly needy individual. The
“rich” individual is one who “needs a totality of human manifestations of life and in whom his
own realization exists as inner necessity, as need.”139 A really wealthy individual, a genuinely
rich person, is he or she who feels and satisfies the need for a variety of activities, a diversity of
138 Foster, John Bellamy, 'Marx's Grundrisse and the Ecological Contradiction of Capitalism', Karl Marx's
Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy 150 Years Later, Marcello Musto (ed.), (Routledge:
New York; 2008), 97-98.
139 Marx, Karl, 'Private Property and Communism', Selected Writings, Lawrence H. Simon (ed.), (Hackett
Publishing Company: Indianapolis; 1994), 115.
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relations, a whole world of experiences and forms of pleasure. The “greater the extent to which
historic needs— needs created by production itself, social needs”— are “posited as necessary,
the higher the level to which real wealth has become developed.” “Regarded materially,” and
this certainly tells us something about Marx’s materialism, “wealth consists only in the manifold
variety of needs,” a “totality of activities, [forms of] intercourse, [and] needs.”140
The theory of need elaborated in the manuscripts for The German Ideology breaks with
the conception of need found not only in Feuerbach, but also in Bauer and Stirner. If we recall,
Marx had criticized Bauer for failing to grasp that “every inclination, every impulse, every
need…assert[s] itself as a force...whenever circumstances hinder their satisfaction.”141 Even if
the external necessity of the “sensuous world” can one day be “reduced to a minimum,” and
leveraged by a “stick as with Saint Bruno,” this still “presupposes the action of producing the
stick.”142 But for Bauer the actual labour of the wage-worker is stuck within the muck of nature
and the pure particularity of immediate need. Bauer rather “acknowledges only one real need, the
need of theoretical criticism,” as if this were the only thing he hungered for.143
While Bauer at least recognized the need for criticism, Stirner tried to do away with the
'fixity' of needs altogether. This is because he, like Bauer, regarded need as a form of
“heteronomy” in the Kantian sense of the term. It “can occur only to Saint Max and his like not
to allow his sex instinct, for instance, to become 'fixed'; it is that already and will cease to be
fixed only as the result of castration.” It all amounts to a “Christian dialectic,” Marx and Engels
insist in the below, because it amounts to assuming that “I myself am not nature.” In Marx’s
140 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.),
(Penguin Books: London; 1993), 527.
141 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 111.
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ontology and anthropology, the individual’s relation to nature— be it to her own “natural
character” and human nature, or to “what is known as external nature”— is not “foreign” to her
as an individual. The “feelings, passions, etc.,” of the human being are not merely
“anthropological phenomena,” but, rather, “truly ontological affirmations of [the] being (of
nature).” Human capacities, needs, relations, etc., are also “really affirmed” in the “sensual
object” which they transform and/or appropriate.144 Again, this is why Marx believed that a truly
enjoyable existence involved cultivating a diversity of essential talents, satisfying a wide range
of developed needs, and interacting on a world-historical scale with other individuals.
[Stirner transforms] this need and its organ…into a master over him, just as earlier he
made the means for satisfying a need...into a master over him. Stirner cannot eat without
at the same time eating for the sake of his stomach. If the worldly conditions prevent
him from satisfying his stomach, then his stomach becomes a fixed desire, and the
thought of eating becomes a fixed idea...Sancho's “revolt” against the fixation of desires
and thoughts is thus reduced to an impotent moral injunction...Each need, which forms
the basis of a “desire,” is likewise something “fixed,” and try as he might Saint Max
cannot abolish this “fixedness” and for example contrive to free himself from the
necessity of eating…The only reason why Christianity wanted to free us from the
domination of the flesh and “desires as a driving force” was because it regarded our
flesh, our desires as something foreign to us; it wanted to free us from determination by
nature only because it regarded our own nature as not belonging to us. For if I myself
am not nature, if my natural desires, my whole natural character, do not belong to
myself— and this is the doctrine of Christianity— then all determination by nature—
whether due to my own natural character or to what is known as external nature—
seems to me a determination by something foreign, a fetter, [and] compulsion used
against me, heteronomy as opposed to autonomy of the spirit. Stirner accepts this
Christian dialectic without examining it.145
In contrast to Stirner and Bauer, Marx does not conceive of need as a form of heteronomy.
Necessity only appears as an alien and external force when it goes unsatisfied and unmastered.
Needs represent a fetter upon human development only when they themselves languish
uncultivated, or are confined within a narrow range of expressions. In Marx’s conception of
historical progress, purely natural needs are on the one hand reproduced in a more humanized
144 Marx, Karl, 'The Power of Money in Bourgeois Society', The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of
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form, and, on the other hand, wholly social needs are produced for the first time. “Hunger is
hunger,” writes the Marx of the Grundrisse, “but the hunger gratified by cooked meat eaten with
a knife and fork is different from that which bolts down raw meat with the aid of hand, nail and
tooth.”146 Yet, again, there are also those essential needs which emerge only as the product of
civilization: e.g., the need for Shakespeare, the “need” for the “most beautiful play.”147 In
opposition to both Bauer and Stirner, Marx’s political philosophy envisions a higher social
formation as one which both satisfies the given needs, and, at the same time, allows for the
greatest possible development of a totality of needs, i.e., a needy individual. The essence of
Marx’s criticism of Stirner is that a free society would not go about “abolishing the fixedness of
their desires and needs” altogether, but, instead, only seek to enable the “normal satisfaction of
all needs” and facilitate the “development of the totality of desires”— i.e., a community of
universally-developed individuals. Moreover, the “latter depends, in turn, on whether we live in
circumstances that allow all-around activity and thereby the full development of our
potentialities.”
Communist organisation has a twofold effect on the desires produced in the individual
by present-day relations; some of these desires— namely desires which exist under all
social relations, and only change their form and direction under different social
relations— are merely altered by the communist social system, for they are given the
opportunity to develop normally; but others— namely those originating solely in a
particular society, under particular conditions of [production] and intercourse— are
totally deprived of their conditions of existence...The fact that one desire of an
individual in modern society can be satisfied at the expense of all others...and that this is
more or less the case with all individuals in the world today and that thereby the free
development of the individual as a whole is made impossible— this fact is expressed by
Stirner thus: “the desires become fixed”...Whether a desire becomes fixed or not, i.e.,
whether it obtains exclusive [power over us]…depends on whether material
circumstances...permit the normal satisfaction of this desire and, on the other hand, the
development of a totality of desires. The latter depends, in turn, on whether we live in
circumstances that allow all-around activity and thereby the full development of our
potentialities. On the actual conditions, and the possibility of development they give
each individual, depends also whether thoughts become fixed or not— just as, for
146 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.),
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example, the fixed ideas of the German philosophers…[which] are inseparable from the
German conditions...[On one hand, since] they attack the material basis on which the
hitherto inevitable fixedness of desires and ideas depended, the Communists are the
only people through whose historical activity the liquefaction of the fixed desires and
ideas is in fact brought about and ceases to be an impotent moral injunction, as it was up
to now with all moralists “down to” Stirner...[In another sense, however, the]
communists have no intention of abolishing the fixedness of their desires and needs, an
intention which Stirner, immersed in his world of fancy, ascribes to them and to all other
men; they only strive to achieve an organisation of production and intercourse which
will make possible the normal satisfaction of all needs, i.e., a satisfaction which is
limited only by the needs themselves.148
Hence, as Hook explains of such passages against Stirner, the “fixation” which Marx and
Engels were really interested in destroying was the fixation imposed upon the development of
human capabilities, needs, and relations through the “division of labour and class
relationships.”149 The endpoint in this process of becoming would be a free association composed
of more fully-developed individuals— a society whose members create and appropriate, produce
and enjoy, in order to satisfy a whole range of essential needs, desires, etc., and cultivate a wide
variety of essential talents, powers, etc. This is why the first premises of materialism are so
significant in my opinion. They represent one possible (and admittedly still simplistic and
abstract) way of presenting a developmental theory of needs, relations, activities, etc., which will
reappear again and again, but in several different forms, throughout many of Marx's major works.
Geras, who also thinks that the first premises are integral to Marx's historical understanding of
human nature in his works as a whole, argues that the theory that Marx begins to articulate here
treats ‘need’ and the human relation to nature as a gauge with which to measure the historical
development of “man's general powers”— and, moreover, that it is this which also serves as the
“normative standard” for his conception of a truly “human society.”150
The account of the first premises of history in The German Ideology highlights another
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lasting feature of Marx’s materialism. In all of the subsequent phases of his intellectual
development, including Capital and beyond, his thought retains the recognition that nature is the
real ground of all history. The “first historical act” is not buried in some primordial past, i.e.,
where philosophers like Bauer can find comfort and “imagine themselves safe” from the “crude
facts” of natural necessity. In order to “make it clear to the Germans”— who always seek to
mystify matters by projecting their views onto some “prehistoric age”— Marx and Engels
emphasize that these “'moments'” of social reproduction, i.e., labour and need, exist not only at
the “dawn of history and the first men,” but that they “still assert themselves today.”151 These
premises belong to the “fundamental condition[s] of all history, which today, as thousands of
years ago, must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life.”152 In direct
opposition to Bauer’s philosophy of nature, Marx’s materialism retains natural necessity as an
essential moment of the dialectic. In his conception of history, the human dependence upon
nature is extended, albeit on a totally transformed basis, even into the highest reaches of an
emancipated society.
As Pilling notes of Marx's view, labour and need are “universal” elements of human life
and, therefore, of human history as a whole. While this may seem like an elementary insight,
which the reader might prefer not to belabour, it is important to stress that this “simple fact” (as
Engels put it in his eulogy) had profound implications for the subsequent development of Marx's
thought. Its “implications are crucial” for how we understand Marx’s emancipatory project,
materialist conception of history, and his later theory of the metabolism with nature.153 As
Hughes suggests, Marx and Engels are effectively extending materialism's “recognition of the
151 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
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dependence of human beings on their natural environments” to include it as a “fundamental and
ongoing condition of history.”154 As they characterize it, the struggle with nature and need, i.e.,
the “materialist connection” which binds individuals to one another in every form of society,
“affect[s] not only the original and natural organization of men,” but also their “entire further
development or non-development up to the present.”155
Foster likewise suspects that The German Ideology's exposition of the “real premises” of
historical materialism remains “integral to Marx's materialist conception of nature and history...in
his work as a whole”— including, namely, the 'metabolic' theory subsequently developed in
Capital.156 As Pines explains, what Marx first recognized in The German Ideology is that the
human interaction with nature was one of the “fundamental and necessary requirements of all
societies.” This notion, he claims, is reaffirmed later in Capital when Marx refers us to the
“universal and eternal necessity imposed by Nature.”157 Pilling makes a similar comparison
between the passages from The German Ideology which address these real premises of
materialism as fundamental facts of all history, and the passages in Capital which characterize
the metabolism with and appropriation of nature as an eternal feature of natural necessity.158 The
later Marx of Capital still stresses, “in opposition to idealism” as it were, the “importance of the
natural and material foundations” of all historical development.159
“Life,” Engels asserts in Dialectics of Nature, is an organic “mode of existence,” the
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“essential element” being just this “continual metabolic interchange with the natural environment
outside” of it. The “cessation of this metabolism” can only ever result in the very negation of
“Life” itself.160 In Capital, Marx was as equally unequivocal as Engels. He refers to this
'intercourse' or 'metabolism' (Stoffwechsel) between human existence and the material conditions
of nature as an “everlasting nature-imposed condition of human existence” (emphasis added).161
An “eternal natural necessity mediates the metabolism between man and nature.”162 This is why
he wrote in the Economic Manuscripts of 1861-1863 that labour is the “appropriation of the
[“use values” of the] natural world for human needs,” and that, as such, it must be treated as the
“universal condition for the metabolic interaction between nature and man, and as such a natural
condition of human life it is independent of, [and] equally common to, all particular social forms
of human life.”163 This is essentially the first draft to a passage which reappears in Capital, where
he writes that labour is the
appropriation of what exists in nature for the requirements of man. It is the universal
condition for the metabolic interaction [Stoffwechsel] between man and nature, the
everlasting nature-imposed condition of human existence, and it is therefore
independent of every form of that existence, or rather common to all forms of society in
which human beings live.164
The political conclusion which Marx draws from this principle of the metabolism is clear. “Just
as the savage must wrestle with nature to satisfy his needs, to maintain and reproduce his life, so
must civilized man”— something which “he must do so in all forms of society and under all
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possible modes of production.”165
The Materialist Conception of History and Historical Conception of Nature
These 'real premises' demonstrate that, even in its very first formulations, Marx's new
conception of history was closely connected to a completely new conception of nature. Marx and
Engels distinguished their materialist conception from the “idealist view of history” precisely
because it ignored that nature is the “real ground of history.” In Germany, history was therefore
“written according to an extraneous standard” because to the philosophers the “real production of
life appears as non-historical, while the historical appears as something separated from ordinary
life.” This was especially the case with Bauer, who, as we discovered, regarded criticism as the
“only active element in history.” The “whole conception of history” in Germany up until Marx
either “totally disregarded” this real relationship between society and nature, or else it reduced it
to a “minor matter quite irrelevant to the course of history.” In Bauer’s philosophy, nature was
reduced to a stick, and the human struggle with natural necessity was relegated to the prehistory
of society— except for the wage-labourers still stuck within the muck of substance of course.
Because the “relation of man to nature is excluded from history,” there is in Bauer’s idealism an
“antithesis of nature and history.”
In direct opposition to Bauer’s approach, which has to “look for a category in every
period,” Marx’s “conception of history…relies on expounding the real process of production—
starting from the material production of life itself...as the basis of all history.” As such, “history”
cannot be “resolved” into Bauer’s “self-consciousness;” rather, “each stage” must be represented
as a “sum of productive forces, a historically created relation to nature and of individuals to one
165 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy David Fernbach (trans.), Vol. III (Penguin Books:
London; 1991), 954, 959.
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another, which is handed down to each generation from its predecessor.” On the one hand, this
relation to nature is “modified by the new generation, but on the other also prescribes for it its
conditions of life and gives it a definite development, a special character.”166 Every “mode of
production” is therefore defined for Marx by the “definite form of activity” through which the
appropriation of and “relation to the rest of nature” takes place.167 This constitutes yet another
enduring feature of Marx’s materialism. According to this economic way of interpreting history,
“all productive force resolves itself” into a historically “given relation to nature.”168
Hence, Marx’s analysis of history “begin[s]” from the purely “natural bases” and
physiological facts of human life, and “proceed[s]” to investigate their social “modification”
throughout the “course of history” by the “actions of men.”169 Marx's historical conception of
nature is, in this way, necessarily connected to the articulation of the first premises of his
materialist conception of history. According to this view, any social theory capable of grasping
history ‘scientifically’ must, from the beginning, have already clarified for itself the starting-
point of all science: the practical process by which individuals transform their socially-mediated
relationship to nature.170 As Dolowitz and Johnston claim, the real premises of materialism
demonstrate not only that Marx regards “Man's struggle with nature to meet his immediate
material means of subsistence” as the “starting-point of human history,” it also illustrates that his
“study of historical change...begin[s] with the real, practical activities of Man” (emphasis
166 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
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added).171 The analysis of history must “begin” from “real individuals, their activity and the
material conditions of their life, both those which they find already existing and those produced
by their activity” (emphasis added).172
Where speculation ends, namely in actual life, there real, positive science begins as the
representation of the practical activity and practical process of the development of
men...This view is not devoid of premises. It proceeds from real premises and does not
abandon them for a moment. These premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation and
fixation, but in their real, empirically perceptible process of development under certain
conditions. When this active life-process is presented, history ceases to be a collection
of dead facts as it is with the empiricists who are themselves still abstract, or an
imagined activity of imagined subjects, as with the idealists.173
It is this “active life-process” between society and nature which provided Marx and
Engels with the material presuppositions for their historical “science” and economic
interpretation of history. Historical materialism tries to examine individuals in their social
relations with each other and with nature— both those given by nature itself from the outset of
human history, and those subsequently created by their own process of social development. The
first premises are therefore illustrative of a foundational aspect of the materialist conception of
history and of Marx's philosophy of praxis: viz., the notion that humans actively “make history,”
but that they make it based upon the definite circumstances of their “material life.” In The
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, he repeats this refrain: while individuals “make their
own history,” they do not make it “just as they please,” or from conditions completely of their
own choosing, but from the conditions inherited and “transmitted from the past.”174 Similar
notions are found throughout Marx’s works from this period. As he and Engels emphasize in The
German Ideology, “circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances;”175 or, as
171 Dolowitz, David P., and Johnston, Jim, 'Marxism and Social Class', Marxism and Social Science, Gamble,
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he had scribbled earlier in the Theses on Feuerbach: while individuals are the “products” of their
“circumstances,” these “circumstances are changed” by individuals.176
Here we see an integral point of connection between Marx’s materialist conception of
history, philosophy of nature, and theory of praxis. The radical humanistic implications of the
intersections within historical materialism between Marx’s philosophy of nature and his concept
of praxis are articulated most clearly during his break with Feuerbach in 1845-46. Feuerbach’s
contemplative materialism excluded the element of practice from all philosophizing about nature,
reducing external nature to a lifeless objectivity, i.e., one unmediated by the socially-modified
modes of mankind's productive and appropriative relationship to it. Connecting the above
passages from The German Ideology, Theses on Feuerbach, and The Eighteenth Brumaire on
similar grounds, Tabak contends that this interplay between external determination and self-
determination, labour and need, education and habit, praxis and nature, etc., is crucial to
comprehending Marx's thought throughout all of the phases of his intellectual development.
Even later movements in Marx's materialism (i.e., as in Capital) “cannot be understood without
acknowledging the presence of [this] first premise in his thought.”177 In one of his later essays on
the topic, Schmidt also describes these connections between Marx’s philosophy of praxis and his
historical conception of nature as an enduring legacy of his break with Feuerbachian naturalism.
[T]he concept of 'mediating practice'...[is what determines the] horizon of all human and
extra-human reality...The concept of practice, as attained in the Theses on Feuerbach, is
precisely the most important theoretically of Marx's concepts. One must always return
to the concept of practice in order to clarify what Marx meant by materialism, and with
what justification his materialism can be called dialectical.178
For Marx, it is “quite obvious from the start” that there is a “materialist connection of
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 61-62.
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178 For Schmidt on praxis, see Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (New
Left Books: London; 1971), 10, 15, 27, 63, 122, 193.
81
men with one another,” and that this very “connection” to one another and to nature must be “as
old as men themselves.” It was Feuerbach's great contribution to German philosophy to have
finally recognized this natural basis of human existence and, thereby, restored materialism to its
rightful place in philosophy. Yet the form which this necessary relation to nature assumes is itself
a product of history, not nature. And this is something which Feuerbach's naturalism forgets. It is
a relation, Marx insists, which is “determined” by the degree to which “their needs and their
mode of production” have been developed through the real material interaction with nature over
time. But east of the Rhine, “where history has stopped happening” for all philosophy, the
philosophers (including Feuerbach) forget that this “connection [to the earth] is ever taking on
new forms, and thus presents a 'history'.”179 Here, once again, we see that Marx’s materialist
conception of history is directly connected to a much more historical conception of nature.
Even Feuerbach, whose philosophy had at least recognized both the sensuousness of
nature in general and the sensuousness of the human being in particular, had failed to grasp the
unity between man and nature as anything more than an abstract, generic, and naturally-arisen
identity. As we learned earlier, when confronted with contradictory instances which disturbed his
presupposition about the natural harmony between the human species-essence and its real socio-
natural existence, Feuerbach fled from sense-certainty into the 'refuge' of a 'higher perception',
i.e., to a Kant-like 'ideal compensation' in the species in general. As he himself expressed this
Kantian principle, “because no single individual, due to his limitations, is the adequate
expression of the Idea, the species, nature seeks to complete the defect of the single existence
through the creation of another.”180 Hence, we do not find in Feuerbach a concept of universally-
179 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
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developed individuality; what we find, instead, is an affirmation of the one-dimensional
individual produced by the capitalist division of labour as well as a corresponding correction by
nature of this “defect” (i.e., through the generic development of the species as a whole). For the
“practical materialist, i.e., the Communist,” however, “it is a question of revolutionising the
existing world” and of “changing the things found in existence.” When we “occasionally”
discover “such views with Feuerbach, they are never more than isolated surmises;” they have
“little influence on his general outlook,” and are, at most, “but embryos capable of
development.”181
This means that right where it was most necessary to be a materialist, i.e., with respect to
politics, economics, and history, Feuerbach lapsed back into the same religious-attitude that he
criticized in Bauer and Stirner. He also conceived of nature as if it were a sort of unmediated
objectivity, i.e., as if it were still the prehistorical nature “not yet been subdued” by human
civilization.182 As Hook put it, Marx is criticizing Feuerbach here for having defined the
“objectivity” of nature as “independent of any actual or possible human processes.”183 Or, as
Schmidt puts it when commenting on the relevant passage from The German Ideology,
Marx went beyond Feuerbach in bringing not only sensuous intuition but also the whole
of human practice into the process of knowledge as a constitutive moment...Marx, like
Feuerbach, wrote of 'the priority of external nature', although with the critical
reservation that any such priority could only exist within mediation...In Feuerbach, man
the species-being, provided with merely natural qualities, confronts the dead objectivity
of nature passively and intuitively rather than actively and practically, in a subjectivity
which remains empty. What Feuerbach described as the unity of man and nature related
only to the romantically transfigured fact that man arose out of nature...Feuerbach's man
does not emerge as an independent productive force but remains bound to pre-human
nature...Feuerbach's anthropological accentuation of man as opposed to the rest of
nature was always abstract. Nature as a whole was for Feuerbach an unhistorical,
homogeneous substratum, while the essence of the Marxist critique was the dissolution
of this homogeneity into a dialectic of Subject and Object. Nature was for Marx both an
181 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
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element of human practice and the totality of everything that exists.184
In practice, concludes Marx, the portions of nature with which humans interact are always
present as a “historical nature.”185 This is why Engels tells us in Ludwig Feuerbach and the
Outcome of Classical German Philosophy that the philosophical break with Feuerbach and the
development of the “materialist conception of history” was also necessarily connected to the
development of a more “historical conception of nature.”186 Or, as he explained in the Dialectics
of Nature, he and Marx recognized that human “development” could no longer be idealistically
“excluded from the temporal history of nature,” as it had been in Feuerbach's nature-
philosophy.187 There are no historical dimensions whatsoever to Feuerbach's philosophy of nature
and statically conceived naturalism. As Quante argues, Feuerbach simply inverted Hegel's
“active-idealist” dialectic in favour of a “passive-sensualist” naturalism. He ignored the
“historical dimension” to the relation to nature, i.e., how the human connection to the “material
environment” is “mediated by society and history.” Instead, he emphasizes a romantically
conceived “original condition.”188
This is why Marx and Engels charged him with failing to be a historian insofar as he was
a materialist, and a materialist insofar as he was a historian.189 The abstract-contemplative
Feuerbachian emphasis upon the immediacy of nature ignores that nature is itself a social
product, i.e., something recreated historically through labour and 'revolutionary practice'.
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Feuerbach went “as far as a theorist possibly can, without ceasing to be a theorist.”190 He
“stopped halfway” because the “lower half of him was a materialist, the upper half idealist.”191
Instead of proceeding into a thorough-going materialism, he did not recognize the subjective side,
human activity, as itself objective, as a material force in the world.192
All of these anti-Feuerbachian aphorisms written in 1845-46 show the point at which
Marx's materialist conception of history parts ways with the 'theoretical revolution' that he had
enthusiastically greeted only a few years earlier. In contrast to philosophical materialism,
“history and materialism do not diverge” for historical materialism.193 Marx's materialism only
discovers so many convergences between nature in its self-production as a process of “natural
history,” and human history's reproduction of it as a “historical nature.”194 Or, as Engels echoes
in the Dialectics of Nature, the “whole of nature [with which humans interact] is also now
merged in [human] history” (emphasis added).195 In fact, in a fully-developed society, the fixed
and abstract distinction between these “two sides” falls away and, in this vanishing-point,
humanity and nature, natural and social science, freedom and necessity, essence and existence,
etc., would be recognized as “inseparable.”196
Feuerbachian “materialism,” Engels stressed in the Outcome of Classical German
Philosophy, remained restricted by its own “one-sidedness” precisely because it was unable to
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develop this more “historical conception of nature.”197 Feuerbach's philosophical materialism
was still constrained by the 18th century “mechanical” notion of nature, envisioning it as a series
of separate 'things' operating in external relation to one another.198 This is an “unhistorical view
of nature” because “motion” is represented here as something which “turns eternally in a circle
and therefore never moves from the spot.”199 It was, of course, “not Feuerbach's fault that this
historical conception of nature...remained inaccessible to him,” for, his philosophy of nature was
merely symptomatic of the generally “wretched [intellectual-scientific] conditions” which
prevailed throughout Germany at the time.200 Feuerbach was not acquainted with the much more
scientific notion of nature as a “process,” and the latest developments in the natural sciences
were outside of the purview of his thinking.201
On the other hand, Engels also claims that the historical materialist conception of nature
is actually the successor of a long intellectual tradition spanning from Heraclitus to Hegel.202
Engels argues that he and Marx had appealed to, and critically appropriated the insights of, such
thinkers in light of the fact that they found the static “conception of Nature” upheld by the
mechanical “materialists” (i.e., the “old materialism” of the 18th century) to be entirely
“incompatible” with both “dialectics and modern natural science”— namely, again, since it made
no room for the comprehension of nature as a “process” or flux.203 In the Dialectics of Nature,
197 Engels, Frederick, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, C.P. Dutt (ed.),
(International Publishers: New York; 1970), 29.
198 Ibid., 26.
199 Ibid., 27.
200 Ibid., 29.
201 Ibid., 27.
202 Engels, Frederick, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Edward Aveling (trans.), (International Publishers:
New York; 2008), 45-52.
203 Ibid., 44-45: “Hegel was not simply put aside. On the contrary, one started out from his revolutionary side
described in the above, from the dialectical method...[But with Hegel] the dialectic of the concept itself became
merely a conscious reflex of the dialectical motion of the real world and the dialectic of Hegel was placed upon its
head; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing before, and placed upon its feet again. And this
materialist dialectic which for years has been our best working tool and our sharpest weapon was, remarkably
enough, discovered not only by us, but also independently of us and even of Hegel by a German worker, Joseph
86
Engels criticizes contemporary scientists and philosophers still stuck within the paradigm of this
“old materialism.” This antiquated materialism
contrast[s] to the history of mankind, which develops in time...[a] history of nature [as]
only an unfolding in space. All change, all development in nature, was denied. Natural
science, so revolutionary at the outset, suddenly found itself confronted by an out-and-
out conservative nature in which even to-day everything was as it had been at the
beginning and in which— to the end of the world or for all eternity— everything would
remain as it had been since the beginning. High as the natural science of the first half of
the eighteenth century stood above Greek antiquity in knowledge and even in the sifting
of its material, it stood just as deeply below Greek antiquity in the theoretical mastery of
this material, in the general outlook on nature.204
By dissecting the world into its dead details, this taxidermical Understanding cannot
comprehend the cosmos as an organic whole, it cannot provide us with a “general outlook on
nature” as a totality of internally-related processes. It sees the 'things' of nature only “in isolation,
apart from their connection with the vast whole,” and it is only capable of “observing them in
repose, not in motion,” “in their death, not in their life.” This is why the natural science
developed since the 18th century, despite all of its practical advancements over ancient
philosophy, fell behind it in constructing an adequate ontological conception of the universe.205
Panta rhei was the great principle introduced by the Ionians, from whom all genuine philosophy
until this day descends according to Engels in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. This was the
“primitive, naive, but intrinsically correct conception of the world” discovered by Heraclitus.
When we consider and reflect upon nature at large, or the history of mankind, or our
Dietzgen. In this way, however, the revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy was again taken up and at the same
time freed from the idealist trammels which in Hegel's hands had prevented its consistent execution. The great basic
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own intellectual activity, at first we see the picture of an endless entanglement of
relations and reactions, permutations and combinations, in which nothing remains what,
where, and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes away.
We see, therefore, at first the picture as a whole, with its individual parts still more or
less kept in the background; we observe the movements, transitions, connections, rather
than the things that move, combine, and are connected. This primitive, naive, but
intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek philosophy, and
was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus; everything is and is not, for everything is
fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away...But this
conception...does not suffice to explain the details of which this picture is made
up...This is, primarily, the task of natural science and historical research; branches of
science which the Greeks of classical times, on very good grounds, relegated to a
subordinate position...But this method of [the scientific] work [of the Understanding]
has also left us as legacy the habit of observing natural objects and processes in
isolation, apart from their connection with the vast whole; of observing them in repose,
not in motion; as constants, not as essentially variables; in their death, not in their
life...At first sight, this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of
so-called sound common sense...[But it] sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it
becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the
contemplation of individual things, it forgets the connection between them...It cannot
see the woods for the trees…[B]ut as soon as we consider the individual cases in their
general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they
become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which
causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will
be cause there and then, and vice versa...Dialectics, on the other hand, comprehends
things and their representations, ideas, in their essential connection, concatenation,
motion, origin and ending...Nature is the proof of dialectics, and it must be said for
modern science that it has furnished this proof with very rich materials increasingly
daily, and thus has shown that, in the last resort, Nature works dialectically and not
metaphysically; that she does not move in the eternal oneness of a perpetually recurring
circle, but goes through a real historical evolution...An exact representation of the
universe, of its evolution, of the development of mankind, and of the reflection of this
evolution in the minds of men, can therefore only be obtained by the methods of
dialectics with its constant regard to the innumerable actions and reactions of life and
death, of progressive or retrogressive changes. And in this spirit, the new German
philosophy has worked...This new German philosophy culminated in the Hegelian
system. In this system— and herein is its great merit— for the first time the whole
world, natural, historical, intellectual, is represented as a process— i.e., as in constant
motion, change, transformation, development; and the attempt is made to trace out the
internal connection that makes a continuous whole of all this movement and
development. From this point of view, the history of mankind no longer appeared as a
wild whirl of senseless deeds of violence, all equally condemnable at the judgment seat
of mature philosophic reason and which are best forgotten as quickly as possible, but as
the process of evolution of man himself. It was now the task of the intellect to follow
the gradual march of this process through all its devious ways, and to trace out the inner
law running through all its apparently accidental phenomena...That the Hegelian system
did not solve the problem it propounded is here immaterial. Its epoch-making merit was
that it propounded the problem...The perception of the fundamental contradiction in
German idealism led necessarily back to materialism, but— nota bene— not to the
simply metaphysical, exclusively mechanical materialism of the 18th century. Old
materialism looked upon all previous history as a crude heap of irrationality and
violence; modern materialism sees in it the process of evolution of humanity, and aims
at discovering the laws thereof...Modern materialism embraces the more recent
discoveries of natural science, according to which Nature also has its history in time.206
206 Ibid., 45-46.
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Feuerbachian naturalism was still constrained by that mechanical materialism which
precluded a more developmental view of nature and of the human relation to it. Feuerbach’s
naturalism treats humans as the passive “products” of their material “circumstances,” and, at the
same time, “forgets” that these material “circumstances are changed” by humans. Again, Marx's
materialism attempts to make-up for this shortcoming in Feuerbach's naturalism by critically re-
introducing the concept of self-change, the “active side,” πραξις, etc., which was until then
developed (but only in an abstract and anti-natural way) by idealism from Kant and Fichte to
Hegel and Bauer.207 With this principle of 'revolutionary practice' in mind, Marx contrasted his
own materialism with Feuerbach's, who could “not see that the world surrounding him is not
something directly given and the same from all eternity,” but, rather, a “historical product, the
result of the activity of a whole succession of generations.”208 And far from abandoning these
insights altogether, Marx will later return to them again in Capital when he maintains that many
of the things which, in their “present form,” “we are accustomed to consider as products of
nature” have actually been previously “mediated” by our own historical “activity,” so that the
“raw material” and ostensibly natural “object of labour” has “already been filtered through
[previously objectified] labour.” He also adds that numerous studies into “human history” have
recorded how these apparently 'natural' objects have “undergone modification by means of
labour,” and how so “many generations” have contributed to producing the “gradual
transformation” which has brought the blind forces of nature under increased “human control”
through the “agency of human labour.”209
207 Marx, Karl, 'Theses on Feuerbach', Selected Writings, Lawrence H. Simon (ed.), (Hackett Publishing
Company: Indianapolis; 1994), 99.
208 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, 'The German Ideology', Selected Writings, Lawrence H. Simon (ed.),
(Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis; 1994), 113-114.
209 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books:
London; 1990), 285-288.
89
Feuerbach's materialism could never have developed in this sort of direction. His
naturalism remained abstract and contemplative, precluding the possibility of any development
in nature or in the human relation to it. In contrast to Feuerbach, Lukacs observed that even in his
earliest writings Marx represented nature as a social category, a social product of the necessary
human interaction with it.210 As Schmidt explains, once the formative fires of labour have
reshaped the natural material in accordance with its needs, Marx argued that the “distinction”
between the human form and natural content could only be made “in abstracto.”211 Even “objects
of the simplest 'sensuous certainty'”— Feuerbach used the example of the “cherry tree” as an
object of 'sense-certainty'— are “given” to sense-consciousness “only through social
development” (emphases added).212 His “unhistorical conception of nature” could not even
permit him to recognize that the very “cherry tree” before his 'sense-certainty' was a not a
product of nature, but of history— specifically, of European commerce and colonialism.
Feuerbach, wrote Marx and Engels, is blind to the fact that the
world surrounding him is not something directly given and the same from all eternity
but the product of industry and the state of society in the sense that it is a historical
product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing on
the shoulders of the preceding one, developing further its industry and commerce, and
modifying the social order according to changed needs. Even the objects of the simplest
“sensuous certainty” are given to him only through social development, industry, and
commercial relationships. The cherry tree, like almost all fruit trees, was transplanted
into our zone by commerce only a few centuries ago, as we know, and only by this
action of a particular society in a particular time has it become “sensuous certainty” for
Feuerbach...Feuerbach speaks in particular of the viewpoint of natural science. He
mentions secrets disclosed only to the eye of the physicist and chemist. But where
would natural science be without industry and commerce? Even this “pure” natural
science receives its aim, like its material, only through commerce and industry, through
the sensuous activity of men.213
210 Lukács, Georg, History and Class Consciousness, Rodney Livingstone (trans.), (MIT Press: Cambridge;
1967), 234.
211 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (New Left Books: London; 1971),
31-33.
212 Engels, Frederick, and Marx, Karl, 'The German Ideology', Selected Writings, Lawrence H. Simon (ed.),
(Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis; 1994), 113-114. Or, see Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German
Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur
(trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 45.
213 Ibid., 45.
90
Feuerbach’s nature is a nature abstracted from human history. He ignores the
transformative effect of the human interaction with nature. Feuerbach forgets that, in our
practical connection to the planet, portions of nature become transformed into something ‘for-
man’.214 What Feuerbach conceived of as 'nature' applies only to that unmediated objectivity
which stands at the threshold of human history or dawn of civilization. At most, for Marx, this
sort of undifferentiated identity between human society and nature applies only to certain
precapitalist formations— limited as they were by the undeveloped productive powers of labour,
and bound to nature and to their 'natural species connection' to each other as if by an 'umbilical
cord'. Only then do individuals appear as products of nature's own history, or, as organic
outgrowths of the inorganic body of nature. However, historical development dissolves these
precapitalist forms of life and the restricted social relations which tether individuals to this
original metabolic unity. All progress in developing the productive forces of capitalist society is
progress away from what Feuerbachian grasped as 'nature'.
Feuerbach, therefore, never speaks of the world of man in such cases, but always takes
refuge in external nature, and moreover in nature which has not yet been subdued by
men. But every new invention, every advance made by industry, detaches another piece
from this domain, so that the ground which produces examples illustrating such
Feuerbachian propositions is steadily shrinking.215
Feuerbach's abstraction of a nature “independent” of human activity “no longer exists anywhere”
on the earth— except, perhaps, on a few “coral islands of recent origin.” The “basis of the whole
sensuous world as it now exists” is “unceasing sensuous labour.”
[I]n Manchester, for instance, Feuerbach sees only factories and machines, where a
hundred years ago only spinning-wheels and weaving-rooms were to be seen, or in the
Campagna of Rome he finds only pasture lands and swamps, where in the time of
Augustus he would have found nothing but the vineyards and villas of Roman
capitalists...So much is this activity, this unceasing sensuous labour and creation, this
production, the basis of the whole sensuous world as it now exists, that, were it
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interrupted only for a year, Feuerbach would not only find an enormous change in the
natural world, but would very soon find that the whole world of men and his own
perceptive faculty, nay his own existence, were missing. Of course, in all this the
priority of external nature remains unassailed, and all this has no application to the
original men produced by generatio aequivoca [spontaneous generation]; but this
differentiation has meaning only insofar as man is considered to be distinct from nature.
For that matter, nature, the nature that preceded human history, is not by any means the
nature in which Feuerbach lives, it is nature which today no longer exists anywhere
(except perhaps on a few Australian coral-islands of recent origin)...Certainly Feuerbach
has a great advantage over the “pure” materialists in that he realises how man too is an
“object of the senses.” But apart from the fact that he only conceives him as an “object
of the senses, not as sensuous activity,” because he still remains in the realm of theory
and conceives of men not in their given social connection, not under their existing
conditions of life, which have made them what they are, he never arrives at the really
existing active men, but stops at the abstraction “man”...As far as Feuerbach is a
materialist he does not deal with history, and as far as he considers history he is not a
materialist. With him materialism and history diverge completely, a fact which
incidentally is already obvious from what has been said.216
Marx therefore replaces Feuerbach’s emphasis upon the abstract unity between humanity
and nature with the real historical unity produced through industry's practical transformation of
the material conditions of production. On the other hand, however, Bauer's abstract antithesis
between history and nature is replaced by the real social antagonism which corresponds only
with the alienated form which the human mastery over nature assumes in a capitalist society.
From this it follows that this transformation of history into world history is not indeed a
mere abstract act on the part of the “self-consciousness,” the world spirit, or of any other
metaphysical spectre, but a quite material, empirically verifiable act, an act the proof of
which every individual furnishes as he comes and goes, eats, drinks and clothes
himself…Incidentally, when we conceive things thus, as they really are and happened,
every profound philosophical problem is resolved, as will be seen even more clearly
later, quite simply into an empirical fact. For instance, the important question of the
relation of man to nature (Bruno goes so far as to speak of “the antitheses in nature and
history” (p. 110), as though these were two separate “things” and man did not always
have before him an historical nature and a natural history) out of which all the
“unfathomably lofty works” on “substance” and “self-consciousness” were born,
crumbles of itself when we understand that [Feuerbach’s] celebrated “unity of man with
nature” has always existed in industry and has existed in varying forms in every epoch
according to the lesser or greater development of industry, just like the “struggle” of
man with nature [in Bauer], [continues] right up to the development of his productive
powers on a corresponding basis.217
The Humanization of Nature
As discussed earlier, even at his most Feuerbachian of moments in the writings of 1843-
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44, Marx retained “critical reservations” which show precisely where he had already gone
beyond the Feuerbachian philosophy which he enthusiastically greeted at the time. In his
writings from this period, all of the quintessentially ‘Feuerbachian’-sounding expressions about
nature begin to take on a modified meaning— e.g., the unassailable “priority of external nature,”
“essential dependence of man upon nature,” “humanism of nature,” etc. Feuerbach was certainly
right in recognizing what the 'comedians' of the old philosophy failed to: namely, the dependence
of society upon nature, and the recognition that human life is itself a part of nature. Marx's
materialism accepts that 'external' nature is in that sense ontologically “independent” of human
life, while human life, even in the final term of human development in socialism, remains
“dependent” upon nature. In contrast to Bauer's pure criticism, Marx recognized that the
becoming of “man for man” in history remains at all times “dependent” upon his material
connection to 'external' nature.
But, unlike Feuerbach, this materialist connection is represented by him as being
determined by the degree to which the productive powers of labour, human need and social
relations have been developed. This is why even when he follows Feuerbach by insisting in the
Manuscripts that there is an “essential dependence of man in nature” and, in The German
Ideology, that this “priority of external nature” remains “unassailed” by practice, Marx in the
same breath departs from the meaning which Feuerbach affords to these expressions. It is
precisely because of such an unassailable and essential dependence that 'external' nature can no
longer be “fixed and isolated” in its “abstract independence” from history in the way that
Feuerbach imagines.218 The nature with which humans interact cannot be divorced from the
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reciprocal influence of that interaction back upon nature.
As Schmidt characterizes it, Marx’s thought proceeds from the naturalism of Feuerbach
by supposing that “[n]ature cannot be separated from man,” but, at the same time, departs from it
by criticizing Feuerbach for forgetting that neither can “man and the accomplishments of his
spirit” in history be “separated from nature.”219 The sensuous world as it actually exists is a
product of world-history. The work of human industry and ingenuity in history has, step by step,
dissolved whatever remains of Feuerbach's 'nature'. As Marx and Engels conclude in their
criticism of Feuerbach, both the “history of nature and the history of men are dependent on each
other so long as men exist” (emphasis added).220 This is why Schmidt argues that “Marx, like
Feuerbach, wrote of 'the priority of external nature',” but, unlike Feuerbach, he did so with the
“critical reservation” in that mind that “any such priority could only exist within mediation.” For
Feuerbach, this dependence was expressed in an entirely one-sided way. The human, “bound to
pre-human nature,” confronts the “dead objectivity of nature passively,” not “actively.”221
The Feuerbachian influence upon Marx's early thought seems to be at its greatest when
we consider the connections between his conception of human nature and his overall philosophy
of nature, or, between humanism and naturalism. But these terms take on an entirely different
significance in Marx. That the “physical and spiritual life of man is tied up with nature,” writes
Marx, is just “another way of saying that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature.”222
That Marx's notion of the human species-essence, of the 'nature' of the human being, is
connected in this way to his understanding of the implicitly human essence of nature, underlines
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that his anthropology is just a special expression of a broader ontology, of a broader philosophy
of nature. In this sense, as we read earlier, he gives us the still pseudo-Feuerbachian sounding
expression in 1844: viz., the species-being (Gattungswesen) of the human being, i.e., “man’s
feelings, passions, etc., are not merely anthropological phenomena,” but “truly ontological
affirmations of [the] being (of nature).”223 This “species-being” of man— which is by no means
mere sense-certainty for Marx, but rather “conscious life activity”— this “species-being” is in
that sense just nature lifted to the level of self-consciousness, a portion of nature raised to the
universal awareness of itself. “Nature attains self-consciousness in men,” Schmidt agrees, which
is to say that human history is for Marx in some sense an essential “part of nature” and
“constitutes nature's self-movement” toward a more human form.224 This species-nature of the
human being, as Lynne confirms, is just “nature become conscious of its worth,” and “knowledge
of one's self as nature become conscious.”225
As elaborated earlier, however, Marx had criticized Feuerbach precisely for rejecting this
Hegelian distinction between essence and existence. Because he has a quite different conception
of species-essence, these seemingly Feuerbachian expressions about the essential dependence of
society upon nature take on a totally transformed in Marx’s writings. In fact, they become
cornerstones in a philosophy of praxis which is explicitly anti-Feuerbachian, which was
developed with Feuerbach as a foil. Marx’s use of Feuerbachian categories, e.g., humanism and
naturalism, are the bearers of a radically new meaning and they operate within a completely
different theoretical context. As Schmidt explains of Marx's critique, because Feuerbach
“unreflectively” defined nature as an “unhistorical, homogeneous substratum,” falling into the
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romantic “myth of a 'pure nature'” unmediated by human practice, he thereby also “identified the
immediate existence of men with their essence.”226 Marx believed that this error led Feuerbach to
a passive sensualism which both romanticizes nature and naturalizes social reality.
As such, Feuerbach did not recognize that the question of the identity between humanism
and naturalism, between the essence of the species and its socio-natural existence, is a practical
and historical question. For Feuerbach, the dependence of humanity upon nature was expressed
in an entirely one-sided way. In contrast to Feuerbach, insists Lynne, “Marx's point” about the
essential dependence of human society upon nature is two-sided. For Marx, says Lynne, the
“essential dependence of man in nature”
[does] not merely [imply] that we are dependent on nature [for subsistence], but that the
character of this dependence is dialectical, that is, we are the product of a process of
overcoming and assimilating that material world...[We are] the genius to transform the
sensuous material world into the image of humanity who understands itself as nature
become conscious of its worth.227
As Marx expresses it in a passage from the manuscript on Estranged Labor— which is
presumably the passage which Lynne is commenting upon in the above—
[t]he animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it.
It is its life activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his
consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not a determination with which he
directly merges. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life
activity. It is just because of this that he is a species-being. Or it is only because he is a
species-being that he is a conscious being, i.e., that his own life is an object for him.
Only because of that is his activity free activity. Estranged labor reverses the
relationship, so that it is just because man is a conscious being that he makes his life
activity, his essential being, a mere means to his existence. In creating a world of objects
by his personal activity, in his work upon inorganic nature, man proves himself a
conscious species-being, i.e., as a being that treats the species as his own essential being,
or that treats itself as a species-being. Admittedly animals also produce. They build
themselves nests, dwellings, like the bees, beavers, ants, etc. But an animal only
produces what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It produces one-sidedly,
whilst man produces universally. It produces only under the dominion of immediate
physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free from physical need and only
truly produces in freedom therefrom. An animal produces only itself, whilst man
reproduces the whole of nature. An animal’s product belongs immediately to its physical
body, whilst man freely confronts his product. An animal forms only in accordance with
the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to
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produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply
everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms objects in
accordance with the laws of beauty. It is just in his work upon the objective world,
therefore, that man really proves himself to be a species-being. This production is his
active species-life. Through this production, nature appears as his work and his reality.
The object of labor is, therefore, the objectification of man’s species-life: for he
duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in
reality, and therefore he sees himself in a world that he has created.228
It is in “practice,” in “work,” Marx stresses elsewhere in the same manuscript, where we
find proof of the “universality which makes the whole of nature his inorganic body.”229 As
Marcuse argues of this passage, it shows that
[f]ar from being a mere economic activity, labor is the 'existential activity' of man, his
'free, conscious activity'— not [simply] a means for maintaining his life, but developing
his 'universal nature'...his faculties, powers, and needs...These terms point back to
Feuerbach and to Hegel. Man's very nature lies in his universality. His intellectual and
physical faculties can be fulfilled only if all men exist as men, in the developed wealth
of their human resources...The emphasis on universality brings nature as well into the
self-development of mankind. Man is free if 'nature is his work and his reality', so that
he 'recognizes himself in a world he has himself made'.230
But in Feuerbachian philosophy, by juxtaposition, nature is represented as a purely unmediated
objectivity. Neither does the human being arise out of nature as a historical being, since she
remains completely submerged within natural history. Thus, as Marcuse argues, when Marx
writes of the “essence of man,” it is a “quite different matter” than when “Bruno Bauer, Stirner
and Feuerbach” do so.231 Into his “definition of man's essential being,” Marx “inserts the basic
traits of practical and social existence.”232 This is why Marx tells us in the Theses on Feuerbach
that human nature is not an abstraction inhering in each isolated individual, but is only realized
in and through the total ensemble of social relations.233 For Marx, elaborates Marcuse, it is not a
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question about an “abstract human essence” which can therefore be realized just as abstractly
through mere philosophy; rather, the whole issue turns completely on the “task” left for
“historical praxis.”
[The] discovery of the historical character of the human essence does not mean that the
history of man's essence can be identified with his factual history...Essence and
existence are separate in him: his existence is a “means” in the realization of his essence,
or— in estrangement— his essence is a means to his mere physical existence. If essence
and existence have become thus separated and if the real and free task of human praxis
is the unification of both as factual realization, then the authentic task...is the radical
abolition of this facticity...The factual situation of capitalism is characterized not merely
by economic or political crisis but by a catastrophe affecting the human essence.234
In the relationship between these two “essential beings”— nature and humanity— there is
an “essential dependence of man in nature” because the human being is, by nature, a natural
being or part of the system of nature. Yet, while Marx follows Feuerbach in defining 'Man' as a
“natural being,” we have seen that he added the caveat that the human being is not “merely a
natural being,” but a “human natural being.”235 His claims about the “dependence” of society
upon nature and the insuperable priority of external nature therefore take on a peculiar
ontological-anthropological significance not found in the writings of Feuerbach. Lynne is right
that, for Marx, this implies not simply that “nature for man” is the natural “existence of man”—
as, say, in food— but, what is more, that “man for man” is at the same time the highest
expression of the “existence of nature,” the self-revealing “human essence of nature.” This is
why he asserts that the “entire [course of] so-called world history is only the creation of man
through human labor,” which again, since he is a natural being, also necessarily demands the
historical “development of nature for man.”236 The practical transformation of nature has this
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“essential connection with man's essential nature” in Marx's writings.237 Appealing to Hegel (and
Bauer), Marx refers to the highest form of this essential connection in socialism as the completed
unity between essence and existence, the “resurrection of nature.”238
It follows from this internal relationship between human nature and so-called 'external'
nature, between completed humanism and completed naturalism, etc., that the highest form of
society would be one which has realized most completely this 'human essence of nature' through
a process of revolutionary praxis. A truly human society, and a correspondingly human relation
to nature, is one which actualizes to the fullest and freest possible degree the essential powers
and needs of each and every individual in relations of mutual recognition with one another. Once
this “natural existence of man [has] become his human existence and nature become human,”
then we can truly say with Marx: “society is the completed, essential unity of man with
nature.”239Communism, he therefore declared, is this Oedipal “riddle of history” at last resolved:
the “resolution” not only to the social antagonism between “man and man,” but also, with it, the
“resolution” to the “conflict between man and nature.”240 Communism completed is, at once, the
“humanism of nature” and “naturalism of man” realized, the unity which as “completed
naturalism is humanism” and as “completed humanism it is naturalism.”241
This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully
developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict
between man and nature and between man and man— the true resolution to the strife
between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between
freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle
of history solved, and it knows itself as this solution...The human essence of nature first
exists only for social man; for only here does nature exist for him as a bond with
Publishers: New York; 2009), 142-145.
237 Marx, Karl, 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts', Selected Writings, Lawrence H. Simon (ed.),
(Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis; 1994), 76.
238 Marx, Karl, 'Private Property and Communism', The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,
Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 137, 142-145. Marx, Karl,
'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts', Selected Writings, Lawrence H. Simon (ed.), (Hackett Publishing
Company: Indianapolis; 1994), 77.
239 Ibid., 73.
240 Ibid., 79.
241 Ibid., 72.
99
man...Only here does nature exist as the foundation of his own human existence. Only
here has what is to him his natural existence become his own human existence, and
nature become man for him. Thus [socialist] society is the unity of [the] being of man
with nature— the true resurrection of nature— the naturalism of man and the human of
nature both brought to fulfillment...We see how subjectivism and objectivism,
spiritualism and materialism, activity and suffering, only lose their antithetical
character...we see how the resolution of the theoretical antitheses is only possible in a
practical way, by virtue of the practical energy of man...The nature which develops in
human history— the genesis of human society— is man's real nature; hence nature as it
develops through industry, even though in an estranged form, is true anthropological
nature...History is a real part of natural history— of nature developing into man...But
since for the socialist man the entire so-called history of the world is nothing but the
creation of man through human labor, nothing but the emergence of nature for man, so
he has the visible, irrefutable truth of birth through himself, of the process of his
creation...[M]an has become for man as the being of nature, and nature for man as the
being of man has become practical, sensuous, perceptible.242
In all of these passages, we find that the nature of the human being and the human
essence of nature are coterminous expressions for Marx. The realization of completed humanism
is naturalism, just as completed naturalism is humanism. “Nature for man” is the foundation for
the coming-into-being of “man for man” because the mastery of natural necessity provides the
material basis for the real possibility and practicability of human freedom. Hence, history shows
that the “reshaping of nature by men” both requires, and results in, a reciprocal “reshaping of
men by men”.243 This is yet another lasting feature of Marx’s materialism. In Capital, for
instance, he repeats the same essential point. The human “acts upon external nature and changes
it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature,” because he “realizes” his own
“purposes” in those materials.244 But it was during this early period of self-clarification in the
first half of the 1840s that Marx began to recognize for the first time the radically humanistic
implications of this connection between his philosophy of nature and his philosophy of praxis.
Since “man is shaped by [his] environment,” Marx and Engels explained as early as The Holy
Family, then “his environment must be made human.” “[W]hat has to be done is to arrange the
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empirical world in such a way that man experiences and becomes accustomed to what is truly
human in it and that he becomes aware of himself as man.”245
This is why, during this period in his intellectual development, Marx referred variously to
the humanization of nature and naturalization of humanity, the human essence of nature and
natural existence of man, completed humanism as naturalism and completed naturalism as
humanism.246 These statements also give expression to the often ignored ethical substance of
Marx's materialist conception of history and equally historical conception of nature. Communism,
the final form to be given to this process of social development and relation to nature, is not the
'end' of human history or 'goal' of human society for Marx. Communism is merely the necessary
form which such a society would have to assume in order to realize its highest goal— which is
nothing else but human society itself. In that sense, as he will tell us a decade later, capitalism
marks the end of the prehistory of humankind and the passage into truly human history.
We see how the history of industry and the established objective existence of industry
are the open book of man’s essential powers, the exposure to the sense of human
psychology. Hitherto this was not conceived in its inseparable connection with man’s
essential being, but only in an external relation of utility, because, moving in the realm
of estrangement, people could only think of man’s general mode of being— religion or
history in its abstract-general character as politics, art, literature, etc.— as the reality of
man’s essential powers and man’s species-activity. We have before us the objectified
essential powers of man in the form of sensuous, alien, useful objects, in the form of
estrangement, displayed in ordinary material industry...[N]atural science has invaded
and transformed human life all the more practically through the medium of industry;
and has prepared human emancipation, although its immediate effect had to be the
furthering of the dehumanisation of man. Industry is the actual, historical relationship of
nature, and therefore of natural science, to man. If, therefore, industry is conceived as
the exoteric revelation of man’s essential powers, we also gain an understanding of the
human essence of nature or the natural essence of man...Communism is the position as
the negation of the negation, and is hence the actual phase necessary for the next stage
of historical development in the process of human emancipation and rehabilitation.
Communism is the necessary pattern and the dynamic principle of the immediate future,
but communism as such is not the goal of human development— wh[ose] goal is the
structure of human society.247
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Conclusion
In contrast to Bauer, who reduced natural necessity, need, and nature to a stick, we have
seen in this chapter that Marx recognized nature as a fundamental premise of all history and of
all human development. His elaboration of the real premises of materialism acknowledge the
human dependence upon nature in ways that Bauer’s philosophy of self-consciousness could not.
Although they mocked the ‘Holy Father’ for being unable to feel the pangs of hunger, Marx and
Engels ground their whole conception of history on the fact that humans must satisfy the needs
of life before they can begin to make history. Thus, they only begin to make their own history by
remaking the material conditions which environ their social life. In their exposition of these real
premises, Marx and Engels argue that by satisfying their given needs, humans also develop new
needs and new ways of satisfying them. As they develop their relations to one another and to
nature over time, they therefore develop themselves as individuals.
Hence, in contrast to Feuerbach, for whom history and nature diverge, Marx’s
materialism presents the human relation to nature as a dynamic, rather than a static, one. He
criticizes Feuerbach for not being a materialist when he is a historian, and not being a historian
when he is a materialist. That is why this chapter has argued that Marx’s materialist conception
of history was developed in conjunction with a much more historical conception of nature. He
presents the nature with which humans interact as a social product. In opposition to Feuerbachian
naturalism, which conceives of nature as a homogeneous objectivity untouched by human
activity over time, Marx grasps nature in its historically-modified forms.
In the final section of this chapter, I argued that this connection between Marx’s
materialist conception of human history and historical conception of the human relation to nature
had significant implications for his political theory and vision of an emancipated society. Since
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humans are shaped by their relation to nature, nature and the human relation to it must be
reshaped into a more human form. Precisely because humankind is dependent upon nature, the
coming-into-being of ‘man as man’ was for Marx dependent upon actualizing the ‘human
essence of nature’. This confluence between natural and human history is one which he
understood as involving the simultaneous humanization of nature and naturalization of humanity.
In this higher form of society, the antagonism between existence and essence, objectification and
affirmation, freedom and necessity— nature and society— would have to be resolved. Society
would, for the first time, have to enter into a human relation to the world of which it is but a part.
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Conclusion
Part I of this dissertation has focused primarily upon the writings composed between
1843 and 1846. This period in Marx’s early intellectual development, as he himself tells us, was
one of both critique and of self-clarification. He underwent a 'settling of accounts' with Hegel,
the Hegelian dialectic, and the Left Hegelians— and, indeed, with his own former philosophical
self. The result of this intense phase in his early intellectual development was the doctrine of
historical materialism— a result which Marx regarded as the 'guiding' thread of his life's work.
However, Part I also defended the interpretive position that the development of this 'materialist
conception of history' involved, at the same time, the development of a completely new
conception of nature. Indeed, we have seen that the first formulations of this new conception of
history emerged out of the break with Bauer and with Feuerbach, and, specifically, the break
with their conceptions of the relationship between history and nature. The rupture between
Bauer's idealism and Marx's materialist conception of history, as well as the rupture between
philosophical and historical materialism, took place through Marx’s retheorization of the
category of nature and the rethinking of the role of nature within the dialectic of negativity.
In formulating this historical conception of nature, 'historical' because it is remade by
labour, Marx departed decisively from both Feuerbach's abstract unity between man and nature,
as well as Bauer's abstract antithesis between nature and history. For Bauer, the Olympian self-
consciousness of the critic is born through the speculative 'death of nature'. He imaginatively
overcomes necessity by reducing the sensuous world of nature to a 'stick'. For Feuerbach, by
contrast, there is an immediate identity between humanism and naturalism, and all contradictions
find their resolution only in the ideal compensation of the species as a whole. His materialism
conceives of nature in a static way which abstracts it from history, and it is just as true that for
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him 'Man' as a species-being remains submerged within this unhistorical nature. Marx, however,
understood nature in a more historically mediated manner. As it exists today, nature is a social
product, and so too, for that matter, is the human nature which has transformed it. Marx's
conception of the convergence between natural and human history, or, of the simultaneous
humanization of nature and naturalization of human society, takes on an entirely different
significance when compared to the connection between humanism and naturalism in Feuerbach.
For Marx, the connection between humanism and naturalism is only fully realized when human
history properly speaking begins. This coming-into-being of human society through labour, this
total social movement, is communism— i.e., the only society in which Marx believed we find
the completed unity between humanity and nature.
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Part II
The Original Unity & Historic Separation
From the Inorganic Body of Nature
Introduction
Part I of this dissertation tracked the changes which took place in Marx's conception of
nature during the mid-1840s. Part II shifts the emphasis of the presentation to the writings of the
late-1850s and 1860s, especially those in which he elaborates his theory of the ‘metabolism’
(Stoffwechsel). During this phase in his intellectual development, Marx articulated his
philosophy of nature in a more historically precise form through his description of precapitalist
societies, account of primitive accumulation, and critique of the ecological rift specific to
capitalism. In his preparatory work for Capital, he uncovered a fundamental difference between
the precapitalist and capitalist modes of this metabolism, and, through an analysis of the
contradictions of bourgeois society, foresaw the possibility of a new relation to nature
developing within a postcapitalist order. This discovery, and his analysis of it in the Grundrisse
and beyond, had a lasting impact upon his thinking about the intersections between nature,
history, and human development. It would continue to inform his political theory and conception
of socialism, as well as shape his views on precapitalist formations and the history of primitive
accumulation, until the very last of his writings. Marx’s representations of these precapitalist and
capitalist forms of the metabolism, and his vision of a radically new relation to nature in
socialism, constitute the themes for Part II of this dissertation.
On account of the limited development given to the productive powers of individuals, Marx
argued that all precapitalist societies were based upon an immediate unity with the earth. In
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contrast to this, he contended that the capitalist mode of production presupposes an
unprecedented separation between the original and eternal sources of all wealth— labour and
nature. As we will learn in Part II, he located the origins of this antagonism in the historical
period which separates the dissolution of feudalism proper from the genesis of capitalist relations
in England— a period of ‘original accumulation’ marked by the often violent ‘clearing away’ of
the labourers from their property in the land. By ‘denuding’ individuals of their nature-given
connections to the soil, this process created the class of ‘free’ labourers required for the coming-
into-being of capitalism. Capitalism’s own reproduction process also expands this rift in the
metabolism on a constantly increasingly scale, completing the estrangement of labour from
nature. Yet, just as the decomposition of feudalism in England laid down all the presuppositions
for the emergence of bourgeois society, so too did Marx believe that the dissolution of capital
would posit the preconditions required for the creation of a still higher form of social life. Its
contradictions push it toward its own inherent barriers, unintentionally providing the groundwork
for human emancipation in the future. In his conception of such a free society, the old union with
nature would be restored, except in a form actually fit for the full development of individuals.
Chapter One, ‘Nature’s Workshop’, examines Marx’s representations of precapitalist life. It
begins by exploring the significance of his general characterization of nature as the “nature-given
inorganic body” of the commune. All precapitalist communities were founded upon an “original
intertwinement” between the worker and this “natural workshop of the soil.” Of course, every
particular precapitalist society presupposed its own “specific objective unity” with these natural
conditions of life and labour. In Marx’s representations of the earliest form of the archaic
commune, i.e., the ‘primitive socialism’ which stands at the dawn of human history, communal
ownership of the land and collectivized forms of labour are said to prevail. Individuals are, by
necessity, linked to one another and to the earth given the undeveloped state of their productive
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powers and their restricted forms of intercourse. It is their “natural species connection” to one
another, and the “umbilical chord” that still attaches them to the soil, which forms their social
bond. However, this clan communism was more or less dissolved everywhere into a multiplicity
of forms. These multiple lines of development out of primitive communism, in which the old
communal property exists in various states of decomposition and transformation, were
categorized by Marx as Slavic, Feudal, etc. In ‘Nature’s Workshop’, I focus primarily on the
three main precapitalist formations which he identifies in the Formen section of the
Grundrisse— i.e., Asiatic, Classical and Germanic.
The first chapter ends by defending the interpretative position that Marx grasped these
different forms as expressing different degrees in the development of the productive powers and
relations of individuals. The decomposition of communal property and communal labour— or,
what is the same thing, the emergence of the 'dualism' or 'antithesis' between personal and
collective property— provided those precapitalist forms further removed from the original state
of the commune with a broader basis for the development of 'individuality'. These precapitalist
developments in property and production broke down the “natural fate” of the older commune,
replacing its purely “naturally-arisen” relations and conditions with this “historically-modified”
presence of the individual. This is why although Marx recognized multiple paths of precapitalist
development, which even co-existed alongside one another at the same moments in history, he
nonetheless regarded them as marking (relative to one another) “progressive” stages in the
historical becoming of human society.
Yet, notwithstanding such developments, all of these different forms were based upon
comparatively restricted relations, narrow needs, and limited productive powers. According to
Marx, there was no room in any of these societies for the free and full development of
individuals precisely because they still had to be cut loose from the 'umbilical cord' of the soil,
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and, as Stueart puts it, torn from the bosom of nature upon which they were raised. Chapter Two,
‘The Separation between Labour and Nature’, examines the significance of Marx’s claim that
capitalism presupposes such a separation of labour from nature. Capitalist relations of
production rest upon a class of 'free labourers'— 'free' because liberated from their previous
connections to the land, to their own labour, and to the community as a whole. In a capitalist
economy, the purely subjective capacity of labour, labour-power, exists in its isolation from the
objective means of its actualization— in the first instance, from nature. From this one
precondition, satirizes Marx, the bourgeoisie derives its divine or nature-given right to exploit
the wealth-creating activities of others. One class of individuals, stripped away from the land and
torn from their connection to the means of production through a historical process, now have
nothing left to sell but their own labour-power to another class of individuals, i.e., those who
now own the means of production and nature itself as their private property.
As far as Marx was concerned, what “really requires explanation” is not the “unity” of
humanity and nature in precapitalist society, but the historic processes which produced this
unprecedented “separation” between them. This is a question which he believed the economists
had mystified by conflating the coming-into-being of capitalism with its being-for-itself, thereby
'naturalizing' the latter as the aeterno modo of the human metabolism with nature. For Marx, by
contrast, the “natural laws” of capitalist production, which are by no means laws of nature
common to every epoch, are founded exclusively upon this artificial product of modern history—
this isolation of labour from property. Moreover, since this separation is a precondition for the
emergence of capital, and not at first a result reproduced by it, he traced its origins back into the
prehistory of modern society, i.e., to a period of primitive accumulation which preceded
capitalist accumulation in England. By examining these issues in detail, the second chapter will
attempt to draw out the integral connections between Marx's critique of political economy,
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account of primitive accumulation, and theory of the metabolism with nature.
Although this separation is a necessary presupposition for capitalism, wage-labour, through
its own systematic reproduction, reproduces this divorce in ever-greater proportions. In Chapter
Three, ‘The Metabolic Rift’, we will find that this isolation of labour from nature, while initiated
by acts of primitive accumulation, is therefore completed only in the capitalist economy. I will
also defend the interpretation that Marx recognized both the sociological and environmental
implications of this metabolic ‘rift’, one which he believed to be irreparable from the limited
standpoint of capital. This is arguably where we find him at the most explicitly ecological point
in his intellectual development. Deforestation, desertification, salinization, erosion, pollution, the
destruction of the nutrient cycle, etc., these, too, according to Marx, are products of the capitalist
mode of production. The blind necessity of capitalism, i.e., its “general exploitation” of the
human qualities and forces of nature, is absolutely antithetical to a form of production founded
upon rationally regulating the necessary interchange with the environment. All progress in
capitalism, he writes, is “progress” in the simultaneous “robbing” of the vitality of labour and of
the fertility of the soil— those original and ultimate sources of all wealth.
However, because Marx regarded this diremption from nature as part of a necessary
phase of estrangement, he also argued that the contradictions of capital produce the preconditions
required for the creation of a higher form of social life, i.e., one which has freed itself from these
fetters on human development as well as from the estrangement vis-a-vis nature. Capitalism’s
ruthlessly universalizing tendencies give a great impetus to the development of the productive
powers of social labour. It pushes wage-labour passed the “natural paltriness” of precapitalist
forms of production, providing the conditions and relations necessary to consciously control our
own interaction with nature in the future. This dialectic forms the subject matter for the fourth
chapter of Part II, ‘The Restoration of Nature and Full Development of the Individual’. I will
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demonstrate that Marx adhered to the view that the social revolution would have to overcome the
metabolic rift characteristic of capitalism, and ‘restore’ the original communal union with the
“inorganic body” of nature— except, in a social form adequate for the most complete
development of the human being, and fit for the appropriation of her total social bond with others.
Having sublated the productive forces of labour developed in an antagonistic manner by
capitalism, Marx envisions such a socialist society as being based upon the return to the
“recognition of nature” as our “real body,” but, as a recognition “equally present” for the first
time in our own “practical power” over the intercourse with it.
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Nature’s Workshop
Introduction: Precapitalist Nature as the Inorganic Body of the Commune
Marx’s critique of political economy demystifies the so-called 'natural laws' of capital
because it illustrates that they proceed from preconditions which are by no means natural, but
historical. Capitalism is predicated upon a definite social relationship: viz., the “encounter” in
the marketplace between the owner of the means of labour and the seller of labour-power.248 This
‘free’ worker is compelled to sell her own wealth-creating powers, like Esau did “his birthright
for a mess of pottage,” because of the presupposed separation which exists here between labour
as a purely subjective capacity and the objective conditions of its realization.249 Yet this
propertylessness of the wage-labourer is no more the creation of nature than are interest rates,
rents, and the categories of classical political economy. Instead, Marx treats the relationship
between the capitalist who possesses the materials, instruments, and conditions of production,
and the wage-worker who has nothing left to sell but her own productive power, as a product of
history.250 It is a historical result resting upon the dissolution of earlier forms of production and
of their socially specific relationships to nature.
According to Marx, prior to the emergence of capitalism, the metabolic interchange between
society and nature was predicated upon the immediate unity of the labourer with the material
means necessary for labour’s actualization. Precapitalist societies proceeded from, and
reproduced anew, this original interconnection between human social life and its nature-given
‘body’ in the sea, soil, woodlands, mountains, etc. However, far from romanticizing this unity
248 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 488-489.
249 See Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 307; Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I,
(Penguin Books: London; 1990), 382.
250 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
1990), 270-271, 273-75.
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between precapitalist nature and precapitalist society, Marx was usually quite critical of central
aspects of it. Although integral to his developmental conception of human history, this critique
has been dismissed or downplayed by contemporary secondary literature aimed at recovering
Marx’s theory of the ‘metabolism’ with nature. More often than not, though, Marx characterizes
this sort of restricted relation to the earth— whether in France, Russia, India, or Ireland— as one
based upon narrowly defined needs, limited social relations, and undeveloped productive powers.
In all of its various forms, precapitalist society was founded upon the relative
‘immaturity’ of the intellectual and practical powers of the human being.251 There is no
possibility whatsoever here for the free and full development of individuals.252 Universally-
developed individuals are for Marx a product of history, not nature.253 In Capital, he asserts that
these social forms are “conditioned by a low stage of development of the productive powers of
labour and correspondingly limited relations between men,” hence, “also limited relations
between man and nature.”254 As Anderson notes, neither does the Grundrisse “idealize” these
precapitalist forms because he viewed them as being “confined” to a “restricted level of
economic and social development” inconsistent with the full actualization of the essential powers
of the human race.255 Marx did not romanticize the precapitalist “dependence” upon a still
unmodified nature because, Schmidt agrees, it “necessarily correspond[ed]” with (quoting the
Grundrisse now) a “level of development of human productive powers which is limited and must
251 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
1990), 173.
252 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 487.
253 Ibid., 158.
254 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
1990), 173.
255Anderson, Kevin, Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies, (University of
Chicago Press: Chicago; 2010), 161.
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in principle be limited.”256
In these “pre-bourgeois form[s],” Schmidt elaborates, there was no estranged “division
between labour and its natural preconditions,” but this also means that individuals were more or
less “yoked” to the immediate circumstances of their “natural existence.”257 “Man, at the
beginning of his history,” Fromm concurs, is “blindly bound or chained to nature” for Marx.258
Precisely because the appropriation of nature appears in the first instance simply as the
appropriation of the purely natural preconditions of production (e.g., in the sense that nature
provides labour with its original instrument, larder, workshop, material, etc.), it follows that the
most undeveloped precapitalist communities remained bound to the still unmodified conditions
of their own intercourse with nature. Marx represents these forms of social life as being regulated
by the cycles of the seasons and tethered to the given limits of the soil from which they sprung.
Of course, the ‘iron necessity’ and ‘natural laws’ of capitalist development have their
own mechanical rhythm and heightened tempo, quite distinct from this ebb and flow of the
natural cycles, but against which the power of prayer and constant sacrifice of human life proves
to be just as inefficacious. As stated in the above, Marx argued that all of these economic laws
proceed from the precondition that there is already an established separation between the simple
subjectivity of labour, and the objective means of its realization. These laws presuppose, in short,
the nakedness of a worker denuded of the ‘natural workshop’ that is the earth.259 Yet, this
presupposition is itself a historic result, the origins of which therefore precedes capitalist
development in time and belongs, properly speaking, to what Marx refers as the prehistory of
256 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (Verso Books: London; 2014), 178-179.
257 Ibid., 81.
258 Fromm, Erich, Marx's Concept of Man, (Ungar Publishing: New York; 1961), 14.
259 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 471-472.
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modern society.260 Later, in the second chapter of this portion of the dissertation, we will
discover not only that the initial formation of capital rests upon the decomposition of this
original unity between nature and precapitalist society, but that the dissolution was made
possible by an ‘original accumulation’ which must therefore predate capitalist accumulation.
Chapter Three will go on to demonstrate that capital, in its own further development,
systematically reproduces and deepens this diremption from nature through the continual
expropriation of estranged labour, and, in doing so according to Marx, ‘completes’ the metabolic
rupture between human life and the means of life. Before undertaking such an endeavour,
however, this chapter considers the significance of Marx's representations of this 'natural unity'
characteristic of precapitalist society, unpacking along the way its implications for his overall
theory of the metabolism.
The “main point” to keep in mind through all this is that nowhere in Marx’s examination
of the precapitalist forms of the metabolism did he discover the “dot-like isolation” of the “mere
free worker,” i.e., one whose capacity to labour appears from the outset separated as a purely
subjective potential from the material moments of its actualization.261 Only in the topsy-turvy
world of capital does this separation of labour from the objective means of its realization appear
as the very precondition for production.262 Instead, Marx claimed to have uncovered, through his
study of a variety of historical and contemporary precapitalist societies, only so many forms to
the unity between the worker and the natural workshop of the soil. This unity, in all of its
precapitalist modes, existed prior to production.263 This means that the appropriation of nature
appears not so much as a result of labour, but “presupposed to labour,” i.e., as the “appropriation
260 Ibid., 471. Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books:
London; 1990), 871.
261 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 485.
262 Ibid., 471.
263 Ibid., 472, 475, 485.
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of the natural conditions of labour” (emphasis added). It is nature alone which supplies labour
with its original “larder” and “natural workshop,” the “original instrument of labour as well as its
workshop and repository of raw materials.” Here, the “individual relates simply to the objective
conditions of labour as being his,” i.e., as the “inorganic nature of his subjectivity, in which the
latter realizes itself”— although, again, not in such a way that it actually “appear[s] as a product
of labour,” but, instead, only as something pregiven and “already there as nature.”264
“Within pre-capitalist forms,” reiterates Bologh, the necessary connection between labour
and the “objective conditions for realizing” it exists prior to the actual activity of production.
The “individual does not have to produce” this connection to nature; instead, the “individual’s
subjective existence” from the outset “includes its objective conditions (the land)” within or as a
part of itself.265 “What is decisive here,” says Schmidt, is that “men act in relation to these
conditions unreflectingly, as if to an extension of their own bodies.”266 Just as we still presuppose
today that our own five senses are faculties endowed by nature (even though they, too, are
modified later by practical activity), so too did precapitalist society presuppose an essential
connection to the earth as its inorganic body. Marx claims that the individual relates to ‘external’
nature here in the same way that he does “his skin, his sense organs.”267 There is no artificial-
social division between the subject and object of the productive process, between this natural
form of labour and the natural conditions of production in the soil. Instead, the particular plot of
land upon which the community sits is regarded by its members as their own inorganic
objectivity, their own social being. In such precapitalist forms of production, the “human being's
264 Ibid., 471, 485.
265 Bologh, Roslyn Wallach, Dialectical Phenomenology, (Routledge: 2010; New York), 80.
266 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (Verso Books: London; 2014), 172.
267 The individual’s “objective mode of existence in his own ownership of the land, an existence presupposed to his
activity,” is the very “presupposition of his activity just like his skin, his sense organs, which of course he also
reproduces and develops, etc., in the life process, but which are nevertheless presuppositions of this process of his
reproduction.”Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.),
(Penguin Books: London; 1993), 485.
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relation to his natural conditions of production” is “presupposed along with his own being,” and
he relates to them as “natural presuppositions of his self, which only form, so to speak, his
extended body.”268
The earth is the great workshop, the arsenal which furnishes both means and material of
labour, as well as the seat, the base of the community. They relate naively to it as the
property of the community, of the community producing and reproducing itself in living
labour. Each individual conducts himself only as a link…The real appropriation
through the labour process happens under these presuppositions, which are not
themselves the product of labour, but appear as its natural or divine presuppositions.269
As Lyotard argues of these sorts of passages from the Grundrisse, Marx represents this
inorganic body of nature as being “bound up with the organic body” of the individual— but as
an undifferentiated identity “given” by nature itself and “not produced” by labour.270 In fact, at
one point in the Grundrisse, Marx goes so far as to suggest that in a certain sense this
precapitalist individual “does not relate to his conditions of production,” but rather unreflectively
lives a “double existence, both subjectively as he himself, and objectively in these natural
nonorganic conditions of his existence” (emphasis added).271 Schmidt also picks up on the
significance of this point, from which he concludes that the implication of this statement is that
labour “enters for the first time in a real sense into a 'relationship'” with the “objective
condition[s]” of labour only after it has been separated from them, i.e., only with the diremption
from nature which marks off the rosy dawn of capitalist history.272 In the strictest sense of the
term, then, these precapitalist societies are pre-‘dialectical’ insofar as there is as of yet no
negation of the original and relatively unmediated unity with nature. These social forms have not
yet passed through the necessary crucible which will separate them from these, the conditions of
their existence, and, as such, for the first time force them into a relationship with them.
268 Ibid., 491.
269 Ibid., 472.
270 Lyotard, Jean-Francois, Libidinal Economy, (trans.) Iain Hamilton Grant, (Continuum: London; 2004), 129.
271 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 491.
272 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (Verso Books: London; 2014), 82.
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Even for the “slave and the serf this was not the case,” notes Schmidt of Marx’s view, “since
they were [appropriated as] merely accidental properties of the material earth.”273 “Under slavery
and serfdom there is basically no division between labour and its natural prerequisites;” rather,
both “moments merge to form an undifferentiated natural basis for the existence of the slave-
owner or the feudal lord.”274 Schmidt repeats this same point elsewhere in the same text:
“Slavery and serfdom know of no separation of labour from its inorganic conditions...The two
moments merge to form an undifferentiated, uniform natural basis for the slave-owner or the
feudal-lord, who conquer the slave and serf” by appropriating their labour as an “organic
accessory of the land.”275 If Schmidt’s reading is correct, as I believe it is, then surely Lyotard
must be mistaken in arguing that Marx’s characterizations of precapitalist nature as the inorganic
body of the community “preclud[es]” all “relation[s] of domination.”276 This metabolic unity
with nature— while it does not necessarily and, Marx speculates, does not originally include
such relations of personal domination— in no way excludes the possibility that the “workers
themselves, the living labour capacities themselves,” “directly” form part of the “objective
conditions of production, and are appropriated as such— i.e., are slaves or serfs.”277 In other
words, far from precluding relations of domination, where such relations do emerge the
dominated are actually incorporated into and appropriated as a part of the natural body of the
community, i.e., they appear as an organic outgrowth of the inorganic body of nature. In the case
of “[s]lavery, bondage, etc.,” Marx insists, the slave or bondsman “appears among the natural
conditions of production for a third individual or community.”278
273 Ibid., 82.
274 Ibid., 81.
275 Ibid., 175.
276 Lyotard, Jean-Francois, Libidinal Economy, (trans.) Iain Hamilton Grant, (Continuum: London; 2004), 129-130.
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For example, defeat in war sometimes “makes the clan conquered by another clan
propertyless and throws it among the inorganic conditions of the conquerors’ reproduction”—
that is, it transforms the members of the defeated commune into its slaves (e.g., the Messenian
helots).279 “If human beings themselves are conquered along with the land and soil as its organic
accessories, then they are equally conquered as one of the conditions of production.”280 The
servile relations then come to appear naturalized, i.e., as if they sprung from the very soil itself,
but slavery and serfdom, as Marx intimates here, were actually results of the historical
decomposition of an earlier and more ‘primary form’ of communal life (i.e., the classlessness of
primitive communism). The transition out of this clan communism into hierarchical societies
involved “further developments of the form of property resting on the clan system,” which,
although a “necessary and logical development of property founded on the community and
labour in the community,” are “always secondary, derived, [and] never [the] original” form of
precapitalist life.281
Nonetheless, Marx’s notion of the precapitalist unity with nature in no way excludes, as
Lyotard suggests, the possibility of such relations emerging, i.e., of individuals being themselves
reduced to natural factors of production. On the contrary as we have seen, he argues that the
slave and the serf are reduced to natural elements of the metabolism with the earth, and are
appropriated as part of the natural body of the community. As Aristotle explains of so-called
‘natural slavery’, the slave is regarded as an animate or “living tool” (empsychon organon), just
279 Ibid., 493.He repeats this point in the Contribution, stating that conquerors sometimes transform the “conquered
people into slaves and thus makes slave labor the basis of production.” Marx, Karl, ‘Introduction to the Critique of
Political Economy’, The German Ideology: Including Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction to the Critique of
Political Economy, Clemens Dutt (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 13.
280 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 491.
281 Ibid., 493, 496.
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as the tool is an inanimate slave.282 Just as there can be no ‘mutual recognition’ between a man
and his ox, the master does not recognize the slave as anything but a mere means provided by
nature. But far from being separated from the metabolic conditions of labour in the land, here the
labouring slave is directly appropriated as a “natural instrument” provided by nature’s workshop,
i.e., just as are beasts of burden.
In relations of slavery and serfdom this separation does not take place; rather, one part
of society is treated by the other as itself merely an inorganic and natural condition of
its own reproduction. The slave stands in no relation whatsoever to the objective
conditions of his labour; rather, labour itself, both in the form of the slave and in that of
the serf, is classified as an inorganic condition of production along with other natural
beings, such as cattle, as an accessory of the earth.283
Even where relations of personal domination did not emerge, these communities were
usually confined within the agricultural boundaries of the village, and enclosed within the narrow
limits afforded by purely “naturally-arisen” relations of kinship. Here, the individual is
connected to others as a “natural member” of a particular “natural community.”284 According to
Marx’s view, they are but “natural component parts” of a social whole organized on the limited
basis provided by the natural presence of the family, or, by the family enlarged into a clan.285
The individual’s real appropriation of nature as a precondition of production (which is, at the
same time, the clan’s own reproduction process) operates entirely within the limits of such
consanguinity. The “relation to land and soil, to the earth, as the [communal] property of the
labouring individual” appears “instantly mediated” here by “his naturally arisen presence as a
member of a tribe.”286 The “first presupposition” for this communal possession of the soil is the
clan itself with its “communality of blood, language, [and] customs,” i.e., the more or less
282 “[W]hile the slave is as it were a part and detachable tool of the master, the tool being a sort of inanimate slave.”
Aristotle, ‘Eudmenian Ethics’, The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. 2, Jonathan Barnes (ed.), (Oxford University
Press: Oxford; 1994), 1241b17-1241b24.
283 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 489.
284 Ibid., 472.
285 Ibid. 474.
286 Ibid., 485.
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historically modified “natural predisposition” of the gens or “clan character” of the commune.287
As Forbes argues, in the earliest and least developed modes of precapitalist life, the
“conditions [of production] presuppose subjective and objective connections to others and
nature” which assume the “form of clan membership”— and this sort of communality is itself a
“natural” precondition for the existence of such societies.288 Lyotard explains that just as the
inorganic body of nature is “given and not produced” in precapitalist society, so too is this
physical “belonging to the commune itself also given [by nature] and not produced.”289 Schmidt
also suggests that the social unity with nature is present here for Marx as nature— that is to say,
the connection to the inorganic body is “found ready to hand in the land, in nature,” just as the
social connection between individuals is determined by the natural unity of the family.290 Such
“earlier modes of human intervention in nature” were regarded by Marx as “fundamentally
modes of nature’s ‘self-mediation’.”291 “Man appears as a mode of nature’s organic existence,”
while on the other side, on the the basis provided by the “‘pure natural existence’ of labour,”
nature appears as a part of his own inorganic objectivity.292 The “‘dialectic of nature’, if it can be
287 Marx notes that the metabolism with the environment is also determined further, on the one hand, by the natural-
economic conditions of labour particular to the land which the commune happens to occupy, and, on the other, by
the natural-social character of the clan itself— both of which are also modified by historical development. “In the
first form of this landed property, an initial, naturally arisen spontaneous [naturwüchsiges] community appears as
[the] first presupposition. Family, and the family extended as a clan [Stamm], or through intermarriage between
families, or combination of clans, since we may assume that pastoralism, or more generally a migratory form of life,
was the first form of the mode of existence, not that the clan settles in a specific site, but that it grazes off what it
finds— humankind is not settlement-prone by nature (except possibly in a natural environment so especially fertile
that they sit like monkeys on a tree; else roaming like the animals)— then the clan community, the natural
community, appears not as a result of, but as a presupposition for the communal appropriation (temporary) and
utilization of the land.When they finally do settle down, the extent to which this original community is modified
will depend on various external, climatic, geographic, physical etc., conditions as well as on their particular natural
predisposition— their clan character. This naturally arisen clan community, or, if one will, pastoral society, is the
first presupposition— the communality [Gemeinschaftlichkeit] of blood, language, customs— for the appropriation
of the objective conditions of their life, and of their life's reproducing and objectifying activity (activity as herdsmen,
hunters, tillers etc.).” Ibid., 472.
288 Forbes, Ian, Marx and the New Individual:, (Unwin Hayman: London; 1990), 67.
289 Lyotard, Jean-Francois, Libidinal Economy, (trans.) Iain Hamilton Grant, (Continuum: London; 2004), 132. .
290 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (Verso Books: London; 2014), 178.
291 Ibid., 179.
292 Ibid., 176.
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meaningfully applied at all” according to Schmidt, is applicable only to Marx’s “description of
the labour process in its naturally-determined form.” A dialectic of nature, as opposed to one
between nature and society, is for Schmidt only “valid for those precapitalist processes” which
are not “structurally dissimilar to the processes which the plant or animal organism” undergoes
in its interaction with the environment, but out of which human history must somehow
emerge.293
In more advanced modes of precapitalist life, these purely ‘natural’ bonds of blood, clan, etc.,
are substituted by historically-developed relations, i.e., relations which extend beyond the
boundaries of the village and the limits of kinship.294 However, in this case, Marx claims, the
individual’s relationship to his inorganic body in nature remains just as “instantly mediated,”
except that it is mediated by this “more or less historically developed and modified presence of
the individual.”295 Or, as Hegel might put it, it is immediately mediated by a mediated immediacy.
This is what Schmidt means when he notes that “Marx repeatedly pointed out that all naturally-
given forms are also ‘the results of a historical process’.”296 As Marx asserts, the individual’s
natural “relation to the earth as property is always mediated through the occupation of the land
and soil, peacefully or violently, by the tribe, the commune, in some more or less naturally arisen
or already historically developed form.”297 Every particular precapitalist form of production is
293 Ibid., 175-176.
294 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 485.
295 Ibid., 485.
296 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (Verso Books: London; 2014), 176.
297 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 485. “The forms of these natural conditions of production are double: (1) his existence as a
member of the commune; hence the existence of this community, which in its original form is a clan system, a more
or less modified clan system; (2) the relation to land and soil mediated by the community, as its own, as communal
landed property, at the same time individual possession for the individual, or in such a way that only the fruits are
divided, but the land itself and the labour remain common...[T]he original conditions of production appear as natural
presuppositions, natural conditions of the producer's existence, just as his living body, even though he reproduces
and develops it, is originally not posited by himself, but appears as the presupposition of his self; his own (bodily)
being is a natural presupposition, which he has not posited. These natural conditions of existence, to which he
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“aim[ed] at the reproduction of the producer within and together with these, his [socially specific]
objective conditions of existence.”298
The “economic aim” of “all these forms,” writes Marx, is the “reproduction of the individual
within the specific relation to the commune.” On the one hand, the individual's relation to the
“objective conditions of labour is mediated through his presence as member of the commune,”
while, on the other, the “real presence of the commune is determined by the specific form of the
individual's property in the objective conditions of labour.”299 As Bologh notes, the “inner unity”
between the “subject and object in these precapitalist forms” expresses itself for Marx in the
specific relation of the individual to property in the soil. But the individual’s “property relation”
is always “mediated” by the naturally-given and/or historically-modified “presence” of his or her
specific “membership in a community.”300 According to Marx, this socially-mediated relation of
individuals to one another and to nature is, in fact, what property “originally means.”301 Property
always reduces itself to a definite relation of production which corresponds, in turn, with a
definite way of relating to others and to nature. “Property,” he reiterates in the same section of
the Grundrisse, “originally means” nothing but this “relation of the working (producing or self-
reproducing) subject to the conditions of his production or reproduction as his own.” “In the last
analysis,” therefore, every form of society, “as well as the property based on it, resolves itself
into a specific stage in the development of the productive forces of working subjects— to which
relates as to his own inorganic body, are [again] themselves [of a] double [character]: (1) of a subjective and (2) of
an objective nature. He finds himself a member of a family, clan, tribe, etc.— which then, in a historic process of
intermixture and antithesis with others, takes on a different shape; and, as such a member, he relates to a specific
nature (say, here, still earth, land, soil) as his own inorganic being, as a condition of his production and reproduction.
As a natural member of the community he participates in the communal property, and [may even] ha[ve] a particular
part of it as his [individualized] possession...[but] [h]is property, i.e., the relation to the natural presuppositions of
his production as belonging to him, as his, is mediated by his being himself the natural member of a community.”
Ibid. 489-492.
298 Ibid., 495.
299 Ibid., 485.
300 Bologh, Roslyn Wallach, Dialectical Phenomenology, (Routledge: 2010; New York), 80.
301 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 491.
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correspond their specific relations amongst one another and towards nature.”302
The original unity between a particular form of community (clan) and the corresponding
property in nature, or relation to the objective conditions of production as a natural
being, as an objective being of the individual mediated by the commune— this unity,
which appears in one respect as the particular form of property— has its living reality in
a specific mode of production itself, a mode which appears both as a relation between
the individuals, and as their specific active relation to inorganic nature, a specific mode
of working (which is always family labour, often communal labour).303
The Precapitalist Forms of Property in the Land
In this passage, Marx begins to speak to the fact that not all precapitalist societies were
“cast from the same die.”304 Through a “historic process” of decomposition and development,
precapitalist life took on a series of “different shape[s].”305 Precapitalist property in the land
came to assume a wide variety of “different forms depending on the conditions of this
production.”306 In the Grundrisse, he wrote more specifically of the “Asiatic, Slavonic, ancient
classical, [and] Germanic form[s],” while in the ‘Preface’ to A Contribution to the Critique of
Political Economy he refers, in “broad outline, [to] the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern
bourgeois modes of production.”307 In the account of primitive accumulation in Capital, he
describes not only the essential characteristics of feudal property in Europe, but also the
intermediary forms of proprietorship which separate its dissolution from the advent of
agricultural capitalism in England.
In the Formen, Marx probably writes more about the precapitalist connection to nature than
he does about the specifically capitalist metabolism throughout the whole of the Grundrisse and
302 Ibid., 495.
303 Ibid., 495.
304 Marx, Karl, ‘Drafts to the Letter to Vera Zasulich’, Marx and Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 24, David Forgacs
(trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1989), 354, 363.
305 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 490.
306 Ibid., 496.
307 Ibid., 495. Marx, Karl, ‘A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’, Marx and Engels: Collected Works,
Vol. 29, Victor Shnittke and Yuri Sdobnikov (trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1987), 275.
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Capital combined. If he was more concerned, as he surely must have been, with the critique of
capitalist society, then why did he expend so much more effort analyzing these precapitalist
relationships to nature in the Grundrisse? As Foster suggests, Marx’s “analysis of pre-capitalist
economic formations” (and, as the next chapter of the dissertation will elaborate, his analysis of
the “dissolution of these forms through primitive accumulation”) is important for understanding
his overall theory of the metabolism because these different types of society were regarded by
him as “changing forms of the appropriation of nature through production.”308 They highlight the
historical character of the human relation to nature, and Marx’s continued emphasis upon
comprehending nature as a social category. Moreover, it was precisely by examining the
historical character of this relationship in its diversity of precapitalist forms that he was able to
isolate the contradictory conditions peculiar to the capitalist intercourse with nature. As
Anderson argues, the true aim of the Grundrisse’s “focus is not noncapitalist social relations as
such, but the uniqueness of modern capitalism.” Marx was really “focused on something else, the
rise of the modern Western proletariat, a working class that was formally free but largely
atomized and stripped of any significant control over its means of production.”309 His study of
precapitalist formations allowed him to identify the metabolic rift characteristic of wage-labour,
and it was this Formen-study in particular which laid the groundwork for his treatment of the
question of ‘original accumulation’ in Capital.
It should also be noted in the context of this discussion that the three main precapitalist
forms which Marx describes in the Grundrisse— and which the Formen labels Asiatic, Classical
and Germanic— are in no way treated by him as geographical, and less still as ethnological,
308 Foster , John Bellamy, ‘Marx’s Grundrisse and the Ecological Contradictions of Capitalism’, Karl Marx’s
Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy 150 Years Later, Marcello Musto (ed.), (Routledge:
New York; 2008), 94.
309Anderson, Kevin, Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies, (University of
Chicago Press: Chicago; 2010), 156, 160.
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designations. It is important to dispel this notion from the outset of any consideration of these
forms. The most controversial category, the Asiatic mode of production, was ‘Asiatic’ for Marx
only because it could still be found preserved throughout parts of Asia at the time. But, as
Lichtheim suggests, he and Engels also recognized that this “kind of communal
ownership...appears under different historical variants” far removed from Asia, e.g., the pre-
Columbian civilizations of South America, the early Celtic clans, etc.310 Engels mentions a wide
variety of such societies extending from the steppes of Mongolia, through Persia and Hindustan,
and into the Arabian peninsula and the Maghreb. In another work, he speaks of this form as
having existed everywhere at one time or another from ‘India to Ireland’. Beneath its
‘semblance’ of Absolutism, Marx argued that the Spanish monarchy could be revealed to be just
one of the many “Asiatic forms of government.”311 In his discussion of the Asiatic form in the
Grundrisse, he develops the view that the “communality of labour” characteristic of this mode of
production has been found in “Mexico, Peru especially, among the early Celts, [and] a few clans
in India.” This form of community is also the “first occurrence of the lordly dominium in the
most original sense, e.g., in the Slavonic communes, in the Rumanian etc.” and, as such, within it
“lies the transition to villeinage.”312
This last statement explains why Marx oscillated between regarding the ‘Slavic’ form as
either ‘Asiatic’ or ‘semi-Asiatic’— until finally treating it, along with the Germanic, Hellenic-
Roman, etc., as one of the several “different forms of its dissolution,” i.e., the dissolution of
primitive common property and communal production.313 The “original form of this property is
310 Lichtheim, George, ‘Marx and the “Asiatic Mode of Production”’, Karl Marx’s Social and Political Thought, Vol.
6, Bob Jessop and Russel Wheatley (ed.), (Routledge: London; 1999), 47.
311 Marx on the Spanish Revolution of 1854 quoted in Draper, Hal, Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution: State and
Bureaucracy, Vol. I, (Monthly Review Press: New York; 1977), 556.
312 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 473.
313 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
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therefore itself direct common property (oriental form, modified in the Slavonic; developed to
the point of antithesis, but still as the secret, if antithetical, foundation in classical and Germanic
property).”314 In all of these instances, it is clear that the concept of the Asiatic mode of
production is neither an ethnological concept nor a geographical label. As Zingarelli argues, the
most complex aspect to revisit is the qualifier ‘Asiatic’, perhaps because Asia evokes an
abstraction linked to certain negative traits, such as despotic, closed and stagnant, to
express the singularity of Eastern processes as distinct from those of the
West...[However,] criticism based on geographical restriction does not appear justified
given that Marx himself in the Formen [and elsewhere] did not limit the Asiatic form to
certain spaces...[H]e located the phenomenon in the orient because in fact the first states
emerge in Egypt, Mesopotamia, China and India...notwithstanding the fact that those
relationships can be found in other geographical spaces and historical times.315
Hence, the ‘Asiatic’ form, like the other forms, actually expresses a general mode of
precapitalist life (in this case, one based upon homogeneous communal property and even
communal forms of labour) which is not confined to certain peoples, places, or periods in history.
Although Marx certainly offered definite examples of such societies in Asia, e.g., the village-
system in northern India, even there he stressed that wherever these forms arise they are
determined further by the social relations, local-natural conditions, etc., specific to those
societies. As Hart puts it, Marx really presents the Asiatic, Roman, etc., types of property and
production as “idealized examples” of precapitalist life, but also cautions that the “historical
explanation of particular cases must draw on an ad hoc series of ecological, political, and other
variables.”316 As Draper concludes, the precapitalist forms which Marx sketches out in the
1990), 171.
314 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 473, 495-498.
315 Zingarelli, Andrea, ‘Asiatic Mode of Production: Considerations on Ancient Egypt’, Studies on Pre-Capitalist
Modes of Production, Laura da Graca and Andrea Zingarelli (ed.), (Brill: Leidin), 72.
316 Hart, Keith, 'Anthropology', Elgar Companion to Marxist Economics, (ed.) Ben Fine and Alfredo Sadd-Filho,
(MPG: Cheshire; 2012), 23. Marx notes that the metabolism with the environment is also determined further, on the
one hand, by the natural-economic conditions of labour particular to the land which the commune happens to
occupy, and, on the other, by the natural-social character of the clan itself— both of which are also modified by
historical development. “In the first form of this landed property, an initial, naturally arisen spontaneous
[naturwüchsiges] community appears as [the] first presupposition. Family, and the family extended as a clan
[Stamm], or through intermarriage between families, or combination of clans, since we may assume that pastoralism,
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Grundrisse are therefore best understood (as Marx himself understood them) as archetypal forms
of property and production, i.e., it is more of a “typological label.” This particular label, ‘Asiatic’,
applies everywhere where there is “common property as found in the Orient.”317
The Original Communality of the Clan
Since the human species is not “settlement prone by nature,” the Grundrisse’s analysis of
these various forms of property actually starts out from the anthropological premise that the
“migratory form of life” (e.g., seasonal hunting grounds, early pastoral societies, etc.) is in fact
the most “natural community,” i.e., the “first form of the mode of existence” common to all
human societies. Marx rarely commented upon such migratory modes of social life— although
his brief allusions to the Mongol empire in the Grundrisse and Capital, as well as his
ethnological notes on the indigenous peoples of North America, are noteworthy exceptions. In
such migratory forms, there can be no 'property' in, nor even 'possession' of, the soil precisely
because the community never “settles on a specific site.” Instead, it merely passes through,
utilizing this or that patch of earth on a purely “temporary” basis. Of course, these communities
still appropriated the use-values of nature as their property, but what they appropriated (e.g., as
or more generally a migratory form of life, was the first form of the mode of existence, not that the clan settles in a
specific site, but that it grazes off what it finds— humankind is not settlement-prone by nature (except possibly in a
natural environment so especially fertile that they sit like monkeys on a tree; else roaming like the animals)— then
the clan community, the natural community, appears not as a result of, but as a presupposition for the communal
appropriation (temporary) and utilization of the land.When they finally do settle down, the extent to which this
original community is modified will depend on various external, climatic, geographic, physical etc., conditions as
well as on their particular natural predisposition— their clan character. This naturally arisen clan community, or, if
one will, pastoral society, is the first presupposition— the communality [Gemeinschaftlichkeit] of blood, language,
customs— for the appropriation of the objective conditions of their life, and of their life's reproducing and
objectifying activity (activity as herdsmen, hunters, tillers etc.).” Ibid., 472.
317 “It was Marx who first stated that the mode of production which Europeans had discovered in Asia in modern
times had also existed in the prehistory of European society, that the Asiatic mode of production had to be
considered a world-wide development, even though it had taken different paths [of development and decomposition]
in different regions [and at different times] and had fossilized in one of them...[But that] did not mean that the
“Asiatic” mode of production was an Oriental monopoly...[or] limited geographically to Asia.” Draper, Hal, Karl
Marx’s Theory of Revolution: State and Bureaucracy, Vol. I, (Monthly Review Press: New York; 1977), 537-542.
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gatherers, graziers, hunters, etc.) was mobile and not fixed to the land. In another section of the
Formen, Marx argues that these roving clans did indeed regard the earth as their ‘property’, but
qualifies that they never “stabilized” their relation to it (vis-a-vis other communes) because they
merely used it as a “halting place.”318
According to this view, then, only the “cultivation of the soil” truly “posits the land as the
individual’s extended body.”319 The earliest forms of this stabilized property of the Stamm
maintained what is sometimes referred to as ‘primitive socialism’. This clan communism was
‘primitive’ because its metabolism with nature was based upon the limited productive capacities
and narrowly defined needs of individuals, as well as their completely localized relations with
one another. As Marx tells us in some of the very last of his writings, this sort of “primitive type
of cooperation”— where work is “carried out communally and the communal product is shared
out”— initially arises due to the “weakness of the isolated individual, and not from the
socialisation of the means of production.”320 This communality was a necessity imposed by
nature itself. But this “labor in common” is for that same reason the “spontaneously developed
form” standing “at the threshold of the history of all civilized peoples.”321 He repeated this same
318 “Property is, it is true, originally mobile, for mankind first seizes hold of the ready-made fruits of the earth,
among whom belong e.g. the animals, and for him especially the ones that can be tamed. Nevertheless even this
situation— hunting, fishing, herding, gathering fruits from trees etc.— always presupposes appropriation of the
earth, whether for a fixed residence, or for roaming, or for animal pasture etc....Among nomadic pastoral tribes—
and all pastoral peoples are originally migratory— the earth appears like other natural conditions, in its elemental
limitlessness, e.g. in the Asiatic steppes and the high plateau. It is grazed etc., consumed by the herds, from which
the pastoral peoples in turn live. They relate to it as their property, although they never stabilize this property. This is
the case too with the hunting grounds of the wild Indian tribes in America; the tribe regards a certain region as its
hunting domain, and asserts it by force against other tribes, or tries to drive others off the domains they assert.
Among the nomadic pastoral peoples, the commune is indeed constantly united; the travelling society, the caravan,
the horde, and the forms of supremacy and subordination develop out of the conditions of this mode of life. What is
in fact appropriated and reproduced here is not the earth but the herd; but the earth is always used communally at
each halting place.> The only barrier which the community can encounter in relating to the natural conditions of
production— the earth— as to its own property (if we jump ahead to the settled peoples) is another community,
which already claims it as its own inorganic body.” Ibid., 491-492.
319 Ibid., 493.
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point on a number of occasions, as, for instance, when he alluded to “communal labour in its
naturally evolved form as we find it among all civilised nations at the dawn of their history.”322
“[R]esearch into history,” he concluded elsewhere, has “uncover[ed]” this primitive communism
as the “point of departure of all cultured peoples.”323
The communal appropriation of nature appears here as the precondition of all production,
i.e., as the nature-given presupposition for the reproduction of the commune itself. There is no
metabolic separation whatsoever between labour and land in this naturally-arisen communism.
As Camatte elaborates, Marx and Engels characterized “primitive communism” as being founded
upon an “immediate union among the component members and between these members and their
natural environment.”324 But there stands a diverse range of intermediary social forms between
the decomposition of this nature-made socialism— based as it was upon an unmediated identity
with its inorganic body— and the capitalist mode of production— which, through the estranged
development of the productive powers of social labour, creates the conditions necessary for a
higher recognition of this corpus naturale in the future, communism proper.
The system of production founded on private exchange is, to begin with, the historical
dissolution of this naturally arisen communism. However, a whole series of economic
systems lies in turn between the modern world, where exchange value dominates
production to its whole depth and extent, and the social formations whose foundation is
already formed by the dissolution of communal property.325
An “enormous gulf,” Engels reminds us, “separates the present-day proletarian and small
peasant from the free member of the old gentile society.”326 Marx reiterated this same point in his
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drafts to the Zasulich-letter, recognizing that between the “death of [this] communal property”
and the “birth of capitalist production” lies a “whole series of successive economic revolutions
and evolutions.”327 The main precapitalist forms which he analyzes in the Grundrisse— Asiatic,
Classical, Germanic— are regarded by him as only so many different paths in the dissolution of
this original communality of labour and property. All of these intermediary precapitalist forms
which separate the decomposition of primitive communism from the advent of capitalist relations
rest, to differing degrees and in different ways, upon the withering away of the old communal
mode of production and appropriation. As Gandy puts it, Marx recognized that the Asiatic,
Roman, Germanic, etc., forms were “several lines of social evolution out of primitive
communism.” The “common ownership of the land” marked by “primitive communism,” which
was “universal at the dawn of history,” gave way to a variety of different modes of precapitalist
life, each with their own horizon of limits.328
The Agricultural Unity of the Archaic Commune
This is why in the “first form” of “landed property” arising out of the decomposition of
clan communism— viz.., that founded atop the so-called “oriental commune”— the “individual
New York; 2009), 63.
327 Marx, Karl, ‘Drafts to the Letter to Vera Zasulich’, Marx and Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 24, David Forgacs
(trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1989), 361.
328 “The self-sufficient communities slept through the ages under the sway of the despot, who taxed and ruled and
defended them. This society remained at a low level of economic evolution...Around the Mediterranean another line
of evolution from primitive communism produced a higher social system: the ancient mode of production. The
ancient mode arouse out of primitive communism with the fusion of several tribes into a town...The city-state is the
economic unity of the ancient mode, and the history of Rome reveals the basic pattern of development...Before the
invasions [of Rome] German tribes owned land in common. But the conquest caused their primitive communism to
explode in a new line of economic evolution. From the German invasions there arose in Western Europe the feudal
mode of production. The feudal mode contained the germs of a higher system: capitalism...For Marx primitive
communism is the source from which history flows: some modes of production evolved a long way from
communism, some not so far, some scarcely at all.” Gandy , Daniel Ross, Marx and History: From Primitive Society
to the Communist Future, (University of Texas Press: 1979), 114.
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is merely the possessor” of land. There still is “no private property in the land and soil.”329 As
Lichtheim puts it, this commune “conserved some elements of primitive communism”— namely,
communal property and even communal forms of labour.330 Marx once claimed in a letter to
Engels that the “absence of private landed property” is the “common basis” for “all the
manifestations of the East”— socially, politically, and metabolically. This is the “real clef, even
to the eastern heaven.”331 Engels, responding to him a few days later, accepted that the
absence of landed property is indeed the key to the whole of the East...[but that this is]
largely due to the climate, combined with the nature of the land, more especially the
great stretches of desert extending from the Sahara right across Arabia, Persia, India and
Tartary to the highest of the Asiatic uplands. Here artificial irrigation is the first
prerequisite for agriculture, and this is the responsibility either of the communes, the
provinces or the central government. In the East, the government has always consisted
of 3 departments only: Finance (pillage at home), War (pillage at home and abroad), and
travaux publics, provision for reproduction. The British government in India has put a
somewhat narrower interpretation on nos. 1 and 2 while completely neglecting no. 3, so
that Indian agriculture is going to wrack and ruin. Free competition is proving an
absolute fiasco there. The fact that the land was made fertile by artificial means and
immediately ceased to be so when the conduits fell into disrepair, explains the otherwise
curious circumstance that vast expanses are now wastes which once were magnificently
cultivated332
Lichtheim argues that the characteristic “features” which Engels enumerates here— e.g.,
“climatic conditions,” “travaux publics,” and “Oriental [centralized] government”— would be
329 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 472, 486.
330 Whether the oriental commune and Asiatic mode of production are “species of primitive communism” as
Rosdolsky and others suggest, or, an entirely separate stage of production as Camatte believes, is open to
interpretation inasmuch as different texts by Marx and Engels seem to offer ground to both of these standpoints. I
am more inclined to agree with Lichtheim that we should interpret Marx as arguing that while the Indian village,
early Scottish clans, etc., may have preserved certain elements of primitive communism (to differing degrees), we
should regard the ‘Asiatic’ mode of production as a form founded upon the dissolution of this original socialism.
There are certain characteristics which, upon closer analysis, would allow us to distinguish highly developed
‘Asiatic’ societies from primitive communism (e.g., increased surplus labour and centralized forms of expropriation,
patriarchy, large-scale public works, and the introduction of class distinctions and relations of personal domination,
indebtedness, etc.). See Rosdolsky, Roman, The Making of Marx’s ‘Capital’, Pete Burgess (trans.), (Pluto Press:
1977; London), 273; Camatte, Jacques, ‘Community and Communism in Russia’, David Brown (trams.), first
published in French in Invariance Series II, n. 4, 1974, <https:// www.marxists.org/archive/camatte/commrus1.htm>;
in English by Spartacus 1978; Lichtheim, George, ‘Marx and the “Asiatic Mode of Production”’, Karl Marx’s Social
and Political Thought, Vol. 6, Bob Jessop and Russel Wheatley (ed.), (Routledge: London; 1999), 49.
331 Marx, Karl, ’Marx to Engels (June 2, 1853)’, Marx and Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 39, Betty Ross and Peter
Ross (trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1983), 33-334.
332 Engels, Frederick, ’Engels to Marx (June 6, 1853)’, Marx and Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 39, Betty Ross and
Peter Ross (trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1983), 339-340.
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“expanded” by Marx (in series of articles on India and in the Grundrisse) into an analysis which
highlights the “absence of private ownership in land” in the archaic commune itself.333 A week
before finalizing one of the articles for the New York Tribune, ‘The British Rule in India’, Marx
wrote back to Engels:
[t]he stationary nature of this part of Asia, despite all the aimless activity on the political
surface, can be completely explained by two mutually supporting circumstances: 1. the
public works system of the central government and, 2. alongside this, the entire Empire
which, apart from a few large cities, is an agglomeration of villages, each with its own
distinct organisation and each forming its own small world...These idyllic republics, of
which only the village boundaries are jealously guarded against neighbouring villages,
continue to exist in well-nigh perfect form in the North Western parts of India only
recently occupied by the English. No more solid basis for Asiatic despotism and
stagnation is, I think, conceivable. And however much the English may have Irelandised
the country, the breaking up of the archetypal forms was the conditio sine qua non for
Europeanisation... Another essential factor was the destruction of the ancient industries,
which robbed these villages of their self-supporting character.334
In the article itself, Marx once again underlines the same essential point: viz., that such primitive
communal conditions create a sort self-sustaining circle of agricultural production which
insulates the commune from contact and intercourse with the larger world outside of it. It was
this primitive unity of the archaic commune with nature which often restricted it from further
historical development according to Marx. It was, at bottom, a restricted metabolism which was
333 Lichtheim, George, ‘Marx and the “Asiatic Mode of Production”’, Karl Marx’s Social and Political Thought, Vol.
6, Bob Jessop and Russel Wheatley (ed.), (Routledge: London; 1999), 41. Indeed, Marx repeats Engels’ words in the
article: “There have been in Asia, generally, from immemorial times, but three departments of Government; that of
Finance, or the plunder of the interior; that of War, or the plunder of the exterior; and, finally, the department of
Public Works. Climate and territorial conditions, especially the vast tracts of desert, extending from the Sahara,
through Arabia, Persia, India, and Tartary, to the most elevated Asiatic highlands, constituted artificial irrigation by
canals and water-works the basis of Oriental agriculture. As in Egypt and India, inundations are used for fertilizing
the soil in Mesopotamia, Persia, &c.; advantage is taken of a high level for feeding irrigative canals. This prime
necessity of an economical and common use of water, which, in the Occident, drove private enterprise to voluntary
association, as in Flanders and Italy, necessitated, in the Orient where civilization was too low and the territorial
extent too vast to call into life voluntary association, the interference of the centralizing power of Government.
Hence an economical function devolved upon all Asiatic Governments, the function of providing public works. This
artificial fertilization of the soil, dependent on a Central Government, and immediately decaying with the neglect of
irrigation and drainage, explains the otherwise strange fact that we now find whole territories barren and desert that
were once brilliantly cultivated, as Palmyra, Petra, the ruins in Yemen, and large provinces of Egypt, Persia, and
Hindostan; it also explains how a single war of devastation has been able to depopulate a country for centuries, and
to strip it of all its civilization.” Marx, Karl, ‘The British Rule in India’, Dispatches from the New York Tribune:
Selected Journalism of Karl Marx, James Ledbetter (ed.), (Penguin Books:London; 2007), 214-215.
334 Marx, Karl, ‘Marx to Engels’ (June 14, 1853), Marx and Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 39, Betty Ross and Peter
Ross (trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1983), 346-347.
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merely reflected in what he criticized as a dehumanizing worship of nature and fatalistic
subservience to natural necessity.
Hindostan is an Italy of Asiatic dimensions…The same rich variety in the products of
the soil, and the same dismemberment in the political configuration. Just as Italy has,
from time to time, been compressed by the conqueror’s sword into different national
masses, so do we find Hindostan, when not under the pressure of the Mohammedan, or
the Mogul, or the Briton, dissolved into as many independent and conflicting States as it
numbered towns, or even villages. Yet, in a social point of view, Hindostan is not the
Italy, but the Ireland of the East....These two circumstances…had brought about, since
the remotest times, a social system of particular features— the so-called village system,
which gave to each of these small unions their independent organization and distinct
life...Now, sickening as it must be to human feeling to witness those myriads of
industrious patriarchal and inoffensive social organizations disorganized and dissolved
into their units, thrown into a sea of woes, and their individual members losing at the
same time their ancient form of civilization, and their hereditary means of subsistence,
we must not forget that these idyllic village-communities, inoffensive though they may
appear, had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism, that they restrained
the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of
superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and
historical energies...We must not forget that this undignified, stagnatory, and vegetative
life, that this passive sort of existence evoked on the other part, in contradistinction,
wild, aimless, unbounded forces of destruction and rendered murder itself a religious
rite in Hindostan. We must not forget that these little communities were contaminated
by distinctions of caste and by slavery, that they subjugated man to external
circumstances instead of elevating man the sovereign of circumstances, that they
transformed a self-developing social state into never changing natural destiny, and thus
brought about a brutalizing worship of nature.335
Contrary to much of contemporary secondary literature, I would contend that the essential
features of this standpoint still inform Marx's later views in the Grundrisse, Capital,
Ethnological Notebooks and drafts to the Zasulich letter— even if these works also show signs of
unique developments all their own. Many of the characteristics which he identifies in the above
and in his other articles on India, as well as in his correspondence with Engels on the subject, are
noticeable in his later descriptions of precapitalist life: e.g., (i) the primitive unity of
manufacturing and agriculture within the archaic commune, and, along with this, the self-
enclosed character of the village-system; (ii) communal property, and at times even communal
labour, but always as based upon the narrow needs, limited powers, and restricted relations of the
335 Marx, Karl, ‘The British Rule in India’, Dispatches from the New York Tribune: Selected Journalism of Karl
Marx, James Ledbetter (ed.), (Penguin Books:London; 2007), 212-218.
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individual members— hence the mystification of nature as a ‘higher power’; (iii) when these
smaller communities are brought together into a larger political unity, it is a unity which often
expresses itself in the form of an overarching despotism which merely shelters them in their
isolation from the outside world. The importance which Marx and Engels sometimes laid upon
(iv) the aspect of 'public works', especially of large-scale waterworks, is specifically applicable
to this more centralized political form.
Although they deemed artificial irrigation to be a necessity imposed by the climatic
conditions of production across parts of Asia, Marx and Engels nonetheless also observed that,
wherever political centralization did not occur, the villages themselves carried out the work
irrigation on a more limited and local level. However, where it does occur, the public works
projects take on colossal proportions. Even though Marx and Engels characterized such
precapitalist forms as confining the development of the productive forces of labour within
shallow limits, they nonetheless recognized that the aqueducts and irrigation systems of the
ancient world (e.g., from China and India to Rome and Egypt) represented a qualitative leap in
the way in which precapitalist societies appropriated the land upon which they sat. With this, the
primordial elements— water and earth— are brought into a socially modified intercourse with
one another for the first time. The forces of nature are harnessed to an unprecedented degree,
even if these examples of human ingenuity and industriousness were present only in a one-sided
manner, or sometimes only possible through the large-scale impressment of unfree labour.336
It is the necessity of bringing a natural force under the control of society, of
economising, of appropriating or subduing it on a large scale by the work of man’s hand,
336 “Marx says on pre-capitalist forms of co-operation: ‘The greater the extent to which production still rests on mere
manual labour, on use of muscle power etc., in short on physical exertion by individual labours, the more does the
increase of the productive force consist in their collaboration on a mass scale.' ('Hence the violent rounding up of the
people in Egypt, Etruria, India etc., for forced construction and compulsory public works.').” Volume III of Capital
quoted in Rosdolsky, Roman, The Making of Marx’s ‘Capital’, Pete Burgess (trans.), (Pluto Press: 1977; London),
240.
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that first plays the decisive part in the history of industry. Examples are the irrigation
works in Egypt, Lombardy, Holland, or in India and Persia where irrigation by means of
artificial canals, not only supplies the soil with the water indispensable to it, but also
carries down to it, in the shape of sediment from the hills, mineral fertilisers. The secret
of the flourishing state of industry in Spain and Sicily under the dominion of the Arabs
lay in their irrigation works.337
But this same element which provided the basis for the flourishing of ancient civilization in
Egypt, Babylon, India, etc., at the same time contributed to forming what Wittfogel referred to as
the “bureaucratic-hydraulic” or “agrobureaucratic” political structure of 'oriental despotism'.
According to Wittfogel’s Weberian critique, while the Grundrisse captures the essential political
features of this “hydraulic aspect of Oriental despotism,” including the “managerial functions of
the despotic state,” Capital “retrogresses” by focusing exclusively upon the “technical side of
large-scale water works” and ignoring their “political setting.”338 This interpretative claim is
mistaken inasmuch as passages from the text in question seem to indicate just the opposite.339
For example, in Volume I, Marx makes similar claims about how the isolation of the villages and
fractured political geography of the Indian subcontinent sheltered the archaic commune from the
political storms of history (again, especially true of northern India).340 Even in his drafts to
Zasulich, the ‘very late’ Marx would continue to defend the view that the isolation of the
(Russian version of the) archaic commune formed the ‘solid basis’ for (Tsarist) despotism.341
Wittfogel questions whether the emphasis which Marx ostensibly places upon waterworks as
the distinguishing feature of all ‘Asiatic’ societies is consistent with his own characterizations of
337 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
1990), 649-650.
338 Wittfogel, Karl August, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power, (Yale university Press: 1957;
New Haven), 382-383.
339 See Marx, Karl, ‘Drafts to the Letter to Vera Zasulich’, Marx and Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 24, David
Forgacs (trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1989), 353, 363, 368. See also Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique
of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London; 1990), 479.
340 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
1990), 479.
341 Marx, Karl, ‘Drafts to the Letter to Vera Zasulich’, Marx and Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 24, David Forgacs
(trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1989), 353, 363.
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non-hydraulic societies (e.g., Russia) as forms of ‘Oriental despotism’.
Why does hydraulic society show such persistence? Is it because of its state-managed
system of hydraulic agriculture? An upholder of the economic interpretation of history
will believe this; indeed Marx himself argued so. But it is significant that Marx and
Engels viewed the Tsarist government of post-Mongol Russia as Orientally despotic,
although both certainly knew that Russian agriculture was not hydraulic. The difficulty
from the standpoint of the economic determinist is manifest; and it is increased when we
realize that, beside Tsarist Russia, certain other agrodespotic states fulfilled the vital
organizational and acquisitive functions of hydraulic society without maintaining a
hydraulic economy proper.342
Aside from mischaracterizing Marx’s economic interpretation of history as a form of
technological determinism, and aside from being mistaken with respect to Marx’s claims about
both Russian and Mongol history, Wittfogel’s critique falls apart of its accord. It is simply not
true that “Marx himself argued” that the “state-managed system of hydraulic agriculture”
provides the key sociological explanation for the “persistence” of this form of social life. Large-
scale waterworks are not the secret clef to understanding the various manifestations of the
Asiatic mode of production. According to Marx, the “Asiatic form necessarily hangs on most
tenaciously and for the longest time.” Why? He tells us in the next sentence: “This is due to its
342 Wittfogel, Karl August, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power, (Yale university Press: 1957;
New Haven), 160-161. To accept Wittfogel’s characterizations of Marx’s thoughts on post-Mongol Russia one
would have to ignore almost everything which Marx wrote about post-Mongol Russia. Wittfogel is right that Marx
“knew that Russian agriculture was not hydraulic,” and, yet, nonetheless classified Tsarist Russia as an ‘Asiatic’, or
sometimes as a ‘semi-Asiatic’ form of production. However, instead of questioning his own interpretation that large-
scale waterworks are the most essential feature of the ‘Asiatic’ mode of production, Wittfogel turns this into an
inconsistency on Marx’s part. Yet, Russia was categories as an ‘Asiatic’ society not because it reproduced the
‘hydraulic’ aspects of its metabolism with nature, but precisely because it was based upon the archaic commune
(which maintained vestiges of communal property). Rising above these isolated totalities, the political unity of the
communes in Russia took on a despotic form. Moreover, Marx also explicitly stated that “post-Mongol Russia”
directly inherited many of these features from the “Mongol invasion” which determined the “political fate” of the
country for centuries. And, as Marx knew well enough long before Wittfogel, neither was this Mongolian Empire a
‘hydraulic’ society, but one originating in a still earlier form of the nomadic Stamm. So little were waterworks the
basis for Mongol despotism that its empire destroyed all of the ancient aqueducts (qanats) of Persia. “The
conquering people may impose its own methods of production upon the conquered (e.g., the English in Ireland in the
nineteenth century, party also in India); or, it may allow everything to remain as it was contenting itself with tribute
(e.g., the Turks and the Romans); or, the two systems by mutually modifying each other may result in something
new, a synthesis (which partly resulted from the Germanic conquests)...The Mongols with their devastations in
Russia, e.g., acted in accordance with their system of production, for which sufficient pastures on large uninhabited
stretches of country are the main prerequisite”— not large-scale waterworks. See Marx, Karl, ‘Drafts to the Letter to
Vera Zasulich’, Marx and Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 24, David Forgacs (trans.), (International Publishers: New
York; 1989), 350, 366; Marx, Karl, ‘introduction to the Critique of Political Economy’, The German Ideology:
Including Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, Clemens Dutt (trans.),
(Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 13.
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presupposition that the individual does not become independent vis-à-vis the commune; that
there is a self-sustaining circle of production, [and] unity of agriculture and manufactures” within
the commune.343
The Grundrisse reminds us again and again of the key to unlocking all of the mysteries of
this social form. The firm foundation for this political despotism is not, as Wittfogel suggests, the
hydraulic-bureaucracy of the Asiatic State (which presupposes precisely what it is meant to
explain), but, rather, the form of agricultural production resting on the oriental commune. As
Zingarelli argues by appealing to Krader’s reading, Wittfogel shifts Marx’s emphasis from the
social relations of this commune to the strictly ‘hydraulic-bureaucratic’ character of the
Mandarin State because he wants to stress the “managerial control” of the waterworks. He even
goes so far as to “convert the categories of despotism” into “economic structures.”344 But the real
social source for this despotic political form, and for the corresponding lack of historical
development which Marx and Engels attributed to it, must be uncovered within the conditions
and relations of the archaic commune itself. The Asiatic State is conceived by Marx (if not in the
articles on India, then certainly from the Grundrisse onward) as an outgrowth of the smaller
communes. No State hangs in the ‘thin air’, as Engels later explained to Tkachov— another ‘Don
Quixote’ who assumed that knight-errantry are compatible with all forms of society.
Communal production in the form of family-, clan-, or village-labour is a “communality
of labour” which, Marx argued, can be subsequently widened to include the massive public
works organized by the ‘State’ (especially irrigation). The original communality of the family is
enlarged in such a way that the State comes to assume the traditional office occupied by the
patriarch of the clan. This consanguinity and familial unity is extended to include the despot, the
343 Ibid., 486.
344 Zingarelli, Andrea, ‘Asiatic Mode of Production: Considerations on Ancient Egypt’, Studies on Pre-Capitalist
Modes of Production, Laura da Graca and Andrea Zingarelli (ed.), (Brill: Leidin), 71.
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“father” of these “little communities,” who exacts his “hereditary” tribute by expropriating the
surplus arising from within the villages themselves. The “communal conditions of real
appropriation through labour” confront these real producers as the “work of the [usually despotic,
often patriarchal] higher unity.” Hence, this State, this “higher community” and “despotic regime
hovering over the little communes,” appears as the exclusive landowner— although, as Marx
reminds us, the communal property of the village continues to “exist in fact as the foundation”
for this whole intercourse with nature. It is “not in the least a contradiction” then, if, “as in most
Asiatic land-forms, the comprehensive unity standing above all these little communities appears
as the higher proprietor or as the sole proprietor.”345
However, instead of revealing through critique these hidden innerconnections, Wittfogel’s
analysis stops short at the surface appearance of things. He treats the Asiatic State as if it hangs
in the ‘thin air’, rather than examining its real foundations in the archaic commune. When these
communities assume such a political form, as Lichtheim argues, the “central government” takes
on the semblance of being the “real landowner.”346 Whenever these communes are brought
together into such a despotism, the agricultural conditions for this metabolism with nature (again,
e.g., centralization of irrigation and aqueducts) then appear as nature-given and even divine
presuppositions, viz., as the work of this higher unity itself. But, as Lichtheim notes, this despotic
political character, including its “centrally controlled canalisation and other public works,” arises
from the nature of the smaller
tribal community [which] forms the basis of a unitary system whose unifying function is
represented, and ultimately usurped, by the despot...The primitive unity of the small
tribal community— by now only one among many communities— appears ‘realised in
the despot, as the father of the many communities’, who also appropriates the surplus
product...The social organism may be more or less democratic...[but] where the major
345 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 472.
346 Lichtheim, George, ‘Marx and the “Asiatic Mode of Production”,’ Karl Marx’s Social and Political Thought, Vol.
6, Bob Jessop and Russel Wheatley (ed.), (Routledge: London; 1999), 41.
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economic operations of society come under central control— as in the Asian societies
with their extensive waterworks— these socially necessary operations ‘appear as the
work of the higher unity— the despotic government suspended above the small
communities’.347
According to Marx and Engels, then, the 'hydraulic' basis to the metabolism with nature
provides just one part of a much larger sociological explanation not merely for despotism, but
also for the vegetative or ahistorical character of this form of the commune. Indeed, State-
centralized and “extensive irrigation in the East” is not the distinguishing feature of this “mode
of production and its corresponding form of political organisation,” as Sawer following
Wittfogel suggests. It is unfortunate that Sawer maintains this line of argument given that she at
least recognizes what Wittfogel did not: viz., that others have “discover[ed] a different
explanation of the AMP in Marx:” namely, the “isolation” created by the communal property of
the village.348
Indeed, Marx himself is clear in a number of works that the roots of this political
phenomenon must be traced back to the isolation of the communes from one another, i.e., their
self-enclosed microcosm and localized social life, which is due to the absence of private property
in the soil. In both the Grundrisse and in Capital, he elaborates that the real basis for both the
historical stagnation and despotism of the Asiatic mode of production is the self-reproducing
form of the oriental commune. All the conditions for their self-perpetuation are contained within
themselves, in the village’s unity of manufacturing with agriculture. The natural basis for its
historical stagnation is precisely this self-subsisting character founded upon common property
and communal labour, which, precisely because it is a tightly-knit circle of dependent
agricultural producers, vegetates in isolation from its neighbours. The giant despotisms which
can rise atop these little communes merely insulate them further from historical change, e.g., by
347 Lichtheim, George, Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study, (Praeger: 1963; New York), 148.
348 Sawer, Marian, Marxism and the Question of the Asiatic Mode of Production, (Martinus Nijhoff: Hague; 1977),
106.
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defending the territory as a whole from outsiders. As Gandy argues, the already “self-sufficient
communities slept through the ages under the sway of the despot.”349 Or, as Draper suggests
quoting Engels, the “complete isolation of the individual communities from one another” is the
“natural basis for Oriental despotism.”350 The underlying and “fundamental relationship remains
unaffected in forms such as oriental despotism,” concludes Schmidt, because the “small, more or
less autarchic communities are the components” of an “all-embracing unity.”351 Since the
individual is “only a possessor, he is at bottom himself the property, the slave of him in whom
the unity of the commune exists.”352
In the case of the tyrannies which can tower over these small and self-subsisting communes,
a “certain quantity of the community's production has found its way to the state as rent in
kind.”353 Hence, the real producers appear as “hereditary possessors” and are, “legally speaking,
without property;” but what really occurs, according to Schmidt’s more accurate reading of the
Grundrisse, is that “communal property [within the village] remains the basis of the self-
sustaining community.” The only difference, he adds, is that a portion of “surplus labour must
naturally be put at the disposal” of the “higher community” represented by the divine and real
despot.354 The despotic political (but also, e.g., religious) institutions extract their hereditary
tribute from the communes in the form of surplus labour/product, payments in kind, etc. As
Zingarelli puts it:
[T]he state appears as the superior or sole proprietor to whom the surplus of the villages
is due...and who benefits from the common labour carried out to exalt the despot or the
divinity...Thus, according to the Formen, the individual is then in fact propertyless or
349 Gandy , Daniel Ross, Marx and History: From Primitive Society to the Communist Future, (University of Texas
Press: 1979), 114.
350 Engels, on Social Relations in Russia, quoted in Draper, Hal, Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution: State and
Bureaucracy, Vol. I, (Monthly Review Press: New York; 1977), 555.
351 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (Verso Books: London; 2014), 172.
352 Ibid., 493.
353 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
1990), 477-479.
354 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (Verso Books: London; 2014), 172.
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property appears to be mediated by means of a grant from the total unity...[However,
Marx’s] analysis of this economic-social form detects village forms of property tied to
the strong local identity and the self-sufficiency of the economy...[to which falls the]
requirements of direct labour and the surrender of surplus labour for state
institutions...The transformation of these bonds with the communities does not affect
their essential features based on agricultural production and manufacturing...The
postulates of 1853 [i.e., Marx’s articles on colonial India, quoted in the above] are in
line....[with his remarks from the Grundrisse] alluding to the village system as a feature
of Asiatic societies and also to the absence of private property.355
Or, as Draper suggests,
[i]f we are considering the naturally evolved community before the institution of the
state separates out, that is, while the Unity is located within the life of the tribal
community itself, then there is no problem. The land is the communal property [of the
clan-commune]. But a special feature of the Asiatic mode of production...[is that with
further development the] communal Unity has [or can] become embodied in “higher”
power, one that has risen above the local communities...Within the framework of its
own little world, the village community may remain relatively unchanged for a long
time; and within this framework it is still the owner of the soil as against the individual.
But there is now a new relationship between it, as a little world, and the larger world
outside its sporelike walls. The essential feature of thee new relationship is the
appropriation of its surplus product by the state power.356
Thus, this mode of production, even where it takes on a centralized form as a State, is
founded upon the self-sufficient circle of manufacturing and agriculture which exists within the
archaic commune, i.e., one which “contains all the conditions of reproduction and surplus
production within itself.” That this commune possesses all of the premises of its own self-
perpetuation explains its historical tenacity much more than waterworks for Marx. This archaic
commune “forms a compact whole producing all it requires.” They not only “constantly
reproduce themselves in the same form,” but they can even appear, disappear, and reappear
again— “spring[ing] up again on the same spot and with the same name.” If a “new community
is founded,” it occurs on the “pattern of the old one, on unoccupied land.” This archaic commune
“serves as a fixed plan and basis for action whenever a new community is started.” This
“unchangeability” stands in “striking contrast with the constant dissolution and refounding of
355 Zingarelli, Andrea, ‘Asiatic Mode of Production: Considerations on Ancient Egypt’, Studies on Pre-Capitalist
Modes of Production, Laura da Graca and Andrea Zingarelli (ed.), (Brill: Leidin), 74-75.
356 Draper, Hal, Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution: State and Bureaucracy, Vol. I, (Monthly Review Press: New
York; 1977), 551.
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Asiatic states, and their never-ceasing changes of dynasty.” Thus, the “structure of the
fundamental economic elements of society remains untouched by the storms which blow up in
the cloudy regions of politics.”357
Again, then, it is not so much the ‘hydraulic-bureaucratic’ features of the State-regulated
metabolism which produces this relative historical immutability. According to Marx’s view,
what explains both the historical resilience and often despotic political character of this social
form is the self-enclosed character of the commune’s metabolism with the soil— and therefore
its complete isolation from, or at least more limited interaction with, its neighbours. It is, at
bottom, a result of the “presupposition that the individual does not become independent vis-à-vis
the commune.” This “self-sustaining circle” and “unity of agriculture and manufactures” restricts
the intercourse between the different communes, as well as between the communes and the
outside world.358 It is this “self-sustaining unity of manufacture and agriculture,” Marx repeats
elsewhere in the Formen, which makes the “Asiatic form” susceptible “least of all” to historic
modification.359 Schmidt, too, suggests that it is not the specifically hydraulic features of the
metabolism, but its communal agricultural character (of which irrigation is just one element),
which accounts for the “nature-like” or “unhistorical existence” of this commune.360 The “law
that regulates the division of labour in the community acts with the irresistible authority of a law
of nature.” It is the “simplicity of the productive organism in these self-sufficing communities”
which “supplies the key to the riddle of the unchangeability of Asiatic societies.”361
357 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
1990), 477-479.
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Individuality and the Dissolution of Communal Property
As Anderson explains, the reason why Marx believed this type of precapitalist society
exhibited so much “resistance” to historical change is because it ”preserved” the vestiges of still
“older clan-based communal forms.”362 Its relative self-sufficiency meant that it could maintain
and reproduce itself in its isolation from the outside world. Within the local “microcosm” of the
village, individuals are hemmed-in by the ties of kinship and limited by the immature state of the
forces of production. All social development is encloistered within the narrow horizons of
village-life.363 Each member of the commune “conducts himself only as a link” within this
tightly knit social chain, within its ‘relations of consanguinity’.364 Appealing to his earlier notion
that the despot appears as the “father” of the tinier communities, and they the “hereditary”
possessors of his land, Marx continued to argue as late as his drafts to Zasulich that the historical
genealogy of such a community is therefore usually no more complicated than the “structure” of
an extended “family tree.”365
He insists throughout all of his middle, late, and very late writings on this subject that there
is no possibility here for the free and full development of individuals. As Hegel teaches us, there
is no scope for individuality within the natural unity of the family (Stamm), i.e., it behaves in
unison as if it were but a single individual.366 The development of the individual, and of the
relations and forces of production with which it corresponds, remains fettered by the “tight
362Anderson, Kevin, Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies, (University of
Chicago Press: Chicago; 2010), 159.
363 Marx, Karl, ‘Drafts to the Letter to Vera Zasulich’, Marx and Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 24, David Forgacs
(trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1989), 353.
364 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
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bond[s]” of blood that connect him or her to the others in the community.367 In the archaic
commune, the individual “has as little torn himself free from the umbilical cord of his tribe or
community as a bee has [freed itself] from his hive.”368 Commenting on this statement, Schmidt
elaborates that for Marx such precapitalist forms of “cooperation” were based upon the limited
foundations provided by the “natural (naturwüchsig) division of labour within a tribe or a
family.”369 Marx repeats this same refrain elsewhere in Volume I of Capital. This form of society,
even where it has not degenerated outright into “direct relations of dominance and servitude,” is
“founded” upon the “immaturity of man as an individual”— viz., an individual who has “not yet
torn himself loose from the umbilical cord of his natural species-connection with other men.”
This type of social formation is “conditioned by a low stage of development of the productive
powers of labor and correspondingly limited relations between men,” and “relations between
man and nature.”370
The important point to keep in mind here is that all modes of production are regarded in the
broad as forms which express different degrees of development, i.e., the development of the
productive powers of society and, at bottom, of the capacities and needs of individuals as well as
of the relations between them, and between them and nature. They are forms in the general
development of the human being, i.e., different phases in the “development of individuality.”371
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These claims underline Marx’s fundamentally social conception of human nature and of
individuality. The human being is, at all points in history, the product of her relations with others.
The “essence of man is no abstraction inhering in each single individual,” but, in “actuality,” the
total “ensemble of social relationships” in their evolving state of development.372
Marx is unequivocal in many of his writings that humans individuate themselves only in the
midst of society, and only through the course of history. As they act upon and change their
relations with one another and with nature, they also change their own nature as individuals.
“[A]ll history is nothing but a continuous transformation of human nature.”373 This standpoint
reflects his lifelong Aristotelian view that the ‘nature’ of any given thing is what it is at the end
of its development— which, as the Grundrisse insists, implies in the case of human nature that
“human beings become individuals only through the process of history.”374 Individuals become
“aware of themselves” as individuals, Forbes summarizes Marx’s view, only with the
“development of the productive power of labour” through which they modify their “relation to
others, to nature, and to the relations of production in which they move.”375
The development of the forces of production dissolves these forms, and their dissolution
is itself a development of the human productive forces. Labour begins with a certain
foundation— naturally arisen, spontaneous, at first— then historic presupposition. Then,
however, this foundation or presupposition is itself suspended, or posited as a vanishing
presupposition which has become too confining for the unfolding of the progressing
human pack.376
productive forces taken over by each new generation, and is, therefore, the history of the development of the forces
of the individuals themselves. Since this evolution takes place naturally, i.e. is not subordinated to a general plan of
freely combined individuals, it proceeds from various localities, tribes, nations, branches of labour, etc. each of
which to start with develops independently of the others and only gradually enters into relation with the others.”
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Bologh therefore suggests that every “specific property relation” is not only regarded by
Marx as “identical with a specific relation within individuals stand, but with types of individuals
as well,” i.e., their “modes of presence” as individuals.377 As Marx himself explains, property in
the “inorganic body” of the earth appears as a “presupposition belonging to his individuality, as a
mode of his presence,” a modality of his own “being” (Dasein).378 As such, all of the particular
forms of precapitalist life “develop particular modes of production and particular forces of
production, subjective, appearing as qualities of individuals, as well as objective.” Hence, when
the specific “mode of production” upon which a “community rests” is “dissolved” (e.g., by
increases in exchange, defeat in war, etc.), we find that the “objective individual, i.e., the
individual defined as Roman, Greek, etc.” is also “dissolved” along with its conditions and
relations.379 In the case of the landed property of the ‘oriental’ commune, Bologh glosses, the
“individual’s objective presence” in relation to the land “embodies” the “communal unity” of
village life. In the other precapitalist forms yet to be discussed, e.g., the Classical and Germanic
commune, the “property relation” will “embody their social relations as citizens of the city or as
independent proprietors” isolated by large tracts of forest.380 As Anderson notes of Marx’s
Grundrisse, only in the Graeco-Roman world, with the “breakdown of communal society, as
well as a certain degree of individuation in both consciousness and social existence, including
property forms,” was it possible to create a broader foundation for social development.381
In Marx and the New Individual, Forbes makes a similar point as Bologh and Anderson,
tying it specifically to the metabolism with nature. The “nature of individuals” in this specifically
377 Bologh, Roslyn Wallach, Dialectical Phenomenology, (Routledge: 2010; New York), 82.
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“pre-capitalist situation” remains all the “less developed” the more it is determined by the whims
and “exigencies of an omnipotent nature.” In the most “primitive modes of production,” the
individual remains completely “undeveloped” because there is, as of yet, no “post-foetal”
relation to society and nature— not yet “post-foetal,” concludes Forbes, because the individual is
still attached by the ‘navel-string’ of her natural bond to both society and nature.382 Fromm
explains that it is essential to
understand Marx's fundamental idea: man makes his own history; he is his own creator.
As he put it many years later in Capital: “And would not such a history be easier to
compile since, as Vico says, human history differs from natural history in this, that we
have made the former, but not the latter.” Man gives birth to himself in the process of
history. The essential factor in this process of self-creation of the human race lies in its
relationship to nature. Man, at the beginning of his history, is blindly bound or chained
to nature. In the process of evolution he transforms his relationship to nature, and hence
himself.383
As Lichtheim observes of Marx’s Grundrisse, the human being
individualizes himself through the historical process, which is primarily a process of
evolving various forms of communal and private property, i.e., various ways of
organizing his social intercourse with nature and the— natural or artificial—
preconditions of work. The different forms of this metabolism correspond to different
stages of society.384
For Marx, the individual “appears originally as a species-being [Gattungswesen], clan
being, herd animal— although in no way whatever as a ζωον πολιτιχον.”385 This social
connectedness is, at first, merely a natural species-connection to nature and to society— at
bottom, one based on relations of consanguinity and tethered to the given limits of the soil. The
“human being is in the most literal sense a ζωον πολιτιχον, not merely a gregarious animal,”
because it “individuate[s] itself only in the midst of society.”386 Thus, contact and intermixture
with other communities, increased exchange, the introduction of precursory forms of private
382 Forbes, Ian, Marx and the New Individual:, (Unwin Hayman: London; 1990), 64.
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property, and, hence, the overall breakdown of more naturally-arisen social relations— again, all
this developing in antithesis to the old communal foundation, and, where successful, bringing
about its dissolution to some extent— these are, for Marx, the chief means of human
individuation in precapitalist history. Consequently, in his view, wherever we find primitive
communal property as the predominant form, we find underdeveloped forms of the human
personality. The primitive cooperation and “combination of manufacture and agriculture” within
the archaic commune leaves the individual “rooted to the spot, ingrown.” By contrast, with the
development of precursory forms of small-scale private property, what we discover is just the
opposite: viz., that the individual begins to cultivate a “relation of freedom” to the natural
conditions of production.387 The land starts to appear more and more as the laboratory of her own
productive powers, as the objectively unfolding content of her personality as an individual.
City-Life and the Ancient Antithesis between Private and State Property
In the second main type of precapitalist property that Marx describes in the Formen, i.e., the
ancient-classical form, it is the city (and not the countryside) which forms the primary landscape
for the regulation of the whole social metabolism with nature. Here, the rural landowners form
part of the political fabric and urban life of the polis or res publica. This community
“presupposes as base not the countryside, but the town as an already created seat (centre) of the
rural population (owners of land).” The “cultivated field appears here as a territorium belonging
to the town,” whereas in the previous mode the locus point of the intercourse with nature— the
village— was itself merely a natural “accessory to the land.”388 In precapitalist forms where the
presupposition is strictly communal possession, notes Schmidt, the villagers appear as a “mere
387 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 494.
388 Ibid., 474.
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appendage of the country;” but, here, the “starting-point is free, petty landownership” and the
“fields form part of the territory of the town.”389
After the city of Rome had been built and the surrounding countryside cultivated by its
citizens, the conditions of the community were different from what they had been
before....Not only do the objective conditions change in the act of reproduction, e.g. the
village becomes a town, the wilderness a cleared field etc., but the producers change,
too, in that they bring out new qualities in themselves, develop themselves in production,
transform themselves, develop new powers and ideas, new modes of intercourse, new
needs and new language. The older and more traditional the mode of production itself—
and this lasts a long time in agriculture; even more in the oriental supplementation of
agriculture with manufactures— i.e. the longer the real process of appropriation remains
constant, the more constant will be the old forms of property and hence the community
generally.390
The “city-state,” explains Gandy, is designated by Marx as the “economic unit of the ancient
mode of production.”391 It is the “city with its territory [which] is the economic totality,” while,
at the same time, the city itself also has its own distinct mode of “economic existence” apart
from the metabolism with the agricultural land.392 “The whole, here, consists not merely of its
parts. It is a kind of independent organism.”393 “With its coming-together in the city,” wrote
Marx, the “commune possesses an economic existence as such; the city’s mere presence, as such,
distinguishes it from a mere multiplicity of independent houses.”394 The individuals, no longer
tethered to the soil, have been released to some degree from the umbilical cord of the more
naturally-arisen forms of the metabolism and of their naturally-arisen social relations with one
another. Again, this signifies what Forbes calls the first stage in the development of a “post-
foetal” relation to nature. As Wood describes it, there is here
some sense of the separation of human beings from an unchangeable natural order, and
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390 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 493-494.
391 Gandy , Daniel Ross, Marx and History: From Primitive Society to the Communist Future, (University of Texas
Press: 1979), 114.
392 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 483.
393 Ibid., 483.
394 Ibid., 483.
150
of the social from the natural realm...[of a society which is] to some extent capable of
transcending the predetermined and inexorable cycle of natural necessity or divinely
ordered destiny...some practical distance from the inexorable cycles of nature, which is
most likely to come with urban civilization, a well-developed realm of human
experience outside the cycles and necessities of nature.395
This community, as Schmidt paraphrases Marx, is the product of a more “dynamic” history.396
As Marx tells us, this form of precapitalist society is the “product of a more active, historical
life” in which individuals (that is, citizens) are no longer “mere accidents,” and no longer “form
purely natural component parts” of the social whole (although within the realm of the oikos such
relations persist).397
These ancients “may perhaps have excused the slavery of one person as a means to the full
human development of another,” but they never thought to develop the “slavery” of the wage-
labourer as a social basis for transforming some “half-educated parvenus” into an “eminent
sausage-maker.”398 The “question” was, rather, which “mode of property creates the best
citizens.” The homogeneous communal property of the archaic commune, in which individuals
are but ‘natural accessories’ of the social organism, is not congruent with this sense of
‘citizenship’. Instead, the land appears here as the inorganic body of his individuality, i.e., it is
the laboratory of his own independent labour. The individual relates to it as the objective body of
his own personality, and also relates to other citizens through the mediation of their personal
property.
Do we never find in antiquity an inquiry into which form of landed property etc. is the
most productive, creates the greatest wealth? Wealth does not appear as the aim of
production…The question is always which mode of property creates the best
citizens...Thus the old view, in which the human being appears as the aim of production,
regardless of his limited national, religious, political character, seems to be very lofty
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when contrasted to the modern world.399
Nevertheless, Marx concludes quite rightly that neither should we romanticize such ancient
social organisms. These childish and one-sided forms from antiquity only appear lofty when
compared to the complete emptiness of modern life— which, just as much as these bygone
societies, represents but a passing phase in the historical development of the human being.
Although particular individuals may appear ‘great’ here (i.e., Aristotle, Pericles, etc.), Marx
concludes that there is no room whatsoever for the full and free development of any and all
individuals, since “such development stands in contradiction to the original relation.”400
In comparison to more archaic forms of commune life, this form of precapitalist property,
as well as the broader (but nonetheless still restricted and one-sided development of)
individuality with which it corresponded, presupposed a completely different relationship to the
objective conditions of production. Rather than communal labour and the common ownership of
the land, Marx discovers a “double form” of property developing here: viz., “state and private
property alongside one another.”401 The individual relates to the soil in part as private proprietor,
and no longer exclusively as a communal possessor.402 The individual citizen “relates to the
others [as] independent proprietors like himself, independent private proprietors— beside whom
the previously all-absorbing and all-predominant communal property is itself posited as a
particular ager publicus alongside the many private landowners.”403 The appropriation of these
natural presuppositions of their labour, of their own property in the soil, appears more and more
as the appropriation of the objective expression of their own personalities as individuals.404
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However, this private property in the soil also assumes a separate and particular
existence.405 As a result of this “double relation which makes him both an equal citizen, a
member of the community, and a proprietor” or owner of private property, it is now possible for
this individual to “lose his property” in the land. Such a loss was unimaginable in the more
communal form of property, “except by means of external influences [viz., war], since the
individual member of the commune never enters into the relation of freedom towards it.”406
Nonetheless, in antiquity, this “antithetical” relation between public and private property
develops in such a way that the “latter is mediated by the former.”407 So, in Rome for example,
the “private proprietor of land is such only as a Roman, but as a Roman he is a private proprietor
of land” (hence, the more easily expropriated property of the metic in antiquity).408 The
territorium which belongs to the Romulan gens as a whole can then be justifiably broken-up and
parcellized into “private property” only because it remains the “domain of a Roman, the part of
the laboratorium belonging to him,” and because this individual is a Roman only insofar as he
has this “sovereign right over a part of the Roman earth.”409
At the same time, in addition to this individualized property, we still find alongside it
property in its older communal form (e.g., in the public property of the ager publicus in Rome,
the State-owned silver mines of Athens, etc.). “Communal property— as state property, ager
possessor [Besitzer]. The less it is the case that the individual's property can in fact be realized solely through
communal labour— thus e.g., the aqueducts in the Orient— the more the purely naturally arisen, spontaneous
character of the clan has been broken by historic movement, migration; the more, further, the clan removes itself
from its original seat and occupies alien ground, hence enters into essentially new conditions of labour, and develops
the energy of the individual more— its common character appearing, necessarily, more as a negative unity towards
the outside— the more, therefore, are the conditions given under which the individual can become a private
proprietor of land and soil— of a particular plot— whose particular cultivation falls to him and his family.” Ibid.,
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publicus— [is] here separated from private property.”410 Yet, this public property of the State
must also be defended, maintained, expanded, etc., through the military service of the citizenry.
Due to the breakdown of the older clan relations, and as a result of this antithesis in the property-
form, the State takes on, on the one hand, a more external relation vis-a-vis its members but, on
the other hand, for the same reason must constantly re-assert its unity with them and against the
outside world of barbarism. The State is the “relation of these free and equal private proprietors
to one another, their bond against the outside, and is at the same time their safeguard.” As
Schmidt explains, one of the “prerequisites for the individual ownership of the land” is the
“community organized as a state defending this land externally and guaranteeing it internally.”
But the “more the [Roman] tribe loses its natural qualities [as a gens] because of historical
development,” the more does its togetherness appear as a “negative unity” against the outside
world.411
The most important point here is that the dualism which develops between these forms of
property in classical antiquity illustrates once more how the natural fate of the more archaic
commune (i.e., of the old Homeric or Romulan gens) has been “broken by historic movement.”
As Lichtheim notes, Marx discovered that the “development of private property” in Greece and
Rome altered the “original communal” conditions of their clans.412 He believed that the private
property of the independent peasant household had provided a wider scope for the development
of individuality. In contrast to contemporary secondary literature which emphasizes the late
break in Marx’s thinking about precapitalist societies, I would argue that this same theory of
human development clearly informs his views through to the Ethnological Notebooks and drafts
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to Zasulich. As he italicized in his notes on Morgan, the “patriarchal family” of the Hellenic
period “marks the peculiar epoch in human progress when the individuality of the person began
to rise above the gens,” whereas, in more archaic modes of social life, the “individuality of
persons was lost in the gens.”413 In the drafts to Zasulich, Marx explicitly claims that a similar
sort of dualism provided the Russian commune with a “broader foundation” for the development
of individuality, i.e., a “broader foundation” which endows it with the potential for a more
“vigorous” historical life. Only on this basis, could the Russian commune break through its
“isolation” and until then restricted relations of “consanguinity.”414
For Marx, Lichtheim argues, this development of “private (landed) property”— as
distinct from the communal property of the ager publicus— signified a “new type of civilisation”
and, I would add, a new type of individuality. That the “individual develops into an independent
landowner” is a sign that historic development has dissolved the older clan-chieftain relations
and Homeric virtues which had once held together the more archaic forms of the Greco-Roman
commune.415 The purely natural bonds of blood, and the restricted relation to nature which they
presuppose, have been replaced by the political association of the city. In Athens, for example,
the male heads of each of the independent households step beyond the narrow relations of
personal dependence which nonetheless still persist within the patriarchy of the oikos; i.e., they
relate to one another as citizens, as members of the polis. The family's “residence,” as such, is no
longer the “economic totality” of social life.416
In fact, as already noted, the city itself takes on an increasingly separate and independent
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existence, both economically and politically in the form of civil society and the body politic.
Indeed, even the whole metabolism with nature and the form of agricultural production is altered
by this city-life. This form of property and mode of production is based (even though slavery
exists) upon independent peasant proprietors. The “presupposition of the survival of the
community is the preservation of equality among its free self-sustaining peasants.” After
Cleisthenes and Solon, the unity of the polis rested upon the maintenance of their economic
reforms, as well as the conservation of this relative political equality and autonomy. Here, the
commune appears as a “product of history.” This historically-arisen social life is recognized by
its members as the “presupposition of property in land and soil,” of their own “private property
as land and soil.” This property, i.e., the “relation of the working subject to the natural
presuppositions of labour as belonging to him,” means that the individuals “relate as proprietors
to the natural conditions of labour” as the “real conditions and objective elements of the
personality of the individual.”417
The Germanic Commune and the Lonely Life in the Woods
In the third form of precapitalist society that Marx examines in the Formen, the Germanic
commune, there was also a certain sort of “dualism” between private and communal property.418
However, in the classical “antithesis,” private property was still mediated by the individual's
relation to the community; here, the determinations have been reversed.419 In contrast to the
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Zasulich’, Marx and Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 24, David Forgacs (trans.), (International Publishers: New York;
1989), 350.
419 “A[nother] form of the property of working individuals, self-sustaining members of the community, in the natural
conditions of their labour, is the Germanic. Here the commune member is neither, as such, a co-possessor of the
communal property, as in the specifically oriental form (wherever property exists only as communal property, there
the individual member is as such only possessor of a particular part, hereditary or not, since any fraction of the
property belongs to no member for himself, but to him only as immediate member of the commune, i.e. as in direct
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contradiction found in Greece and Rome, the dualism of the Germanic commune develops in
such a manner that the “communal property appears only as the complement to individual
property, with the latter as the base.”420 In contrast to the classical form, individualized “landed
property here appears neither as a form antithetical to the commune's landed property, nor as
mediated by it.”421 Rather, it is the community itself which is mediated by this individualized
property. The “commune exists” almost exclusively through the “interrelations among these
individual landed proprietors.”422 The appropriation of nature (still presupposed here, as in all
other precapitalist forms, as a precondition for production) takes place entirely within this
specific context. The individual families relate to the cultivated earth beneath their feet, and to
each other, as independent proprietors— that is, no longer merely as possessors of a
homogeneous common property. Instead of the communal appropriation of a communal product,
in the latter stages of the Germanic commune’s development we find relatively independent
families harvesting the fruits of their own household production.
The so-called “ager publicus, the communal or people's land, as distinct from individual
property, also occurs among the Germanic tribes.” In fact, Engels suggests that this communal
property made up the vast bulk of the land even after this ‘dualism’ had been developed.
However, the ager publicus does not manifest itself, as in Rome, Greece, etc., in such a manner
unity with it, not in distinction to it. This individual is thus only a possessor. What exists is only communal property,
and only private possession. The mode of this possession in relation to the communal property may be historically,
locally etc. modified in quite different ways, depending on whether labour itself is performed by the private
possessor in isolation, or is in turn determined by the commune or by the unity hovering above the particular
commune); nor is the situation such as obtains in the Roman, Greek form (in short, the form of classical antiquity)—
in this case, the land is occupied by the commune, Roman land; a part remains to the commune as such as distinct
from the commune members, ager publicus in its various forms; the other part is divided up and each parcel of land
is Roman by virtue of being the private property, the domain of a Roman, the part of the laboratorium belonging to
him; but, also, he is a Roman only in so far as he possesses this sovereign right over a part of the Roman earth.”
Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin Books:
London; 1993), 476-477.
420 Ibid., 486.
421 Ibid., 484.
422 Ibid., 484.
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that it constitutes a “particular economic presence of the state as against the private
proprietors.”423
Among the Germanic tribes, the ager publicus appears rather merely as a complement
to individual property, and figures as property only to the extent that it is defended
militarily as the common property of one tribe against a hostile tribe. Individual
property does not appear mediated by the commune; rather, the existence of the
commune and of communal property appear as mediated by it, i.e., as a relation of the
independent subjects to one another.424
In contrast to the property of the Roman State, this communal property exists merely in the
woodlands for hunting, rivers for fishing, and grasslands for grazing. As Marx explained in his
drafts to the letter to Zasulich, a “dualism” developed within the Germanic mark (comparable to
some to extent to the Slavic-Russian obshchina or mir) because “arable land became private
property, while the forests, pastures, waste ground, etc., remained communal property.”425 The
“hunting and grazing lands” were reserved for “communal use,” and regarded as the indivisible
“common property of the individual proprietors.”426 The maintenance of these lands for strictly
communal purposes was also a natural presupposition necessary for the reproduction of the
Germanic commune. After all, the “hunting land, grazing land, [and] timber land” could not be
“divided” if they were to continue to “serve as means of production in this specific form.”427
Although this form of the commune had long since been dissolved, Marx not only claimed
423 Ibid., 483.
424 Ibid., 483-484.
425 Marx, Karl, ‘Drafts to the Letter to Vera Zasulich’, Marx and Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 24, David Forgacs
(trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1989), 350\, 366.
426 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 485.
427 Ibid., 483. “The chief use of the common mark was in pasturage for the cattle and feeding of pigs on acorns.
Besides that, the forest yielded timber and firewood, litter for the animals, berries and mushrooms, while the moor,
where it existed, yielded turf. The regulations as to pasture, the use of wood, etc., make up the most part of the many
mark records written down at various epochs between the thirteenth and the eighteenth centuries, at the time when
the old unwritten law of custom began to be contested. The common woodlands that are still met with here and there,
are the remnants of these ancient unpartitioned marks. Another relic, at all events in West and South Germany, is the
idea, deeply rooted in the popular consciousness, that the forest should be common property, wherein every one may
gather flowers, berries, mushrooms, beechnuts and the like, and generally so long as he does no mischief, act and do
as he will. But this also Bismarck remedies, and with his famous berry-legislation brings down the Western
Provinces to the level of the old Prussian squirearchy.” Engels, Frederick, ‘The Mark’, Socialism: Utopian and
Scientific, Edward Aveling (trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1989), 83-84.
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that its decomposition formed the basis for feudal property, but that one could still find its
scattered relics within the interstices of contemporary Europe (e.g., in his own home town of
Trier).428 As Engels explains, the “common woodlands,” wherever they still existed in Europe,
were but “remnants of these ancient unpartitioned marks.” In thinking through how to respond to
Zasulich, Marx appealed to the work of Maurer on this subject, who had used classical and
medieval sources as a means of reconstructing the history of the Germanic commune. By tracing
its development back through the various stages of its dissolution, Marx felt that Maurer was
able to reassemble the essential elements of the more original form of the German mark. Hence,
as important as Maine and Morgan might be for Marx’s historical anthropology, we should also
acknowledge the role which Mauer played in shaping his thinking during this period.429 As
Anderson notes, Marx had written to Engels in the late 1860s with a degree of measured praise
for Maurer’s most recent work, precisely because it had “shown not only that communal
property was the original Germanic form, as much as in Russia or India, but also that it had
428 “A few traces of these have survived until our own time, but all through the Middle Ages they served as the basis
and as the type of all public institutions and permeated the whole of public life, not only in Germany, but also in the
north of France, England, and Scandinavia And yet they have been so completely forgotten, that recently G. L.
Maurer has had to re-discover their real significance. Two fundamental facts, that arose spontaneously, govern the
primitive history of all, or of almost all, nations: the grouping of the people according to kindred, and common
property in the soil. And this was the case with the Germans. As they had brought with them fromAsia the method
of grouping by tribes and gentes, as they even in the time of the Romans so drew up their battle array that those
related to each other always stood shoulder to shoulder, this grouping also governed the partitioning of their new
territory east of the Rhine and north of the Danube. Each tribe settled down upon the new possession, not according
to whim or accident, but, as Caesar expressly states, according to the gens-relationship between the members of the
tribe...The land which was not taken possession of by the village remained at the disposal of the hundred [i.e., a
grouping of villages]. What was not assigned to the latter remained for the shire [i.e., an association between the
hundreds]. Whatever after that was still to be disposed of— generally a very large tract of land— was the immediate
possession of the whole people. Thus in Sweden we find all these different stages of common holding side by
side....In Caesar’s time a great part at least of the Germans, the Suevi, to wit, who had not yet got any fixed
settlement, cultivated their fields in common. From analogy with other peoples we may take it that this was carried
on in such a way that the individual gentes, each including a number of nearly related families, cultivated in
common the land apportioned to them, which was changed from year to year, and divided the products among the
families.” Marx, Karl, ‘Drafts to the Letter to Vera Zasulich’, Marx and Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 24, David
Forgacs (trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1989), 350.
429 Engels, Frederick, ‘The Mark’, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Edward Aveling (trans.), (International
Publishers: New York; 1989), 77-79.
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persisted in parts of rural Germany until their own time.”430
However, as a result of both internal and, later, external influences, a distinct dualism
started to develop in this Germanic commune (according to Marx’s interpretation of Mauer). The
decomposition of the older and more communal form of the Germanic clan started to give way to
a new metabolic relation to the soil as individualized property. To be sure, it is not present as
private property in the bourgeois sense of the term, as something which one can sell away to
another. Rather, it initially takes the almost religious form of the inviolability of the home (as
opposed to the more communal housing of the nomadic life and of primitive communism).
Subsequently, this is expanded into the inviolability of the family’s homestead (which already
gives us an indication of the extent to which more communal forms of agricultural labour have
been dissolved). During the age of Tacitus, the Germanic lands were all still formally communal
property (i.e., and were even continually redistributed by the commune on an annual or biennial
basis). However, the plots themselves were in practice already being cultivated separately by
these more independent households. After the fall of Rome, this sanctity of the homestead
becomes instituted so that the customary right of independent households to the fruits of their
own labour is codified, and the lands gain a hereditary title in law. In this ‘synthesis’ between
Roman and Germanic property, Marx and Engels found, on one hand, that the tilled fields
become appropriated more and more as individual household property, but, on the other, that
much of the rest of the land remains the communal property of the local village, or, even of the
people as a whole (so that the specifically State-form of the Roman ager publicus is effectively
abolished).431
430Anderson, Kevin, Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies, (University of
Chicago Press: Chicago; 2010), 139.
431 “[T]his [communality of labour] soon ceased. At all events, Tacitus (150 years after Caesar) only mentions the
tilling of the soil by individual families. But the land to be tilled only belonged to these for a year. Every year it was
divided up anew and redistributed...[and the] uncultivated land, forest and pasture land, is still a common possession
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In Marx’s view, the distinct form which this dualism assumed arose out of the specific
conditions of the Germanic commune's metabolism with nature. The clan-families, forming
tightly knit and self-sustaining circles of peasant proprietors, were but “small dots” isolated from
one another by large forests. With the ancients, it was the life of the city which formed the
“economic totality.” However, the “Germanic barbarians” carried on a “traditional system” of
agricultural production in which they became “accustomed to [a] lonely life in the country.”432
The larger unity of this “commune exists” only as the “occasional coming-together”of these self-
subsisting atoms, not as a really being-together (as in the urban life of antiquity). The
togetherness of the Teutonic commune was merely presupposed because of a common language,
religion, blood lines, etc., or, more practically speaking, the “occasional coming-together” for
for common use...The first piece of ground that passed into the private property of individuals was that on which the
house stood. The inviolability of the dwelling, that basis of all personal freedom, was transferred from the caravan of
the nomadic train to the log house of the stationary peasant, and gradually was transformed into a complete right of
property in the homestead. This had already come about in the time of Tacitus. The free German’s homestead must,
even in that time, have been excluded from the mark, and thereby inaccessible to its officials, a safe place of refuge
for fugitives...For the sacredness of the dwelling was not the effect but the cause of its transformation into private
property. Four or five hundred years after Tacitus, according to the same law-books, the cultivated land also was the
hereditary, although not the absolute freehold property of individual peasants, who had the right to dispose of it by
sale or any other means of transfer. The causes of this transformation, as far as we can trace them, are two-fold. First,
from the beginning there were in Germany itself, besides the close villages already described, with their complete
ownership in common of the land, other villages where, besides homesteads, their fields also were excluded from
the mark, the property of the community, and were parcelled out among the individual peasants as their hereditary
property. But this was only the case where the nature of the place, so to say, compelled it: in narrow valleys, and on
narrow, flat ridges between marshes, as in Westphalia; later on, in the Odenwald, and in almost all the Alpine valleys.
In these places the village consisted, as it does now, of scattered individual dwellings, each surrounded by the fields
belonging to it. A periodical re-division of the arable land was in these cases hardly possible, and so what remained
within the mark was only the circumjacent untilled land. When, later, the right to dispose of the homestead by
transfer to a third person became an important consideration, those who were free owners of their fields found
themselves in an advantageous position...But, second, conquest led the Germans on to Roman territory, where, for
centuries, the soil had been private property (the unlimited property of Roman law), and where the small number of
conquerors could not possibly altogether do away with a form of holding so deeply rooted...But if the German
conquerors adopted private ownership in fields and meadows— i.e., gave up at the first division of the land, or soon
after, any re-partition...they introduced, on the other hand, everywhere their German mark system, with common
holding of woods and pastures, together with the over-lordship of the mark in respect to the partitioned land. This
happened not only with the Franks in the north of France and the Anglo-Saxons in England, but also with the
Burgundians in Eastern France, the Visigoths in the south of France and Spain, and the Ostrogoths and
Langobardians in Italy...All other land, i.e., all that was not house and farmyard, or so much of the mark as had been
distributed among individuals, remained, as in early times, common property for common use; forests, pasture lands,
heaths, moors, rivers, ponds, lakes, roads and bridges, hunting and fishing grounds.” Ibid., 79-83.
432 Marx, Karl, ‘Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy’, The German Ideology: Including Theses on
Feuerbach and Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, Clemens Dutt (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New
York; 1998), 13.
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some definite purpose such as war, adjudication between the clans, etc.433 As Anderson suggests
of Marx’s representations of this precapitalist form in the Grundrisse, its social life was
“centered in the countryside,” with the clans “isolated by great distances in the forest.” The
larger commune was “not permanent, but rather a periodic coming together.”434 In the “Germanic
world,” the “totality is the individual residence.” Perelman argues that, at least in some instances,
Marx’s descriptions of such precapitalist societies were not “terribly inaccurate,” as, for example,
when he tells us here that “each individual household contains an entire economy, forming as it
433 “The Germanic commune is not concentrated in the town...The history of classical antiquity is the history of
cities, but of cities founded on landed property and on agriculture; Asiatic history is a kind of indifferent unity of
town and countryside...[But] the Middle Ages (Germanic period) begins with the land as the seat of history, whose
further development then moves forward in the contradiction between town and countryside...With its coming-
together in the [ancient] city, the commune possesses an economic existence as such; the city's mere presence, as
such, distinguishes it from a mere multiplicity of independent houses. The whole, here, consists not merely of its
parts. It is a kind of independent organism. Among the Germanic tribes, where the individual family chiefs settled in
the forests, long distances apart, the commune exists, already from outward observation, only in the periodic
gathering-together [Vereinigung] of the commune members, although their unity-in-itself is posited in their ancestry,
language, common past and history, etc. The commune thus appears as a coming-together [Vereinigung], not as a
being-together [Verein]; as a unification made up of independent subjects, landed proprietors, and not as a unity. The
commune therefore does not in fact exist as a state or political body, as in classical antiquity...For the commune to
come into real existence, the free landed proprietors have to hold a meeting...The economic totality is, at bottom,
contained in each individual household, which forms an independent centre of production for itself...In the world of
antiquity, the city with its territory is the economic totality; in the Germanic world, the totality is the individual
residence, which itself appears as only a small dot on the land belonging to it...In antiquity (Romans as the most
classic example, the thing in its purest, most fully developed form), the form of state property in land and that of
private property in land [are] antithetical, so that the latter is mediated by the former, or the former itself exists in
this double form. The private proprietor of land hence at the same time urban citizen...In the Germanic form, the
agriculturist [is] not [a] citizen of a state, i.e., not [the] inhabitant of a city; [the] basis [is] rather the isolated,
independent family residence, guaranteed by the bond with other such family residences of the same tribe, and by
their occasional coming-together [Zusammnenkommen] to pledge each others' allegiance in war, religion,
adjudication, etc. Individual landed property here appears neither as a form antithetical to the commune's landed
property, nor as mediated by it, but just the contrary. The commune exists only in the interrelations among these
individual landed proprietors as such. Communal property as such appears only as a communal accessory to the
individual tribal seats and the land they appropriate. The commune is neither the substance of which the individual
appears as a mere accident; nor is it a generality with a being and unity as such [seiende Einheit] either in the mind
and in the existence of the city and of its civic needs as distinct from those of the individual, or in its civic land and
soil as its particular presence as distinct from the particular economic presence of the commune member; rather, the
commune, on the one side, is presupposed in-itself prior to the individual proprietors as a communality of language,
blood etc., but it exists as a presence, on the other hand, only in its real assembly for communal purposes; and to the
extent that it has a particular economic existence in the hunting and grazing lands for communal use, it is so used by
each individual proprietor as such, not as representative of the state (as in Rome).” Marx, Karl, Grundrisse:
Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin Books: London; 1993), 483-
485.
434Anderson, Kevin, Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies, (University of
Chicago Press: Chicago; 2010), 161.
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does an independent center of production.”435
Unlike the more cosmopolitan conditions of the city-state, social development occurs here
within the same sort of strict familial and local-clan limits which we find in the Asiatic mode of
production. Nonetheless, the “dualism” or “double form” of property which exists in this
iteration of the commune provided the conditions in which a sort of rugged “individuality can
develop” and become “autonomized” as Camatte notes.436 On this basis, Marx claims that the
Germanic commune— which, as Lichtheim suggests, was for him the “original cell for the
medieval body politic”— became the sole centre of “liberty” throughout the middle ages in
Europe.437
Multilinearity and the Question of Pre-Capitalist ‘Progress’
435 Perelman, Michael, The Invention of Capitalism: Classical Political Economy and the Secret History of Primitive
Accumulation, (Duke University Press: Durham; 2000),72.
436 Camatte, Jacques, ‘Community and Communism in Russia’, David Brown (trams.), first published in French in
Invariance Series II, n. 4, 1974; in English by Spartacus 1978, <https://www.marxists.org/archive
/camatte/commrus1.htm>.
437 Lichtheim, George, ‘Marx and the “Asiatic Mode of Production”’, Karl Marx’s Social and Political Thought, Vol.
6, Bob Jessop and Russel Wheatley (ed.), (Routledge: London; 1999), 48. See also Engels, Frederick, ‘The Mark’,
Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Edward Aveling (trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1989), 84-85: “Just
as the members of the community originally had equal shares in the soil and equal rights of usage, so they had also
an equal share in the legislation, administration and jurisdiction within the mark. At fixed times and, if necessary,
more frequently, they met in the open air to discuss the affairs of the mark and to sit in judgment upon breaches of
regulations and disputes concerning the mark. It was, only in miniature, the primitive assembly of the German
people, which was, originally, nothing other than a great assembly of the mark...In primitive times, the whole public
authority in time of peace was exclusively judicial, and rested in the popular assembly of the hundred, the shire, or
the whole tribe...Even when the Frankish kings began to transform the self-governing shires into provinces governed
by royal delegates, and thus separated the royal shire courts from the common mark tribunals, in both the judicial
function remained vested in the people. It was only when the old democratic freedom had been long undermined,
when attendance at the popular assemblies and tribunals had become a severe burden upon the impoverished
freemen, that Charlemagne, in his shire courts, could introduce judgment by Schöffen, lay assessors, appointed by
the king’s judge, in the place of judgment by the whole popular assembly. But this did not seriously touch the
tribunals of the mark. These, on the contrary, still remained the model even for the feudal tribunals in the Middle
Ages. In these, too, the feudal lord only formulated the issues, while the vassals themselves found the verdict. The
institutions governing a village during the Middle Ages are but those of an independent village mark, and passed
into those of a town as soon as the village was transformed into a town, i. e., was fortified with walls and trenches.
All later constitutions of cities have grown out of these original town mark regulations. And, finally, from the
assembly of the mark were copied the arrangements of the numberless free associations of medieval times not based
upon common holding of the land, and especially those of the free guilds. The rights conferred upon the guild for the
exclusive carrying on of a particular trade were dealt with just as if they were rights in a common mark. With the
same jealousy, often with precisely the same means in the guilds as in the mark, care was taken that the share of
each member in the common benefits and advantages should be equal, or as nearly equal as possible.”
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In the Contribution, Marx asserts that “new superior relations of production never replace
older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework
of the old society.” On the basis of this principle of immanent development, he claimed that, in
“broad outline,” the historical shapes of society that he had undertaken a study of— the “Asiatic,
ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production”— represent “epochs marking
progress in the economic development of society.”438 Schmidt regards these prefatory remarks
about precapitalist forms in the Contribution as rather schematic in comparison to the more
nuanced and open-ended analysis offered in the Grundrisse. According to him, when the
Grundrisse “compared a series of geographically separated varieties of landownership, that is to
say the Oriental, South American, Slavic, Germanic, and Classical types,” Marx proceeded by
“thrusting the question of the temporal succession of these forms entirely into the background.”
Schmidt suggests that this parallels the basic pattern laid out in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature
insofar as it presents these “different form[s] of the pre-capitalist community [as] stand[ing]
beside each other,” i.e., as a topography of historically “indifferent, unconnected forms of
existence.”439 However, instead of Hegel’s Naturphilosophie, he argues that the Contribution
illustrates that Marx momentarily reverted to presenting these precapitalist forms through the
template of the Philosophy of History, i.e., by schematically characterizing them as a successive
series of stages marking-out the progressive development of the productive powers of social
labour.
All statements about nature relate to the particular stage reached in its appropriation by
society. Moreover, owing to the changes in the constellations in which men are linked to
one another and to nature, a uniform dialectical structure cannot be ascribed to human
history in general...although many of Marx's own formulations appear to support this
interpretation...The ‘coherent series of forms of intercourse’ later, in the famous preface
to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, became the necessary
438 Marx, Karl, ‘Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’, Marx and Engels: Collected Works,
Vol. 29, Victor Shnittke and Yuri Sdobnikov (trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1987), 263-264.
439 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (Verso Books: London; 2014), 167-168.
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succession of progressive epochs of the economic social formation, from the Asiatic
mode, via the classical and the feudal, and from there to the bourgeois mode of
production. It is not difficult to show that here Marx was far too willing to follow the
scheme of development set out in Hegel’s philosophy of history, and that the real course
of history is much more complicated.440
To be sure, Marx’s analysis is consistent with the thesis of ‘multi-linearity’ if we take it to
mean that different precapitalist societies, at different times and in different places, based upon
different relations and different conditions, undergo different forms of development whose stages
unfold in different orders of succession.441 Taken in this strict sense, he does not impose a
“uniform dialectical structure” upon the precapitalist forms of the metabolism with nature
(emphasis added). Notwithstanding the fact that they mark off, in the broad, phases in the general
development of human society, Marx never treated Asiatic, Classical, etc., societies as
‘universal’ social formations which all peoples must pass through in the same phases of
procession. He never entertained such a strict determinism, and, if he had, we would be right to
reconsider, question, and abandon it. However, we have seen that the Grundrisse actually
represented precapitalist societies as undergoing their own unique processes of development, and,
as I will go on to elaborate, Marx’s account of primitive accumulation in Capital recognizes that
the dissolution of precapitalist society also took on a variety of historical and contemporary
forms in England, on the Continent, and throughout the colonial world.
In contrast to Schmidt, however, others suggest that the cited statement from the
Contribution merely “lists in order modes of production” which, precisely because they represent
divergent paths of historical development, constitute examples of property and production
“further and further removed from primitive communism: Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and
440 Ibid., 167-168.
441 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
1990), 876.
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bourgeois.”442 Anderson, another proponent of the ‘multilinearity’ thesis, argues that Marx’s
presentation only “seemed like a unilinear perspective” to some because it regards the ‘naturally
arisen’ socialism of the archaic commune as the “first stage of social development for all
societies;” but, he is right to add, it was Marx’s view that this original form broke apart into
multiple lines of precapitalist development.443 Primitive communism— the original, primary, and
universal form found at the beginning of all human social history— underwent everywhere its
own distinct process of dissolution and development. The archaic commune, in its various states
of decomposition and modification, were identified by Marx as ‘Asiatic’, ‘Slavic’, ‘Roman’,
‘Germanic’, ‘Feudal’, etc., property. This is the meaning behind his claim that the “original form
of this property is therefore itself direct common property”— as found still in the “oriental form,
modified in the Slavonic; developed to the point of antithesis, but still as the secret, if antithetical,
foundation in classical and Germanic property.”444
These precapitalist forms are presented by Marx as different forms of production, as
different modes of the socially-mediated intercourse with nature. However, because he interprets
these as “geographically separated” forms of life, rather than as archetypal examples of different
forms of property in the soil, Schmidt makes the dubious claim that no particular precapitalist
society is represented in the Grundrisse as a ‘progressive’ phase or “higher stage of
development” in comparison to others.445 But Marx’s ‘Rough Draft’ does indeed represent these
precapitalist shapes of society as expressing different degrees in the development of the
capacities, needs, and relations of human beings. That these precapitalist forms existed
442 Gandy, Daniel Ross, Marx and History: From Primitive Society to the Communist Future, (University of Texas
Press: 1979), 12.
443Anderson, Kevin, Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies, (University of
Chicago Press: Chicago; 2010), 161.
444 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 473.
445 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (Verso Books: London; 2014), 167-168.
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indifferently alongside one another in different places, but at the same moments in history, by no
means implies that the Grundrisse brackets the question of whether they mark out “progressive”
phases in relation to one another.
In Capital, he reiterates that the Teutonic, Slavic, and Hellenic forms of property must be
understood as different forms in the dissolution of an older and more archaic commune— to be
sure, not one necessarily imported ready-made from Asia itself, but, rather, as the spontaneously
developed and naturally-arisen social form standing at the dawn of all human history.446 But that
they represent multiple paths of development in the history of precapitalist society in no way
excludes the fact that they also represent different degrees in the general development of the
human being. The modified post-Solonian gens was regarded by the Marx of the Grundrisse as a
superior form of social life in comparison to the older Homeric gens from which it emerged. The
same was arguably true, as already noted, of Marx’s thoughts on Mauer’s reconstruction of the
history of the German mark— that sole centre of medieval liberty. As such, the “primary form”
of the archaic commune, found everywhere at one point or another, underwent everywhere its
own distinct processes of dissolution. But, for that same reason wrote Marx as late as 1881, their
history “reveals to us a series of different types, marking progressive epochs” (emphasis
added).447
Schmidt reads the Grundrisse as if Marx were agnostic on this question of precapitalist
‘progress’. On the contrary, though, he explicitly states there (just as he does in Capital and in
the drafts to Zasulich) that these forms of precapitalist life, and that the social relations with
which they correspond, are continually cast aside with the progressive unfolding of the human
446 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
1990), 171. Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.),
(Penguin Books: London; 1993), 882.
447 Marx, Karl, ‘Drafts to the Letter to Vera Zasulich’, Marx and Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 24, David Forgacs
(trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1989), 363.
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pack.448 Originally, the human is a social animal only in his or her immediate and natural
species-connection with others. This is why he claims that the individual must be counted as
among the products of history. The human being is individuated only in the definite context of
this or that society, and through a concrete process of historical development. The richest forms
of individuality depend completely upon the richness of the individual’s relations to others,
social relations which are therefore integral to who they are as individuals. The original clan
communism and cooperative character of the archaic commune was a necessity imposed by
nature, a product of the undeveloped productive powers of people. According to Marx’s view of
things in the Grundrisse, Contribution, Capital, late anthropological writings, and drafts to
Zasulich, those modes of precapitalist social life which had moved away from this primitive
socialism through the introduction of small-scale private property (e.g., of the sort which Marx
identified with post-Solonian Athens, the yeomanry of precapitalist England, the flourishing
period of the German mark, etc.) gave more room to the free development of individuality. Only
on the basis of this dualism do individuals start to enter into a ‘relation of freedom’ to their
conditions of life in nature.
In defence of this interpretative position one need go no further than Marx’s own depictions
of different precapitalist communities. Consider, for example, his representations of common
property in British India not simply in the early 1850s, but from the late 1860s through to the
1880s. In the articles for the Tribune, just as in the Grundrisse, Capital, Ethnological Notebooks,
and drafts to Zasulich, such communal forms are regarded as having confined individual
development within definite limits, tethering the members of the village to the soil by the
umbilical cord of their naturally-arisen social connections to one another and to nature. This was
448 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 497.
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true for Marx not just of colonial India (especially, again, its northwestern reaches), but of all
precapitalist forms (non-European and European alike) which preserved elements of the archaic
commune: e.g., communal forms of property and the communality of labour; the self-sufficient
and localized life brought about by the unity of manufacturing and agriculture in the village-
system; the commune’s isolation with respect to its neighbours and the outside world.
Compare Marx’s representations of this Indian village to the ‘broader’ individuality which
he attributes to the peasant-citizen in post-Solonian Athens in the Grundrisse and the
Ethnological Notebooks; or to that ‘golden age’ of the independent yeomanry in Capital; or,
albeit to a lesser degree perhaps, the Russian peasant producers after their emancipation from
serfdom in the drafts to Zasulich, letter to Mikhailovsky, and Russian ‘Preface’ to The
Communist Manifesto— but, by no means, every precapitalist society either throughout the
colonial world of the 19th century, or, for that matter, in the history of Western Europe itself.
These various forms, and the greater degree of individuality with which they corresponded
according to Marx, all rested upon the development of the dualism between the personal
appropriation of one’s own labour and the older communal heritage (common property) which
was itself present in contrasting states of decomposition and modification in the Asiatic, Hellenic,
and Germanic forms of landed property.
Understood by Gandy as archetypal forms of property/production (and not geographic or
ethnological categories), these multiple lines to the dissolution of primitive communism
represent different forms of development relative to one another. Moreover, in one particular
corner of the globe (indeed, in one particular country in Europe), the historical ‘succession’ of
these forms created the preconditions for capitalism. As Gandy explains, Marx’s “conception of
history was multilinear” insofar as it acknowledged that
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Humanity has not passed through a series of universal social forms. A worldwide system
could hardly emerge, for the disruptive elements of [precapitalist] history...have
continually thrown whole peoples off their developmental track…Some lines of
development led into agelong stagnation. Others progressed rapidly, then ran into a dead
end. Some stalled and collapsed…One line spiralled up through higher and higher levels
of capitalism, but this took place in a corner of the globe. This corner soon drew the
world into capitalism.449
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the significance of Marx’s characterization of precapitalist nature
as the ‘inorganic body’ of the commune. In the most original form of precapitalist social life, the
primitive socialism which marks the outset of the history of all peoples, the metabolism was
defined by communal property and collective labour. This, however, he believed to be a
necessity imposed by nature, i.e., one due to the undeveloped state of the productive powers of
individuals and their localized forms of social intercourse. In all subsequent forms, we find this
communality in its various states of decomposition. In the Asiatic mode of production, the
communal property of the village-system was preserved to a great degree, and the individual
therefore continued to relate to the social organism as a natural component. In contrast to
Wittfogel, who argued that this form was distinguished by its State-centralized waterworks, I
defended the interpretation that this metabolism was based primarily upon the self-enclosed unity
of manufacturing and agricultural production within the archaic commune. For Marx, it is the
communal property of the village which provides the ‘key’ to explaining its rural isolation,
underdevelopment, historical tenacity and despotic tendencies.
In the histories of Greece and Rome, the introduction of private property and urban life of
their polities broke the “natural fate” and “familial unity” of their older gens, allowing for the
449 Gandy , Daniel Ross, Marx and History: From Primitive Society to the Communist Future, (University of Texas
Press: 1979), 112 .
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broader development of individuality. Instead of being reduced to “natural accessories” of the
land, Marx represents such household property in the soil as forming part of the personality of
the individual. This commune exists through the interrelations of these free peasant producers,
and the maintenance of their relative political equality. Communal property still exists here—
except it persists in the form of the State-owned ager publicus, expanded through colonial
expropriation. In contrast to this antithesis, the common property of the Germanic commune
appears merely as a complement to private property. The Teutonic clans, separated by vast
swaths of dense forest, freely appropriated the communal property of the woodlands, meadows,
moors, etc., as a supplement to their household-familial property. This form of the commune
therefore exists merely in the sporadic ‘coming-together’ of these independent proprietors. As a
result of this “dualism,” however, Marx characterizes this form as having created the conditions
for a higher degree of “liberty” and “relation of freedom” to landed property.
Marx presented the different forms of precapitalist society— nomadic, primitive socialism,
Asiatic, Slavic, Classical, Germanic, Feudal, etc.— as archetypal forms of the metabolism with
nature, each one based upon different forms of activity, different relations, and different types of
individuals. I defended the interpretative position that Marx characterized these not as a
topography of ‘geographically separated’ forms of existence, as Schmidt suggests, but, as
Bologh and Forbes substantiate, more or less naturally-arisen and/or historically-modified modes
of property corresponding with completely different modes in the individual’s ‘presence’ or
‘being’ as an individual. Those communities further removed from primitive communism, and
which had introduced precursory forms of private property, created a broader foundation for such
individuality. As such, although Marx acknowledged several paths of precapitalist development
out of primitive communism, he, for the same reason, regarded these as expressing different
degrees of development. This was a view which he entertained in the Contribution and the
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Grundrisse, as well as in Capital, the Ethnological Notebooks, and the late writings on Russia.
Hence, he both avoided the sort of unilinear schematic usually attributed to his theory of history,
but, at the same time, also regarded these multiple forms of precapitalist development as marking,
relative to one another, progressive phases in the historical becoming of human society.
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The Separation of Labour from Nature
Introduction: The Historic Separation Presupposed by Capitalist Production
The capitalist mode of production proceeds from a set of preconditions which
distinguishes it from all of the earlier forms examined in the last chapter. According to Marx, its
starting-point is formed by a presupposition which is by no means natural, but only emerges as
the result of a distinct historic process: namely, a process which leaves one class of individuals
in possession of the means of production, and another possessing nothing but their own
productive powers.450 What makes the wage-worker a wage-worker is just this: viz., that her own
labour-power is from the outset separated from the means of its realization, and that she must
therefore sell this wealth-creating capacity to capital.451 But this “positing of the individual as a
[wage] worker, in this nakedness, is itself a product of history.”452 After all, Marx’s survey of
precapitalist society has already illustrated that “nature does not produce on one hand owners of
money or commodities, and on the other hand men possessing nothing but their own labour-
power.”453 Instead, this relationship is the product of the historical destruction of those older
forms of social life discussed in the last chapter. In this chapter, I examine the interconnections
450 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 471-472.
451 From the other side of this relation, i.e., from the standpoint of the consciousness of the capitalist, it follows that
he can“exploit living labour only in so far as he advances at the same time the conditions for the realization of this
labour, i.e., as a means and object of labour, machinery and raw materials...Similarly, he is only a capitalist at all,
and can undertake the process of exploiting labour, because he confronts, as proprietor of the conditions of labour,
the worker as the mere owner of labour-power. We have already shown in Volume 1 how it is precisely the
possession of these means of production by the non-workers that turns the workers into wage-labourers and the non-
workers into capitalists.” Marx, Karl,Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, David Fernbach (trans.), Vol. III
(Penguin Books: London; 1991), 132-133.
452 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 471-472.
453 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
1990), 272-73.
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between Marx’s theory of the metabolism and his historical account of this separation of labour
from its unity with nature.
The question of how this “strange phenomenon arise[s]”— viz., where one class of
individuals has “nothing to sell except their labouring power, their working arms and brains”—
actually “lies beyond the pale” of an economic examination of labour-power as a commodity.454
For strictly methodological reasons, then, Capital temporarily brackets this historical question of
the coming-into-being of capitalism. Had Marx done otherwise, and begun chronologically, he
would have had to deal with categories and relations which, while historically first, are
conceptually of a secondary significance to an analysis of the essential elements of the capitalist
mode of production.455 However, he does occasionally allude to the real historic origins of
bourgeois society long before arriving at a more thorough-going explication in the section on
'So-Called Primitive Accumulation' at the end of Volume I. So, for instance, when he deals with
'The Sale and Purchase of Labour-Power'— notably, right before entering into the “hidden abode
of production”— he briefly hints at the precapitalist social processes which created the
preconditions for capitalist production in the first place.
As Marx elaborates there, the “mere circulation of money and commodities” does not yet
454 “But before doing so [i.e., speaking to labour-power as a commodity], we might ask, how does this , that we find
on the market a ? That the one set buys continually in order to make a profit and enrich themselves, while the other
set continually sells in order to earn their livelihood? The inquiry into this question would be an inquiry into what
the economists call “previous or original accumulation,” but which ought to be called original expropriation. We
should find that this so-called original accumulation means nothing but a series of historical processes, resulting in a
decomposition of the original union existing between the labouring Man and his Instruments of Labour. Such an
inquiry, however, lies beyond the pale of my present subject. The separation between the Man of Labour and the
Instruments of Labour once established, such a state of things will maintain itself and reproduce itself upon a
constantly increasing scale, until a new and fundamental revolution in the mode of production should again overturn
it, and restore the original union in a new historical form.” Marx, Karl, ‘Value, Price and Profit’, Speech before the
First International Working Men's Association, (June 1865), in Marx, Karl: Value, Price and Profit, (International
Publishers: New York; 1969), Eleanor Marx Aveling (ed.),
<https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1865/value-price-profit/index.htm>.
455 The history behind why the “free worker confronts him in the sphere of circulation is a question which does not
interest the owner of money, for he finds the labour-market in existence...And for the present it interests us just as
little. We confine ourselves to the fact theoretically, as he does practically.” Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of
Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London; 1990), 272-273.
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constitute capitalism, and the owner of money and seller of commodities is not yet a capitalist.
This is because capital is a social relation, not a thing. The foundation for the whole bourgeois
mode of production is the encounter between the owner of the means of production and the “free
worker” in the marketplace. But the widespread existence of labour-power as a commodity
already presupposes an existing division between producers and the material means of
production, a separation in no way common to every historical form of society. The relation
between those who own the means of production and those who must sell their productive
powers is not the eternal form of the social metabolism with nature. The relation between wage-
labour and capital has “no basis in natural history,” nor does it even have a “social basis common
to all periods of human history.” The divorce which exists here between labour and the means of
labour only emerges as the “result of past historic development, the product of many
revolutions.” That Mr. Moneybags now confronts the wage-worker as the personification of an
economic category, as the embodiment of a mere capacity, i.e., “labour-power on the market as a
commodity,” means that capitalism somehow arises out of the destruction of those precapitalist
forms of life discussed earlier in the last chapter of the dissertation. The origins to this “new
epoch” must therefore be traced back to the “extinction of a whole series of older formations”—
but this “one historical pre-condition comprises a world's history.”456
This speaks to the so-called 'extra-economic origins' of bourgeois society and the historic
dissolution of pre-bourgeois “natural form[s] of wealth”— a dissolution which, as we will
discover, was made possible by acts of primitive accumulation which stripped away these
individuals from the soil. In fact, Marx insists in the below that it is not so much the natural
unity between precapitalist labour and the precapitalist means of life in nature which needs to be
explained (although he himself spends so much time explaining it in the very same section of the
456 Ibid., 270-274.
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Formen). Instead, what really requires explanation is the historic separation between these two
sides— a division which is initiated by primitive accumulation, but only fully realized in the
relation between wage-labourer and capitalist.
What Mr. Proudhon calls the extra-economic origin of property, by which he
understands just landed property, is the pre-bourgeois relation of the individual to
objective conditions of labour, initially to the natural objective conditions of labour—
for, just as the working subject appears naturally as an individual, as natural being— so
does the first objective condition of his labour appear as nature, earth, as his inorganic
body; he himself is not only the organic body, but also the subject of this inorganic
nature...Proudhon would not only be able to, but would have to, accuse capital and
wage labour— as forms of property— of having an extra-economic origin. For the
encounter with the objective conditions of labour as separate from him, as capital from
the worker's side, and the encounter with the worker as propertyless, as abstract worker
from the capitalist's side— the exchange such as takes place between value and living
labour, presupposes a historic process, no matter how much capital and labour
themselves reproduce this relation and work out its objective scope, as well as its
depth— a historic process, which, as we saw, forms the history of the origins of capital
and wage labour...It is not the unity of living and active humanity with the natural,
inorganic conditions of their metabolic exchange with nature, and hence their
appropriation of nature, which requires explanation or is the result of a historic process,
but rather the separation between these inorganic conditions of human existence and
this active existence, a separation which is completely posited only in the relation of
wage labour and capital.457
Capitalist relations rest upon this “nakedness” of the worker, “denuded” now of the
inorganic body of the soil. This is what Marx refers to as the propertylessness of a free
labourer— ‘free’ because freed from any means of production of her own. The historical
emergence of a ‘free’ labourer rests upon the total dissolution of the primitive social metabolism
with the land, forests, rivers, etc. The extinction of these now bygone forms of productive
activity, the destruction of the definite ways of life with which they corresponded, and the
decomposition of their socially specific ways of relating to nature— these constitute moments in
the genesis or coming-into-being of capital. Capitalism itself therefore marks off a completely
457 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 488-489. Foster reinforces the essential concluding point of this passage, noting that “[j]ust
as this metabolic relation constituted the universal condition defining production [in all its precapitalist forms], so
the alienation of this metabolism was the most general expression of both human alienation and alienation from
nature, which had its highest form in bourgeois society...It was the historical alienation of human beings from nature
under capitalist production rather than their unity in production in general that therefore required critical analysis.”
Foster , John Bellamy, ‘Marx’s Grundrisse and the Ecological Contradictions of Capitalism’, Karl Marx’s
Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy 150 Years Later, Marcello Musto (ed.), (Routledge:
New York; 2008), 95.
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unprecedented stage in the historical metabolism with nature. This is why even though Marx
dedicated a great amount of space in the Formen to the examination of the precapitalist forms of
the metabolism, he was primarily interested with them only insofar as this historical investigation
allowed him to locate the origins of something quite specifically capitalist: viz., the complete
diremption from nature characteristic of the wage-labour process. With this divorce between
labour and property given, labour-power stands on one side as a mere capacity, compressed into
an abstraction, precisely because it really has been isolated from the objective moments of its
realization. As Foster suggests of the connections between Marx’s analysis of precapitalist
formations, account of primitive accumulation, and theory of the metabolism, Marx’s
treatment of pre-capitalist economic formations in the Grundrisse, was meant to lead
into the analysis of capitalist development itself, as part of a general historical
understanding…[T]he section on pre-capitalist forms ended with the reconsideration of
the original, primitive accumulation of capital arising out of these historical precursors,
making it clear that the original basis for accumulation and capitalism’s simultaneous
dissolution of all earlier economic formations was the central issue here…As he wrote
in Capital, ‘private landownership, and thereby expropriation of the direct producers
from the land— private landownership by the one, which implies lack of ownership by
others— is the basis of the capitalist mode of production’...The main presupposition of
capitalism was the dissolution of all previous connections to the land on the part of the
direct producers. It was ‘the historic dissolution of...naturally arisen communism’ as
well as ‘a whole series of economic systems’ separated from ‘the modern world, in
which exchange value dominates’...The Grundrisse provided a trenchant analysis of
these processes of dissolution. What was primarily at issue was the ‘Dissolution of the
relation to the earth— land and soil— as natural conditions of production — to which
he [the human being] relates as to his own inorganic being’...Living labour, which was
originally connected to and in community with the land was now defined by the fact
that the earth was the worker’s ‘not property’.458
Political Economy’s Naturalization of Capital
For the reasons given, in order to explain the historical genesis of the capitalist mode of
production, Marx claims that we have to examine the initial accumulation which precedes and
preconditions capitalist accumulation. This original accumulation separated these working
458 Foster, John Bellamy, ‘Marx’s Grundrisse and the Ecological Contradictions of Capitalism’, Karl Marx’s
Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy 150 Years Later, Marcello Musto (ed.), (Routledge:
New York; 2008), 97-99.
177
individuals from their previous intertwinement with the instruments of labour, as well as from
their communal and individual property in the land. Scholars have not sufficiently recognized the
significance of all of the interconnections between Marx's metabolic theory, account of primitive
accumulation, and criticism of political economy. But certainly one of the essential features of
his critique is the charge that the economists continually project back onto this question of the
historical formation of capitalist relations, those very relations as we find them in their fully-
formed state. Political economy therefore conflated the “being” and “becoming” of both capital
and capitalist, i.e., confusing the metabolic conditions which the capitalist mode of production
reproduces as a result of itself with the metabolic preconditions for such production in the first
place. As Schmidt explains of Marx's critique in the Grundrisse and Capital,
the classical bourgeois economists find it much easier to regard capital as the eternal,
natural form of human production. In so far as they are aware of its historically limited
character, they are inclined to present the conditions of its origin as the conditions of its
present-day realization, i.e., they imply that the conditions characteristic of the fully-
formed bourgeois economy are the same conditions as those under which the capitalist
is not yet able to act as such.459
In other words, political economy presupposed precisely what it should have explained. It
only explained away the problem of the coming-into-being of capitalist society by reference to
the very categories which are themselves a product of its subsequent history. These
“Robinsonades” merely transferred the circumstances of the present back onto the simplicity of
the past, and, in doing so, only naturalized the relations and conditions peculiar to modern
society. “The only reason for engaging in such projection,” as Meszaros sees it, “is to harmonize,
in the interests of social legitimation, the commodity form of exchange with the established,
historically contingent form of property embodied in relations of production.” These
“legitimatory claims,” because “historically false,” only work toward “eternalizing” the
459 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (Verso Books: London; 2014), 180.
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particular conditions “attached to the notion of private property.”460 Meszaros concludes
elsewhere in the same work that the artificial “external historical necessity” imposed by these
conditions are then “self-servingly proclaimed” to be part of an “unalterable natural law,”
something which only works in the “service of eternalizing the established social order.”461
Of course, the conception of the “Natural Individual” advanced by political economy really
“rests on such naturalism” about as much as bankers, clerks, and financial advisers do. Instead,
Marx insists that this conception of human nature is the “anticipation of ‘civil society’,” the
anticipation of an atomized society where the isolated “individual appears detached from the
natural bonds etc. which in earlier historical periods make him the accessory of a definite and
limited human conglomerate.” This bourgeois individual, the “product on one side of the
dissolution of the feudal forms of society,” then “appears as an ideal, whose existence they
project into the past” as “history’s point of departure.” But the “more deeply we go back into
history,” all the “more does the individual…appear as dependent, as belonging to a greater whole:
in a still quite natural way in the family and in the family expanded into the clan [Stamm]; then
later in the various forms of communal society arising out of the antitheses and fusions of the
clan.” This “point could go entirely unmentioned,” Marx concludes, if this nonsense had not
been “earnestly pulled back into the centre of the most modern economics by Bastiat, Carey,
Proudhon etc.” It appears to them as if “capital is a general, eternal relation of nature; that is, if I
leave out just the specific quality” which makes capital capital. The economists present the
current form given to production as if it were “encased in eternal natural laws independent of
history, at which opportunity bourgeois relations are then quietly smuggled in as the inviolable
460 Meszaros, Istvan, Social Structure and Forms of Consciousness: The Dialectic of Structure and History, Vol. 2,
(Monthly Review Press: New York; 2011), 414.
461 Ibid., 330.
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natural laws on which society in the abstract is founded.”462
Krader is right to suggest that this critique highlights a certain degree of continuity in Marx’s
thought. From his early repudiation of the naturalism of Feuerbachian ‘Man’, through the
Grundrisse’s analysis of precapitalist formations and Capital’s critique of political economy, to
the anthropology of the Ethnological Notebooks, Marx rejects the naturalization of modern
relations of production. Instead, he attempts to demystify such appearances by revealing their
historical character, including the historical qualities of the human relation to nature.
The eighteenth century had the fiction of man which Marx caricatured, the Robinsonade,
or man taken in isolation from society…This man is divorced from all social relations,
hence is inconceivable as human. Marx opposed this abstraction of man from society
just as he opposed the abstraction of man in his generic being as Feuerbach had
proposed it, in the nineteenth century, and the abstraction of man from the primitive
condition, which permitted the vacuum to be filled by whatever prejudice is current; he
then added to this the opposition to the abstraction of man from society as the alienation
of man in society.463
Again, one of the central features of Marx’s critique of political economy is that it attempts to
demonstrate through a description of precapitalist societies, historical account of primitive
accumulation, and identification of the metabolic separation characteristic only of modern
462 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 83-87. As Marx tells us in the above, these 18th century illusions about human nature would
be irrelevant were it not for the fact that 19th century political economy, e.g., Proudhon, had revitalized them. This
aspect of his critique of political economy can actually be traced back a decade earlier to the 1847 The Poverty of
Philosophy, where he criticizes Proudhon along the same lines. “Instead of a supposition, an affirmation and a
negation, we have now an ordinance that M. Proudhon issues purposely to prove the necessity of competition, its
eternity as a category, etc. If we imagine that ordinances are all that is needed to get away from competition, we
shall never get away from it...And if we go so far as to propose to abolish competition while retaining wages, we
shall be proposing nonsense by royal decree. But nations do not proceed by royal decree. Before framing such
ordinances, they must at least have changed from top to bottom the conditions of their industrial and political
existence, and consequently their whole manner of being. M. Proudhon will reply, with his imperturbable assurance,
that it is the hypothesis of ‘a transformation of our nature without historical antecedents’, and that he would be right
in ‘excluding this from the discussion’, we know not in virtue of which ordinance. M. Proudhon does not know that
all history is nothing but a continuous transformation of human nature...Since competition was established in France
in the eighteenth century as a result of historical needs, this competition must not be destroyed in the nineteenth
century because of other historical needs. M. Proudhon, not understanding that the establishment of competition was
bound up with the actual development of the men of the eighteenth century, makes of competition a necessity of the
human soul, in partibus infidelium.” Marx, Karl, ‘Poverty of Philosophy: Answer to the Philosophy of Poverty by M.
Proudhon’, Marx and Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 6, Jack Cohen et. al. (trans.), (International Publishers: New
York; 1976), 192.
463 Krader, Lawrence, ‘Introduction’, The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx, (ed.) Lawrence Krader, (Van
Gorcum: Assen; 1974), .61.
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production, that the laws of capitalist society apply only to capitalist society. The ‘natural laws’
of its metabolism with nature are not eternal ‘laws of nature’ for Marx. His mode of presentation
and method of critique, especially in Capital, are phenomenologically oriented toward the
‘denaturalization’ of political economy’s mystification of these relations specific only to
capitalism. As Gruffydd-Jones argues,
Marx’s critical engagement with the classical political economists highlights a defining
feature of his method: the need to distinguish carefully between the transhistorical and
historically specific...This capacity to ‘denaturalize’ the social world by underlining the
historically produced and potentially transient or changeable, rather than natural and
eternal, features of the present.464
This is what makes Capital, understood as a sort of phenomenological kritik of political
economy and of capitalist society, both ‘scientific’ in the Hegelian (and by no means positivist)
sense, and, at the same time, an act of political praxis in itself. This is why Dunayevskaya
complains that
[s]ome Marxists have treated the phenomenon of alienated labor as if it were a leftover
from Marx’s Young Hegelian days...The mature Marx, on the other hand, shows that to
be the very pivot on which turns, not alone the science or literature of political economy,
but the productive system itself...There is nothing [of] intellectual [theorizing
here]...[but] a very real and very degrading labor process which accomplishes this
transformation...Marx’s concept of the degraded worker seeking universality, seeking to
be a whole man, transformed the science of political economy into the science of human
liberation...Marxism is wrongly considered “a new political economy”…Marx
transformed it from a science which deals with things...into one which analyzes
relations...[Capitalism itself] makes social relations between men appear as relations
between things. But these things belie, instead of manifest, the essence. To separate the
essence— the social relations— from the appearance— the exchange of things—
required a new science.465
Marx's critique of the crude materialism and fetishism of vulgar economics demonstrates
precisely where these forms of thought adhered to the immediate surface appearance of things,
and moreover just as they appear from the bourgeois standpoint. These ideological forms
assume what Husserl had referred to as a 'natural-attitude' vis-a-vis the capitalist mode of
464 Gruffydd-Jones, Branwen, ‘Method of Political Economy’, Elgar Companion to Marxist Economics, (ed.) Ben
Fine and Alfredo Sadd-Filho, (MPG: Cheshire; 2012), 223.
465 Dunayevskaya, Raya, Marxism and Freedom: From 1776 until Today, (Humanity Books: New York; 2000), 105-
106.
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production. This is why Paci stresses that the critique of political economy in Capital is always
“on guard” against the sort of “naturalism” which tends to mystify the “fact of bourgeois
society...along with its genesis” and the “possibilities for changing it.”466 “Marx is against the
naturalization of social relations;” social relations cannot be “reduced to naturalistic relations.”
Such an “abstract naturalism” effectively “ignores history and fails to realize that social relations
are historical,” and, moreover, that the very “categories of economics are founded on [that] real
history.”467
The political economists proceeded from the laws ‘natural’ to capitalism, but, precisely by
conceiving of them as “eternal and natural,” could not comprehend their historical status.
Needless to say, the economists in the end proved quite incapable of bringing history “into
harmony with the general laws of property proclaimed by capitalist society itself.” In
comparison to this mystifying method, Marx demonstrated that the “correct observation and
deduction of these laws” of value, not despite but precisely because of their systematic character,
always “point towards a past lying behind this system.” His “method indicates the points where
historical investigation must enter in,” or, the moments where the “bourgeois economy” only
“points beyond itself to earlier historical modes of production.” Marx’s critique therefore
attempts to denaturalize these laws by showing, through such an “historical investigation,” that
this society, like the others before it, is “merely [another] historical form” of the metabolism.468
This is one of the reasons why he places so much emphasis upon the analysis of precapitalist
formations and of primitive accumulation as a way of locating the artificial division specific to
the capitalist relationship to nature. As Hudis argues, the Formen-study of these “diverse forms
466 Paci, Enzo, The Function of the Science and the Meaning of Man, (trans.) Paul Piccone and James Hansen,
(Northwestern University Press: Evanston; 1972), 411.
467 Ibid., 425.
468 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 460-461.
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of precapitalist society” allowed Marx to discover that capitalism is “not at all ‘natural’” as the
political economists suspect— a method which would later become integral to the final form
given to the critique of political economy in Capital. In both works, Marx shows that these
relations correspond with a “historically specific” mode of production, in comparison to which
all of the distinctions between precapitalist forms of life are relatively unimportant.469 Marx’s
historical analysis in the Grundrisse served, in two main ways, towards the demystification of
the ‘naturalized’ appearances of modern life. On the one hand, he attempts to illustrate that
capitalism came into being through the dissolution of earlier relations, and, on the other, that its
own contradictions point to the real possibility of their immanent suspension. Hence, his analysis
of the precapitalist past and of the capitalist present was ultimately oriented, Hudis is right to
suggest, toward demonstrating the inherent tendencies which create the conditions, relations,
capacities and needs necessary for the emergence of a free association of universally developed
individuals. Such totally-developed individuals are conceived of as the result of a long process of
history, a standpoint which does away with the silly conception of the 18th century individual as
the ‘normal man’ and measure of all human development.
It is impossible to create a new society from scratch...The ‘universally developed
individuals’ that characterise the stage that follows capitalism are themselves a product
of prior stages of historical development...Largely for this reason, the Grundrisse
contains a considerable amount of historical analysis of the development of capitalism
as well as of precapitalist forms of production...At issue in many of these debates [about
the Grundrisse] is why Marx accorded so much attention to precapitalist
formations...There is no question that Marx was deeply interested in understanding the
manner in which capitalist social relations emerged out of the womb of precapitalist
modes of production. At the same time, the Grundrisse indicates that Marx was just as
interested in how a historical understanding of the emergence of capitalist commodity-
production could shed light on a future post-capitalist society...The social relations of
any given society generally appear ‘natural’ and ‘normal’ in the eyes of its participants,
especially when they have prevailed for a considerable length of time. This proclivity to
naturalise social relations is no less prevalent among philosophers, as he shows in his
comments about John Stuart Mill and others in the ‘Introduction’ to the Grundrisse.
One way to challenge this tendency towards naturalisation is through the historical
investigation of social formations that preceded capitalism. The peculiar and transitory
nature of capitalism is brought into focus by elucidating the marks that distinguish its
469 Hudis , Peter, Marx’s Concept of the Alternative to Capitalism, (Haymarket Books: Chicago; 2003), 119.
183
relations of production from precapitalist forms...[B]y focusing on communal forms of
association, production and distribution that precede capitalism, Marx shows that the
isolated individuality and atomisation that characterise modern capitalism are by no
means natural or eternal...The historical aberration [is not the “Germanic, Slavic, and
‘Asiatic’ communal forms,” but] is, instead, the concept of free individuality abstracted
from the communal conditions that prevails in modern capitalist societies. The very
concept of the atomised and independent individual, he argues, arises and can only arise
on the basis of developed social and economic relations...As he puts it, ‘Man becomes
individualized only through the process of history’...[the ultimate social form of which
is consistent with] ‘the absolute unfolding of man’s creative abilities’...[W]ealth—
understood as the unfolding of the richness of the human personality— now becomes an
end-in-itself...Contrary to the claim that Marx focused mainly on the present and
secondarily on the past, his emphasis on tendencies towards dissolution in his analyses
of both the present and past indicate that he was most of all concerned about the future.
For Marx, however, the future cannot simply be spelled out on the basis of the
individual’s imagination: it must be traced out through an analysis of existing social
formations.470
At the outset of Capital, Marx brackets the historical question of the becoming of
capitalist relations (and, still more, any speculation about the possibility of their suspension in
the future) because his critique begins by accepting the superficial appearances of modern
society. But he also makes it clear through a brief thought-experiment in Chapter One that these
naturalized semblances of modern life can be dispelled by even the most cursory examination of
social history.471 In the thought-experiment, he temporarily ‘transports’ his reader from the
‘Robinsonades’ which take place on Crusoe’s island to Feudal Europe, before finally asking us
to imagine the possibility of a still higher formation, i.e., one based upon freely associated and
470 Ibid., 116-117, 119-120, 123.
471 This manoeuvre in the first chapter of Capital, observes Krader, uses as its “example of labor in common” not the
“communes of the dawn of civilization,” but rather Feudal Europe. In his initial draft of this chapter in the 1859
Contribution, Marx had indeed extended this thought-experiment to include a consideration of more archaic forms
of the commune, e.g., the Slavic and Indian forms of communal property. Marx, Karl, ‘A Contribution to the
Critique of Political Economy’, Marx and Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 29, Victor Shnittke and Yuri Sdobnikov
(trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1987), 275. However, in the 1867 edition to Capital, he moves that
discussion into a footnote when he alludes to the primary form of the commune as being anything but a specifically
Slavic ‘curiosity’. Compare Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin
Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin Books: London; 1993), 882; Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben
Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London; 1990), 171. As Krader concludes from all this, Marx retained the
view (only reinforced later by Morgan and, in a negative way, by Maine) that this primitive communal property
could be found everywhere at one time or another, e.g., in India, and, in differing forms of its dissolution, in Russia,
Rome, and Germany. Krader, Lawrence, ‘Introduction’, The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx, (ed.) Lawrence
Krader, (Van Gorcum: Assen; 1974), 74. While criticizing the Robinsonades of political economy in the Grundrisse,
he therefore found it quite absurd for the economists to always “leap” straight away to a very “specific form of
property, e.g., private property.” “History rather shows common property (e.g., in India, among the Slavs, the early
Celts, etc.) to be the more original form.” Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy,
Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin Books: London; 1993), 87-88.
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fully developed individuals. “The only way to overcome the fetishism that attaches itself to
products of labour,” argues Hudis, “is to step outside of capitalism’s confines and examine it
from the standpoint of non-capitalist social relations. Marx therefore proceeds to examine value-
production from the vantage-point of precapitalist and postcapitalist social relations.”472
Through these sorts of brief glimpses into the history of the forms which precede
capitalist production, and through a more thorough-going analysis of the classic form of
primitive accumulation at the end of Volume I, Marx was able to concretize his criticism by
showing precisely where the bourgeois consciousness of political economy conflates the coming-
into-being with the being of capitalism, i.e., thereby treating this society as if it were an “eternal
and natural (not historical) form” of the metabolism. As he puts it, political economy advances
the “insipid notion” that this historically-arisen social relation between wage-labour and capital
is a “spontaneous, natural attribute inherent in individuals and inseparable from their nature (in
antithesis to their conscious knowing and willing).” Of course, this “bond is their product,” a
“historic product” which “belongs to a specific phase of their development.”473 But to the
economists, these relations really do appear fixed as if they were the universal-natural form of
social life and the aeterno modo of the human relation to nature. Even though these relations
have been “created by society, [they] appear as if they were natural conditions, not controllable
by individuals.”474
Marx’s emphasis always falls upon the historical character of the capitalist metabolism. It
472 Hudis , Peter, Marx’s Concept of the Alternative to Capitalism, (Haymarket Books: Chicago; 2003), 156.
473 Ibid., 162. “[P]roduction has in fact its prerequisite conditions, which form factors of it. These may appear at first
to have a natural origin. By the very process of production they are changed from natural to historical, and if they
appear during one period as a natural prerequisite of production, they formed at other periods its historical
result...Although the latter [a new distribution] appears now as the prerequisite condition of the new period of
production, it is in itself but a product of [past history and present] production, not of production belonging to
history in general, but of production relating to a definite historical period.” Marx, Karl, ‘Introduction to the Critique
of Political Economy’, The German Ideology: Including Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction to the Critique of
Political Economy, Clemens Dutt (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 13.
474 Ibid., 156, 164.
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was the dissolution of the precapitalist relation to the land which set free the elements necessary
for the genesis of bourgeois society. But the period which makes-up this immediate prehistory of
capital was presented in a very mysterious way by the political economists. They presented these
moments of original accumulation as if they unfolded according to the natural laws of capitalism
itself. For them, this “whole movement” is regarded in abstraction so that the affair appears to
“turn around in a never-ending circle which we can only get out of by assuming a primitive
accumulation...which precedes capitalist accumulation.”475 They themselves conceived of this
“original accumulation” not in the sense in which Marx understood it, but in such a way that this
non-capitalist appears to accumulate with all of the virtuosity of a capitalist. Again, this is
because they presented the becoming of capital as if it were already capitalism in its being-in-
and-for-itself. For example, Smith had characterized this previous accumulation through a little
“anecdote about the past:” namely, that there were savers and spendthrifts. The former forsook
luxuries for industriousness, miserliness, and all of the other Calvinist virtues; the latter wasted
away their earnings in no time on vice and comfort, thereby falling into a deserved destitution.476
But precisely because the ‘accumulation’ in question precedes the existence of capitalism—
i.e., because it is the “point of departure” and not the “result of the capitalist mode of
production”— it follows that this previous phase of accumulation cannot be grasped in this facile
way.477 In contrast to this mystifying method, Marx’s work in the Grundrisse and Capital
attempts to denaturalize the fetishized reality of modern life by revealing that the 'natural laws'
475 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
1990), 873.
476 Mocking the mythology behind these bourgeois conceptions about the past, Marx parodied Smith on how “long
ago there were two sorts of people: one the diligent, intelligent and above all frugal elite; the other, lazy rascals,
spending their subsistence, and more, in riotous living...Thus it came to pass that the former sort accumulated wealth,
and the latter sort finally had nothing to sell but their own skins. And from this original sin dates the poverty of the
great majority who, despite all their labour, have up to now nothing to sell but themselves, and the wealth of the few
that increases constantly, although they have long ceased to work.” Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political
Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London; 1990), 873-874.
477 Ibid., 873.
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of capital are not everlasting features of the human metabolism with nature, but simply “socially
valid” categories and “objective” expressions of this particular mode of production— based, at
bottom, on alienated labour. The process of primitive accumulation provided capitalism’s
historic presuppositions, which precisely as such historic presuppositions, are past and
gone, and hence belong to the history of its formation, but in no way to its contemporary
history...The conditions and presuppositions of the becoming, of the arising, of capital
presuppose precisely that it is not yet in being but merely in becoming; they therefore
disappear as real capital arises, capital which itself, on the basis of its own reality, posits
the conditions for its realization. Thus, e.g., while the process in which
money...originally becomes capital presupposes on the part of the capitalist an
accumulation...undertaken as a not-capitalist...[t]he bourgeois economists who regard
capital as an eternal and natural (not historical) form of production then attempt to
legitimate it again by formulating the conditions of its becoming as the conditions of its
contemporary realization; i.e., presenting the moments in which the capitalist still
appropriates as not-capitalist— because he is still becoming— as the very conditions in
which he appropriates as capitalist...[This demonstrates] an inability [on the part of the
economists] to bring the mode of appropriation of capital as capital into harmony with
the general laws of property proclaimed by capitalist society itself.478
Marx, in juxtaposition to this procedure, traced the historical origins of these natural laws right
back to precapitalist processes of primitive accumulation and the historical production of a class
of 'free labourers'.
[T]o unleash the “eternal laws of Nature” of the capitalist mode of production, [is] to
complete the process of separation between the workers and the conditions of labour, to
transform, at one pole, the social means of production and subsistence into capital, [and]
at the opposite pole, the mass of the population into wage-labourers, into free ‘labouring
poor’, that artificial product of modern history.479
Capital is not a thing, but a specific social relation between individuals (which merely
takes on the appearance of a relation between things). Hence, “[i]n themselves, money and
commodities are no more capital than the means of production and subsistence are. They need to
be transformed into capital.” As noted at the beginning of this chapter, this only occurs in the
peculiar exchange-relation between “two very different kinds of commodity owners.”480 This is
why Marx insisted that “money can be piled up in part by way of the sheer exchange of
478 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 459-460.
479 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
1990), 925.
480 Ibid., 874.
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equivalents; but this forms so insignificant a source [of original accumulation] that it is not worth
mentioning historically.”481 As Rosdolsky argues by referring us to a passage from Volume III,
monetary wealth in its precapitalist forms (e.g., merchant wealth, usury, etc.) may certainly have
worked to dissolve precapitalist relations in a more thorough-going way, but it cannot help much
in “explaining the transition from one mode of production to another.”482 Instead, money merely
acted as an additional solvent in the process of dissolution already initiated by acts of primitive
accumulation— acts involving, at bottom, expropriation and displacement.
Insofar as we restrict our attention to the historic formation of capitalism, the original
separation does not appear as the work of mere money, but often as naked force without so much
as a pretence of legality and equal exchange. Through clearing, enclosure, and the violation of all
the old customary ties (which had until then bound the serf, independent proprietor, tenants, etc.,
to both the soil and the community), the newly freed labourers are made landless, homeless,
propertyless— in short, free of any means of production, and hence any sufficient means of life,
of their own. Driven into destitution and denuded of their inorganic social body in nature, they
now have nothing left to sell but their own skins, the natural powers of their own organic bodies.
[I]n truth the period of the dissolution of the earlier modes of production and modes of
the workers relation to the objective conditions of labour is at the same time a period in
which monetary wealth on the one side has already developed to a certain extent…It is
itself one of the agencies of that dissolution, while at the same time that dissolution is
the condition of its transformation into capital. But the mere presence of monetary
wealth, and even the achievement of a kind of supremacy on its part, is in no way
sufficient for this dissolution into capital to happen. Or else ancient Rome, Byzantium
etc., would have ended their history with free labour and capital, or rather begun a new
history…The original formation of capital does not happen, as is sometimes imagined,
with capital heaping up necessaries of life and instruments of labour and raw materials,
in short, the objective conditions of labour which have already been unbound from the
soil and animated by human labour....Rather, its original formation is that, through the
historic process of the dissolution of the old mode of production, value existing as
money-wealth is enabled, on one side, to buy the objective conditions of labour; on the
other side, to exchange money for the living labour of the workers who have been set
free. All these moments are present; their divorce is itself a historic process, a process of
481 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 504.
482 Rosdolsky, Roman, The Making of Marx’s ‘Capital’, Pete Burgess (trans.), (Pluto Press: 1977; London), 275.
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dissolution, and it is the latter which enables money to transform itself into capital.
Money itself, to the extent that it also plays an active role, does so only in so far as it
intervenes in this process as itself a highly energetic solvent, and to that extent assists in
the creation of the plucked, object-less free workers...by helping to speed up their
separation from them— their propertylessness...What had changed was simply this, that
these necessaries were now thrown on to the exchange market…and thus fell into the
domain and under the supremacy of money wealth. Likewise with the instruments of
labour....[U]nbound from their land and soil, spinner and weaver with their stools and
wheels came under the command of money wealth. Capital proper does nothing but
bring together the mass of hands and instruments which it finds on hand. It
agglomerates them under its command. That is its real stockpiling; the stockpiling of
workers, along with their instruments...There can therefore be nothing more ridiculous
than to conceive this original formation of capital as if capital had stockpiled and
created the objective conditions of production— necessaries, raw materials,
instrument— and then offered them to the worker, who was bare of these possessions.
Rather, monetary wealth in part helped to strip the labour powers of able-bodied
individuals from these conditions; and in part this process of divorce proceeded without
it. When the formation of capital had reached a certain level, monetary wealth could
place itself as mediator between the objective conditions of life, thus liberated, and the
liberated but also homeless and empty-handed labour powers, and buy the latter with the
former. But now, as far as the [original] formation of money-wealth itself is concerned,
this belongs to the prehistory of the bourgeois economy...a historic process which
divorces the objective conditions of labour from the worker and makes them
independent of him, [and] it is at the same time the effect of capital and of its process,
once arisen, to conquer all of production and to develop and complete the divorce
between labour and property, between labour and the objective conditions of labour,
everywhere.483
This powerful critique of the superstitions surrounding the history of primitive
accumulation emphasizes that it is the social relation which emerges out of the divorce between
labour and property, not the mere presence of money, exchange, etc., which constitutes the most
necessary precondition for the coming-into-being of capitalism. But this passage is also
significant because it emphasizes that, at a certain point in this development (viz., after the
instruments of labour and natural conditions of production have been stripped away to some
degree from these increasingly object-less workers), money could be transformed into capital,
intervening more and more as the “mediator” between these previously connected elements of
the labour process. The only thing that had “changed” was that, the necessities of life having
been separated from individuals and thrown into the market as commodities, money was able to
achieve a kind of unprecedented hegemony over the social metabolism with nature. This just
483 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 506-512.
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means that once it ‘stands on its own two feet’, once it is mature enough to unfold according to
its own intrinsic laws, once it reproduces itself as an organic totality, etc., capital will continually
renew this original separation, deepening the human diremption from nature.484 As Schmidt puts
it in The Concept of Nature in Marx:
[O]nce it is historically developed, it is related to its prerequisites as to ‘the preliminary
historical stages of its becoming’. These stages are then ‘superseded in its being’. What
originally appeared as the foundation for capital's growth now appears ‘as posited by
capital— not as the precondition of its origin but as the consequence of its own
reality’...In the centuries of 'primitive accumulation'...there arose within the womb of
feudal society...the capital-relation characteristic of bourgeois society as a historical
form of life. This capital-relation rests on the abstract separation of the worker (as a
class) from the means of production, the material prerequisites of labour. Once this
separation has come into effect, the basis is provided for 'the becoming and, still more,
the being of capital as such', since the separation is reproduced 'on a constantly
increasing scale', as Marx tried to show.485
As Perelman notes, this implies that “once the work of primitive accumulation was
complete,” the “‘silent compulsion’ of the market” could take over.486 Or, as Wood explains in
the below, after the metabolic separation from the soil has been established to some extent,
relations of personal dependence can be substituted more and more by impersonal market
relations, thereby giving money, when transformed in the hands of the capitalist, its
unprecedented power. The direct expropriation of the surplus of peasant producers— which
earlier took the form of direct coercion, payments in kind, and other forms of ‘extra-economic’
exploitation, etc., through a range of political, juridical, and social structures of power— is
replaced here by the purely ‘economic’ and indirect coercion imposed by the artificial natural
necessity of exchange-relations.
Marx constructs his argument on the premise that human beings interact with each other,
with nature and with the conditions of labour— the material, instruments and products
of labour— to achieve their subsistence and self-reproduction, and that these relations
take different forms in different modes of production. In particular, development from
484 Marx, Karl,Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
1990), 874.
485 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (Verso Books: London; 2014), 179-181.
486 Perelman, Michael, The Invention of Capitalism: Classical Political Economy and the Secret History of Primitive
Accumulation, (Duke University Press: Durham; 2000), 102.
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one mode of production to another has been a progressive ‘separation of free labor from
the objective conditions of its realization— from the means and material of labor’...
Before capitalism, direct producers had related to the basic condition of labour— the
land— as their property, whether the communal property of one or another form of
primitive communalism or the free landed property of the independent small producing
household. This meant that appropriating classes could extract surplus labour from
direct producers only by what Marx calls ‘extra-economic’ means, the superior force
derived from political, military and judicial status— as, for instance, feudal lords
extracted labour services or rent from peasants who remained in possession of land.
Capitalism would transform not only the relation of direct producers to the conditions of
their labour but also the form in which surplus labour is extracted from them.
Capitalism completely disrupts the ‘natural unity of labor with its material
prerequisites’...Wage labourers in capitalism have been completely separated from the
conditions of their labour…The separation of the direct producers from the means of
production meant the proletarianization of the labour force, the transformation of direct
producers into wage labourers and their exploitation not by ‘extra-economic’ but by
purely ‘economic’ means.487
Although Steuart, Price, Anderson, etc., had already presented this process of ‘clearing’
more honestly, Marx was seeking to dispel the commonplace myth about original accumulation
which had become the “sacred” creed of economics after Adam Smith. These “bourgeois
economists” recited Smith’s “nursery tale” as one would repeat a religious rite, with the
consequence that such “insipid childishness is every day preached to us in defence of
property.”488 The superstition which surrounds this process of “primitive accumulation plays
approximately the same role in political economy as original sin does in theology.” In the
prelapsarian period which makes-up this mystified prehistory of capitalism, it seems as if the
“idyllic reigns from time immemorial,” for Smith imagines that the capitalist came into the world
as free from sin as Adam himself.489
Yet, however unconsciously, political economy's “attempts at apologetics” actually
demonstrate its own “guilty conscience” and capitalism’s 'first sin' to belabour the analogy.490
This is because what the “economists call 'previous or original accumulation'” is instead more
487 Wood, Ellen Meiksins, ‘Capitalism’, Elgar Companion to Marxist Economics, (ed.) Ben Fine and Alfredo Sadd-
Filho, (MPG: Cheshire; 2012), 34.
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appropriately “called original expropriation.”491 As Harvey explains of Capital, what
distinguishes Marx’s account of primitive accumulation is that in his “version” of the tale,
all the rules of market exchange earlier laid out [and assumed] (in chapter 2) are
abandoned. There is no reciprocity, no equality. Yes, the accumulation of money is
there, markets of a sort are there, but the real process is something else. It is about the
violent dispossession of a whole class of people from control over the means of
production, at first through illegal acts, but ultimately, as in the enclosure legislation in
Britain, through actions of the state...Smith, along with most other classical political
economists preferred to ignore the role of the state in primitive accumulation. There
were exceptions. James Steuart, Marx notes, certainly understood that state violence
was absolutely central to proletarianization but took the position that it was a necessary
evil.492
Hence, the real origins of capital can be traced back through the annals of “actual history” to
centuries of “conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder,” etc. The thievery and violence is
perpetuated on such a large scale that, paraphrasing the words of Steuart, it “tears the children of
the earth from the breast on which they were raised.”493 This “history, the history of their
expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire.”494 In contrast to
the commonplace “nursery tale” proffered by much of political economy, this “original
accumulation” was “anything but idyllic.”495
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and
entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the beginnings of
the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the
commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things which characterize the dawn of the era
of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive
accumulation.496
Primitive Accumulation and the Emergence of the ‘Free’ Labourer
The precapitalist formations that Marx examines in the Grundrisse represent a variety of
491 Marx, Karl, ‘Value, Price and Profit’, Speech before the First International Working Men's Association, (June
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ways of relating to property in the soil. Yet, these various forms, despite all their differences,
rested in one way or another upon the unity between labour and the nature-given conditions of
labour. In comparison to these, we have seen that bourgeois society can only develop upon the
basis of a 'free worker'— i.e., an objectless class of individuals compelled to sell their labour-
power to another class who now own the means of labour as their private property. Both
communal possession of the sort that Marx found in the ‘oriental’ commune in India, and small-
scale individual proprietorship of the sort that preceded capitalism in England, are
fundamentally incompatible with the nature of capitalist agriculture.
A presupposition of wage labour, and one of the historic preconditions for capital, is
free labour and the exchange of this free labour for money, in order to reproduce and to
realize money...Another presupposition is the separation of free labour from the
objective conditions of its realization— from the means of labour and the material for
labour. Thus, above all release of the worker from the soil as the natural workshop—
hence dissolution of small, free landed property as well as of communal landownership
resting on the oriental commune. In both forms, the worker relates to the objective
conditions of his labour as to his property; this is the natural unity of labour with its
material [sachlich] presuppositions...The individual relates to himself as proprietor, as
master of the conditions of his reality...He relates to others in the same way...he relates
to the others as co-proprietors.497
In addition to the communal property of the archaic commune (e.g., destroyed by
colonialism on the Indian subcontinent, in Java, etc.) as well as forms of proprietorship founded
upon the independent peasant (e.g., the yeomanry destroyed by the classical form of primitive
accumulation in England), the coming-into-being of capitalism presupposes further the
dissolution of all relations based upon either direct domination or personal dependence of one
sort or another. It involves the dissolution not merely of slavery and serfdom (as well as a range
of unfree statuses)— in which the individual’s labour is appropriated as part of the natural
conditions of production and as an accessory to the inorganic body of nature; it also implies the
dissolution of the sort of craft relations developed within the medieval guild. A mature capitalist
497 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
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society will replace all of these different types of precapitalist connections to the community, to
the tools of production, and to nature itself with formally free persons who, because they are
separated from all of these elements, are now entirely dependent upon accidental, external, and
impersonalized exchange-relations completely beyond their conscious control.
[T]he relation of labour to capital, or to the objective conditions of labour as capital,
presupposes a process of history which dissolves the various forms in which the worker
is a proprietor, or in which the proprietor works. Thus above all (1) Dissolution of the
relation to the earth— land and soil— as natural condition of production— to which he
relates as to his own inorganic being; the workshop of his forces, and the domain of his
will. All forms in which this property appears presuppose a community, whose members,
although there may be formal distinctions between them, are, as members of it,
proprietors...(2) Dissolution of the relations in which he appears as proprietor of the
instrument. Just as the above form of landed property presupposes a real community, so
does this property of the worker in the instrument presuppose a particular form of the
development of manufactures, namely craft, artisan work; bound up with it, the guild-
corporation system etc...Here labour itself still half artistic, half end-in-itself, etc.,
mastery...Labour still as his own, definite self-sufficient development of one-sided
abilities, etc....(4) Dissolution likewise at the same time of the relations in which the
workers themselves, the living labour capacities themselves, still belong directly among
the objective conditions of production, and are appropriated as such— i.e., are slaves or
serfs. For capital, the worker is not a condition of production, only work is. If it can
make machines do it, or even water, air, so much the better. And it does not appropriate
the worker, but his labour— [and] not directly, but mediated through exchange. These
are, now, on one side, historic presuppositions needed before the worker can be found as
a free worker, as objectless, purely subjective labour capacity confronting the objective
conditions of production as his not-property, as alien property, as value for-itself, as
capital.498
The range of free, semi-free and unfree statuses across the countryside, e.g., serfs, slaves
and small independent landed proprietors; the craft corporations and guild-relations within the
town; and the courtiers, attendants, retainers, clergy, and other parasitic relations characteristic of
feudalism— all of these were barriers to the development of capital. Marx therefore refers us to
several different “processes of dissolution.” The older social arrangements, e.g., those based
upon relations of personal dependence and payments in kind, were in this way gradually
rendered obsolete and increasingly substituted with new 'contractual' relations, i.e., exchange
relations founded upon formally free (but objectively dependent) individuals. The emergence of
498 Ibid., 495-498.
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such a free labourer therefore includes the negation of the more “affirmative” forms of the
relationship which had until then existed between labour and the objective conditions of labour
in the land, instruments of production, etc. In a capitalist society, both the activity and means of
labour can be commodified precisely on the basis of their existing separation from one another.
As Burkett explains, the “commodification of [the] necessary conditions of production requires
the socio-formal separation of the producers from these conditions,” and vice versa.499 These
processes of dissolution therefore 'set free' not only the labourer, but, of course, also all of the
other elements of production: this “same process [also] freed” the “land and soil, raw material,
necessaries of life, instruments of labour,” etc., “from their previous state of attachment to these
individuals now separated from them.”500
To be sure, Marx acknowledges that this process meant disrupting not only all forms of
499 Burkett, Paul, ‘Value, Capital and Nature: Some Ecological Implications of Marx's Critique of Political
Economy’, Science & Society, Vol. 60, No. 3, Marxism and Ecology (Fall, 1996), 338.
500 “On one side, historic processes are presupposed which place a mass of individuals...in the position, if not at first
of real free workers, nevertheless of such who are so δυνάμει, whose only real property is their labour capacity and
the possibility of exchanging it for values then present; individuals who confront all objective conditions of
production as alien property, as their own not-property, but at the same as values, as exchangeable, hence
appropriable to a certain degree through living labour. Such historic processes of dissolution are also the dissolution
of the bondage which fetter the worker to land and soil and to the lord of land and soil; but which factually
presuppose his ownership of the necessaries of life— this is in truth the process of his release from the earth;
dissolution of the landed property relations, which constituted him as a yeoman, as a free, working small landowner
or tenant (colonus), a free peasant; dissolution of the guild relations which presuppose his ownership of the
instrument of labour, and which presuppose labour itself as a craftsmanlike, specific skill, as property (not merely as
the source of property); likewise dissolution of the client-relations in the various forms in which not-proprietors
appear in the retinue of their lord as co-consumers of the surplus product...It will be seen on closer inspection that all
these processes of dissolution mean the dissolution of relations of production in which: use value predominates,
production for direct consumption…and hence that, in all these relations, payments in kind and services in kind
predominate over payments in money and money-services...It will likewise be found on closer observation that all
the dissolved relations were possible only with a definite degree of development of the material (and hence also the
intellectual) forces of production. What concerns us here for the moment is this: the process of dissolution, which
transforms a mass of individuals...into free labourers δυνάμει— individuals forced solely through their lack of
property to labour and to sell their labour...the same process which divorced a mass of individuals from their
previous relations to the objective conditions of labour, relations which were, in one way or another, affirmative,
negated these relations, and thereby transformed these individuals into free workers, this same process freed—
δυνάμει— these objective conditions of labour— land and soil, raw material, necessaries of life, instruments of
labour...from their previous state of attachment to these individuals now separated from them...The same process
which placed the mass face to face with the objective conditions of labour as free workers also placed these
conditions, as capital, face to face with the free workers. The historic process was the divorce of elements which up
until then were bound together.” Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin
Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin Books: London; 1993), 502-503.
195
agriculture in which labour is “bound to the soil,” but also in which the agricultural producers
themselves are quite often bound to the “lord of the land.” Yet, the problem is that this is the
aspect of the process which “alone exists for our bourgeois historians.” By contrast, he shows
that this process of dissolution not only put an end to serfdom and slavery, but also to both the
guild-system and forms of small-scale household property. The newly ‘freed’ individuals are, in
contrast to the relatively self-sufficient peasant household or craftsman, absolutely dependent
upon impersonal economic interconnections completely beyond their conscious control.
Moreover, forms of personal dependence, e.g., even serfdom, “factually presuppose” the
individual’s “ownership of the necessaries of life.” Hence, the withering away of these older
relations also ‘emancipated’ the individual from all of the customary “guarantees of existence
afforded by the old feudal arrangements.” The free labourer is “free” in the “double sense” that
they are freed from their previous connections to both the community and the land, and, as such,
free to sell themselves to this or that purchaser of their labour-power.501
Marx refers to this process of dissolution in a variety of ways, but all of which express the
same content. Primitive accumulation involved the denuding, divorcing, separating,
expropriating, clearing away, etc., from the land of the thereafter free labourer. Only in this way
501 “[They] neither form part of the means of production themselves, as would be the case with slaves, serfs, etc., nor
do they own the means of production, as would be the case with self-employed peasant proprietors. The free
workers are therefore free from, unencumbered by, any means of production of their own. With the polarization of
the commodity-market into these two classes, the fundamental conditions of capitalist production are present. The
capital-relation presupposes a complete separation between the workers and the ownership of the conditions for the
realization of their labour. As soon as capitalist production stands on its own feet, it not only maintains this
separation, but reproduces it on a constantly extending scale. The process which creates the capital-relation can be
nothing other than the process which divorces the worker from the ownership of the conditions of his own
labour...So-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the
producer from the means of production. It appears as 'primitive' because it forms the pre-history of capital...The
economic structure of capitalist society has grown out of the economic structure of feudal society. The dissolution of
the latter set free the elements of the former...[because the] immediate producer, the worker, could dispose of his
own person only after he had ceased to be bound to the soil, and ceased to be the slave or serf of another person...[It]
appears, on the one hand, as their emancipation from serfdom and from the fetters of the guilds, and it is this aspect
of the movement which alone exists for our bourgeois historians. But, on the other hand, these newly freed men
became sellers of themselves only after they had been robbed of all their own means of production, and all the
guarantees of existence afforded by the old feudal arrangements.” Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political
Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London; 1990), 873-875.
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were pastures and arable lands thrown into the market as commodities, along, of course, with
those who once belonged to them. This stripping away of the worker from the natural workshop
of the soil, this release of the peasant proprietor from the earth upon which he was raised,
signified nothing less than an absolute rupture between human life and the metabolic conditions
necessary for its own reproduction, a rift between labour and its nature-given inorganic body in
the land. This is why Camatte, following Marx, locates the fundamental “discontinuity with
nature” (characteristic of capitalist production) in the historical ‘clearing away’ of the
precapitalist peasantry from the soil.502 This process of decomposition cut the agricultural
producer loose from of the natural bond which had until then tied him to the soil, severing once
and for all the umbilical cord which had bound labour to nature.
On the European continent, the transition from feudal to capitalist production took place
later, but was also more abbreviated and direct. When, at the end of Volume I, Marx examines
the history of primitive accumulation in its most 'classic form', namely, as it took place in
England, he traces it back through a much more protracted process of forcibly (and later 'legally')
overturning not so much quintessentially feudal relations, but, rather a number of other forms of
landed property— including, as I have mentioned, small-scale independent agricultural
production, local handicraft, cottage industry, etc.— all of which were nonetheless still stamped
by certain feudal features. All of these forms were regarded by Marx either as intermediary
forms of property (i.e., the yeomanry, themselves already the products of the original
decomposition of feudal ties), or, as was the case with the ‘commons’, vestiges of still more
archaic communal modes (i.e., of the older clan heritage which preceded feudalism).
In England, then, it was not exclusively a question of the transition from feudalism into
502 Camatte, Jacques, ‘Community and Communism in Russia’, David Brown (trams.), first published in French in
Invariance Series II, n. 4, 1974; in English by Spartacus 1978, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/camatte/
commrus1.htm>.
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capitalism. It was not simply a question of the transition from common to private property
(although this also occurs through the enclosure of the commons, church lands, etc.). It is rather
primarily, according to Marx, a transition from one form of private property to another, i.e., the
petty property of the many is transformed into the great monopolies of the few.503 What made the
initial emergence of capitalism possible in England, as opposed to on the continent, was the
displacing of the peasant producer from the field, and the corresponding reconstitution of social,
political and legal arrangements which had bound these agricultural workers (in their various
states of freedom and unfreedom) to the land and/or the lord of the land.504 Once those English
agricultural lands have become 'sheepwalks' for Moore's man-eaters, the newly freed
individuals— torn from the soil, shut out from the commons, and driven away even from their
cottages— turn through desperation to begging and brigandry before they ever develop the
necessary 'discipline' to submit to wage-labour and that ‘silent compulsion’ of the laws of a
capitalist economy.505 This is why, according to Marx, the historical genesis of the wage-worker
involved not only extra-legal means of expropriation, enclosure, and privatization, but also laws
against vagrancy and vagabondage, houses of terror, work relief, etc. Only in this way was the
“field” finally “cleared” of its inhabitants and “conquered” for “capitalistic agriculture.” It is in
503 Marx, Karl, ‘Letter to Vera Zasulich’, Marx and Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 24, David Forgacs (trans.),
(International Publishers: New York; 1989), 370-371.
504 “As Marx noted in his chapter on primitive accumulation, what was fundamentally required for the development
of capitalism was not the economic process of saving capital for investment, but the creation of a new social
context...[in which] the majority of people were forced to commodify their labour-power as a result of their
complete separation from any rightful access to the necessary means of production— in the first instance, from the
land. Feudal social relations as a rule tied the producer to the soil through the direct domination of social relations of
lordship. As a result, where no historical process emerged specifically to dissolve feudal agrarian social relations, the
continued evolution of class relations of surplus appropriation tended not only to maintain the peasant upon the soil,
but to preserve the normative social regulation of peasant production through both local customary law and higher
statutory authority.” Comninel, George C., ‘English Feudalism and the Origins of Capitalism’, The Journal of
Peasant Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4, July 2000, 43-44, <http://www.yorku.ca/comninel/courses/ComninelPDF/
English_feudalism(JPS).pdf>.
505 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
1990), 896, 899, 905.
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this strict sense that Marx also suggests that the “economic structure of capitalist society has
grown out of the economic structure of feudal society,” and that the “dissolution of the latter set
free the elements of the former.”506
The relationship between wage-labour and capital appears at the end of all this as a definite
result of English history. It is a specific socio-economic relation not found at any other moment
in history, let alone is it a universal product of the human metabolism with nature. But Marx also
substantiated this point by turning away from the history of the mother-country of capital to its
colonies, where the “beautiful illusion” of a 'free contract' between formally equal parties is torn
apart and one could witness on-going acts of previous accumulation. In the colonies, the
“necessary law” of the exchange between labour and capital had to be supplemented by outright
force: slavery and indentured labour became the original and “natural basis” for the emergence
of capitalism in America, the West Indies, etc. This is because only a fraction of the colonial
506 Ibid., 875. “In England, serfdom had disappeared in practice by the last part of the fourteenth century. The
immense majority of the population consisted then, and to a still larger extent in the fifteenth century, of free peasant
proprietors, however much the feudal trappings might disguise their absolute ownership...They enjoyed the right to
exploit the common land, which gave pasture to their cattle, and furnished them with timber, fire-wood, turf,
etc...Communal property...was an old Teutonic institution which lived on under the cover of feudalism...[I]ts forcible
usurpation, generally accompanied by the turning of arable into pasture land, begins at the end of the fifteenth
century and extends into the sixteenth...The prelude to the revolution that laid the foundation of the capitalist mode
of production was played out in the last third of the fifteenth century and the first few decades of the sixteenth. A
mass of 'free' and unattached proletarians was hurled onto the labour-market by the dissolution of the bands of
feudal retainers, who, as Sir James Steuart correctly remarked, 'everywhere uselessly filled house and castle'...[T]he
great feudal lords, in their defiant opposition to the king and Parliament, created an incomparably larger proletariat
by forcibly driving the peasantry from the land, to which the latter had the same feudal title as the lords themselves,
and by usurpation of the common lands...Transformation of arable land into sheep-walks was therefore its
slogan...The eighteenth century, however, did not yet recognize as fully as the nineteenth the identity between the
'wealth of the nation' and the poverty of the people. Hence the very vigorous polemic, in the economic literature of
that time, on the 'enclosure of commons'...The stoical peace of mind with which the political economist regards the
most shameless violation of the “sacred rights of property” and the grossest acts of violence to persons, as soon as
they are necessary to lay the foundations of the capitalistic mode of production, is shown by Sir F. M. Eden,
philanthropist and tory, to boot...It was not only land that lay waste, but often also land that was still under
cultivation, being cultivated either in common or held under a definite rent paid to the community, that was annexed
by the neighbouring landowners under pretext of enclosure...The last great process of expropriation of the
agricultural population from the soil is, finally, the so-called 'clearing of estates', i.e. the sweeping of human beings
off them...The spoliation of the church’s property, the fraudulent alienation of the State domains, the robbery of the
common lands, the usurpation of feudal and clan property, and its transformation into modern private property under
circumstances of reckless terrorism, were just so many idyllic methods of primitive accumulation. They conquered
the field for capitalistic agriculture, made the soil part and parcel of capital, and created for the town industries the
necessary supply of a ‘free’ and outlawed proletariat.” Ibid., 877-895.
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population formed wage-workers in the proper sense. Given the relative availability of land
expropriated from the indigenous populations, the price of labour on the market was often too
dear to be of much use.507 Instead, many European immigrants to America, some of them wage-
labourers on the other side of the Atlantic, ‘reverted’ back to being independent proprietors upon
their arrival. This also explains the unfortunate case of that “[u]nhappy Mr. Peel, who provided
for everything except the export of English relations of production to Swan River!” But poor Mr.
Peel accidentally discovered something very important about European capitalism in Australia:
viz., that capital no longer exists as capital wherever labour ceases to exist as wage-labour. His
story teaches us that capitalism is a definite social relation, not a thing.
Wakefield discovered that, in the colonies, property in money, means of subsistence,
machines and other means of production does not yet stamp a man as a capitalist if the
essential complement to these things is missing: the wage-labourer, the other man, who
is compelled to sell himself of his own free will. He discovered that capital is not a thing,
but a social relation between persons which is mediated through things. A Mr. Peel, he
complains, took with him from England to the Swan River district of Western Australia
means of subsistence and of production to the amount of £ 50, 000. This Mr. Peel even
had the foresight to bring besides [this], 3, 000 persons of the [English] working
class…Once he arrived at his destination, 'Mr. Peel was left without a servant to make
his bed or fetch him water from the river.' Unhappy Mr. Peel, who provided for
everything except the export of English relations of production to Swan River!...So long,
therefore, as the worker can accumulate for himself— and this he can do so long as he
remains in possession of his means of production— capitalist accumulation and the
capitalist mode of production are impossible...How then, in old Europe, was the
expropriation of the worker from his conditions of labour brought about?...By a social
contract of a quite original kind…[According to the political economists]: the mass of
mankind expropriated itself in honour of the 'accumulation of capital.' Now one would
think that this instinct of self-denying fanaticism would especially run riot in the
colonies, the only places where the men and the conditions exist to turn a social contract
from a dream into a reality...Indeed, the drive to self-expropriation for the glory of
capital exists so little...that slavery, according to Wakefield himself, is the sole natural
basis of colonial wealth...At home, in the mother country, the smug deceitfulness of the
political economist can turn this relation of absolute dependence into a free contract
between buyer and seller...But in the colonies this beautiful illusion is torn aside.508
Wakefield’s tale about colonial capital is actually illustrative of Marx’s argument that, far
from being the aeterno modo of the human metabolism with nature, the capitalist mode of
507 “Where land is very cheap and all men are free,” where “everyone can easily obtain a piece of land for himself,”
there “labour is very dear”— if it can be obtained “at any price.”Ibid., 935.
508 Ibid., 932-936.
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production rests upon the historical expropriation of the peasant producer from the land— an
‘original’ separation by no means common to every form of social life. As Marx jests in the
above, given the pretences of political economy one would imagine that their Robinsonades
might actually be realized in the colonial world, where a so-called ‘state of nature’ exists most of
all. But only after an original separation is complete, and the agricultural labourer has been
released from the natural laboratory of the soil, can capitalism appear on the surface of things as
if it were an equal exchange and free contract between the owners of the means of production,
and those who have nothing left to sell but their own bodily powers. Only then, on the basis of
this separation from the soil, does capital start to work itself out through its own ‘natural laws’.
Hence, the ‘beautiful illusion’ of a naturally-arisen social contract between wage-labourer
and capital was torn apart in the colonies precisely because, there, this necessary division
between labour and land had not yet been completed. This also underlines, I would add, the
spatial dimensions and territoriality of capitalism as a sort of geographic project, i.e., as one
which strives to stamp the whole world in its image. It also illustrates the uneven geographies of
primitive accumulation during the 19th century. When a nation with a decisively capitalist
character extends its dominion over other parts of the globe which have not yet developed the
metabolic preconditions for capital, it must reestablish, or rather establish on new ground, the
artificial divorce between living labour and its material conditions.
Insofar as this metabolic separation did not exist, or did yet exist on a considerable
enough scale, colonial ‘capital’ continued to develop upon the wholly external or “natural basis”
provided by indentured and slave labour. As Perelman suggests, Merivale (whose insights Marx
appeals to in the Grundrisse and Capital) had shown that the “essential message” of the
“Wakefield school” was this: “where workers found alternatives to wage labour, capital would
even resort to slavery;” colonial “capital would submit itself to the rules of the marketplace only
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after labor had been made to submit to capital” in the colonies.509 As Harvey notes, Wakefield’s
theory of colonialism and Merivale’s critique of it were radically re-appropriated by Marx.
Merivale’s critique allowed Marx to transform Wakefield’s theory into a “devastating rebuttal of
Adam Smith” and the fantasies surrounding primitive accumulation. Wakefield, a small mind
next to a genius such as Smith, nevertheless “recognized” what Smith could not: namely, that the
capitalist “cannot be a capitalist” without “‘free’ (in the double sense!) laborers to work.” In
order to reproduce the capitalist mode of production in the colonies, the capitalists and colonial
administrations would have to revert back to the “brutal tactics of the prehistory of capital,” no
less than the wage-labourers would try to revert back to independent proprietorship.510 This
illustrated Marx’s fundamental point that capitalism is preconditioned by the separation of labour
from the laboratory of the soil; where there is no such separation, the capitalist will not encounter
the wage-labourer in the marketplace.
In his lectures on colonialism, Merivale had commented on a report issued by the
Agricultural and Immigration Society of Trinidad, which was in the process of instituting some
of Wakefield’s recommended reforms.511 In Wakefield’s story, Mr. Peel, having brought wage-
509 Perelman, Michael, The Invention of Capitalism: Classical Political Economy and the Secret History of Primitive
Accumulation, (Duke University Press: Durham; 2000), 331.
510 Harvey, David, A Companion to Marx’s Capital, (Verso: London; 2010), 301-302.
511According to Merivale, the report written by the committee “presents a remarkable picture of the condition of
things in a tropical colony, possessing a wide extent of fertile and untouched soil, and a very small population, from
which the restraints of slavery had just been removed...The effects on the character of the negroes, both in respect of
steadiness of labour and moral conduct, of this rapid change in fortunes are amply considered in this pamphlet. It
will be remembered, in reading the details, that they rest chiefly on the testimony of planters, and persons connected
with planters, whose minds are naturally under some degree of bias...But the effect of this immigration [which had
been recommended by the committee] seems, in the opinion of the committee, to have been neutralized by the
extreme difficulty of enforcing continuous labour...To counteract this tendency, the committee propose...“provisions
for regulating the conditions of the negroes,” by which I presume a committee of planters to mean coercive
provisions; limitations on the absolute freedom at present enjoyed; something in the nature of the Code Rural of
Hayti. Their arguments appear to be, that in densely peopled colonies the labourer, although free, is naturally
dependent on the capitalist; in thinly peopled ones, the want of this natural dependence must be supplied by artificial
restrictions. It is needless to say how jealously such proposals require to be watched. It is impossible that restrictions
imposed on the working classes can make labour palatable...[as they prefer] establishing themselves on the land as
small owners; but this, it must be confessed, seems to present the greatest difficulty of all. The committee speak of
the “simply but comprehensive principles promulgated by Mr. Wakefield,” and recommended the establishment of a
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workers from Europe to his lands in Australia, found that, once in the colonial world, they all
reverted into independent peasant producers. Newly freed black labour, as Merivale suggests in
his analysis of the pro-Wakefield report, merely brought this problem to the surface and
developed it in a new form in the West Indies. This is why Jamaican plantation-owners lamented
that the slaves, once liberated, refused to work for them. It is clear that Marx’s critique of
Wakefield was greatly influenced by Merivale’s thoughts.512 For instance, the case-study of
Jamaica and Merivale’s conception of “uniform industry” is developed further in the
Grundrisse’s Hegelian notion of the general industriousness of the wage-worker, where Marx
recites Merivale’s critique of Wakefield almost point by point.513
land and immigration fund...[after which] crown lands should be sold in lots of not less than 320 acres. Squatting,
they say, could be easily prevented; but whether this be so or not, it would seem impossible to prevent the re-sale to
labourers in small allotments...The planters, in short, would still very naturally prefer labourers who should
voluntarily remain in the condition of their subjects; and believe that, without placing them in some intermediate
position between slavery and absolute freedom, no steadiness of labour, or economical prosperity, can be secured in
colonies possessing a great extent of land...[T]he consequences of negro emancipation have only presented it [viz.,
this problem] under a new aspect .” Merivale, Herman, Lectures on Colonization and Colonies, (Longman: London;
1861), 313-214.
512As Merivale puts it, a “considerable portion of its [Jamaica’s] surface has gone out of sugar cultivation, and either
has been devoted to other and less productive purposes, or abandoned to the bush. The landed fortunes have all but
disappeared...Of course this phenomenon is differently accounted for, according to party views. The doctrine of the
West Indian interest is, that Jamaica has ceased to flourish because the free negro will not work. The opposite
theorists urge several pleas...[T]hey point to general indebtedness...[and] the inveteracy of the old habits and nations
of the times of slavery, which have prevented the landowners from dealing justly with the labourers, from offering
sufficient wages, and allowing the use of the soil on liberal terms...But those who are accustomed more to rely on
general rather than special causes for the explanation of very general phenomenon, will perhaps be disposed to look
a little farther into the case...[F]or the successful raising of exportable produce in new, and especially tropical,
countries, abundance of fresh soil is the first requisite, abundance of labour the second. When the old system of
production was checked in Jamaica, first by the abolition of the slave trade, and then by emancipation, it possessed
neither of these requisites. It had a great extent of virgin soil indeed, but not of virgin soil adapted to cane production.
The sugar land was beginning to show signs of exhaustion, or rather of entering into that second stage, in which
additional capital and labour are required to maintain production...[On the other hand] extensive mountain pastures
and savannas, where men might live and multiply at small cost, was an evil, not a good, in a commercial point of
view. It enabled the emancipated labourer to subsist without uniform industry, and only to lend his hand to the
planter reluctantly and irregularly.” Ibid., 341-342.
513 On general wealth as distinct from all precapitalist “natural forms of wealth,” see Marx, Karl, Grundrisse:
Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin Books: London; 1993), 222-
226: “Money is therefore not only an object, but is the object of greed [Bereicherungssucht]. It is essentially auri
sacra fames. Greed as such, as a particular form of the drive, i.e. as distinct from the craving for a particular kind of
wealth, e.g. for clothes, weapons, jewels, women, wine, etc., is possible only when general wealth, wealth as such,
has become individualized in a particular thing, i.e. as soon as money is posited in its third quality. Money is
therefore not only the object but also the fountainhead of greed. The mania for possessions is possible without
money; but greed itself is the product of a definite social development, not natural,as opposed to historical. Hence
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The Times of November 1857 contains an utterly delightful cry of outrage on the part of
a West-Indian plantation owner. This advocate analyses with great moral indignation—
as a plea for the re-introduction of Negro slavery— how the Quashees (the free blacks
of Jamaica) content themselves with producing only what is strictly necessary for their
own consumption, and, alongside this 'use value', regard loafing (indulgence and
idleness) as the real luxury good; how they do not care a damn for the sugar and the
fixed capital invested in the plantations, but rather observe the planters' impending
bankruptcy with an ironic grin of malicious pleasure, and even exploit their acquired
Christianity as an embellishment for this mood of malicious glee and indolence. They
have ceased to be slaves, but not in order to become wage labourers, but, instead, self-
sustaining peasants working for their own consumption. As far as they are concerned,
capital does not exist as capital, because autonomous wealth as such can exist only
either on the basis of direct forced labour, slavery, or indirect forced labour, wage
labour. Wealth confronts direct forced labour not as capital, but rather as relation of
domination [Herrschaftsverhältnis]; thus, the relation of domination is the only thing
which is reproduced on this basis, for which wealth itself has value only as gratification,
not as wealth itself, and which can therefore never create [the] general industriousness
[of wage-labour].514
the wailing of the ancients about money as the source of all evil. Monetary greed, or mania for wealth, necessarily
brings with it the decline and fall of the ancient communities [Gemeinwesen]. Hence it is the antithesis to them...As
material representative of general wealth,as individualized exchange value, money must be the direct object, aim
and product of general labour, the labour of all individuals. Labour must directly produce exchange value, i.e. money.
It must therefore be wage labour. Greed, as the urge of all, in so far as everyone wants to make money, is only
created by general wealth. Only in this way can the general mania for money become the wellspring of general, self-
reproducing wealth...When the aim of labour is not a particular product standing in a particular relation to the
particular needs of the individual, but money, wealth in its general form, then, firstly the individual's industriousness
knows no bounds; it is indifferent to its particularity, and takes on every form which serves the purpose; it is
ingenious in the creation of new objects for a social need, etc....The period which proceeds the development of
modern industrial society opens with general greed for money on the part of individuals as well as of states. The real
development of the sources of wealth takes place as it were behind their backs, as a means of gaining possession of
the representatives of wealth. Wherever it does not arise out of circulation— as in Spain— but has to be discovered
physically, the nation is impoverished, whereas the nations which have to work in order to get it from the Spaniards
develop the sources of wealth and really become rich. This is why the search for and discovery of gold in new
continents, countries, plays so great a role in the history of revaluation, because by its means colonization is
improvised and made to flourish as if in a hothouse. The hunt for gold in all countries leads to its discovery; to the
formation of new states; initially to the spread of commodities, which produce new needs, and draw distant
continents into the metabolism of circulation, i.e. exchange. Thus, in this respect, as the general representative of
wealth and as individualized exchange value, it was doubly a means for expanding the universality of wealth, and
for drawing the dimensions of exchange over the whole world; for creating the true generality [Allgemeinheit] of
exchange value in substance and in extension. But it is inherent in the attribute in which it here becomes developed
that the illusion about its nature, i.e. the fixed insistence on one of its aspects, in the abstract, and the blindness
towards the contradictions contained within it, gives it a really magical significance behind the backs of individuals.
In fact, it is because of this self-contradictory and hence illusory aspect, because of this abstraction, that it becomes
such an enormous instrument in the real development of the forces of social production...In order to function
productively, money in its third role, as we have seen, must be not only the precondition but equally the result of
circulation, and, as its precondition, also a moment of it, something posited by it...It is inherent in the simple
character of money itself that it can exist as a developed moment of production only where and when wage labour
exists; that in this case, far from subverting the social formation, it is rather a condition for its development and a
driving-wheel for the development of all forces of production, material and mental. A particular individual may even
today come into money by chance, and the possession of this money can undermine him just as it undermined the
communities of antiquity. But the dissolution of this individual within modern society is in itself only the enrichment
of the productive section of society...It is clear, therefore, that when wage labour is the foundation, money does not
have a dissolving effect, but acts productively; whereas the ancient community as such is already in contradiction
with wage labour as the general foundation.”
514 Ibid., 325-326.
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What the case-study of Jamaica demonstrates, just like the tale of Mr. Peel, is that the
capitalist “development of the social productivity of labour,” of a general industriousness in the
wage-worker, is “impossible without the expropriation of the workers” from their connection to
the earth.515 Wherever the metabolic separation is incomplete, ‘capital’ is not yet regulated by the
indirect compulsion of its own ruthlessly universalizing tendencies, but by the direct compulsion
afforded by the crack of the whip. This is why Wakefield's recommendations, adopted at one
point by Parliament, advocated a three-pronged strategy of stricter regulations on newly freed
black labourers, increased working-class immigration to the colonies, and restrictions on the
selling of small allotments to those immigrants. Just as protectionism was aimed at
“manufacturing capitalists artificially in the mother country,” “Wakefield's theory of
colonization” was “aimed at manufacturing wage-labourers in the colonies.”516
It must be kept in mind that the new forces of production and relations of production do
not develop out of nothing, nor drop from the sky, nor from the womb of the self-
positing Idea; but from within and in antithesis to the existing development of
production and the inherited, traditional relations of property. While in the completed
bourgeois system every economic relation presupposes every other in its bourgeois
economic form, and everything posited is thus also a presupposition, this is the case
with every organic system. This organic system itself, as a totality, has its
presuppositions, and its development to its totality consists precisely in subordinating all
elements of society to itself, or in creating out of it the organs which it still lacks. This is
historically how it becomes a totality. The process of becoming this totality forms a
moment of its process, of its development. On the other hand, if within one society the
modern relations of production, i.e. capital, are developed to its totality, and this society
then seizes hold of a new territory, as e.g. the colonies, then it finds, or rather its
representative, the capitalist, finds, that his capital ceases to be capital without wage
labour, and that one of the presuppositions of the latter is not only landed property in
general, but modern landed property; landed property which, as capitalized rent, is
expensive, and which, as such, excludes the direct use of the soil by individuals. Hence
Wakefield's theory of colonies, followed in practice by the English government in
Australia. Landed property is here artificially made more expensive in order to
transform the workers into wage workers, to make capital act as capital, and thus to
make the new colony productive; to develop wealth in it, instead of using it, as in
America, for the momentary deliverance of the wage labourers. Wakefield's theory is
infinitely important for a correct understanding of modern landed property.517
515 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
1990), 932.
516 Ibid., 932.
517 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 287.
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Hence, Marx certainly recognized that primitive accumulation was not something
relegated entirely to the past. His writings (e.g., the Grundrisse, Capital, correspondence from
the late 1860s, and the drafts to Zasulich) speak to the uneven geographies of primitive
accumulation in the 19th century and to the territoriality of the capitalist metabolism as an on-
going a geographic project. Wherever the metabolic separation remains incomplete, colonial
capital must strive to reenact the processes which appear, from the perspective of the colonizing
country itself, as moments of its own prehistory. Thus, Marx identified on-going acts of
primitive accumulation, especially in the colonies, but also, e.g., internally-driven forms in
Russia (although that in no way endorses Harvey’s view of ‘accumulation by dispossession’
within capitalist society). The “expropriation of the mass of the people from the soil forms the
basis of the capitalist mode of production,” whereas, in the colonies, the “separation of the
worker from the conditions of labour and from the soil, in which they are rooted, does not yet
exist, or only [exists] sporadically, or on too limited a scale.”518
Indeed, the “essence of a free colony,” i.e., as the history of America shows, is that the “bulk
of the soil is still public property, and every settler on it can therefore turn part of it into his
private property...without preventing later settlers from performing the same operation.” This is
the “secret both of the prosperity of the colonies,” and, at the same time, of their “cancerous
affliction” when it comes to their “resistance to the establishment of capital.”519 What Wakefield
really “discovered,” therefore, was “not something new about the colonies, but, in the colonies,
the truth about capitalist relations in the mother country:” namely, that capital is not a thing, but
a social relation.520 It is a social relation which depends completely upon the artificial separation
518 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
1990), 934-935.
519 Ibid., 934.
520 Ibid., 932.
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between labour and the metabolic means of labour in the land. This is the “secret discovered in
the New World by the political economy of the Old World:” viz., that the capitalist mode of
production rests entirely upon the original “expropriation of the worker” from the earth.521
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the interconnections between Marx’s account of primitive
accumulation, critique of political economy and theory of the metabolism with nature. In his
view, capitalism presupposes the separation between labour and its inorganic body. As a
presupposition, its origins fall outside of the history of capital itself and belong, properly
speaking, to the prehistory of modern society. However, these historical origins were shrouded in
the mysteries of political economy. The nursery tales of the economists naturalized the social
relations specific to modern society by conflating the coming-into-being with the being of
capitalism. They projected the isolated individual of the 18th century back into history, presenting
wage-labour as both the aeterno modo of the metabolism with nature and the final term of human
development. I defended the interpretation that Marx regarded this social atomism and form of
individuality as the product of the most modern social relations, i.e., relations which arise out of
the unprecedented separation of individuals from their connections to their own labour, to others,
and to nature. The ‘natural laws’ of capital, which are by no means laws of nature common to
every epoch of human history, are artificial products of this denuding of the now ‘free’ labourer.
Marx substantiated this point not merely by examining the historical genesis of capitalist
relations in England, but also by identifying on-going acts of primitive accumulation in Russia,
America, India and the colonies more generally. I suggested that he radically appropriated
Wakefield’s theory of colonialism, and Merivale’s critique of it, in order to undermine the
521 Ibid., 940.
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fanciful ideas about ‘original’ accumulation dominant since Smith. Wakefield unwittingly
discovered in the colonies the truth of the historical formation of capitalist relations in Europe:
viz., that it rests upon the expropriation of the labourer from the land. In many of the colonies,
where land was plentiful and/or wage-labour scarce, the ‘social contract’ had to be enforced by
violent means. Wherever the separation does not yet exist on a sufficient scale, colonial ‘capital’
must resort to the methods of accumulation which belonged to its earlier stages of development.
It re-enacts the moments of its own prehistory: the first time as tragedy, and the second time as
tragedy. Slavery, indentured labour, and artificial restrictions on the selling of small allotments—
all these constituted elements in the “natural” foundations of colonial capital. In this chapter, I
also argued that Marx’s analysis of these on-going acts of primitive accumulation in the colonies
highlights his understanding of the geographical dimensions of capitalism as a territorial project.
Wherever it settles, colonial capital must reproduce anew the separation necessary for the
creation of a class of ‘free’ labourers who are, δυναμις, wage-workers.
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The Metabolic Rift
Introduction
The last chapter examined Marx’s account of the dissolution of the precapitalist metabolism.
By stripping the agricultural workers away from the natural workshop of the soil, primitive
accumulation created the class of ‘free’ labourers required for the coming-into-being of capital.
In this chapter, we learn that not only does this severance from nature constitute the primary
presupposition for the capitalist mode of production, but that, with its own further development
as an organic system, capital reproduces this separation as a result of itself. It expands this
isolation of labour-power from the material means of its actualization, and, in doing so, deepens
the estrangement from nature. In wage-labour, the process of objectifying labour appears as only
so moments in its own de-realization. It confronts its own objectivity as a reality opposite itself,
and, indeed, on a constantly increasing scale through the growing disproportion between living
and previously objectified labour. While consulting historical and contemporary secondary
literature, as well as Marx’s relevant writings from this period, this chapter of the dissertation
defends the interpretative position that he was aware of both the sociological and ecological
implications of this separation between labour and nature.
In addition to his insights into the dehumanization which accompanies this rupture in the
traditional forms of the metabolism, I will demonstrate that Marx was also ahead of his time in
recognizing the environmental effects of this divorce. In fact, he saw essential interconnections
between the degradation of the worker and the exhaustion of the soil, between the struggle over
the length of working-day and over the limits of fertility in the land. These are all products of the
blind necessity of capital. They are problems which cannot be resolved within this economic
system because its inherent tendencies create them. Hence, according to Marx’s view, both the
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destruction of agriculture and the exploitation of wage-labour are irreparable from the
standpoint of capitalist society. These ecological dimensions to his critique of political economy
reach their climax in his claim that the ‘natural laws’ of capital violate the actual laws of nature,
undermining the universal-natural conditions required for every historical and possible mode of
production.
The Isolation of Labour-Power from its Objectivity
With the dawn of capitalist society, the “original...identity of man and nature” has passed
over into its “equally abstract opposite: the radical divorce of labour from its objective natural
conditions.” Schmidt argues that while Marx may have been interested in precapitalist
formations for a variety of other reasons (e.g., anthropological, sociological, historical and
political), his “critique of political economy” in Capital and in the ‘Rohentwurf’ is primarily
concerned with them only insofar as they help us to triangulate the social origins of “something
typical only of bourgeois society, namely the 'division between these inorganic conditions of
human existence and this active existence itself, a division first posited in its completeness in the
relation between wage-labour and capital'.”522
Only in the capitalist mode of production does the realization of the subjective capacity of
labour presuppose its separation from the material means of its realization. This form of “living
labour, existing as an abstraction [apart] from these moments of its actual reality,” presupposes
prior to the act of production a “complete denudation, [i.e., the] purely subjective existence of
labour, stripped of all objectivity.”523 This is the “denudation” and “nakedness” of the individual
worker, isolated now from his necessary contact with the “objective, nature-given inorganic
522 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (Verso Books: London; 2014), 82.
523 Ibid., 295-296.
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body of his subjectivity.”524 To be sure, Marx himself recognized “labour-power, or labour
capacity,” as the “aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities existing in the physical
form, the living personality, of a human being [emphasis added]”— rather than, as some have
suggested as of late, a completely abstract category and homogeneous economic unit. In fact, far
from endorsing the latter view, this is actually one of the many targets of his critical analysis of
political economy. It is actually capitalism which has reduced the wage-worker to the
personification of this abstract, non-objective capacity.
In a capitalist society, labour-power is reduced to a mere “capacity” which, like all other
commodities, means “nothing unless it is sold.” The propertyless wage-workers who do not sell
away their labour will feel their lack of connection to the means of production as a “cruel nature-
imposed necessity.” Hence, it is important to keep in mind that when Marx refers to the
“capacity for labour,” he is not referring to the actual activity of labour “anymore than we speak
of digestion when we speak of capacity for digestion. As is well known, the latter process
requires something more than a good stomach.”525 In all this, he in no way shies away from the
notion that “labour is determined by nature.” That “labour is determined by nature” also just
means that “in all conditions of society and culture,” the individual who, by birth or
524 Ibid., 295, 473.
525 “The ultimate or minimum limit of the value of labour-power is formed by the value of the commodities which
have to be supplied every day to the bearer of labour-power, the man, so that he can renew his life-process...It is an
extraordinarily cheap kind of sentimentality which declares that this method of determining the value of labour-
power, a method prescribed by the very nature of the case, is brutal, and which laments with Rossi in this matter: 'To
conceive capacity for labour (puissance de travail) in abstraction from the workers' means of subsistence during the
production process is to conceive a phantom (etre de raison). When we speak of labour, or capacity for labour, we
speak at the same time of the worker and his means of subsistence, of the worker and his wages.' When we speak of
capacity for labour, we do not speak of labour, anymore than we speak of digestion when we speak of capacity for
digestion. As is well known, the latter process requires something more than a good stomach. When we speak of
capacity for labour, we do not abstract from the necessary means of subsistence. On the contrary, their value is
expressed in its value. If his capacity for labour remains unsold, this is of no advantage to the worker. He will rather
feel it to be a cruel nature-imposed necessity that his capacity for labour has required for its production a definite
quantity of the means of subsistence, and will continue to require this for its reproduction. Then, like Sismondi, he
will discover that 'the capacity for labour...is nothing unless it is sold'.” Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political
Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London; 1990), 277.
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circumstance, right or accident, “possesses no other property than his labour” must give himself
over as the “slave of other men who [have] made themselves the owners of the material
conditions of labour.” The political economists had “very good grounds” to obscure this fact of
nature by attributing a “supernatural creative power” to labour.526 But it is “only the ‘concept’ in
Hegel’s sense,” satirized Marx, which somehow “manages to objectify itself without external
material”— which, apart from being a questionable reading of Hegel, is at least a very good gibe
at the political economists.527
Of course, labour will objectify itself and, in order to reproduce herself as a wage-labourer,
the worker will get her crust of ‘dry bread’— but only because she receives back (in the form of
wages) a portion of her own objectified labour. It is true, then, that this “separation” of “labour
from the objective moments of its existence” is necessarily and constantly “suspended” within
the capitalist “production process” itself— and, of course, without such a suspension of the
separation between producer and means of production, production would be an impossibility.528
Yet, it is only ‘suspended’ once labour-power has been sold away to the capitalist, just like poor
Esau bartered away his birthright to Jacob in exchange for a pot of red lentils. It is the capitalist
who, by buying-up the instruments, materials, land, labour-power, etc., brings together the now
separated elements of the production— and, from this one act, proclaims his or her divinely-
ordained or nature-given right to expropriate the wealth-creating activity of others.
This notion that the wage-worker is denuded of her inorganic body and means of life in
nature can be found in the Grundrisse, Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63, and Capital, but its
526 Marx, Karl, 'Critique of the Gotha Programme', Selected Writings, Lawrence H. Simon (ed.), (Hackett Publishing
Company: Indianapolis; 1994), 316.
527 Marx, Karl, ‘The Commodity’ (English Translation of Chapter One of Capital based on first German edition),
Albert Dragstedt (trans.), (New Park Publications: London; 1976), 7-40., <https://
www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/commodity.htm#n1>.
528 Marx quoted in Rosdolsky, Roman, The Making of Marx’s ‘Capital’, Pete Burgess (trans.), (Pluto Press: 1977;
London), 216.
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origins can be traced back as early as the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts.
The worker can create nothing without nature, without the sensuous external world. It is
the material on which his labor is realized, in which it is active, from which and by
means of which it produces. But just as nature provides labor with the means of life in
the sense that labor cannot live without objects on which to operate, on the other hand, it
also provides the means of life in the more restricted sense...[T]he more the worker by
his labor appropriates the external world, hence sensuous nature, the more he deprives
himself of the means of life in a double manner…[Labour is the] universality which
makes all nature his inorganic body— both inasmuch as nature is (1) his direct means of
life, and (2) the material, the object, and the instrument of his life activity. Nature is
man's inorganic body— nature, that is, in so far as it is not itself the human body...That
man's physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to
itself, for man is a part of nature...In tearing away from man the object of his production,
therefore, estranged labor tears from him his species life, his real objectivity as a
member of the species and transforms his advantage over animals into the disadvantage
that his inorganic body, nature, is taken away from him...It estranges from man his own
body, as well as external nature.529
Foster likewise argues that this conception of the alienation from the ‘inorganic body’ of nature,
a conception first elaborated in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, was later “carried
forward into the Grundrisse” where Marx continually refers to precapitalist (and socialist) nature
as the ‘inorganic body’ of “human subjectivity.”530 Yet, we should be reminded here that when
the Grundrisse refers us to precapitalist nature as the ‘inorganic body’ of precapitalist society,
the claim is qualified: the immediate presence of this inorganic body is given by nature, and is
not yet produced by the ‘universality’ of labour. Moreover, Schmidt is right: when Marx returns
again to this philosophical conception of nature as “man's inorganic body” in the Grundrisse, he
resituates the historic origins of its estrangement within the context of primitive accumulation.
Nature appears in the Paris Manuscripts, with reference to Hegel's Phenomenology of
Mind, as 'the inorganic body of man; that is to say nature, excluding the human body
itself'. It is his body, 'with which he must remain in continuous interaction in order not
to die'...In the Grundrisse, as well as the final version of Capital, Marx used terms of a
somewhat ontological flavour to describe the appropriation of the material world. The
earth is described in the Grundrisse as the 'laboratory', the 'primitive instrument', and
the 'primitive condition of production', and in Capital as 'the original larder' and 'the
original tool house'. Moreover, the theme of the Paris Manuscripts that nature is the
inorganic body of man appears again in the Grundrisse in a remarkably more concrete
529 Marx, Karl, 'Estranged Labor', The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan (trans.),
Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 109,. 112, 114.
530 Foster , John Bellamy, ‘Marx’s Grundrisse and the Ecological Contradictions of Capitalism’, Karl Marx’s
Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy 150 Years Later, Marcello Musto (ed.), (Routledge:
New York; 2008), 96.
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form in the course of the analysis of the origin of property...Marx's statement that man is
yoked to his natural existence as to his body is not applied here to the labour-process in
general, but only to its pre-bourgeois forms...As long as nature is appropriated through
agriculture and is therefore absolutely independent of men, men are abstractly identical
with nature. They lapse, so to speak, into natural existence...With the emergence of
bourgeois conditions of production, this identity changes into its equally abstract
opposite: the radical divorce of labour from its objective natural conditions....What the
critique of political economy is interested in and wishes to explain is something typical
only of bourgeois society, namely the 'division between these inorganic conditions of
human existence and this active existence itself, a division first posited in its
completeness in the relation between wage-labour and capital'.531
Moreover, Marx goes to great lengths to demonstrate that this “[s]eparation of property from
labour” is not only the presupposition for, but also the outcome of, capital: i.e., it is the
“necessary law of this exchange between capital and labour.”532 Not only is the diremption a
precondition for the capitalist mode of production; it is reproduced on a constantly-expanding
scale as a result of it. As Burkett characterizes Marx’s view, this metabolic “separation is fully
realized” not through primitive accumulation, but only in the relation between wage-labour and
capital in a mature capitalist society, i.e., where production is completely “unencumbered by the
producers’ prior social ties to natural conditions.”533 We have already read Marx assert that this
“historic process which divorces the objective conditions of labour from the worker,” is, with the
maturation of bourgeois society itself, also posited as the “effect of capital.” In fact, only
capitalism will “complete the divorce between labour and property.”534
This means that the actual process of objectification inevitably confronts the worker as an
estranged mode of objectivity. The realization of labour passes over into its opposite, i.e., into its
de-realization, in that it creates its own unreality. Precisely because the worker's “subjective
power of labour” is now “lacking in objectivity,” Schmidt observes that it is already
531 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (Verso Books: London; 2014), 80-82.
532 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 295
533 Burkett, Paul, ‘Value, Capital and Nature: Some Ecological Implications of Marx's Critique of Political
Economy’, Science & Society, Vol. 60, No. 3, Marxism and Ecology (Fall, 1996), 338.
534 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 506-512.
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predetermined from the outset that this “power meets its negation ‘as a value existing for itself’
in the alienated and objective conditions of labour” owned by capital.535 That the capacity for
labour now exists in this purely subjective mode implies that when it does come to realize itself,
when it does objectify itself, it will realize itself as a reality opposed to itself, as an objectivity
belonging to an other being— in a word, as capital. Hence, as Schmidt insists of Marx's analysis,
“once this separation has come into effect,” capital will reproduce it on an ever-increasing scale,
deepening the estrangement from nature.536 This is also why Rosdolsky explains that readers
should not interpret Marx as arguing that this “process of the divorce of the worker from the
means of production” is merely a “historical fact” of primitive accumulation, i.e., one which has
been “concluded once and for all” by the prehistory of bourgeois society.537
[The] absolute separation between property and labour, which is inherent in the capital-
relation, but only represented a historical precondition of it from the previous standpoint,
'now also appears as the product of labour itself, as objectification, materialisation of its
own moments'. Up until now it could be assumed that capital became a power ruling
over labour, precisely by means of the 'primitive accumulation' of its owners. However,
this illusion disappears as soon as we look at the circuit of surplus capital.538
“Under the capitalist modality of metabolic exchange with nature,” writes Mészáros, the
actual “objectification of human powers necessarily assumes the form of alienation— subsuming
productive activity itself under the power of a reified objectivity, capital.”539 Once we consider
the sort of capital that has reproduced itself, i.e., capital which stands on its own legs, we
therefore find according to Rosdolsky that the “illusion” of political economy “first disappears:”
viz., “that the capitalist [has] exchange[d] anything at all with the worker other than a part of the
535 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (Verso Books: London; 2014), 82.
536 Ibid., 181.
537 Rosdolsky, Roman, The Making of Marx’s ‘Capital’, Pete Burgess (trans.), (Pluto Press: 1977; London), 279.
538 Ibid., 258.
539 Meszaros quoted in Foster , John Bellamy, ‘Marx’s Grundrisse and the Ecological Contradictions of Capitalism’,
Karl Marx’s Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy 150 Years Later, Marcello Musto (ed.),
(Routledge: New York; 2008), 100-101.
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latter's own objectified labour.”540 A critical analysis of this wage-labour process lifts the veil of
its surface appearances, destroying the semblance of an “exchange of equivalents” between these
freely contracting parties.541 What initially appears under capitalist social relations as the
condition for “appropriation through labour” and, hence, “seemingly the condition of the
worker's property,” ultimately “reveals itself through a necessary dialectic as [the] absolute
divorce of labour and property,” as the very “foundation of the worker's propertylessness.”
Production based on exchange value, on whose surface this free and equal exchange of
equivalents proceeds, is at its base the exchange of objectified labour as exchange value
for living labour as use value, or, to express this in another way, the relating of labour to
its objective conditions— and hence to the objectivity created by itself— as alien
property: alienation [Entäusserung] of labour...In the various forms in which labour
relates to the conditions of production as its own property, the reproduction of the
worker is by no means posited through mere labour, for his property relation is not the
result but the presupposition of his labour. In landed property this is clear; it must also
become clear in the guild system that the particular kind of property which labour
creates does not rest on labour alone or on the exchange of labour, but on an objective
connection between the worker and a community and conditions which are there before
him, which he takes as his basis. These too are products of labour, of the labour of world
history; of the labour of the community— of its historic development, which does not
proceed from the labour of individuals nor from the exchange of their labours.
Therefore, mere labour is also not the presupposition of realization [Verwertung]. A
situation in which labour is merely exchanged...presupposes the separation of labour
from its original intertwinement with its objective conditions, which is why it appears as
mere labour on one side, while on the other side its product, as objectified labour, has an
entirely independent existence as value opposite it. The exchange of labour for labour—
seemingly the condition of the worker's property—rests on the foundation of the
worker's propertylessness.542
540 Rosdolsky, Roman, The Making of Marx’s ‘Capital’, Pete Burgess (trans.), (Pluto Press: 1977; London), 266.
541 “[All precapitalist social formations] express a predominance of use value and of production directed towards use
value, as well as of a real community which is itself still directly present as a presupposition of production.
Production based on exchange value and the community based on the exchange of these exchange values— even
though they seem, as we saw in the previous chapter on money, to posit property as the outcome of labour alone,
and to posit private property over the product of one's own labour as condition— and labour as general condition of
wealth, all presuppose and produce the separation of labour from its objective conditions...This exchange of
equivalents proceeds; [yet] it is only the surface layer of a production which rests on the appropriation of alien
labour without exchange, but with the semblance of exchange...Thus there is no longer any ground for astonishment
that the system of exchange values— exchange of equivalents measured through labour— turns into, or rather
reveals as its hidden background, the appropriation of alien labour without exchange, complete separation of labour
and property. For the domination of exchange value itself, and of exchange-value-producing production,
presupposes alien labour capacity itself as an exchange value— i.e. the separation of living labour capacity from its
objective conditions; a relation to them— or to its own objectivity— as alien property; a relation to them, in a word,
as capital.” Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.),
(Penguin Books: London; 1993), 509-510.
542 Ibid., 514-515.
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Rosdolsky, Schmidt, Mezaros and Burkett are right to argue that this metabolic rupture
between labour and nature is not merely a historical fact of primitive accumulation. Marx speaks
to how the “alienation” of the human being from the “objective conditions” of her own existence
is really an alien “objectivity created by itself,” i.e., it is constantly reproduced by her own
“objective” powers, her own “objectified labour.” This means that, once established, capitalism
also continually reproduces and expands the division. This separation, which appears at first
merely as an external “starting-point” for the coming-into-being of capital, becomes, at a later
stage in its own formation, the “characteristic result of capitalist production,” i.e., one which is
“constantly renewed and perpetuated.” In the marketplace, the propertyless worker entered into
an exchange relation with the owner of the means of production in which she exchanged her
wealth-creating activity for a wage. When the worker “enters the process [of actual production],
his own labour has already been alienated [enifremdet] from him, appropriated by the capitalist,
and incorporated with capital, it now, in the course of the process, constantly objectifies itself so
that it becomes a product alien to him [fremder Produkt].” Hence, the “worker always leaves the
process in the same state as he entered it— a personal source of wealth, but deprived of any
means of making that wealth a reality for himself.” The “worker himself constantly produces
objective wealth, in the form of capital, an alien power that dominates and exploits him; and the
capitalist just as constantly produces labour-power, in the form of a subjective source of wealth
which is abstract, exists merely in the physical body of the worker, and is separated from its own
means of objectification and realization.”
Under these “objective conditions,” as soon as wage-labour “realizes itself...it
simultaneously repulses this realization from itself as an alien reality,” i.e., creates and recreates
a “reality alienated [entfremdet] from it.” It is from such remarks that we come to appreciate that
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Dunayevskaya was right to argue against Althusser that, far from abandoning the concept of
‘alienation’, Marx’s later works actually enrich the earlier theory of estrangement. They not only
expand that concept into a more thorough-going critique of political economy and of capitalism,
while adding historical dimensions which were at most only hinted at in the earlier works, but
they also deepen the Hegelian substance of that theory. The “external conditions of his being” are
not a being for the wage-worker, but constitute the inorganic body and organs of practice of an
“other-being.” Labour “posits itself objectively, but it posits this, its objectivity, as its own not-
being.” What wage-labour reproduces, above all else therefore, is itself as wage-labour. What it
affirms is its own self-negation. The wage-worker constantly reproduces her own alienation from
the means, activity, and results of production, her own estranged relation to herself, to others, and
to nature. Wage-labour produces nothing but its own absolute impoverishment vis-a-vis the alien
world of value which it creates. This “incessant reproduction, this perpetuation of the worker, is
the necessary condition for capitalist production.”543 It is the “objectification of himself as a
power independent of himself, which moreover rules over him, rules over him through his own
actions”— it is the reign of dead over living labour.544
The Ecological Implications of the Rift in the Metabolism
Marx acknowledges in his middle and late writings that this separation of the eternal
elements of the wealth-creating process— labour and nature— has serious sociological and
ecological implications for both the happiness of human beings and health of the planet. He
recognized that there were distinct ecological dimensions to the contradictions of capitalist
543 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
1990), 716.
544 Ibid., 454.
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development. For example, he elaborated the view that these antagonisms disrupt the natural
cycles of regeneration by preventing the return of compostable waste back to the land,
effectively sapping the long-term fertility of the soil. Taken in this sense, the ‘natural’ laws of
capitalist development are antithetical to the actual laws of nature which determine the
reproduction of human life in all types of society. The blind and destructive impulses of this
economy undermine preconditions necessary for human life in all of its historical and possible
forms, for which nature inevitably seeks its ‘revenge’. This irrationality was something which
Marx believed to be absolutely irreparable from the standpoint of capitalist society, and, as such,
he intimates at the ‘ecological necessity’ of a social revolution.
Interspersing statements from Capital, Foster offers his interpolation by arguing that since
the “human labour process” is defined by Marx as the “universal condition for the metabolic
interaction between man and nature,” then it follows that the specifically capitalistic “rift in this
metabolism” can mean “nothing less than the undermining” of the “everlasting nature-imposed
conditions of human existence.”545 Indeed, Marx explicitly states that this “rift” presupposed and
reproduced by the social laws of bourgeois society violates the very “metabolism prescribed by
the natural laws of life itself.”546 The historically-arisen laws ‘natural’ only to capitalist society
threaten the universal and natural conditions of human existence. As Santilli suggests, since
capitalism depends upon the “severing” of individuals from their “universal inorganic body,”
their “social body” in nature, it simultaneously separates them from their “means of life” in
545 Foster, John Bellamy, 'Marx's Ecology in Historical Perspective', International Socialism Journal, No. 96, Winter
2002, <http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/isj96/ foster.htm>, 109.
546 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, David Fernbach (trans.), Vol. III (Penguin Books: London;
1991), 949-950. “[Capitalism] provoke[s] an irreparable rift in the interdependent process of social metabolism, a
metabolism prescribed by the natural laws of life itself. The result of this is a squandering of the vitality of the soil,
which is carried by trade far beyond the bounds of a single country (Liebig)...Large-scale industry and industrially
pursued large-scale agriculture have the same effect. If they are originally distinguished by the fact that the former
lays waste and ruins labour-power and thus the natural power of man, whereas the latter does the same to the natural
power of the soil, they link up in the later course of development, since the industrial system applied to agriculture
also enervates the workers there, while industry and trade for their part provide agriculture with the means of
exhausting the soil.”
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nature, it “cuts man off from the power to sustain the life of his own organic body.”547
As Burkett argues, critics who accuse Marxism of reinforcing the “ideology” of capitalist
industrialism by doubling-down on the market's exploitation of the biosphere ignore that such
severe “ecological problems” only emerge as the historical result of this metabolic “separation of
workers and their communities from the land and other necessary conditions of production.”548
For Marx, “capital’s appropriation of [these] natural conditions” is “mediate[d]” through the
“system’s social separation of workers from these conditions and the alienated form of their
unification.”549 These ecological criticisms of Marx also ignore a selection of passages where he
intimates at the ways in which, through a necessary dialectic of negativity, this metabolic rift
would have to be overcome by a socialist society and its higher recognition of nature. Hence,
such critiques fall short of triangulating the “ecological problem” of contemporary capitalism
547 Santilli, P., ‘Marx on Species-Being and Social Essence’, Karl Marx’s Social and Political Thought, Vol. 8, (ed.)
Bob Jessop and Russell Wheatley, ( Routledge: London; 1999), 114. “Labour capacity denuded of the means of
labour and the means of life is therefore absolute poverty as such, and the worker, as the mere personification of the
labour capacity, has his needs in actuality, whereas the activity of satisfying them is only possessed by him as a non-
objective capacity (a possibility) confined within his own subjectivity. As such, conceptually speaking, he is a
pauper, he is the personification and repository of this capacity which exists for itself, in isolation from its
objectivity…Labour capacity appears on the one hand as absolute poverty, in that the whole world of material
wealth as well as its general form, exchange value, confronts it as alien commodity and alien money, whereas it is
itself merely the possibility of labour, available and confined within the living body of the worker, a possibility
which is, however, utterly separated from all the objective conditions of its realisation, hence from its own reality,
denuded of them, and existing independently over against them. To the extent that all the objective conditions for
labour to come to life, for its actual process, for really setting it in motion— all the conditions for its
objectification— mediate between the capacity for labour and actual labour, they can all be described as means of
labour. In order that labour capacity may as an independent factor come to meet the objectified labour represented
by the owners of money and commodities, that it may confront the value personified by the capitalist, it must be
denuded of its own means of labour and step forth in its independent shape as the worker who is obliged to offer his
labour capacity as such for sale as a commodity. Since actual labour is the appropriation of nature for the
satisfaction of human needs, the activity through which the metabolism between man and nature is mediated, to
denude labour capacity of the means of labour, the objective conditions for the appropriation of nature through
labour, is to denude it, also, of the means of life.” Marx, Karl, ‘Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63’, Marx and Engels:
Collected Works, Vol. 30, Emile Burns and Ben Fowkes (trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1988), 39-40.
548 Burkett, Paul, Marxism and Ecological Economics: Toward a Red and Green Political Economy, (Brill: London;
2006), 154-155. “At the heart of Marx’s critique of capitalism, as Foster has demonstrated, is the metabolic rift
between society and nature produced by the alienation of workers from the conditions of production and the
development of these conditions as means of capital accumulation. The combined simplification and degradation of
labour and nature...is a primary mechanism of this rift.” Ibid., 292.
549 Ibid., 155.
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within the context of the historical “specif[icity] [of] the system’s class relations.”550
It should be no surprise if we find that an economic system based upon the exploitation of
the productive powers of human beings, also exploits nature itself for the private advantage of
one individual over another in this Darwinian social struggle. Indeed, Marx characterized the
industrial phase of capitalism as an irresistible “system of general utility,” a “system of general
exploitation of the natural and human qualities.”551 Moreover, these processes of exploitation in
manufacturing and agricultural production “link up later in the course of [capitalist]
development.” In precapitalist forms, manufacturing was developed within the narrow confines
afforded by agriculture. However, in a mature capitalist society, the reverse is true: agriculture
becomes just a special branch of industry.552 I would argue that for Marx this specifically
industrial phase of capitalist production marked unto itself a wholly new epoch in the
metabolism with nature precisely because of this ‘inversion’ of the old union between
manufacturing and agriculture.
Just as the transformation of the agricultural producer into a wage-worker depletes the
energy and degrades the health of the individual, or ruins the “natural power of man,” so too
does the industrial exploitation of the land destroy the “natural power of the soil.” Hence, the
“robbing of labour” is necessarily accompanied by the “robbing [of] the soil” according to Marx.
In a capitalist society, the vitality of the worker is “squandered” and the fertility of the land
“exhausted;” it “enervates the workers” while “exhausting the soil” upon which they stand. It
550 Ibid., 155.
551 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 409-410.
552 As Marx puts it, “where agriculture is the predominant industry, such as in ancient and feudal societies, even the
manufacturing industry and its organization, as well as the forms of property which pertain to it, have more or less
the characteristic features of the prevailing system of landownership [and agricultural production]; [society] is then
either entirely dependent on agriculture, as in the case of ancient Rome, or, as in the Middle Ages, it intimates in its
city relations the forms of organization prevailing in the country.” Marx, Karl, ‘Introduction to the Critique of
Political Economy’, The German Ideology: Including Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction to the Critique of
Political Economy, Clemens Dutt (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 21-22.
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goes about “undermining the original sources of all wealth— the soil and the worker.”553
This language of ‘robbery’ reflects the direct influence of both Carey and Liebig upon
Marx’s ecological thinking from the mid-1840s through to the late-1860s (although, with Carey,
the relationship is more complicated). In his work on political economy, a work which Carey
personally sent to Marx, he wrote that the “political economists of England have overlooked the
fact that man is a mere borrower from the earth, and that when he does not pay his debts, she
does as do all other creditors, that is, she expels him from his holding.”554 In addition to ruining
the “energies of the country,” the capitalist goes about “robbing the earth of its capital stock.” It
is a “spoilation system” in which the “conditions of reproduction” in the soil are undermined.555
Foster, Burkett, and other contemporary ecological Marxists argue that Marx’s theory of the
metabolism and concept of the rift was also shaped by the work of Liebig— one of the fathers of
organic chemistry and one of the earliest advocates for its application to the ‘improvement’ of
the soil. Indeed, in both the Grundrisse and Capital, Marx favourably cites Liebig’s work on the
Stoffwechsel (‘metabolism’) with nature in a number of key instances.
When working on Capital in the early 1860s, Marx was deeply affected by Liebig's
analysis. In 1866, he wrote to Engels that in developing his critique of capitalist ground
rent, “I had to plough through the new agricultural chemistry in Germany, in particular
553 The capitalist mode of production “concentrates the historical motive power of society; on the other hand, it
disturbs the metabolic interaction between man and the earth, i.e. it prevents the return to the soil of its constituent
elements consumed by man in the form of food and clothing; hence it hinders the operation of the eternal natural
condition for the lasting fertility of the soil. Thus it destroys at the same time the physical health of the urban worker,
and the intellectual life of the rural worker....In modern agriculture, as in urban industry, the increase in the
productivity and the mobility of labour is purchased at the cost of laying waste and debilitating labour-power itself.
Moreover, all progress in capitalist agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the worker, but of robbing
the soil; all progress in increasing the fertility of the soil for a given time is a progress towards ruining the more
long-lasting sources of that fertility. The more a country proceeds from large-scale industry as the background of its
development, as in the case of the United States, the more rapid is this process of destruction. Capitalist production,
therefore, only develops the techniques and the degree of combination of the social process of production by
simultaneously undermining the original sources of all wealth— the soil and the worker.” Marx, Karl, Capital: A
Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London; 1990), 637-638. Or see, Marx,
Karl, ‘Capital: A Critique of Political Economy’, Vol. I, Marx and Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 35, Samuel Moore
and Edward Aveling (trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1996), 506-508.
554 Carey quoted in Foster, John Bellamy, Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature, (Monthly Review Press: New
York; 2000), 152.
555 Carey quoted in ibid., 153.
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Liebig and Schijnbein, which is more important for this matter than all the economists
put together”...Indeed, “to have developed from the point of view of natural science the
negative, i.e., destructive side of modern agriculture,” Marx was to note in Capital, “is
one of Liebig's immortal merits”...Far from having ecological blinders with regard to
the exploitation of the earth, Marx, under the influence of Liebig's work of the late
1850s and early 1860s, was to develop a systematic critique of capitalist “exploitation”
(in the sense of robbery, i.e., failing to maintain the means of reproduction) of the
soil.556
In the 1840s, Liebig’s discovery of the nutrient cycle was regarded by Marx and Engels as a
practical refutation of the Malthusian doctrines about population growth outpacing agricultural
productivity, including the increased hysteria about the natural limits of the soil.557 Consider, for
example, Engels’ remarks about how the “productivity of the soil” is multiplied by the powers of
socialized labour (e.g., as present in “science”). At the outset of the Potato Famine, he claimed
that an “overpopulated” country such as Britain could easily provide for a much larger
population precisely because the productivity of labour grows exponentially alongside the
increase in population.558 The difficulty lies not in the Malthusian limits to the ‘natural’ fertility
of the soil, but, rather, in the fact that this general development of the human being works itself
out within the “context of the antitheses” of capitalism.559
556 Foster, John Bellamy, 'Marx’s Theory of Metabolic Rift: Classical Foundations for Environmental Sociology',
AJS Volume 105, Number 2 (September 1999), 376.
557 Foster, John Bellamy, Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature, (Monthly Review Press: New York; 2000), 152.
558 As Engels remarked later of the Famine: “But if it has already required the labour of thousands of years for us to
learn to some extent to calculate the more remote natural consequences of our actions aiming at production, it has
been still more difficult in regard to the more remote social consequences of these actions. We mentioned the potato
and the resulting spread of scrofula. But what is scrofula in comparison with the effect on the living conditions of
the masses of the people in whole countries resulting from the workers being reduced to a potato diet, or in
comparison with the famine which overtook Ireland in 1847 in consequence of the potato disease, and which put
under the earth a million Irishmen, nourished solely or almost exclusively on potatoes, and forced the emigration
overseas of two million more? When the Arabs learned to distil alcohol, it never entered their heads that by so doing
they were creating one of the chief weapons for the annihilation of the original inhabitants of the still undiscovered
American continent. And when afterwards Columbus discovered America, he did not know that by doing so he was
giving new life to slavery, which in Europe had long ago been done away with, and laying the basis for the Negro
slave traffic. The men who in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries laboured to create the steam engine had no
idea that they were preparing the instrument which more than any other was to revolutionise social conditions
throughout the world...But even in this sphere, by long and often cruel experience and by collecting and analysing
the historical material, we are gradually learning to get a clear view of the indirect, more remote, social effects of
our productive activity, and so the possibility is afforded us of mastering and controlling these effects as well.”
Engels, Frederick, Dialectics of Nature, Clemens Dutt (trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1976), 293-295.
559 “The productivity of the soil can be increased ad infinitum by the application of capital, labour and science.
According to the most able economists and statisticians (cf. Alison’s Principles of Population, Vol. I, Chs. 1 and 2),
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However, in the 1850s and 1860s, the emphasis of Liebig’s work shifted, acknowledging
that capitalist industry had used the very scientific knowledge which he had helped develop only
for its own short-term gains. It failed to reproduce sustainable conditions of agricultural
development— or what Liebig called the metabolic conditions for restitution (in that, like Carey,
he believed the elements borrowed from the soil had to be ‘returned’ to it in the form of compost,
nutrients, etc.).560 The natural powers of the land were being laid waste in a wanton manner,
damaging local ecologies and disrupting the natural rhythms of the soil. In the 1850s, Marx
appealed to this later work of Liebig as well, arguing that the industrial transformation of
agricultural production under capitalism was ruining the long-term elasticity of the soil in the
pursuit of its own short-term ends. Capitalism’s “progress in increasing the fertility of the soil for
a given time” ultimately “violates the conditions necessary to lasting fertility of the soil”— it
amounts to nothing other than the “progress towards ruining the lasting sources of that fertility.”
As Harriss-White notes, Marx recognized, especially by encountering the later work of Liebig,
that capitalist agriculture “could ruin soil as well as improve it” through the “application of
chemical fertilizer.”561 This is why Foster finds it confounding that ecological critics regard the
early Marx as more ecological, when, in fact, he finds that Marx’s ecology is most fully
developed in Capital under the influence of Liebig’s critical period.562 Appropriating Liebig, he
“over-populated” Great Britain can be brought within ten years to produce a corn yield sufficient for a population six
times its present size. Capital increases daily; labour power grows with population; and day by day science
increasingly makes the forces of nature subject to man.” Engels, Frederick, ‘‘Outlines of a Critique of Political
Economy’, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New
York; 2009), 204, 217
560 Foster, John Bellamy, Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature, (Monthly Review Press: New York; 2000), 152.
561 Harriss-White, Barbara, 'Ecology and the Environment', Elgar Companion to Marxist Economics, Ben Fine and
Alfredo Sadd-Filho (ed.), (MPG: Cheshire; 2012), 103.
562 “[The] neglected but crucial elements within Marx's social theory offer firm foundations for the development of a
strong environmental sociology. In contrast to most treatments of Marx's ecological writings, emphasis will be
placed not on his early philosophical works but rather on his later political economy. It is in the latter that Marx
provided his systematic treatment of such issues as soil fertility, organic recycling, and sustainability in response to
the investigations of the great German chemist Justus von Liebig— and in which we find the larger conceptual
framework, emphasizing the metabolic rift between human production and its natural condition...In the 1840s, this
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developed the view that that a radical modification of both production and circulation would be
necessary in order to remedy the negative effects of this rift, and allow for the ‘restitution’ of the
earth.
As a subset of the larger metabolic rupture between labour and nature, Harriss-White notes
that Marx’s study of Liebig allowed him to recognize that the rift also disrupts the natural circuit
of the “nutrient cycle” by preventing “recycling waste from consumption” from being returned to
the soil itself.563 One way in which this manifests itself is through the “antagonistic relationship
between town and country.”564 In addition to the disruption caused by the division between city
and countryside, the same phenomenon can be witnessed, on an even larger scale, in global trade.
This, again, marks out the influence of Carey upon Marx’s work in Capital.565 Marx recognized
that the metabolic circulation of organic refuse was disrupted as a result of the world-historical
proportions assumed by the commerce in agricultural goods. Trade trucks the products, and the
waste from such products, to distant lands, preventing the metabolic return of compostable refuse
to the patch of soil from which it was sprung. In conjunction with the division between city and
scientific revolution in soil chemistry, together with the rise of a fertilizer industry, promised to generate a faster rate
of agricultural improvement— impressing many contemporary observers, including Marx and Engels, who up to the
1860s believed that progress in agriculture might soon outpace the development of industry in general. Still, capital's
ability to take advantage of these scientific breakthroughs in soil chemistry was limited by development of the
division of labor inherent to the system, specifically the growing antagonism between town and country. By the
1860s, when he wrote Capital, Marx had become convinced of the contradictory and unsustainable nature of
capitalist agriculture, due to two historical developments in his time: (1) the widening sense of crisis in agriculture in
both Europe and North America associated with the depletion of the natural fertility of the soil, which was in no way
alleviated, but rather given added impetus by the breakthroughs in soil science; and (2) a shift in Liebig's own work
in the late 1850s and early 1860s toward an ecological critique of capitalist development....Much of this discussion
of the metabolic relation between human beings and nature reflected Marx's early, more directly philosophical
attempts to account for the complex interdependence between human beings and nature. In the Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Marx had explained that, ‘Man lives from nature, i.e., nature is his body, and he
must maintain a continuing dialogue with it if he is not to die. To say that man's physical and mental life is linked to
nature simply means that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature’...But the later introduction of the
concept of metabolism gave Marx a more solid-and scientific-way in which to depict the complex, dynamic
interchange between human beings and nature, resulting from human labor.” Foster, John Bellamy, 'Marx’s Theory
of Metabolic Rift: Classical Foundations for Environmental Sociology', AJS Volume 105, Number 2 (September
1999), 371, 376, 380.
563 Harriss-White, Barbara, 'Ecology and the Environment', Elgar Companion to Marxist Economics, Ben Fine and
Alfredo Sadd-Filho (ed.), (MPG: Cheshire; 2012), 104.
564 Ibid., 104.
565 Foster, John Bellamy, Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature, (Monthly Review Press: New York; 2000), 154.
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country, the global dimensions to agricultural trade “disturbs the [metabolic] circulation of
matter between man and the soil, i.e., prevents the return to the soil of its elements consumed by
man in the form of food and clothing.” As Harriss-White argues, Marx emphasizes that the
“spatial” dimensions assumed by the “appropriation” of nature in a global capitalist economy
bring about an unprecedented “dislocation of metabolic flows.”566
This is why Marx repeatedly notes that the import of guano became so significant for the
maintenance of English agriculture— a measure advocated by Liebig in order to assist in the
restoration of the nutrient cycle. In an interesting passage, he links the struggle over the
working-day to this struggle over the soil. These contradictions are both products of the blind
necessity of capital. Just as the attempt to extend the working-day ran up against certain natural
limits, so too did the attempt to stretch the natural limits of the soil.
If the Reglement organique of the Danubian Principalities was a positive expression of
the appetite for surplus labour which every paragraph legalized, the English Factory
Acts are the negative expression of the same appetite. These laws curb capital's drive
towards a limitless draining away of labour-power by forcibly limiting the working day
on the authority of the state, but a state ruled by capitalist and landlord. Apart from the
daily more threatening advance of the working-class movement, the limiting of factory
labour was dictated by the same necessity as forced the manuring of English fields with
guano. The same blind desire for profit that in the one case exhausted the soil had in the
other case seized hold of the vital force of the nation at its roots. Periodical epidemics
speak as clearly on this point as the diminishing military standard of height in France
and Germany.567
He repeats the same point in another section of the same chapter, connecting again the
lengthening of the working-day to the robbing of the fertility of the soil, reminding us that both
processes are driven on by the same “blind and measureless drive” of capital.
[It is] self-evident that the worker is nothing other than labour-power for the duration of
his whole life, and that therefore all his disposable time is by nature and by right labour-
time, to be devoted to the self-valorization of capital. Time for education, for
intellectual development, for the fulfilment of social functions, for social intercourse,
for the free play of the vital forces of his body and his mind, even the resttime of
566 Harriss-White, Barbara, 'Ecology and the Environment', Elgar Companion to Marxist Economics, Ben Fine and
Alfredo Sadd-Filho (ed.), (MPG: Cheshire; 2012), 104.
567 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
1990), 348.
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Sunday (and that in a country of Sabbatarians!)— what foolishness! But in its blind and
measureless drive, its insatiable appetite for surplus labour, capital oversteps not only
the moral but even the merely physical limits of the working day. It usurps the time for
growth, development and healthy maintenance of the body. It steals the time required
for the consumption of fresh air and sunlight. It haggles over the meal-times, where
possible incorporating them into the production process itself, so that food is added to
the worker as to a mere means of production, as coal is supplied to the boiler, and
grease and oil to the machinery. It reduces the sound sleep needed for the restoration,
renewal and refreshment of the vital forces to the exact amount of torpor essential to the
revival of an absolutely exhausted organism. It is not the normal maintenance of labour-
power which determines the limits of the working day here, but rather the greatest
possible daily expenditure of labour-power, no matter how diseased, compulsory and
painful it may be, which determines the limits of the workers' period of rest. Capital
asks no questions about the length of life of labour-power. What interests it is purely
and simply the maximum of labour-power that can be set in motion in a working day. It
attains this objective by shortening the life of labour-power, in the same way as a greedy
farmer snatches more produce from the soil by robbing it of its fertility.568
Hence, the metabolic separation between labour and the means of labour in nature
destroyed the more sustainable foundations of the old precapitalist union between manufacturing
and agriculture (on the basis provided by agriculture). In its place, it developed a new union
between agriculture and industry (on the artificial basis provided industry). But capitalist
agriculture soon discovered that by tearing apart this primitive unity, by throwing the earth, its
products, and those who labour upon it into the market as commodities, it had also begun to
destroy the universal conditions of this metabolism. The application of chemical fertilizers and
importation of guano became an ever-increasing and artificially-imposed natural necessity.
Ecological critics of Marx often ignore these rather insightful (especially, for the time) claims
about the specifically capitalist roots of this metabolic rift.
Marx and Engels did not restrict their discussions of environmental degradation to the
robbing of the soil but also acknowledged other aspects of this problem, including the
depletion of coal reserves, the destruction of forests, and so on. As Engels observed in a
letter to Marx, 'the working individual is not only a stabaliser of present but also, and to
a far greater extent, a squanderer of past, solar heat. As to what we have done in the way
of squandering our reserves of energy, our coal, ore, forests, etc., you are better
informed than I am'...Marx referred to the 'devastating' effects of 'deforestation'...as a
long term result of an exploitative relation to nature (not simply confined to capitalism):
‘The development of civilization and industry in general', Marx wrote, 'has always
shown itself so active in the destruction of forests that everything that has been done for
their conservation and production is completely insignificant in comparison'.569
568 Ibid., 375.
569 Ibid., 381.
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Marx’s theory of the metabolism is ecological, then, in the sense that it recognizes the irrational
character and unsustainable consequences of this capitalist relationship to the environment.
Capital destroys the ‘original sources’ of all wealth, man and nature— a rift which is irreparable
from its narrow horizons.
Needless to say, the social laws of the capitalist economy, and the separation of labour and
nature, would have to be done away with by a higher social formation. Hence, he speculates in
the below of how just as the private ownership of one individual by another now appears morally
objectionable, so too, from the standpoint of a socialist society, will this private ownership of the
earth be absolutely unacceptable. Socialism would have to reunite all of humanity with its
inorganic body in nature, reestablishing the affirmative communal connection between the
subjective and objective elements of the labour process. From then onward, Marx argued, every
generation would be regarded not as the owners, but merely as the temporary stewards of the
earth— viz., as custodians who would safeguard the planet for subsequent generations to enjoy.
[Capitalism] exclude[s] workers engaged in a struggle over wages from the very earth
itself as their habitat. One section of society here demands tribute from the other for the
0very right to live on the earth, just as landed property in general involves the right of
the proprietors to exploit the earth's surface, the bowels of the earth, the air and thereby
the maintenance and development of life...[I]t is only the title a number of people have
to property in the earth that enables them to appropriate a part of society's surplus-
labour as tribute...From the standpoint of a higher socio-economic formation, the private
property of particular individuals in the earth will appear just as absurd as the private
property of one man in other men. Even an entire society, a nation, or all simultaneously
existing societies taken together, are not the owners of the earth. They are simply its
possessors, its beneficiaries, and have to bequeath it in an improved state to succeeding
generations, as boni patres familias.570
570 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, David Fernbach (trans.), Vol. III (Penguin Books: London;
1991), 911. This, too, exhibits a degree of continuity with ideas first formulated in the Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844. “The domination of the land as an alien power over men is already inherent in feudal landed
property. The serf is the adjunct of the land...[Nonetheless,] there still exists the semblance of a more intimate
connection between the proprietor and the land...The estate is individualized...It appears as the inorganic body of its
lord....It is necessary that this appearance be abolished...dragged completely into the movement of private property
and that it [the land] become a commodity...[But free] [a]ssociation, applied to land, shares the economic advantage
of large-scale landed property, and first brings to realization the original tendency inherent in land division, namely,
equality. In the same way, association reestablishes, now on a rational basis, no longer mediated by serfdom,
lordship and the silly mysticism of property, the intimate ties of man with the earth, since the earth ceases to be an
object of huckstering, and through free labor and free enjoyment becomes once more a true personal property of
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Conclusion
In this chapter, we have seen Marx argue that the divorce of labour from nature, although
introduced by primitive accumulation, is reproduced on an ever-increasing scale by capitalist
accumulation. As Rosdolsky explains, when we consider capitalism as a completed totality and
no longer in its process of historical genesis, we find that it deepens and completes this
estrangement from nature. What is at first an external starting-point for the coming-into-being of
the capitalist economy, its historical presupposition, is, through the operation of its own inherent
tendencies, continually renewed and reposited as the inevitable outcome of its systematic laws.
The purely subjective capacity to labour, labour-power, is objectified; but the very process of
objectification appears as an otherness and alien mode of objectivity, as the creation of the
objective body of capital.
Appealing to the work of contemporary eco-Marxists such as Foster and Burkett, as well as
relevant insights from primary writings, I attempted to substantiate the view that Marx
recognized both the human and environmental costs of this rift in the metabolism with nature. In
man...As for large landed property, its defenders have always, sophistically, identified the economic advantages
offered by large-scale agriculture with large-scale landed property, as if it were not precisely as a result of the
abolition of property, that this advantage, for one thing, would receive its greatest possible extension, and, for
another, only then would be social benefit.” Marx, Karl, 'Rent of Land', The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
of 1844, Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 100-101, 103.
These concepts, and the line of development which they show in Marx’s ecological thinking from the early to the
late works, also found some expression in Engels’ early writings. He, like Marx in the above, connects the
‘huckstering’ of the land to the alienation of the individual. According to Engels, the production process is reducible
to “the natural objective side, land; and the human, subjective side, labor, which includes capital and, besides capital,
a third factor...the spiritual element of invention, of thought, alongside the physical element of sheer labor. What has
the capitalist to do with the spirit of invention?...Land, capital and labor are for him the conditions of
wealth...Science is no concern of his. What does it matter to him that he has received its gifts through Berthollet,
Davy, Liebig, Watt, Cartwright, etc....[He] practices robbery in monopolizing the land...To make the earth an object
of huckstering— the earth which is our one and all, the first condition of our existence— was the last step toward
making oneself an object of huckstering. It was and is to this very day an immorality surpassed only by the
immorality of self-alienation.” Engels, Frederick, ‘Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy’, The Economic and
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York;
2009), 207-208, 210.
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fact, we have seen that he appropriated the work of Carey and Liebig in his linking of the
struggle over the length of the working-day to the capitalist tendency to try to push the soil
passed the limits of its fertility. He not only connected this exploitation of the earth to the
exploitation of the wage-labourer, but regarded both forms of exploitation as irreparable from the
standpoint of bourgeois society. Only in a higher society— one no longer determined by the
separation from nature, but by its reunification with it— can humanity heal the ecological
damage caused by capital.
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The Restoration of Nature and Full Development of the Individual
Introduction
The first chapter of Part II of this dissertation began by considering the significance of
Marx’s representations of precapitalist society. In all of its various states, precapitalist life was
determined by the unity between labour and the natural laboratory of the land. Here, individuals
related to the soil, woodlands, etc., as their own inorganic body. However, we have seen that, in
Marx’s analysis of history, the capitalist economy is to be distinguished from all previous modes
in that it presupposes an unprecedented separation between labour, the activity by which humans
appropriate the conditions of their life, and nature, the original and eternal bases of life itself. He
traced this divorce, this necessary precondition for the coming-into-being of bourgeois society,
back into the prehistory of capital— a period of primitive accumulation mystified by the political
economists. The second chapter elaborated what I regard as the interconnections between his
denaturalizing critique of political economy, theory of the metabolism with nature and historical
account of primitive accumulation. This process of expropriation tore individuals from their
nature-given means of life in the field, creating the propertyless class of free labourers required
for a system based upon the exploitation of wage workers.
In the previous chapter, I moved on to highlight the sociological and ecological dimensions
of Marx’s critique of this “rift” reproduced on an expanding scale by capital. He believed that
this rupture in the metabolism could only be repaired in a form of freely-associated production
where individuals are reconnected with the direct conditions of their life and labour. As he
characterizes it, the old communal recognition of nature would then be restored— except in a
higher form of society consistent also with the full development of human nature. This chapter
situates all of these themes within the context of Marx’s materialist conception of history and
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human development, as well as his political theory and conception of socialism. He understood
this entire movement of history as integral to the progressive unfolding of human nature, and, in
particular, grasped the rift specific to capitalism as part of a necessary phase of estrangement
operating within a larger dialectic of development.
The Dialectic of Self-Referred Negativity
Marx treated this divorce of labour from nature as a necessary stage in a larger process of
human development insofar as, in and through this diremption, capital creates the material means
for its own suspension— including the real possibility for a reconciliation with nature in the
future. In his social ontology, the intrinsic contradictions to this phase of negativity are said to
unfold in such a way as to produce, within this mode of estrangement, the subjective and
objective preconditions necessary for their own resolution— and capitalism accomplishes this
task not despite, but precisely as a result of, its contradictory character. It is all part of a dialectic
of self-referred negativity which posits the presuppositions required for the negation of the
negation, and for the positive restoration of the communal bond between society and nature in a
higher form of production.571
On one hand, then, Marx’s critique took-up the task of demonstrating that the “merely
historical form” of the ‘natural laws’ of capitalist production emerges out of the suspension of
“earlier historical modes of production” and, ipso facto, their socially specific metabolisms with
571 “Capital increases daily; labour power grows with population; and day by day science increasingly makes the
forces of nature subject to man. This immeasurable productive capacity, handled consciously and in the interest of
all, would soon reduce to a minimum the labour falling to the share of mankind. Left to competition, it does the
same, but within a context of antitheses...But the economist does not know himself what cause he serves. He does
not know that with all his egoistical reasoning he nevertheless forms but a link in the chain of mankind’s universal
progress. He does not know that by this dissolution of all sectional interests he merely paves the way for the great
transformation to which the century is moving— the reconciliation of mankind with nature and with itself.” Engels,
Frederick, ‘Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy’, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,
Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 217.
232
nature.572 At the same time, however, he also claimed to have uncovered, through an appreciation
of this necessary dialectic and “correct grasp of the present,” the essential features of an
emerging post-capitalist metabolism. Hence, on the other hand, he asserts that these “signs” of
capitalism’s “becoming” in history also “point” to the immanent “suspension of the present form
of production,” offering “foreshadowings of the future” and of a “new state of society” which
will transcend capitalism's alienated relationship to nature. In the same way that the dissolution
of the precapitalist relation the soil posited all the preconditions necessary for the coming-into-
being of capital, so too does capitalism, by driving toward its own dissolution, bring into being
the preconditions for a still higher form of the intercourse with nature.573 As Hudis explains of
the Grundrisse, Marx’s historical investigation into precapitalist forms allowed him not only to
locate the origins of the alienation (including in relation to nature) specific to capitalist relations,
but to also identify the conditions necessary for the supersession of those barriers (including the
creation of a new ‘social metabolism’).574
In the last chapter, we read Marx claim that the capitalist exploitation of human powers
and of natural forces, while at first distinguished, later “link up” in the “course of development”
because industry and agriculture come to be united with one another on the foundations
produced by industry. Previously, it was just the reverse of this: in its precapitalist “infancy” and
“childlike” state of unity, manufacturing and agricultural production were wedded to one another
572 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 460-461.
573 “In order to develop the laws of bourgeois economy, therefore, it is not necessary to write the real history of the
relations of production. But the correct observation and deduction of these laws, as having themselves become in
history...point towards a past lying behind this system. These indications [Andeutung], together with a correct grasp
of the present, then also offer the key to the understanding of the past— a work in its own right which, it is to be
hoped, we shall be able to undertake as well. This correct view likewise leads at the same time to the points at which
the suspension of the present form of production relations gives signs of its becoming— foreshadowings of the
future. Just as, on one side the pre-bourgeois phases appear as merely historical, i.e. suspended presuppositions, so
do the contemporary conditions of production likewise appear as engaged in suspending themselves and hence in
positing the historic presuppositions for a new state of society.” Ibid., 460-461.
574 Hudis , Peter, Marx’s Concept of the Alternative to Capitalism, (Haymarket Books: Chicago; 2003), 119.
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on the primitive bases provided by agriculture, i.e., the natural conditions of labour in the land.
However, Marx also held the view that this antagonism between agriculture and industry creates
the conditions necessary for their “higher synthesis in the future” precisely on the “basis of the
more perfected forms they have each acquired during their temporary separation,” and, in the
industrial phases of capitalist development, their alienated form of unity.
This explains why, although he arguably appropriated certain ecological elements from
Carey’s political economy, his relation to both Carey’s politics and economics remained critical.
It was within this context that he assisted Cluss in preparing a challenge to the American
economist. In the article, Cluss insists that Carey’s work “totally overlooks the transforming,
revolutionary element in the destructive effects of industry.”575 Marx accepted Carey’s charge
that large-scale industry, by reproducing and expanding the metabolic separation, robs the soil of
its fertility just as readily as it robs the worker of her health and vitality. However, unlike Carey,
he also believed that through this contradictory system involving the all-around exploitation of
both labour and nature, capital brings together the necessary preconditions for the “systematic
restoration” of this bond in a higher form of society— namely, one congruent with the most
complete development of human beings and the return to the recognition of nature as their own
social body.
Capitalist production collects the population together in great centres, and causes the
urban population to achieve an ever-growing preponderance...The dispersal of the rural
workers over large areas breaks their power of resistance, while concentration increases
that of the urban workers...In the sphere of agriculture, large-scale industry has a more
revolutionary effect than elsewhere, for the reason that it annihilates the bulwark of the
old society, the 'peasant ', and substitutes for him the wage-labourer. Thus the need for
social transformation, and the antagonism of the classes, reaches the same level in the
countryside as it has attained in the towns. A conscious, technological application of
science replaces the previous highly irrational and slothfully traditional way of working.
The capitalist mode of production completes the disintegration of the primitive familial
union which bound agriculture and manufacture together when they were both at an
undeveloped and childlike stage. But at the same time it creates the material conditions
575 Perelman, Michael, Marx’s Crises Theory: Scarcity, Labor, and Finance, (Greenwood Publishing: New York;
1987), 16.
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for a new and higher synthesis, a union of agriculture and industry on the basis of the
forms that have developed during the period of their antagonistic isolation.576
Even in its plundering of the environment, and in its exploitation of the physical and
mental powers of the human being, capitalism exhibits a tendency to substitute science in the
place of superstition— although Marx recognized that this scientific mastery operates within the
confines of estrangement and blind necessity of capitalism’s own laws. But only through the
dissolution of this original-natural bond with nature (this “primitive familial union”) is the
“development of the full force of production” and “application of science possible for the first
time.”577 In this strict sense, then, capitalism works to demystify nature itself, although this
disenchantment always comes at the cost of mystifying its own social relations. It accomplishes
this demystification, however, inasmuch as it overcomes the restricted relationships
characteristic of all precapitalist forms of the metabolism with nature— restricted relations based
upon the limited development of the productive powers of labour. Instead of treating nature as a
divine ‘power for itself’, capital subjects those forces more and more to the command of
socialized labour, but, as such, also appears more and more as an entirely superfluous social form.
The historical necessity of capitalism, Marx tells us, is thereby exhausted when it runs up against
its own inherent limits and barriers.
[T]he production of relative surplus value, i.e. production of surplus value based on the
increase and development of the productive forces, requires the production of new
consumption...[i.e.,] production of new needs and discovery and creation of new use
values...Hence exploration of all of nature in order to discover new, useful qualities in
things; universal exchange of the products of all alien climates and lands; new (artificial)
preparation of natural objects, by which they are given new use values. The exploration
of the earth in all directions, to discover new things of use as well as new useful
qualities of the old....[This means] development, hence, of the natural sciences to their
highest point; likewise the discovery, creation and satisfaction of new needs arising
576 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
1990), 637-638. The alternative translation of this passage can be found in Marx, Karl, ‘Capital: A Critique of
Political Economy’, Vol. I, Marx and Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 35, Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (trans.),
(International Publishers: New York; 1996), 506-508.
577 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 276.
235
from society itself; the cultivation of all the qualities of the social human being,
production of the same in a form as rich as possible in needs, because rich in qualities
and relations— production of this being as the most total and universal possible social
product, for, in order to take gratification in a many-sided way, he must be capable of
many pleasures [genussfähig], hence cultured to a high degree— is likewise a condition
of production founded on capital...Thus, just as production founded on capital creates
universal industriousness on one side— i.e. surplus labour, value-creating labour— so
does it create on the other side a system of general exploitation of the natural and human
qualities, a system of general utility, utilizing science itself just as much as all the
physical and mental qualities, while there appears nothing higher in itself, nothing
legitimate for itself, outside this circle of social production and exchange. Thus capital
creates the bourgeois society, and the universal appropriation of nature as well as of the
social bond itself by the members of society. Hence the great civilizing influence of
capital; its production of a stage of society in comparison to which all earlier ones
appear as mere local developments of humanity and as nature-idolatry. For the first time,
nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be
recognized as a power for itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws
appears merely as a ruse so as to subjugate it under human needs, whether as an object
of consumption or as a means of production. In accord with this tendency, capital drives
beyond national barriers and prejudices as much as beyond nature worship, as well as
all traditional, confined, complacent, encrusted satisfactions of present needs, and
reproductions of old ways of life. It is destructive towards all of this, and constantly
revolutionizes it, tearing down all the barriers which hem in the development of the
forces of production, the expansion of needs, the all-sided development of production,
and the exploitation and exchange of natural and mental forces. But from the fact that
capital posits every such limit as a barrier and hence gets ideally beyond it, it does not
by any means follow that it has really overcome it, and, since every such barrier
contradicts its character, its production moves in contradictions which are constantly
overcome but just as constantly posited. Furthermore, the universality towards which it
irresistibly strives encounters barriers in its own nature, which will, at a certain stage of
its development, allow it to be recognized as being itself the greatest barrier to this
tendency, and hence will drive towards its own suspension.578
The momentous technological achievements and scientific advances of capitalist society
represented for Marx the ideal overcoming of precapitalist nature-idolatry, but, by no means, the
real overcoming. Instead, capitalism’s own social mastery over the forces of nature appears
reflected back upon this society as an unpredictable force of nature, as another form of blind
necessity. Hence, the great task left to a socialist society is to radically reappropriate and
complete this historical movement by truly rationally regulating and consciously controlling not
only the social relations between its members, but also their intercourse with the planet as a
whole. Yet, such a free association is only possible on the basis provided by this previous phase
578 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 408-410.
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of antagonistic social development. Capitalism not only destroys the vegetative precapitalist
unity with nature, it also produces the conditions for its own destruction, exhibiting tendencies
which point beyond itself.
[A]ncient social organisms of production are much more simple and transparent than
those of bourgeois society. But they are founded either on the immaturity of man as an
individual, when he has not yet torn himself loose from the umbilical cord of his natural
species-connection with other men, or on direct relations of dominance and servitude.
They are conditioned by a low stage of development of the productive powers of labour
and correspondingly limited relations between men within the process of creating and
reproducing their material life, hence also limited relations between man and nature.
These real limitations are reflected in the ancient worship of nature, and in other
elements of tribal religions. The religious reflections of the real world can, in any case,
vanish only when the practical relations of everyday life between man and man, and
man and nature, generally present themselves to him in a transparent and rational form.
The veil is not fully removed from the countenance of the social life-process, i.e., the
process of material production, until it becomes production by freely associated men,
and stands under their conscious and planned control. This, however, requires that
society possess a material foundation, or a series of material conditions of existence,
which in their turn are the natural and spontaneous product of a long and tormented
historical development.579
Rosdolsky explains that, for Marx, the
original unity between the worker and the conditions of production...has two main
forms: the Asiatic communal system (primitive communism) and small-scale
agriculture based on the family...Both are embryonic forms and both are equally
unfitted to develop labour as social labour and the productive power of social labour.
Hence the necessity for the separation, for the rupture, for the antithesis between labour
and property (by which property in the conditions of production is to be understood).
The most extreme form of this rupture, and the one in which the productive forces of
social labour are also most powerfully developed, is capital. The original unity can be
re-established only on the material foundation which creates it [i.e., the separation] and
by means of the revolutions which, in the process of this creation, the working class and
the whole society undergo.580
As Rosdolsky claims in the above, this dialectic highlights Marx’s view of the historic necessity
of the metabolic separation between producer and property. This rupture between society and
nature enacted and re-enacted by the primitive and capitalist phases of accumulation is presented
by Marx as an essential aspect of the “martyrology” of the proletariat as the ‘universal class’.
The temporary sacrifice of human life and of nature is supposed to be transfigured by this same
579 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
1990), 172-173.
580 Rosdolsky, Roman, The Making of Marx’s ‘Capital’, Pete Burgess (trans.), (Pluto Press: 1977; London), 273.
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historical process of suffering, by this slaughter-bench of history. We therefore have to ask, with
Hegel, to what final aim have these sacrifices have been offered?
In agriculture, as in manufacture, the capitalist transformation of the process of
production also appears as a martyrology for the producer; the instrument of labour
appears as a means of enslaving, exploiting and impoverishing the worker; the social
combination of labour processes appears as an organized suppression of his individual
vitality, freedom and autonomy...But by destroying the circumstances surrounding that
metabolism, which [in its precapitalist forms] originated in a merely natural and
spontaneous fashion, it compels its systematic restoration as a regulative law of social
production, and in a form adequate to the full development of the human race.581
According to Marx, then, the historic crucible of capitalism is like a ‘steeling school’ in
that it forges and tempers the productive powers of social labour, which, when sublated by a
higher form of social life, becomes the basis for the free creation and enjoyment of the genuine
wealth of society— which is nothing else but these universally developed individuals themselves
in their relations of mutual recognition with one another.
Relations of personal dependence (entirely spontaneous at the outset) are the first social
forms, in which human productive capacity develops only to a slight extent and at
isolated points. Personal independence founded on objective [sachlicher] dependence is
the second great form, in which a system of general social metabolism, of universal
relations, of all-round needs and universal capacities is formed for the first time. Free
individuality, based on the universal development of individuals and on their
subordination of their communal, social productivity as their social wealth, is the third
stage. The second stage creates the conditions for the third.582
Marx treats these three basic forms of the metabolism— precapitalist, capitalist, and socialist—
as phases corresponding with the general development of the essential powers of the human
species. These claims illustrate that even in his ‘economic’ writings he continued to grasp this
overall process of historical development, and the procession of forms through which this
development traverses, as a ‘dialectic of negativity’, i.e., as a process of ‘self-referred negation’
in Hegel’s sense of the term.
As Gould observes, “Marx traces this development through three [general] stages.” The
581 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London;
1990), 637-638.
582 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 158.
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“universal social individual” is characterized by him as the final “product of this historical
development.”583 In the first phase, precapitalist society is marked by personal relations based
upon “particularity.” The individual members are but natural components of the social organism,
and, where relations of domination emerge, the dominated are appropriated as organic
accessories of the inorganic body of nature. In contrast to these communities where the members
have not yet differentiated themselves from the social whole, Gould tells us that, in the second
social form, seemingly “external relations” based upon atomized individuals persist. But this
‘abstract universality’ of capitalism is said to be producing, within the limits of such
estrangement, the social presuppositions for a new society based upon the real or concrete
universality of the capacities, needs, and relations of the individual— i.e., “internal relations that
are concretely universal.”584
Hence, without trying to be too schematic, there is a great truth to Rosdolsky’s conclusion
that by dividing “history into three stages,” Marx was ‘coquetting’ with Hegel and trying to
present them “in the form of a dialectical triad” so to speak. He suggests that in the previously
cited passage, Marx points, “on the one hand, to pre-capitalist social formations, and on the other,
to the socialist social order which replaces” the capitalist metabolism, in order to argue that
capitalism is integral to a much larger process that will eventually break its tight fetters on
human development. The end-point to this historical process of human becoming is nothing else
but the realization of a fully-developed individual, possible only upon the basis provided by that
individual’s appropriation of her total social bond with others and with nature. In such a free
association of totally-developed individuals, their relations with each other and with nature
would take on a ‘transparent’ (because no longer blind and irrational) form. The social relations
583 Gould, Carol, Marx's Social Ontology: Individuality and Community in Marx's Theory of Social Reality, (MIT
Press: Cambridge; 1978), 1-2.
584 Ibid., 7-8.
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between individuals, as well as between individuals and nature, would be consciously controlled
by the individuals themselves— and, moreover, in a manner fit for, appropriate to, and
corresponding with the full development of their own human nature. Or, as Rosdolsky puts it,
“history is therefore seen in terms of its most basic final outcome; as a necessary process of the
elaboration and development of the human personality and its freedom.” However, he adds,
“from Marx's point of view the issue was not so much to demonstrate the necessity of this
process (this was already recognised by classical German philosophy),” but, instead, to “place”
that necessity “on the firm foundation of real history, i.e. the development of the social relations
of production.”585
Hence, Marx’s method of critique, precisely by identifying the contradictions intrinsic to
the present, underlines immanent tendencies within capitalism which create the real possibility
for its own transcendence. Its very own antagonisms set free the means for their resolution,
affirming the wisdom of Hegel who once wrote that, in the last instance, real possibility always
proves to be identical with historical necessity.
No social formation is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is
sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace
older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the
framework of the old society. Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is
able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises
only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the
course of formation. In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois
modes of production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic
development of society. The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic
form of the social process of production— antagonistic not in the sense of individual
antagonism but of an antagonism that emanates from the individuals' social conditions
of existence— but the productive forces developing within bourgeois society create also
the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism.586
The law of exchange-value is therefore said to be producing not only the estrangement of the
individual from himself, from others, and from nature, but, moreover, to be advancing “beyond”
585 Rosdolsky, Roman, The Making of Marx’s ‘Capital’, Pete Burgess (trans.), (Pluto Press: 1977; London), 415.
586 Marx, Karl, ‘Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’, Marx and Engels: Collected Works,
Vol. 29, Victor Shnittke and Yuri Sdobnikov (trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1987), 263-264.
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itself and toward the true “universality and comprehensiveness of his relations and capacities.” In
a higher society which sublates this alien wealth, the productive relation to nature would then be
transformed into, and recognized as, an essential aspect of the “universal development of
individuals”— with a condition for this development being the “universal appropriation of nature
as well as of the social bond itself by the members of society.”
[W]ithin bourgeois society, the society that rests on exchange value, there arise relations
of circulation as well as of production which are so many mines to explode it. (A mass
of antithetical forms of the social unity, whose antithetical character can never be
abolished through quiet metamorphosis. On the other hand, if we did not find concealed
in society as it is the material conditions of production and the corresponding relations
of exchange prerequisite for a classless society, then all attempts to explode it would be
quixotic)...In the case of the world market, the connection of the individual with all, but
at the same time also the independence of this connection from the individual, have
developed to such a high level that the formation of the world market already at the
same time contains the conditions for going beyond it.587
Precapitalist One-Sidedness, the Emptiness of Estrangement and Full Development
According to Marx, then, this estranged society is creating out of itself the ‘real
possibility’ for the full development of individuality, and,upon this historically arisen basis, an
entirely new relation to the earth. Such a free association of fully-developed individuals is
therefore no “product of nature, but of history.” It presupposes production based upon exchange-
relations as “a prior condition,” i.e., as a previous phase of world-history. In its ruthless and
relentless process of social reproduction, capitalism certainly takes on the proportions of a
monstrous “system” of “general exploitation” which holds nothing sacred outside of its narrow
circle. Yet, for Marx, it is precisely this system of all-around estrangement which contains within
itself the means for advancing into a higher form of social life based upon the all-around
development of individuals. Capital lays down the initial foundations for socialist society's
universal appropriation of, and practical mastery over its intercourse with, nature. It imposes
587 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 159, 161.
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upon the wage-labourer a general industriousness, an indifference to particularity, etc. And, put
crudely, this “[u]niversal prostitution appears as a necessary phase in the development of the
social character of personal talents, capacities, abilities, activities.”588
The dissolution of all products and activities into exchange values presupposes the
dissolution of all fixed personal (historic) relations of dependence in production, as well
as the all-sided dependence of the producers on one another....This reciprocal
dependence is expressed in the constant necessity for exchange, and in exchange value
as the all-sided mediation....The reciprocal and all-sided dependence of individuals who
are indifferent to one another forms their social connection...The social character of
activity, as well as the social form of the product, and the share of individuals in
production here appear as something alien and objective, confronting the individuals,
not as their relation to one another, but as their subordination to relations which subsist
independently of them and which arise out of collisions between mutually indifferent
individuals...Patriarchal as well as ancient conditions (feudal, also) thus disintegrate
with the development of commerce, of luxury, of money, of exchange value, while
modern society arises and grows in the same measure...When we look at social relations
which create an undeveloped system of exchange...then it is clear from the outset that
the individuals in such a society, although their relations appear to be more personal,
enter into connection with one another only as individuals imprisoned within a certain
definition, as feudal lord and vassal, landlord and serf, etc., or as members of a caste etc.
or as members of an estate etc. In the money relation, in the developed system of
exchange (and this semblance seduces the democrats), the ties of personal dependence,
of distinctions of blood, education, etc, are in fact exploded, ripped up (at least, personal
ties all appear as personal relations); and individuals seem independent (this is an
independence which is at bottom merely an illusion and it is more correctly called
indifference), free to collide with one another and to engage in exchange within this
freedom; but they appear thus only for someone who abstracts from the conditions, the
conditions of existence within which these individuals enter into contact (and these
conditions, in turn, are independent of the individuals and, although created by society,
appear as if they were natural conditions, not controllable by individuals)....In the case
of the world market, the connection of the individual with all, but at the same time also
the independence of this connection from the individual, have developed to such a high
level that the formation of the world market already at the same time contains the
conditions for going beyond it...It has been said and may be said that this is precisely
the beauty and the greatness of it: this spontaneous interconnection, this material and
mental metabolism which is independent of the knowing and willing of individuals, and
which presupposes their reciprocal independence and indifference. And, certainly, this
objective connection is preferable to the lack of any connection, or to a merely local
connection resting on blood ties, or on primeval, natural or master-servant relations.
Equally certain is it that individuals cannot gain mastery over their own social
interconnections before they have created them. But it is an insipid notion to conceive
of this merely objective bond as a spontaneous, natural attribute inherent in individuals
and inseparable from their nature (in antithesis to their conscious knowing and willing).
This bond is their product. It is a historic product. It belongs to a specific phase of their
development. The alien and independent character in which it presently exists vis-à-vis
588 This is why in societies based upon commodity-production as the universal-elementary form of production,
money becomes raised into a universal equivalent which represents the “possibility of all things needed.” It is, as
Marx put it more politely while appealing to Shakespeare and Goethe, the estranged essence of all human powers,
needs, relations, etc. Marx, Karl, ‘The Power of Money in Bourgeois Society’, The Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844, Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 165-168.
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individuals proves only that the latter are still engaged in the creation of the conditions
of their social life, and that have not yet begun, on the basis of these conditions, to live
it. It is the bond natural to individuals within specific and limited relations of production.
Universally developed individuals, whose social relations, as their own communal
[gemeinschaftlich] relations, are hence also subordinated to their own communal control,
are no product of nature, but of history. The degree and the universality of the
development of wealth where this individuality becomes possible supposes production
on the basis of exchange values as a prior condition, whose universality produces not
only the alienation of the individual from himself and from others, but also the
universality and the comprehensiveness of his relations and capacities...The
exchangeability of all products, activities and relations with a third, objective entity
which can be re-exchanged for everything...is identical with universal venality,
corruption. Universal prostitution appears as a necessary phase in the development of
the social character of personal talents, capacities, abilities, activities. More politely
expressed: the universal relation of utility and use.589
As Marx tells us here, even these accidental and impersonal connections of the
marketplace are preferable to the precapitalist lack of connection, or to localized social
connections based upon relations of domination. At the same time, however, these capitalist
relations, because they appear as external relations to the individuals who comprise them, take on
a naturalized character as blind and erratic forces of nature. This is why Marx resists both the
romantic urge to call for a return to an all too idealized precapitalist past, and the complete
contentment which the bourgeois consciousness of political economy finds in the illusory
freedom of modern life. To the romantic, the rustic idyll of a simplistic social life seems ‘lofty’
in comparison to the ugly reality of this modern world. And as Marx tells us in the above, these
precapitalist relations, even where they manifested themselves as relations of personal
dependence, were nonetheless transparent enough to take the form of personal relations— that is,
they did not assume a fantastic form as relations between things. In comparison to capitalism,
which offers satisfaction only to those satisfied with their own estrangement, these simplistic and
seemingly ‘idyllic’ modes of life offer the sort of limited gratification provided by the one-sided
objectification of the individual (e.g., as a shepherd, craftsman, etc.). But this also means that,
even in the freer forms of precapitalist society, there is no possibility for the free and full
589 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 156, 164.
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development of human nature.
Thus the old view, in which the human being appears as the aim of production,
regardless of his limited national, religious, political character, seems to be very lofty
when contrasted to the modern world, where production appears as the aim of mankind
and wealth as the aim of production. In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form
is stripped away, what is wealth other than the universality of individual needs,
capacities, pleasures, productive forces etc., created through universal exchange? The
full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so-called nature
as well as of humanity’s own nature? The absolute working-out of his creative
potentialities, with no presupposition other than the previous historic development,
which makes this totality of development, i.e. the development of all human powers as
such the end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick? Where he does not
reproduce himself in one specificity, but produces his totality? Strives not to remain
something he has become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming? In bourgeois
economics— and in the epoch of production to which it corresponds— this complete
working-out of the human content appears as a complete emptying-out, this universal
objectification as total alienation, and the tearing-down of all limited, one-sided aims as
sacrifice of the human end-in-itself to an entirely external end. This is why the childish
world of antiquity appears on one side as loftier...It is satisfaction from a limited
standpoint; while the modern gives no satisfaction; or, where it appears satisfied with
itself, it is vulgar.590
Marx steps outside of this “antithesis” between the “romantic viewpoint” and the
“bourgeois viewpoint.” The latter regards the “complete emptiness” of modern life— in contrast
to the relative one-sided “fullness” of precapitalist society— as the end of all history. However,
Marx views this “complete emptying-out” of the present as but a transitory phrase in the
“complete working-out” of human nature. Capitalism is not the ‘end’ of history, but merely the
last stage in the prehistory of human society.
[Capitalism produces within the form of estrangement] the comprehensiveness of his
relations and capacities. In earlier stages of development the single individual seems to
be developed more fully, because he has not yet worked out his relationships in their
fullness, or erected them as independent social powers and relations opposite himself. It
is as ridiculous to yearn for a return to that original fullness as it is to believe that with
this complete emptiness history has come to a standstill. The bourgeois viewpoint has
never advanced beyond this antithesis between itself and this romantic viewpoint, and
therefore the latter will accompany it as legitimate antithesis up to its blessed end.591
This speaks to why, although he recognized the tremendous historical and contemporary
suffering involved in the destruction of these precapitalist forms of life, Marx never lamented
590 Ibid., 487-488.
591 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 162.
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their loss in the sense of wishing to return to the past. Although he certainly registered in a
powerful literary tone the historical theft and contemporary colonial violence involved in
creating the conditions necessary for capitalist production, never did he romanticize about the
possibility of returning to— nor, where they still existed inside and outside of Europe, of
remaining forever within— these precapitalist forms of life. This is because, even where they did
not form the “solid foundation” for despotism, patriarchy, slavery, or serfdom, these ‘idyllic’
appearances ultimately rested upon the immaturity of humanity’s intellectual and practical
powers, the narrowness of relatively unmodified needs, and the restrictedness of the individual’s
relations with others and with nature. Far from idealizing these precapitalist societies and their
connection to the inorganic body of nature, Marx asserts that these forms were based, at bottom,
upon the limited development of its individual members, including their scientific and
intellectual capacities, and, again, the restricted relations with each other and with nature which
this lack of development supposes. As Schmidt characterizes it, capitalism, which
rests precisely on the complete isolation of individuals from each other...represents an
advance over the limited local totalities based on nature and on relations of personal
dependence. Marx therefore had no intention of transfiguring the natural life-process of
the pre-industrial stages of society in the irrationalist manner of the neoromantic
ideologists…[or] to create a world outlook of a nature-monism.592
While Marx never longed for the return of these archaic social formations, he did
however speculate on a number of occasions about the reuniting of society and nature, i.e.,
restoring and returning to the original union between labour and its inorganic body in a higher
form of society. As Rosdolsky suggests in reference to Marx’s views on this question, the
“original union” destroyed by capital would be “restored” through a “historical reversal” brought
about by a total revolution in the relations of production.593 As Marx put it an address to the
International, with the “separation between the Man of Labour and the Instruments of Labour
592 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (Verso Books: London; 2014), 175-176.
593 Rosdolsky, Roman, The Making of Marx’s ‘Capital’, Pete Burgess (trans.), (Pluto Press: 1977; London), 279.
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once established, such a state of things will maintain itself and reproduce itself upon a constantly
increasing scale, until a new and fundamental revolution in the mode of production should again
overturn it, and restore the original union in a new historical form.”594 Hence, when Marx
(quoting Morgan) refers to the “return of modern societies to the ‘archaic’ type of communal
property,” he cautions that we should be too “alarmed at the word ‘archaic’.” For, by this, he
only means to say that the “‘the new system’ towards which modern society tends ‘will be a
revival in a superior form of an archaic [communal] social type’.” The “fatal crisis which
capitalist production has undergone in the European and American countries where it has
reached its highest peak” is a “crisis that will end in its destruction, in the return of modern
society to a higher form of the most archaic type— collective production and appropriation.”595
Real Communality
This is the meaning that Marx attributes to the notion that, in a communist society,
individuals would 'return' to the “recognition of nature” as their “real body”— except as a
recognition mediated for the first time through their own theoretical understanding and practical
mastery over the metabolism with it.596 A truly human society would have to reestablish the
communal unity with nature, but it would have to establish it for the first time as a social unity
(and not one pregiven by nature). The sort of relations of personal dependence characteristic of
precapitalist life, in which social relations are intertwined with the natural conditions of
production, must first be replaced by the impersonal “reciprocal dependence” of all upon all in
594 Marx, Karl, ‘Value, Price and Profit’, Speech before the First International Working Men's Association, (June
1865), in Marx, Karl: Value, Price and Profit, (International Publishers: New York; 1969), Eleanor Marx Aveling
(ed.), <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1865/value-price-profit/index.htm>;
595 Marx, Karl, ‘Drafts to the Letter to Vera Zasulich’, Marx and Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 24, David Forgacs
(trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1989), 350, 357.
596 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 542.
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the world-market “before it is possible to think of a real social communality
[Gemeinschaftlichkeit].” Long before she will be able to transform herself into a fully-developed
individual, the individual will have to be made into a free labourer, cut loose from the umbilical
cord of the limited connections which bind her to both nature and to the community. True
sociality is something “posited by society, not as determined by nature,” because “individuals
cannot gain mastery over their own social interconnection before they have created them”
(emphasis added).597
In “all the forms of society in which land ownership is the prevalent form,” the “natural
element is the predominant one” because individuals are still attached to society and to nature
through what are more or less naturally-arisen relations.598 This is what Forbes referred to earlier
as a ‘pre-foetal’ metabolism. Capitalism, precisely on the basis of the metabolic “break,”
becomes what Hart calls the
enabling force for the emergence of a human society fully emancipated from primitive
dependence on nature. It is, of course, not that society itself, but its midwife. Human
evolution before capitalism is marked by two processes: the individuation of the original
herd and the separation of social life from its original matrix, the earth as laboratory.599
Even in precapitalist societies, the development of personal property, increases in exchange,
contact with other communities, etc., were, for Marx, the chief means of such human
individuation in history. But this process reaches its alienated peak in the atomized social
relations characteristic only of capitalist production— i.e., where externalized relations appear
entirely independent of the isolated and dot-like individuals.
And there is something of Hegel in all this. In his presentation of the transition into ‘civil
society’, the relations between individuals “loses” its previously unreflective “ethical character”
597 Ibid., 276.
598 Marx, Karl, ‘Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy’, The German Ideology: Including Theses on
Feuerbach and Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, Clemens Dutt (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New
York; 1998), 22.
599 Hart, Keith, 'Anthropology', Elgar Companion to Marxist Economics, (ed.) Ben Fine and Alfredo Sadd-Filho,
(MPG: Cheshire; 2012), 23.
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through the dissolution of the natural substantiality of the family. It becomes replaced instead
with a “system of atomism,” i.e., a “general system” which “connect[s] [these] self-subsisting
extremes” in such a way that money, the universal equivalent, appears as the only mediating link
and “form of unity” between “their particular interests.” The simple bonds of blood which held
the family (Stamm) together, where members moved as if they were a “single individual,” are
now dissolved so that the social whole “particularises itself abstractly into many persons,” i.e.,
individuals who formally “exist independent and free, as private persons.”600
Marx believed that by overturning the precapitalist “natural form of wealth,” by
dissolving this “natural community,” by releasing the “worker from the soil as his natural
workshop,” by disrupting the “natural unity of labour,” etc., capitalism signified a completely
“new epoch” in the way in which humanity relates to the material conditions of its existence.
Precisely by tearing apart the old bond with the land and cutting the human being loose from the
umbilical cord of her natural species-connection, capitalism replaces these wholly natural
conditions with historical ones. In all precapitalist social formations, social relations were more
or less relations provided by nature, and not by social development. In such societies, the
“restricted relation of men to nature determines their restricted relation to one another, and their
restricted relation to one another determines men's restricted relations to nature.” Thus, while it
was anything but “idyllic,” the process of primitive accumulation dissolved what were, in Marx’s
own estimation, also less than “idyllic” social relations. These precapitalist relations had left
society both enthralled to nature (because of the limited forces of production), and, as was often
the case, one class of individuals enthralled to another (through relations of personal dependence,
patriarchy, slavery, serfdom, etc.).
600 Hegel, G.W.F., ‘Philosophy of Mind’, Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, A.V. Miller (trans.), (Oxford
University Press: Oxford; 2003), § 523.
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However, with the emergence of the bourgeois mode of production, the multitude of these
relations were dissolved into a single-relation, viz., the relation between wage-labourer and
capitalist. By “releas[ing]” the peasant “worker from the soil as his natural workshop,” wage-
labour has now “replaced the very earth as the ground on which the community stands.” It
“transforms labour on the soil itself, which appears by its nature as the direct wellspring of
subsistence, into a mediated source of subsistence, a source purely dependent on social
relations.”601 The “progressive displacement” of natural necessity, and the “possibility of a
universal development of the productive forces”— hence, also, a “totality of activities,” of “new
needs,” and of the “comprehensiveness” of the individual’s relations with others and with
nature— rests, as Meszaros recognizes of Marx’s view, upon this original tearing away of the
“natural ground from every industry.”602 As Schmidt describes Marx’s conception of human
development in history, the human being in precapitalist society
appears as a mode of nature's organic existence...The distinction between what is
naturally given and what has historically evolved may perhaps be valid for individual
phases of pre-bourgeois history...However, the distinction between Asiatic despotism,
the slave economy of classical antiquity, and medieval feudalism (three forms of social
relationship which are all determined by landownership) fades into insignificance in
[the] face of bourgeois society, whose emergence constitutes a decisive rupture in world
history...In pre-bourgeois times, the relation between the natural and the historical
element formed part of the vast content of nature. In the bourgeois epoch, this relation
forms part of history, even as far as unappropriated nature is concerned...[E]arlier
modes of human intervention in nature were fundamentally modes of nature's 'self-
mediation', since the mediating Subject (individual or community) remained a part of
immediately natural existence, [but] under capitalism the mediation of nature became
something strictly historical, because social...Pre-bourgeois development had a
peculiarly unhistorical character because its material prerequisites— the instrument as
well as the material— were not themselves the product of labour, but were already
found to hand in the land, in nature. Under capitalism, however, these subjective and
objective conditions of production became something created by the participants in
history. Relationships were no longer determined by nature, but set up by
society...Despite all the negativity of the capitalist system (and of course Marx did not
overlook this) it signifies, precisely in this negativity, 'a total revolution in, and
development of, material production.603
601 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 276.
602 Ibid., 285.
603 Ibid., 176-179.
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The result of this process of human development in history, and the final product of the
estrangement which occurs within the capitalist mode of production, is a ‘rich individual’—
genuinely rich insofar as she is able to expend and enjoy the total social wealth of her own
powers and needs as an individual, and rich in both of these precisely because she is able to
apply and appropriate the common social wealth of her own relations with others.604 Through its
ceaseless expansion of “new needs” (as well as new abilities and new relations) capitalism
promotes the “cultivation of all the qualities of the social human being,” that “most total and
universal product.” The general industriousness and indifference to particularity imposed as a
matter of necessity upon the wage-worker drives labour beyond the “natural paltriness” of its
precapitalist forms, and, in Marx’s estimation, beyond the barriers of capitalism itself. It imposes
a general industrious which, when sublated by a higher form of society, becomes the basis for the
enjoyment of the genuine wealth of society, the “general property of the new species.”
The great historic quality of capital is to create this surplus labour, superfluous labour
from the standpoint of mere use value, mere subsistence; and its historic destiny
[Bestimmung] is fulfilled as soon as, on one side, there has been such a development of
604 “This necessity is itself subject to changes, because needs are produced just as are products and the different
kinds of work skills...The greater the extent to which historic needs— needs created by production itself, social
needs— needs which are themselves the offspring of social production and intercourse, are posited as necessary, the
higher the level to which real wealth has become developed. Regarded materially, wealth consists only in the
manifold variety of needs....[I]f agriculture itself rests on scientific activities, if it requires machinery, chemical
fertilizer acquired through exchange, seeds from distant countries etc., and if rural, patriarchal manufacture has
already vanished— which is already implied in the presupposition— then the machine-making factory, external
trade, crafts etc. appear as needs for agriculture. Perhaps guano can be procured for it only through the export of silk
goods. Then the manufacture of silk no longer appears as a luxury industry, but as a necessary industry for
agriculture. It is therefore chiefly and essentially because, in this case, agriculture no longer finds the natural
conditions of its own production within itself, naturally arisen, spontaneous, and ready to hand, but these exist as an
independent industry separate from it— and, with this separateness the whole complex set of interconnections in
which this industry exists is drawn into the sphere of the conditions of agricultural production— it is because of this,
that what previously appeared as a luxury is now necessary, and that so-called luxury needs appear e.g. as a
necessity for the most naturally necessary and down-to-earth industry of all. This pulling-away of the natural ground
from the foundations of every industry, and this transfer of its conditions of production outside itself, into a general
context— hence the transformation of what was previously superfluous into what is necessary, as a historically
created necessity— is the tendency of capital. The general foundation of all industries comes to be general exchange
itself, the world market, and hence the totality of the activities, intercourse, needs etc. of which it is made up. Luxury
is the opposite of the naturally necessary. Necessary needs are those of the individual himself reduced to a natural
subject. The development of industry suspends this natural necessity as well as this former luxury— in bourgeois
society, it is true, it does so only in antithetical form, in that it itself only posits another specific social standard as
necessary, opposite luxury.” Ibid., 527-528.
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needs that surplus labour above and beyond necessity has itself become a general need
arising out of individual needs themselves— and, on the other side, when the severe
discipline of capital, acting on succeeding generations [Geschlechter], has developed
general industriousness as the general property of the new species [Geschlecht]— and,
finally, when the development of the productive powers of labour, which capital
incessantly whips onward with its unlimited mania for wealth, and of the sole conditions
in which this mania can be realized, have flourished to the stage where the possession
and preservation of general wealth require a lesser labour time of society as a whole,
and where the labouring society relates scientifically to the process of its progressive
reproduction, its reproduction in a constantly greater abundance; hence where labour in
which a human being does what a thing could do has ceased...Capital's ceaseless
striving towards the general form of wealth drives labour beyond the limits of its natural
paltriness and thus creates the material elements for the development of the rich
individuality which is as all-sided in its production as in its consumption, and whose
labour also no longer appears as labour, but as the full development of activity itself, in
which natural necessity in its direct form has disappeared, because a historically created
need has replaced a natural one. This is why capital is productive; i.e. an essential
relation for the development of the productive forces. It ceases to exist only where the
development of these productive forces themselves encounters its barrier in capital
itself.605
As Rosdolsky insists of this “striking passage from the Rough Draft,”
[c]apitalist production is therefore radically different from all previous modes of
production by virtue of its universal character, and its drive to continually revolutionise
the material forces of production. If pre-capitalist stages of production were never able
to increase labour beyond that required for immediate subsistence, due to their primitive,
undeveloped techniques, then the 'great historic aspect of capital' consists in the fact that
it 'produces surplus labour, surplus from the standpoint of simple use-value, of mere
subsistence'; and it carries out this task by developing, on the one hand, the social forces
of production, and on the other, human needs, and capacities for labour, to an extent that
has never existed before.606
All precapitalist development is therefore development within a restricted range, a matter of
national or local history for Marx. In “comparison” to “all earlier” epochs which “appear as mere
local developments” in retrospect, the world-historical significance of capital is that it is the first
social form in which we encounter the general development of needs, capacities, and relations—
albeit, again, in their alienated mode of becoming.607 This same process of exploitation (and the
struggle against it) is what produces the objective and subjective preconditions necessary for a
community of all-around individuals— viz., a free association enabling the cultivation of all of
our essential powers, including all of our intellectual, scientific, moral, aesthetic, etc., capacities;
605 Ibid., 325.
606 Rosdolsky, Roman, The Making of Marx’s ‘Capital’, Pete Burgess (trans.), (Pluto Press: 1977; London), 423.
607 Ibid., 409.
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hence, also, creation and enjoyment of the very process itself and of the results our own self-
objectifying activity. Herein rests the only historic justification for capitalism, its only civilizing
influence so far as Marx was concerned, i.e., its necessity from the standpoint of the coming-into-
being of a socialist society. It is the only ‘consolation’ which his critique offers for the slaughter-
bench of the history of capital and the martyrdom of the proletariat. “Not in vain,” he and Engels
wrote in their first corroborative work, does the working-class “go through the stern but steeling
school of labour.”608
608 Engels, Frederick, and Marx, Karl, ‘The Holy Family; or Critique of Critical Criticism: Against Bruno Bauer and
Company’, Marx and Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 4, Jack Cohen et al. (trans.), (International Publishers: New
York; 1975), 37. “Thus, on the one hand, we have a totality of productive forces, which have, as it were, taken on a
material form and are for the individuals no longer the forces of the individuals but of private property...Never, in
any earlier period, have the productive forces taken on a form so indifferent to the intercourse of individuals as
individuals, because their intercourse itself was formerly a restricted one. On the other hand, standing over against
these productive forces, we have the majority of the individuals from whom these forces have been wrested away,
and who, robbed thus of all real life-content, have become abstract individuals, but who are, however, only by this
fact put into a position to enter into relation with one another as individuals. Labour, the only connection which still
links them with the productive forces and with their own existence, has lost all semblance of self-activity and only
sustains their life by stunting it. While in the earlier periods self-activity and the production of material life were
separated, in that they devolved on different persons, and while, on account of the narrowness of the individuals
themselves, the production of material life was considered as a subordinate mode of self-activity, they now diverge
to such an extent that altogether material life appears as the end, and what produces this material life, labour (which
is now the only possible but, as we see, negative form of self-activity), as the means. Thus things have now come to
such a pass that the individuals must appropriate the existing totality of productive forces, not only to achieve self-
activity, but, also, merely to safeguard their very existence. This appropriation is first determined by the object to be
appropriated, the productive forces, which have been developed to a totality and which only exist within a universal
intercourse. From this aspect alone, therefore, this appropriation must have a universal character corresponding to
the productive forces and the intercourse. The appropriation of these forces is itself nothing more than the
development of the individual capacities corresponding to the material instruments of production. The appropriation
of a totality of instruments of production is, for this very reason, the development of a totality of capacities in the
individuals themselves. This appropriation is further determined by the persons appropriating. Only the proletarians
of the present day, who are completely shut off from all self-activity, are in a position to achieve a complete and no
longer restricted self-activity, which consists in the appropriation of a totality of productive forces and in the thus
postulated development of a totality of capacities. All earlier revolutionary appropriations were restricted;
individuals, whose self-activity was restricted by a crude instrument of production and a limited intercourse,
appropriated this crude instrument of production, and hence merely achieved a new state of limitation...Modern
universal intercourse can be controlled by individuals, therefore, only when controlled by all. This appropriation is
further determined by the manner in which it must be effected. It can only be effected through a union, which by the
character of the proletariat itself can again only be a universal one, and through a revolution, in which, on the one
hand, the power of the earlier mode of production and intercourse and social organisation is overthrown, and, on the
other hand, there develops the universal character and the energy of the proletariat, without which the revolution
cannot be accomplished; and in which, further, the proletariat rids itself of everything that still clings to it from its
previous position in society. Only at this stage does self-activity coincide with material life, which corresponds to
the development of individuals into complete individuals and the casting-off of all natural limitations.” Engels,
Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology: Including Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction to the Critique of
Political Economy, Clemens Dutt (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 95-97.
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Capitalism’s universalizing tendency is an “essential relation for the development of the
productive forces,” but it “ceases” to be so when this development “encounters its barrier in
capital itself.” As such, the “universalizing tendency” germinating within capitalism “can never
come to real fruition within its own framework,” as Meszaros explains of Marx’s views in this
previous passage.609 This is the most important crisis theory in all of Marx’s writings: the crisis
of human development in capitalist society. His critique of political economy must therefore be
grasped as a sort of ‘moral science’. It has as its ethical aim the vision of a form of society in
which conditions and relations would permit the free and full development of every individual,
i.e., individuals who are both rich in needs and in the real wealth of powers required to satisfy
them.
There appears here the universalizing tendency of capital, which distinguishes itself
from all previous stages of production. Although limited by its very nature, it strives
towards the universal development of the forces of production, and thus becomes the
presupposition of a new mode of production....where the free, unobstructed, progressive
and universal development of the forces of production is itself the presupposition of
society...The feudal system, for its part, foundered on urban industry...With the
development of wealth...the economic conditions on which the community rested were
dissolved, along with the political relations of the various constituents of the community
which corresponded to those conditions: religion, in which it was viewed in idealized
form (and both rested in turn on a given relation to nature, into which all productive
force resolves itself); the character, outlook, etc., of the individuals. The development of
science alone— i.e., the most sordid form of wealth, both its product and its producer—
was sufficient to dissolve these communities. But the development of science, this ideal
and at the same time practical wealth, is only one aspect, one form in which the
development of the human productive forces, i.e., wealth, appears. Considered ideally,
the dissolution of a given form of consciousness sufficed to kill a whole epoch. In
reality, this barrier to consciousness corresponds to a definite degree of development of
the forces of material production...[But] [c]apital posits the production of wealth itself
and hence the universal development of the productive forces, the constant overthrow of
the prevailing presupposition, as the presupposition of its reproduction...[and therefore
tends, despite itself, towards the] highest development of the forces of production, hence
also the richest development of individuals...The barrier to capital is that this entire
development proceeds in a contradictory way, and that the working-out of the
productive forces, of general wealth etc., knowledge etc., appears in such a way that the
working individual alienates himself [sich entaussert]; relates to the conditions brought
out of him by his labour as those not of his own but an alien wealth...But this
antithetical form is fleeting, and produces the real conditions of its own
suspension...The result is...the real development of the individuals from this basis as a
constant suspension of its barrier, which is recognized as a barrier, not taken as a
609 Meszaros, Istvan, Social Structure and Forms of Consciousness: The Dialectic of Structure and History, Vol. 2,
(Monthly Review Press: New York; 2011), 286.
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sacred limit. Not an ideal or imagined universality of the individual, but the universality
of his real and ideal relations. Hence also the grasping of history as a process, and the
recognition of nature (equally present as practical power over nature) as his real body.610
In Marx’s judgement, the exploitative, but nonetheless necessary, stage of estrangement
marked by capitalism signifies the last antagonistic phase in the absolute “working-out of the
productive forces, of general wealth etc., knowledge etc.” This very same “historic tendency”
also “begets its own negation with the inexorability which governs the metamorphoses of nature”
because it has “itself created the elements of a new economic order, by giving the greatest
impulse at once to the productive forces of social labour and to the integral development of every
individual producer.” At the end of this process of human becoming, Marx believed we would
“arrive at the form of economy which ensures, together with the greatest expansion of the
productive powers of social labor, the most complete development of man:” socialism.611
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have seen that although Marx criticized capitalism’s rupture of the
traditional forms of the metabolism, and recognized the ecologically destructive implications of
this rift, he also regarded this separation of labour from nature as part of a necessary stage of
estrangement. It is ‘necessary’ only inasmuch as it is integral to creating the conditions and
relations for a still higher form of society, i.e., one which has both freed itself from all fetters on
human development and which has overcome the divorce from nature. Marx believed that just as
the dissolution of feudalism laid down the preconditions for bourgeois society, so too would the
inherent laws of capital and the organized struggle against them provide the presuppositions for
the coming-into-being of socialism. These ruthlessly universalizing tendencies not only disrupt
610 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 540-542.
611 Marx, Karl, ‘Russia’s Pattern of Development’ (Marx to the editorial board of the Otechestvenniye Zapiski), Marx
and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, Lewis S. Feuer (ed.), (Anchor Books: New York; 1959), 440.
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the primitive unity of manufacturing with agriculture, and push labour passed the natural
paltriness of its precapitalist forms, they also drive capitalism itself toward its inherent limits.
Marx saw the germs of a completely new social order emerging out of these contradictions.
In the impetus which they give to the development of the productive powers of society, and to
the technical organization of that productivity, lies the power to satisfy human need and liberate
individuals from unnecessary labour. In its application of science to the labour process, in which
knowledge itself becomes a direct force in production, Marx discovers the preconditions for
mastering the metabolism and rationally regulating the relation to nature in socialism. In the
forms of social intercourse given to labour within the factory and which the workers themselves
give to their own fraternal associations during their struggle against capital, he sees the seeds of
the free association of the future— an association in which the free and full development of
every individual becomes the highest aim.
In Marx’s conception of such a higher community, individuals would be reconciled with
their inorganic social body in nature, and would be able to consciously control for the first time
their own metabolism with the earth. It is this conscious control which would allow them to
prevent and repair the sort of ecological damage reaped by the blind necessity of the natural laws
of capitalist production. Such an association would therefore have to cultivate a new ‘recognition
of nature’, but one which also includes their ‘practical power’ over the interaction with it.
Humanity would thereby ‘return’ to the communal unity with nature— except, as I have stressed
of Marx’s view, in a new social form congruent with the most complete actualization and
enjoyment of our own human nature.
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Conclusion
Marx’s historical conception of nature, and of the changing forms of the human
metabolism with it, must be understood as a moving dialectic. In Chapter One of this part of the
dissertation, we saw that he represented the first forms of the metabolism— which is to say, all
precapitalist societies— as presupposing a comparatively unmediated unity between labour and
its inorganic body in nature. On account of the immaturity of the productive powers of
individuals, their limited forms of social intercourse with one another, and the relatively
unmodified natural conditions of production, this was a unity whose shape was always more or
less given by nature, and not produced by labour itself. According to Marx, there was no room
for the free and full development of all individuals in these precapitalist forms, precisely,
because they were more or less tied by an ‘umbilical cord’ to the soil and to their ‘natural
species-connection’ with each other.
Primitive accumulation tore these children of the earth from the land upon which they
were raised, clearing the field for the capitalist exploitation of both the forces of nature and the
productive powers of the now free labourers. This formed the subject matter for Chapter Two,
where I examined the metabolic dimensions of Marx’s representations of this process of
primitive accumulation, as well as the meaning and part which they play within his critique of
political economy and of the coming-into-being of capitalism. In Chapter Three, we examined
the significance of his claim that this separation, while introduced by primitive accumulation, is
reproduced on an ever-expanding scale by the wage-labour process itself. The realization of
wage-labour is a process of de-realization. It objectifies itself in opposition to itself, and, in doing
so, only deepens and completes the divorce from nature. In that chapter, I also demonstrated that
Marx’s understanding of this ‘rift’ has distinct ecological implications. The ‘natural laws’ of
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capital are said to violate the actual natural laws of life, undermining the universal-natural
conditions of life. This rupture can only be remedied, he argued, by abolishing the blind
necessity of the capitalist economy and rationally regulating the interchange with nature in the
future.
Yet, as discussed in the last chapter of this part of the dissertation, capitalism itself was
also represented by Marx as a necessary phase of estrangement, as the last antagonistic phase of
world-history. Its ruthlessly universal tendencies, its all-around exploitation of both nature and
humanity, pushes it toward its own inherent barriers. It creates the means, and the individuals
who will use them, to supersede its limited form and regulate the metabolism in a mode fit for
the full development of the human race. This would mean returning once again to the old
recognition of nature as the inorganic body, except in a manner consistent with the most
complete actualization of individuals as individuals. This form of society would be bound neither
by the mysticism of precapitalist life, where nature appeared as a higher power, nor by the self-
mystifying idolatry of capitalist society, where our own mastery over the forces of nature
confronts us as an alien entity. Instead, in a free association of individuals, the relation to nature
takes on a ‘transparent’ character because consciously controlled in a way which would not ruin
it, but, rather, pass it on to all subsequent generations.
257
Part III
Rationality, Necessity &Work in Socialism:
Marx & the Frankfurt School
Introduction
Some of the most insightful, and at times also most critical, commentaries on the concept
of nature in Marx come to us from the members of the Frankfurt Institute, as well as the second-
and third-generation of critical theorists influenced by them. At a time when orthodoxy prevailed,
the Frankfurt School attempted to critically rethink the meaning of Marx's writings, and, indeed,
marked a real revolution in the understanding of them. To borrow Marx's epithets for Feuerbach,
we might say that they underwent a settling of accounts with the status of nature within the
Marxian dialectic, and were the first group of thinkers, since Marx and Engels themselves, to
have made genuine discoveries in this field. They took-up a serious and critical attitude toward
Marx's philosophy of nature, and we, too, should afford them the respect of both taking those
criticisms seriously and seriously criticizing them when appropriate. For, although they assumed
a more thoughtful posture towards the part which nature plays in the dialectic, some of their
claims about Marx's concept of nature were deeply mistaken and, to this day, represent the most
formidable interpretative barrier to fully comprehending it. Part III of this dissertation is
therefore presented in the form of an ‘anti-critique’ because it subjects these Frankfurt criticisms
of Marx’s philosophy of nature to scrutiny through a closer evaluation of the relevant texts.
To be sure, we should avoid painting these thinkers with too broad a brush. They were of
a different mind on many subjects, including the meaning and significance of the concept of
nature in Marx's writings. However, several of the critiques of Marx's philosophy of nature
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which emerge out of this intellectual tradition share features in common which justify them
being considered together in the first chapter of Part III. One of those recurring themes— which
we find in different forms in the works of Adorno, Horkheimer, Schmidt, Leiss and Moltmann—
is the charge that Marx's conception of history, idea of economic development and political
theory underscore a philosophy of nature which is confined within the same paradigms as
traditional Western philosophy, scientific materialism and the logic of the marketplace. They
allege that Marx’s thinking about nature is restricted by the same dualistic ontology as Descartes,
or that he analyzes the relation to nature through the same utilitarian framework as Bentham, or
that he envisages a ‘mastery’ of nature which merely reiterates Bacon— and that, as such, his
conception of the human relation to nature is susceptible to the Weberian critique of instrumental
reason and/or Heideggerian critique of technological rationality. Were Marx’s vision of a
socialist society to be actualized, according to Adorno, Schmidt and other critical theorists, it
would likely only reproduce in a new form the “domination” of nature characteristic of
capitalism, European Enlightenment and Western civilization more generally.
Chapter One of Part III, entitled ‘The Frankfurt Critique of Marx’s Concept of Nature:
Rationality, Utility, and Domination’, will argue that these critiques are underpinned by
philosophic assumptions quite different from Marx’s. To be sure, unlike Weber and Heidegger,
Marx did not conceive of ‘rationality’ as a dominating force, and it would be anachronistic to
suggest that he did. However, neither was his conception of reason informed so much by Bacon
or Descartes or Bentham, as it was by Hegel. We will discover in the first chapter that, even in
his later writings, Marx continued to reject utilitarian thinking about the interrelationship
between society and nature, and, in fact, criticized the capitalist economy as a “system of general
utility” involving the “general exploitation” of both humanity and nature. In juxtaposition to
thinkers such as Adorno, Schmidt and Leiss, he explicitly elaborated the view in Capital that this
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destruction of the planet by capitalism was irrational, and that, in a higher society, the rationally-
regulated relation to the earth would presuppose the mastery over that metabolism— a ‘mastery’
which would actually allow us to prevent and repair the damage which we do to nature. When
our own activities and social relations with one another confront us as uncontrollable and blind
forces of nature, that is when they inevitably dominate not only ourselves, but also the portions
of nature with which we are intertwined. Hence, Marx argued that only by overcoming the blind
necessity of capital, and consciously controlling our own social powers, could we ever hope to
prevent our necessary interaction with nature from destroying the necessary bases of human life
itself.
As such, comprehending the meaning of his conception of nature in socialism requires
coming to terms with the meaning which he ascribes to this idea of rationally regulating the
metabolism. The appreciation of the inner-connection between his philosophy of nature and his
political philosophy depends very much upon an appreciation of his vision of the direct relation
to nature in necessary work. However, the historical and contemporary secondary literature on
Marx’s conception of nature in socialism has completely misunderstood his famous distinction
between the realms of freedom and necessity in ‘The Trinity Formula’ chapter of Volume III of
Capital. In Chapter Two, ‘Freedom and Necessity: From Marx to Marcuse and Schmidt’, I
question the significance which Schmidt and Marcuse attach to this distinction between free-time
and work-time, and the meaning which they attribute to the necessary interaction with nature in
labour.
In his late works from 1967 onward, Marcuse reinterprets Marx’s remarks on the realm of
necessity as indicating that he represented it as “realm of [continued] estrangement” within
socialism. Work-time may be reduced to a minimum, and free-time expanded proportionately,
but, according to this reading, the actual activity of the working-day would remain as “unfree” as
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it is in capitalism. However, he contends that Marx’s theoretical division is itself reflective of the
division between life and labour in a capitalist society. He also speculates that the progress of
technological rationality since Capital was written has opened-up horizons of human possibility
unimagined, or deemed all too utopian, by the Marx of the ‘Trinity Formula’. Full automation,
Marcuse concludes, would allow for freedom to emerge from within the realm of necessity,
making Marx’s very distinction “obsolete.” In the second chapter, I will argue that Marcuse’s
interpretation is at odds with the textual evidence. Marx certainly recognized that the working-
day could only be reduced to a minimum, and never be abolished outright, in a higher mode of
production. However, we will discover that that recognition does not take on the meaning which
Marcuse attaches to it precisely because the question of freedom was not reducible for Marx to
the question of the expansion of free-time. In fact, in the passage from Volume III, he explicitly
refers to freedom within the realm of necessity, and not merely beyond it. Neither in that passage,
nor in any of his other writings, do we find Marx characterizing the realm of necessary work as a
“realm of alienation” within socialism, or labour as inevitably “unfree” activity. Instead, I will
show that, there and elsewhere, he imagines the possibility of liberation within necessary labour,
as well as outside of it.
In the second chapter, we will also find that Schmidt’s interpretation of the relevant
passage is similar to Marcuse’s, except that the significance of these expressions takes on
ontological dimensions for him. The Concept of Nature in Marx argues that the remarks in
Volume III provide us with proof that Marx departed from his youthful speculations about the
identity between humanism and naturalism, and that, in the later works, it is the irresolvable
problem of the non-identity between human society and natural necessity which prevails over the
transformative powers of reason, labour and praxis. In the end, Schmidt interprets Marx’s
comments on the realm of necessity as underlining the “inextinguishable internal moment” of
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heteronomy in a socialist society, and the “concrete limits” of all dialectics. It speaks to what he
ultimately presents as the “dialectical duality” of the mature Marx’s materialism: viz., that nature
and natural necessity set insuperable barriers to the realization of freedom, happiness, and the
full development of human nature. The second chapter will argue that Schmidt’s work, which
began as a dissertation written under the supervision of Adorno, anachronistically projects
elements of Adorno’s critique of Marxism as an identity philosophy into his own interpretation of
Marx’s late writings. There is no “indestructible boundary” between the subject and object in the
Marxian dialectic. These sorts of interpretative claims are the result of Schmidt re-reading
Adorno’s “negative ontology” and principle of the “primacy of the object” back into Capital.
Instead, Marx’s claims throughout the Grundrisse and Capital illustrate that he conceived of
necessary work being transformed by the revolution to such an extent that it would be made
consistent with the full actualization of human nature. Even in these late writings, Marx
maintained the view that nature, and the human relation to it in work, could undergo
humanization.
Chapter Three of Part III, ‘The Vanishing Away of Direct Necessity: Marx’s Speculations
on the Highest Phases of Socialism’, argues that the Grundrisse and Critique of the Gotha
Programme shed a different light on the distinction which Marx establishes in Capital. Drawing
on this primary literature, as well as commentaries by Sayers and Hudis, the third chapter will
explore the implications of these views for his political theory and conception of the productive
relation to nature in socialism. More often than not, Marx’s remarks in these works complement,
rather than contradict, what he has to say in Capital— presuming that we interpret it in a more
appropriate manner than Marcuse or Schmidt. However, in a few noteworthy instances, he
arguably moves beyond the claims found there, compelling us to question further any reading of
a sharp distinction between labour and non-labour in his political thinking. In the Grundrisse, he
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not only holds that labour is a potential form of free and creative activity, he also argues that the
“abstract antithesis” between free-time and work-time would eventually have to disappear in a
higher social formation. He characterizes this process, by which labour is stripped of its
appearance as a mere means-to-an-end activity, as the vanishing away of direct necessity and of
the direct form of labour. Labour, in the highest stages of a communist society, would no longer
appear as labour. In the Critique of the Gotha Programme, which is the only real outlier in all of
his relevant works, these tendencies in Marx’s thought are pushed to their outer limits when he
imagines work in the highest stages of human development as being transformed from a “mere
means” of life into “life’s prime want.” But even if, as Capital suggests, work could never
become transformed into life’s primary desire and the truest type of freedom, this in no way
reaffirms the interpretations offered by Marcuse and Schmidt, as the Marx of Capital never
presented work in a socialist society as either undesirable or unfree.
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The Frankfurt Critique of Marx's Concept of Nature:
Rationality, Utility and Domination
Introduction: The Critique of Instrumental Rationality and Domination of Nature
Taken together, the thinkers of the Frankfurt School arguably represent the most serious
philosophical challenge to Marx’s concept of nature. However, in this chapter, I will argue that
many of their critiques are based upon questionable interpretations of key aspects of his writings.
They contend that the only reason why class exploitation ceases in Marxism is because it is to be
exchanged in the future for the collectivized exploitation of nature. His vision of communism, it
is alleged, merely sublimates the same aggressive instincts cultivated by capitalism by
redirecting them entirely at nature. These criticisms tend to downplay the extent to which Marx,
especially the later Marx of the Grundrisse and Capital, emphasized the real social possibility
and even ecological necessity of a new relationship to nature emerging with the advent of the
revolution. For instance, Moltmann, building partly upon the work of Bloch, claims that in
Marx’s socialism the “exploitation [of humanity] caused by capitalism would be overcome,” but
not the exploitation of nature by industrial society. In the later works, “Marx acknowledged only
one transformation:” i.e., the undoing of the “self-alienation of humanity, achieved at nature's
cost.”612 “Nature remains the submissive slave of humanity” in “communism” as well as in
capitalism.613 Appropriating the views of Adorno, Schmidt likewise argues that the later Marx
only envisions how a “new society is to benefit man alone, and there is no doubt that this is to be
at the expense of external nature.”614
Having incorporated elements of the Heideggerian and/or Weberian critiques of
612 Moltmann, Jurgen, 'The Alienation and Liberation of Nature', On Nature, Leroy S. Rouner (ed.),
(University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame; 1984), 133.
613 Ibid., 136-137.
614 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (New Left Books: London; 1971),
155-156.
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'instrumental reason' and 'technological rationality' into their interrogation of Marx's
philosophical categories, many of these critics accuse historical materialism of endorsing the
same ideology of industrialism which underpins capitalist conceptions of 'progress'. For example,
Leiss, a former student of Marcuse's, suggests that since “technology was not the yet the source
of false consciousness” for Marx as it had been for Heidegger, Marxism was still restricted by
the ideological “idea of [the] mastery over nature.” Leiss concedes that, within the context of 19th
century thinking, Marx's writings undoubtedly contain “profound insight[s]” into the relationship
with nature, but that, nonetheless, its “dialectic of man and nature” is no longer an “adequate
starting-point” because it cannot account for the development of “technological rationality” in
the 20th century.615 According to this interpretation, the notion which we find expressed in
Capital, i.e., of “rationally regulating” the metabolism with nature in such a way as to allow for
the full development of “human nature,” implies not only that such a society would continue to
degrade nature to the status of a dead object, but, moreover, that it would also be unlikely to lead
to the promised realization of human nature— or, would realize a human nature quite different
from the one Marx dreamt up.
This type of criticism can be traced back primarily to the work of Horkheimer and
Adorno. As Horkheimer argues in the Critique of Instrumental Reason, up until now the
instrumental “mastery of nature has not brought man to self-realization,” but, rather, only to the
sort of technological “manipulation that leaves the individual” a hollowed-out and one-sided
functionary of capital— the very of opposite of Marx's intentions of course.616 This is a point
which he repeats in the Eclipse of Reason where he contends that the “history of man's efforts to
615 Leiss, William, The Domination of Nature, (Beacon Press: Boston; 1974), 83-84.
616 Horkheimer, Max, Critique of Instrumental Reason, Matthew J. O'Connell (trans.), (Continuum: New York;
1967), 4.
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subjugate nature is also the history of man's subjugation by man.”617 Even Marcuse— who, more
than many of the other Frankfurters, retained the hope that the advances made by industry since
Marx could be reorganized to open-up hitherto unimagined horizons of human possibility—
argued more and more in his later writings that complete liberation could only be found in a
society which overcomes the Promethean rationality of work through full automation.618 This is
because he, too, believed that the “technological transformation of Nature” through industry and
science has always “treated Nature as it has treated man— as an instrument of destructive
productivity.”619 Yet, according to Marcuse at least, the completion of such technological
rationality would signify, at the same time, the end of utopianism— which is to say, it would
create the conditions for realizing the final goal of utopian socialism.
However, Horkheimer and Adorno were much more pessimistic than Marcuse. As
Horkheimer retorted in the Critique of Instrumental Reason, while the administrative
“centralization of economic” forces and the corresponding development of “technology” has
enabled social production to tend toward “becoming fully automated,” the “increased rationality
of the individual as a result of his work in industry” has only led to his increased
“manipulation.”620 While the immense forces of production created by capitalism have exceeded
the imaginative horizons of the most utopian socialists (and this newfound potential finds
expression, e.g., in Marcuse's political philosophy), the likelihood of realizing those utopian
ideas seems more distant than ever. For Horkheimer and Adorno, then, the progress of reason has
led to the disenchantment not only of nature, but also of humanity’s own romantic vision of itself.
617 Horkheimer, Max, Eclipse of Reason, (Continuum: New York: 1974), 105.
618 Marcuse, Herbert, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, (Vintage Books: New York;
1962), 149-150, 160.
619 Marcuse, Herbert, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, (Beacon
Press: Boston; 1966), 240-241.
620 Horkheimer, Max, Critique of Instrumental Reason, Matthew J. O'Connell (trans.), (Continuum: New York;
1967), 4.
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[While the] present potentialities of social achievement surpass the expectations of all
the philosophers and statesmen who have ever outlined in utopian programs the idea of
a truly human society...[the] hopes of mankind [still] seem farther from fulfilment today
then they were even in the groping epochs when they were first formulated by
humanists. It seems that even as technical knowledge expands the horizon of man's
thought and activity, his autonomy as an individual, his ability to resist the growing
apparatus of mass manipulation, his power of imagination, his independent judgement
appear to be reduced. Advance in [the] technical faculties for enlightenment is
accompanied by a process of dehumanization. Thus progress threatens to nullify the
very goal it is supposed to realize— the idea of man...As understood and practiced in
our civilization, progressive rationalization tends, in my opinion, to obliterate that very
substance of reason in the name of which this progress is espoused.621
Schmidt follows Horkheimer and Adorno in his assertion that the “progress” of the 20th
century created “technical possibilities” undreamt of by even the most utopian programs
criticized by Marx. However, rather than actualizing this emancipatory potential, the universality
of 'reason' continues to be “negatively realized” under advanced capitalism.
Today, when men's technical possibilities have outstripped the dreams of the old
Utopians many times over, it appears rather that these possibilities, negatively realized,
have changed into forces of destruction, and therefore, instead bringing about an albeit
always humanly limited salvation, lead to total destruction, a grim parody of the
transformation intended by Marx, in which Subject and Object are not reconciled, but
annihilated.622
Schmidt certainly recognizes that Marx was of the “opinion that human happiness” was
“proportional to the measure of man's technical mastery of nature,” as well as the “social
organization of that technical mastery.”623 However, like Adorno, Horkheimer and many other
first-, second- and third-generation critical theorists, Schmidt questions whether such “technical
progress” really is to “man's benefit” or not.624 He claims that it
belongs essentially to the advance of civilization as more and more organized increasing
domination, that nature takes revenge on the men who have degraded it to mere material
for human aims, by ensuring that men can only buy their domination by an ever-
increasing suppression of their own nature.625
These critiques of 'instrumental rationality' are often interpreted today as a wholesale
621 Horkheimer, Max, Eclipse of Reason, (Continuum: New York: 1974), v-vi.
622 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (New Left Books: London; 1971),
163.
623 Ibid., 135.
624 Ibid., 136.
625 Ibid., 138.
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rejection of Hegelian reason. But the best minds of the Frankfurt School recognized that the
reason which has been “negatively realized” under capitalism (Schmidt), and which therefore
only annihilates the genuine “substance of reason in the name of which this progress is
espoused” (Horkheimer), is not at all Hegelian. Rather, it is precisely this essential content which
has been annihilated by the progress of modern society. In this respect, Hegel’s conception of
rationality continues to negatively inform Frankfurt critiques of the instrumentalization of reason
in capitalist society. And, to differing degrees, Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse and Schmidt leave
open the possibility of a truly 'rational' society emerging— i.e., one potentially emancipated from
both the domination of one class over another, and the domination of nature by society.626 In fact,
626 Although this is not how many contemporary critical theorists read Adorno and Horkheimer, there is a
good deal of textual evidence to support this sort of interpretation. To be sure, what Bernstein says of Adorno is true.
“Yet if Adorno was a Hegelian, he cannot be an orthodox Hegelian...If for Hegel philosophy is one's own
time...expressed in thought, then historical changes transforms the possibilities of philosophical expression. To be
writing after the French Revolution is significantly different from writing philosophy 'after Auschwitz'. Hegel
conceived the French Revolution, including 'the Terror', as formative for our education toward freedom...Adorno
thought Auschwitz revealed the intransigent moment of violence in the modern conception of reason.” Bernstein,
J.M., 'Negative Dialectic as Fate: Adorno and Hegel', The Cambridge Companion to Adorno, Tom Huhn (ed.),
(Cambridge Publishers: Cambridge; 2004), 20. This certainly represents a pessimistic view with respect to the
possibility of the realization of the rational. Yet, as I have said, it is not a wholesale rejection of Hegelian reason.
Rather, this conception of 'rationality' remains, in some respects, the metric by which Adorno and Horkheimer gauge
the dehumanization and domination characteristic of the instrumental reason of capitalist society. The Dialectic of
Enlightenment sought to explore the “nexus of rationality and social actuality” as well as its “inseparab[ility]” from
“nature and the mastery of nature.” Yet, the caveat is added that the “critique of enlightenment is intended to prepare
the way for a positive notion of enlightenment which will release it from the entanglement in blind domination.”
Adorno, Theodor W., and Horkheimer, Max, Dialectic of Enlightenment, John Cumming (trans.), (Continuum: New
York; 1972), xv-xvi. Or, see Horkheimer in the Eclipse of Reason: the problem of “pragmatic reason is not new. Yet,
the philosophy behind it, the idea that reason, the highest intellectual faculty of man, is solely concerned with
instruments, nay, is a mere instrument itself, is formulated more clearly and accepted more generally today than ever
before. The principle of domination has become the idol to which everything is sacrificed. The history of man's
efforts to subjugate nature is also the history of man's subjugation by man.” Horkheimer, Max, Eclipse of Reason,
(Continuum: New York: 1974), 105. The critique of instrumental rationality takes on a new significance when we
understand it in this way. It ultimately speaks to the irrationality of capitalism as a system, as a system which
annihilates the promise of Hegelian Reason. Hegelian Reason, in this sense, negatively informs the critical theories
of Horkheimer and Adorno. “With the development of the economic system in which control of the economic
apparatus by private groups of men, survival as affirmed by reason— the reified drive of the individual bourgeois—
was revealed as destructive natural power, no longer to be distinguished from self-destruction. The two were
indissolubly blended. Pure reason became unreason.” Adorno, Theodor W., and Horkheimer, Max, Dialectic of
Enlightenment, John Cumming (trans.), (Continuum: New York; 1972), 90-91. “The irrationalism of totalitarian
capitalism, whose way of satisfying needs has an objectified form determined by domination which makes the
satisfaction of needs impossible and tends toward the extermination of mankind, has its prototype in the hero who
escapes sacrifice by sacrificing himself. In other words: the history of renunciation...[However, this hero is] also a
sacrifice for the abrogation of sacrifice. His dominative renunciation, as a struggle with myth, represents a society
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Adorno and Horkheimer claim that the ultimate aim of their critical theory is to liberate reason
from its tendencies toward the domination of nature and to recover its non-instrumental, non-
exploitative essence.
In any case, thinkers such as Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and Schmidt are mistaken
when they extend those critiques of instrumental reason to apply to Marx's conception of the
socialist metabolism with nature. For instance, Schmidt concludes that the further development
of tendencies inherent in industrialization, irrespective of whether under capitalist or communist
conditions, would only lead to the destruction of both society and nature.627 In The Concept of
Nature in Marx, he refers to this as the dim “prophecy of the Dialektik der Anfklarung” issued by
Adorno and Horkheimer: viz., the “grim parody” of the “young Marx's dream of a humanization
of nature” and “naturalization of man” as it passes over into its opposite, i.e., the dehumanization
of man and death (without any resurrection) of nature.628 This apocalyptic possibility is rooted,
as Horkheimer explains in the Eclipse of Reason, in the 'instrumentalization' of reason itself.
From the time when reason became the instrument for the domination of human and
extra-human nature by man— that is to say, from its very beginnings— it has frustrated
its own intention of discovering the truth. This is due to the very fact that it made nature
a mere object, and that it failed to discover the trace of itself in such objectivization.629
There is certainly a great measure of truth to Horkheimer's statement. It adequately
expresses the connection between the capitalist domination of nature and the mystification of the
social relations which achieve this domination. The capitalist economy takes up a 'natural-
attitude' towards its own destructive tendencies. Its own social forces appear as blind and
uncontrollable forces of nature since they confront the individuals, whose relations they are, as
hostile and alien powers. In this sense, the “domination” of nature by capitalist society obscures
that no longer needs renunciation and domination, which gains mastery over itself not in order to coerce itself and
others, but in expiation.” Ibid., 55-56.
627 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (New Left Books: London; 1971),
163.
628 Ibid., 163.
629 Horkheimer, Max, Eclipse of Reason, (Continuum: New York: 1974), 176.
269
the “trace of itself in such objectivization,” and leads just as much to the domination of human
beings. Again, though, to extend this critique of 'instrumental reason' to Marx is quite another
matter. Marx regarded the total productive forces of society, including science, technology,
machinery, etc., as objectifications of the human mind, as the objective presence of the essential
capacities of individuals.630 All of the products, means, and forces of production are only so
many “moments” and “objectifications of the process” whose “only subjects are the individuals”
in their relations with each other.631 As such, Marx does not foresee a socialist society reducing
the nature transformed by the productive powers of labour to an alien and external objectivity;
instead, he argued that individuals would relate to it as the inorganic body of society, i.e., as an
objectification of their needs, capacities and relations with each other.
According to Horkheimer, modern society fails to recognize the trace of itself in nature
because, in practice and theory, it reduces nature to a mere object. However, Adorno takes a
different approach. He suggests that these same tendencies toward 'domination' are present in
Marx's philosophy of nature because he tried to “take things unlike the subject and make them
like the subject” through practice, labour, and reason, and, as such, “underwrote something as
arch-bourgeois as the program of an absolute control of nature.”632 Of course, Adorno concedes,
Marx only “underwrote” this “program” so as to create the material conditions necessary for the
satisfaction of human need and full development of individuals. However, he argues that, in
doing so, Marx ignored that this industrial mastery over nature threatens to undermine the very
basis of human life in the environment.633
However, the points of intersection (examined in Part II of this dissertation) between
630 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.),
(Penguin Books: London; 1993), 706.
631 Ibid., 712.
632 Adorno, Theodor W., Negative Dialectics, E.B. Ashton (trans.), (Taylor and Francis: New York; 1973), 244.
633 Ibid., 244.
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Liebig's ecological studies and the metabolic theory in Capital illustrates just the opposite.
Marx's works and correspondence during this middle and late period demonstrate that he was
worried about a great many ecological issues. These concerns included deforestation, water
pollution, soil erosion and fertility, salinization and desertification, recycling and composting, as
well as the environmental effects of increasing urbanization, globalized trade, and chemical
fertilization— absolutely astonishing given that he was a man of the 19th century. He recognized
that capitalism's destruction of the planet, especially through the industrialization of agriculture,
was undermining the natural bases of human life itself. We have already read the ominous
warning which he issued in Capital: the social laws of capitalism are violating the actual nature-
given laws of the metabolism which apply to all historical and possible modes of production.634
He concluded that this unsustainable metabolic rift between society and nature was irreparable
from the standpoint of the capitalist relations which created it— thereby implying what he will
explicitly insist upon only a few dozen pages later in Volume III: viz., that a socialist society can
rectify these issues only by rationally-regulating the interchange with nature.635
Jarvis argues that Adorno underwent a “reconsider[ation]” of the “relation between
economics and domination in Marx's thought.” Since he came to feel that “domination cannot be
shown to be coeval with property relations,” Adorno found it “harder to argue that the end of
those relations will also be the end of domination.” The “collapse of capitalism,” he concluded
during this early period of reassessment, “would by no means be guaranteed to bring an end
either to mystification or to domination.”636 These aggressive tendencies represent unmastered
and even potentially unmasterable instincts, which, as such, are possibly transhistorical social
634 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, David Fernbach (trans.), Vol. III (Penguin Books:
London; 1991), 911, 949-950.
635 Ibid., 959.
636 Jarvis, Simon, 'Adorno, Marx, Materialism', The Cambridge Companion to Adorno, Tom Huhn (ed.),
(Cambridge Publishers: Cambridge; 2004), 93.
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phenomena. As Horkheimer elaborates in the Eclipse of Reason, this tendency toward
domination is also present in all 'identity' philosophies, in which he mistakenly includes both
Hegel and Marx. He and Adorno allege that Hegel and Marx envision, as the final outcome of
their dialectics, the emergence of a homogeneous and undifferentiated unity between the subject
and object, spirit and nature, etc.637
Socialism and the Pure Utility of Nature
Following Adorno and Horkheimer, Schmidt questions whether a Marxist society would
undo capitalism's exploitation of the environment. However, according to him, this ecological
problem arises not because Marxism is an 'identity' philosophy, as Adorno and Horkheimer claim,
but precisely because Marx acknowledged more and more in his late writings that nature's non-
identity could never be abolished by labour. The utopian “moment of [the] identity of man and
nature” speculated about in The Holy Family and Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts has
passed over, in the Grundrisse and Capital, into this metabolic “problem of non-identity.”638 This
is precisely what is so appealing to Schmidt about Capital: viz., that it emphasizes that
“historically the incompatibility of man and nature, i.e., in the last analysis the necessity of
637 Horkheimer, Max, Eclipse of Reason, (Continuum: New York: 1974), 174. “every philosophy that ends in
the assertion of the unity of nature and spirit as an allegedly ultimate datum, that is to say, every kind of
philosophical monism, serves to entrench the idea of man's domination of nature...The very tendency to postulate
unity represents an attempt to consolidate the claim of spirit to total domination, even when this unity is in the name
of the absolute opposite of spirit, nature: for nothing is supposed to remain outside the all-embracing concept. Thus
even the assertion of the primacy of nature conceals within itself the assertion of the absolute sovereignty of spirit,
because it is spirit that conceives this primacy and subordinates everything to it...The real difficulty in the problem
of the relation between spirit and nature is that hypostatizing the polarity of these two entities is as impermissible as
reducing one to the other...On the one hand, each of the two poles has been torn away by abstraction; on the other,
their unity cannot be conceived and ascertained as a given fact...[S]ubjective reason is that attitude of consciousness
that adjusts itself without reservation to the alienation between subject and object...[while] objective reason displays
an inclination to romanticism...[which] expresses a real antinomy...The task of philosophy is not to stubbornly play
the one against the other, but to foster a mutual critique and, thus, if possible, to prepare in the intellectual realm the
reconciliation of the two in reality.”
638 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (New Left Books: London; 1971),
137.
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labour, triumphs over the unity of man and nature.”639
According to Schmidt’s interpretation, the middle and late Marx came to the recognition
that the externality of natural necessity could never be wholly dissolved by the socialist form of
the metabolism. Nature remains “external to men even in a classless society.”640 He argues that
the 'negative' implication of this ontology is that nature would continue to be treated in a
utilitarian and exploitative fashion in socialism. As such, the “problem of nature, as an object to
be mastered, continues to exist for men in their new-found solidarity.”641 In Schmidt's Adorno-
like interpretation of Marx (i.e., not in the sense that he interprets Marx in the same way as
Adorno does, but in the sense that he reads Marx as if he were really reading Adorno),
the Grundrisse shows plainly that...[quoting the Grundrisse] Nature becomes...pure
Object for man, a pure thing of utility; it ceases to be recognized as a power for itself;
and the theoretical knowledge of its autonomous laws itself appears only as a stratagem
for subjecting it to human needs...[From which Schmidt concludes that it] remains to be
seen whether this situation can change in any essential feature under post-capitalist
conditions...Since the realm of necessity will continue to exist as long as human history,
men will always be compelled to behave towards nature in an essentially appropriative,
interfering, struggling manner [emphasis added].642
It should be noted that this remark from the Grundrisse, which refers to the reduction of
nature to an object of pure utility, is elaborated in specific reference to the historical becoming of
capitalist society. This is significant because Marx’s sketch of capitalism's historical triumph
over precapitalist society should not be understood as an apologia, but, rather, only as a
preliminary step in his ruthless criticism of its contradictions. Schmidt misinterprets these
statements as if they formed part of some sort of uncritical acceptance of the ‘domination’ of
nature indicative only of capitalist production. But Marx characterizes capitalism in this very
same passage as a “system of general utility” which both dehumanizes individuals and destroys
nature. To be sure, his conception of history treats capitalism’s “general exploitation of the
639 Ibid., 30.
640 Ibid.,137.
641 Ibid., 136.
642 Ibid., 157.
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natural and human qualities” in the same way, i.e., as an integral phase in a larger movement of
historical development, even if, from a strictly ethical standpoint, he no more endorses the
domination of nature than he does the estrangement of the wage-labourer.643 What Schmidt has
done, therefore, is to mistake aspects of Marx’s ‘scientific’ analysis of economic history with
moralizing claims about the relation to nature in the future.
For Marx, however, the reduction of the whole world to a “matter of utility” is not a
determination given by everlasting natural necessity. Far from treating the earth as a mere
commodity, in precapitalist forms of social life nature was raised into a higher power.644 The
disenchantment, but at the same time also debasement, of nature to an object of pure utility is the
historically specific outcome of bourgeois relations. Needless to say, Marx believed that a
socialist society would 'sublate' the productive powers developed in an antagonistic way by
capitalism. But in such a higher society, whose newfound “recognition of nature” also proceeds
for the first time from this “practical power” over the metabolism with it, individuals would
regard their rationally regulated relation to the world as an objectification of their own activities,
needs, and relations— but, for that same reason, in no way as a mere 'object'. Marx did not
conceive of the nature transformed by human activity as a mere object, and, in this, he broke
with Feuerbach’s contemplative naturalism. For him, it follows that to treat one’s own
objectification as an object of exploitation, as a matter of mere utility, is to treat one’s own
objective activity and objective being as a matter of mere utility.
Of course, Schmidt is right that even in a socialist society individuals would have to
continue to 'wrestle' with natural necessity through labour (except ever more successfully), and
continue to 'subject' natural forces to the human will (except ever more rationally). Needless to
643 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.),
(Penguin Books: London; 1993), 409-410.
644 Ibid., 409-410.
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say, every mode of production is based upon the appropriation of the use-values of nature, i.e. in
order to satisfy human needs of one sort or another. This is just a fact of the metabolism that is
human life, and it applies to all historical and possible forms of production. But Marx's
recognition of the simple fact that the appropriation of the useful properties of nature would
continue in communism does not imply that he adhered to a utilitarian philosophy, as Schmidt
claims. When Schmidt asserts that Marx assumed that humans would have to confront nature in
an “appropriative, interfering, struggling” manner in all forms of human society, including
communism, he somehow takes this to mean exploitative in the specifically capitalist sense of
the term. Indeed, he at times conflates the general concepts of need, necessity, necessary labour,
use-value, appropriation of nature, etc.— which exist in some way or another in every epoch of
human history, and every form of society— with the artificial necessity imposed by the
specifically capitalist form of this metabolism.
For Schmidt to suggest that the metabolism characteristic of capitalism would be
extended, unchanged, into a socialist society ignores that that society would not be determined
by the blind necessity of the bourgeois economy. In a capitalist society, according to Marx,
nothing is inviolable. Everything, including individuals and ‘external’ nature, are sacrificed to
'utility' in the most narrowly conceived bourgeois/utilitarian sense of the term— i.e., as when the
“only utility whatsoever which an object can have for capital can be to preserve or increase it.”645
This system of general exploitation holds “nothing [as] legitimate for itself, outside this circle of
social production and exchange.” If we were to seriously consider measuring “all human acts,
movements, relations, etc.,” according to this single principle of utility, we would “first have to
deal with human nature in general, and then with human nature as historically modified in each
epoch.” This would mean shedding the one-sided conception of the bourgeois individual as the
645 Ibid., 270.
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metric by which we judge the needs of the “normal man.”646
There are many other first-, second-, and third-generation critical theorists who elaborate
criticisms comparable to Schmidt’s. Leiss likewise dismisses Marx's theory of metabolism as one
grounded in a Cartesian dialectic. In the last instance, Marx merely reformulates and reaffirms
the instrumental view of humanity’s relation to nature. Marxism’s philosophy of nature simply
“serves as an elaboration of the Saint-Simonian outlook” influenced as it was by “Francis
Bacon.”647 Like Schmidt and Leiss, Moltmann also mistakenly claims that Marx's political
philosophy is underpinned by a ‘utilitarian’ and ‘instrumental’ conception of the human relation
to nature. Appropriating Bloch’s distinction between ‘home’ and ‘work’, he argues that Marx’s
Promethean conception of labour can never realize its stated aim: i.e., to make itself at home in
the world. Instead, his thought allegedly remains circumscribed within the same limits as the rest
of modern philosophy from Descartes onward.648 Although Moltmann acknowledges that both
“modern idealism” and “dialectical materialism” attempt to “overcome the splitting of the world
into subjectivity and objectivity, into res cogitans and res extensa,” he fails to account for how
the ontology of internal relations developed by Hegel and Marx is at all consistent with this
646 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books:
London; 1990), 758-759.
647 Leiss, William, The Domination of Nature, (Beacon Press: Boston; 1974), 84. As Schmidt correctly claims
(however inconsistently), while he may “[a]t first” have “shared Bacon's view, which was inherited and developed
by the Enlightenment”— namely, the view that “nature should be seen essentially from the point of view of its
usefulness to man”— “Marx went far beyond all the bourgeois theories of nature presented by the Enlightenment.”
Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (New Left Books: London; 1971), 78, 155.
As Engels explained in the Dialectics of Nature, “[t]he dialectics that has found its way into popular consciousness
finds expression in the old saying that extremes meet. In accordance with this we should hardly err in looking for the
most extreme degree of fantasy, credulity, and superstition, not in that trend of natural science which, like the
German philosophy of nature, tries to force the objective world into the framework of its subjective thought, but
rather in the opposite trend, which, relying on mere experience, treats thought with sovereign disdain and really has
gone to the furthest extreme in emptiness of thought. This school prevails in England. Its father, the much lauded
Francis Bacon.” Engels, Frederick, Dialectics of Nature, Clemens Dutt (trans.), (International Publishers: New York;
1976), 297.
648 Moltmann, Jurgen, 'The Alienation and Liberation of Nature', On Nature, Leroy S. Rouner (ed.),
(University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame; 1984), 133, 136-137.
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Cartesian-Baconian standpoint which he attributes to them.649
In Private Property and Communism, Marx criticized those who would grasp the “history
of industry” only from the “perspective of alienation” by treating the “essential connection” to
nature, to others, and to one's own life-activity in an “external utilitarian way.” Schmidt and other
critical theorists sometimes accept that his early philosophy was explicitly anti-utilitarian in
recognizing that this relation to nature through labour has an “essential connection with man's
essential nature.”650 However, in contrast to them, I believe that this is a lasting feature of Marx’s
materialism, philosophy of nature and theory of human development. Even into his later writings,
he continued to argue that this one-sided principle of utility is merely reflective of an economy
where the wholeness of the human being has been divided, and all of her pleasures, activities,
and connections to society and nature reduced to a single relation: the exchange-relation. One's
life and relations with others appears as an external, accidental and commercial affair in which
'things' ultimately rule over the people who create and consume them. As Marx reminds us while
quoting Shakespeare and Goethe in The Power of Money, money in bourgeois society perfectly
represents this estranged essence of the human being. Everything— every desire, every need,
and every bond to society and to nature— can be bought and sold away.651 Capitalism, as he tells
us in both the early manuscripts and again in the Grundrisse, is nothing else but a system of
universal prostitution.652
Schmidt, Moltmann and others are mistaken in contending that the later Marx abandoned
649 Ibid., 133.
650 See Marx, Karl, 'Private Property and Communism'', The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,
Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 141-142. Or, see Marx,
Karl, 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts', Selected Writings, Lawrence H. Simon (ed.), (Hackett Publishing
Company: Indianapolis; 1994), 76.
651 Marx, Karl, 'The Power of Money in Bourgeois Society', The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of
1844, Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 165-169.
652 Marx, Karl, 'Private Property and Communism', The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,
Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 133. Marx, Karl,
Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin Books: London;
1993), 163.
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this earlier philosophy of nature— influenced by the humanism of Goethe and the naturalism of
Feuerbach, the philosophies of Hegel and of Schiller— for a more hard-nosed utilitarian
calculus.653 Instead, one finds that the late Marx continues to explicitly associate such
utilitarianism with the fetishism and perverse logic which prevails in market societies. The entire
wisdom of this philosophical school amounts to equating freedom with ‘utility’, and the positive
assertion of one’s own personality with ‘self-interest’— and both in the most narrowly conceived
sense of the expressions.654 However, the point of revolutionary praxis is not to replace the
particularity of one set of class interests with another, but to overcome class society and satisfy
the universal interest of humankind as a whole. This would finally be 'self-interest' not in the
narrowly conceived poverty of Benthamite political economy, but in that higher Aristotelian
sense of the 'self-love' which is possible only through relations of mutual recognition with others
alike in virtue.
Hegel has already proved in his Phenomenologie how this theory of mutual exploitation,
which Bentham expounded ad nauseum [is deficient]...[T]he theory of usefulness is
depicted [there] as the final result of the enlightenment. The apparent stupidity of
merging all the manifold relationships of people in the one relation of usefulness, this
apparently metaphysical abstraction arises from the fact that, in bourgeois society, all
relations are subordinated in practice to the one abstract monetary-commercial
relation...Political economy is the real science of this theory of utility...[A]ll the activity
of individuals in their mutual intercourse, e.g., speech, love, etc., is depicted as a
relation of utility and utilisation...[these relations having] validity for the individual[s]
not on their own account, not as self-activity...[but only as a] relation of
utility...[Therefore it means only that] I derive benefit for myself by doing harm to
someone else...For him only one relation is valid on its own account— the relation of
653 Ibid., 134.
654 As Burkett explains, in the “Marxist view, the monetary valuation of nature, that is, its effective reduction
to a private good, indirectly manifests working people’s alienation from the essentially communal conditions of
social production...Under capitalism, the means of production and the productive division of labour, in short the
producers’ entire metabolic interaction with nature, are scientifically developed and socialised. But, since this
development is driven not by the goal of sustainable improvements in human development...but by competitive
monetary accumulation, the productive forces of nature and social labour appear as alien forces holding power over
the workers, in fact as productive powers of capital itself.” Burkett, Paul, Marxism and Ecological Economics:
Toward a Red and Green Political Economy, (Brill: London; 2006), 86-87. Hence, as he concludes in another
chapter, the “workers’ struggles, both inside and outside the workplace, contain a powerful pro-ecological potential
insofar as they contest all forms of money-driven exploitation of labour and nature. The goal must be general
disalienation, not more tolerable forms of alienation...Marxism detects a radical potential for worker-community
movements to fight for new relations of production that treat human-natural relations as ends in themselves rather
than instruments of alienated production and profit-making.” Ibid., 140.
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exploitation...The material expression of this use is money, the representative of the
value of all things, people and social relations...The advances made by the theory of
utility and exploitation, its various phases, are closely connected with the various
periods of development of the bourgeoisie...The complete subordination of all existing
relations to the relation of utility, and its unconditional elevation to be the sole content
of all other relations, we find for the first time in Bentham.655
This passage from The German Ideology indicates that even while breaking with
Feuerbachian humanism, Marx continued to criticize utilitarianism in much the same way that he
had in the manuscripts on The Power of Money, Private Property and Communism, and
Estranged Labor. In particular, he continued to single out Bentham and Mill in the Grundrisse
and Capital for regarding all relations, needs and capacities from the standpoint of this shallow
principle. Far from reflecting a 'romantic' or 'utopian' moment in Marx's early intellectual
development (which his later 'economism' obliterates), we find the same sort of critique of the
‘stupidity’ of Bentham in Capital:
the principle of utility was no discovery made by Bentham. He simply reproduced in his
dull way what Helvetius and other Frenchmen had said with wit and ingenuity in the
eighteenth century. To know what is useful for a dog, one must investigate the nature of
dogs. This nature is not itself deducible from the principle of utility. Applying this to
man, he that would judge all human acts, movements, relations, etc. according to the
principle of utility would first have to deal with human nature in general, and then with
human nature as historically modified in each epoch. Bentham does not trouble himself
with this. With the dryest naivete he assumes that the modern petty bourgeois, especially
the English petty bourgeois, is the normal man. Whatever is useful to this peculiar kind
of normal man, and to his world, is useful in and for itself. He applies this yardstick to
the past, the present and the future...If I had the courage of my friend Heinrich Heine, I
should call Mr. Jeremy a genius in the way of bourgeois stupidity.656
Although Schmidt acknowledges that Marx went beyond both Benthamite utilitarianism
and Bacon's philosophy of nature, he mistakenly claims that the implications of this new view
were restricted more and more in the late writings to the purely social world. Whenever Marx
and Engels refer to the overcoming of the blind necessity of market relations, they allegedly had
in mind only the emancipation of 'man from man', which, according to Schmidt's interpretation,
655 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 109-
113.
656 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books:
London; 1990), 758-759.
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is itself possible only on the basis provided by the continued subjugation of nature. Marx does
not envision this “exploitation of nature” as “ceas[ing] in the future,” but as continuing
unabated— limited perhaps only by a more “rationalized” form of exploitation, i.e., one which
would only ensure that nature is “robbed step by step of the possibility of revenging itself on
men for their victories over it.”657 Hence, he disparages that whenever Marx and Engels
“complain about the plundering of nature, they are not concerned with nature itself but with
considerations of economic utility.”658 But this is only because Schmidt considers Marx’s
concern for human need and emphasis upon labour’s conscious control over its own relation to
nature as prima facie anti-ecological. As if human society, its needs, and its 'economic'
considerations, were not themselves a part of “nature itself.” Or, as if a romantic concern for
“nature itself”— that is, as abstracted completely from human beings, their activities, needs and
relations with others— could ever form a sound basis for developing a critique oriented toward
overcoming the contradictions inherent in the capitalist relationship between society and nature.
In his reading, Schmidt effectively reproduces Adorno's claim that Marxism strives
toward the “absolute domination of nature,” i.e., its “absolute submission to labour.”659 For
Schmidt, the new social relations of production proposed by Marx do not imply a “new relation
with extra-human nature”— although, as I have already pointed out throughout this dissertation,
this seems to be one of the most basic points of connection between Marx's materialist
conception of history and his historical conception of nature; it is an elementary presupposition
of his historical theory of the metabolism.660 But Schmidt does not see any necessary link in the
657 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (New Left Books: London; 1971),
155-156.
658 Ibid., 155.
659 Jarvis, Simon, 'Adorno, Marx, Materialism', The Cambridge Companion to Adorno, Tom Huhn (ed.),
(Cambridge Publishers: Cambridge; 2004), 90.
660 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.),
(Penguin Books: London; 1993), 495.
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late Marx between a revolution towards a “more human society,” and the development of a more
“human” way of relating to nature. Having expunged Marx's late writings of any trace of the idea
of the humanization of nature, and having taken this ostensible “problem of non-identity” as the
great insight of the “later, and more critical” Marx, it is confounding to find Schmidt
subsequently criticizing such a view for its utilitarian and exploitative attitude toward the
environment.
The question raised here, of the extent to which a more human society might also enter
into a new relation with extra-human nature, has been the subject of an extra-ordinary
amount of discussion between interpreters of Marx. Here too, the mature Marx
withdrew from the theses expounded in his early writings. In later life he no longer
wrote of a 'resurrection' of the whole of nature. The new society is to benefit man alone,
and there is no doubt that this is to be at the expense of external nature. Nature is to be
mastered with gigantic technological aids...The exploitation of nature will not cease in
the future but man's encroachments into nature will be rationalized, so that their remoter
consequences will remain capable of control. In this way, nature will be robbed step by
step of the possibility of revenging itself on men for their victories over it...[But] [w]e
should rather ask, whether the future society will not be a mammoth machine, whether
the prophecy of the Dialektik der Anfklarung, that 'human society will be a massive
racket in nature', will not be fulfilled rather than the young Marx's dream of a
humanization of nature, which would at the same time include the naturalization of
man.661
Marx on the Mastery of the Metabolism with Nature
The Frankfurt School’s philosophical faith in the emancipatory potential of industry and
technical mastery over the forces of nature was understandably shaken by the course of the 20th
century. The humanism and promise of liberation, which had until then accompanied all progress
in the forces of production, suddenly gave way to the opposite tendency, e.g., advanced forms of
barbarism, an industrial-scale holocaust, and the global terror of the atomic age. The
development of the productive powers of social labour seemed to offer the future not
emancipation but intensified manipulation, not a reconciliation with nature but continued
domination. All of the aspects of Marx’s political philosophy which appeared to reaffirm these
661 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (New Left Books: London; 1971),
155-156.
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anti-ecological tendencies of modernity came under increased suspicion. Under the influence of
Weber’s notion of the 'iron cage' of reason, the Frankfurters rejected the Marxian conception of
the ‘mastery’ of nature— an idea which they took to imply that the 'exploitative' relation to the
environment (characteristic of capitalism) would be extended unmodified into a socialist society.
However, Marx did not share these philosophic assumptions about rationality. Instead, he
and Engels argued that capitalism is antithetical to a ‘consciously controlled’ metabolism, and
that the rift with nature can only be repaired in a higher society which restores the communal
union with it.662 This new society would proceed from the “recognition of nature” as its “real
body,” but this would also include its own “practical power” over the interaction with it; only
then would humankind overcome the disastrous separation specific to capitalism.663 Each
subsequent generation of socialist society would be obliged to pass on this relation to the planet
in an “improved” state.664 As such, Marx’s vision of how a communist society might go about
“rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control,”
differs qualitatively from what he explicitly criticizes as the ecologically-destructive irrationality
of capitalism (emphasis added).665 Schmidt is therefore mistaken in contending that Marx did not
662 Capitalism, as Engels puts it, develops the productive powers of social labour which “makes the forces of
nature subject to man;” yet, he cautions there, it does so only within the “context of antitheses” since this
“productive capacity” is not “handled consciously.” Engels, Frederick, ‘Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy’,
The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan (tr.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International
Publishers: New York; 2009), 217.
663 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.),
(Penguin Books: London; 1993), 542.
664 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, David Fernbach (trans.), Vol. III (Penguin Books:
London; 1991), 911.
665 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, David Fernbach (trans.), Vol. III (Penguin Books:
London; 1991), 959. Or see Marx, Karl, Capital, David McLellan (ed.), Abridged Edition, (Oxford University Press:
Oxford; 2008), 470. This is also why I fundamentally disagree with Foster that “there is simply no indication
anywhere in Marx's writings that he believed that a sustainable relation to the earth would come automatically with
the transition to socialism.” Foster argues that, instead, Marx “emphasized the need for planning in this area.” See
Foster, John Bellamy, 'Marx’s Theory of Metabolic Rift: Classical Foundations for Environmental Sociology', AJS
Volume 105, Number 2 (September 1999), 387. To say that socialism would not necessarily develop a more
reasonable relation to nature, because this would demand “planning” in the realm of necessity, forgets just what
socialism is. Marx defines such a society in Capital as a free association of more fully-developed individuals who,
in the realm of labour, would go about “rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their
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foresee the “exploitation of nature…ceas[ing] in the future,” but merely “rationalized” so as to
prevent nature from reaping its revenge upon humanity.666 To be sure, he is right that a truly
rational relation to the earth would both appreciate the fact that humans live within a “metabolic
interaction with nature,” and, at the same time, “renounce the ruthless exploitation of the
latter.”667 Yet, Marx’s philosophy of nature explicitly meets both of these ecological
qualifications. It acknowledges that humans are a part of nature, and, at the same time, also
offers glimpses into a future society freed from domination. But this liberation of nature from
domination presupposes precisely the rational ‘mastery’ of the metabolism with it. As Burkett
puts it,
communal property is designed to promote the free development of human beings
(compared to class societies) while protecting the interests of future generations in a
sustainable appropriation of nature— one that maintains and even improves the quality
of natural wealth. In Marx’s vision, the de-alienation of the conditions of production
includes a broad diffusion of the scientific knowledge required for effective communal
management of natural conditions and their appropriation in the social labour process.
Underlying the ecological potential of Marx’s vision is an interesting economic
paradox…If people want to develop as natural beings, they must develop further as
social beings, and an explicit socialization of the natural conditions of production…So
if we want to live with nature, we must master our social organization.668
As McNally claims, the “indifference to nature” that is sometimes mistakenly “ascribed
to Marx” in ecological critiques more accurately reflects his own critique of “capital’s
indifference to nature.” It is “precisely this indifference” which is so “central to his claims for the
irrationality of capitalism as a system.”669 In Capital, as we read in Part II, he argues that the
irrational tendencies of the ‘natural laws’ of bourgeois development undermine the actual
common control.” Hence, their own social “freedom in this field”— socialism— depends completely upon a new
and rational relation to the earth, i.e., one based precisely upon the 'plan' of the freely associated producers.
666 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (New Left Books: London; 1971),
155-156.
667 Ibid., 154.
668 Burkett, Paul, Marx and Nature: Toward a Red and Green Perspective, (St. Martin's Press: New York;
1999), 257.
669 McNally, David, 'Beyond the False Infinity of Capital: Dialectics and Self-Mediation in Marx's Theory of
Freedom', New Dialectics and Political Economy, Robert Albrighton and Joh Simoulidis (ed.), (Palgrave Macmillan:
New York; 2003), 14.
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universal-natural laws of the metabolism. Foster emphasizes Marx’s thoughts on salinization as
an example of this tendency. “Agriculture,” wrote Marx, “when it progresses spontaneously and
is not consciously controlled...leaves deserts behind it.”670 The “moral of the tale” is that the
capitalist system runs counter to a rational agriculture, or that a rational agriculture is
incompatible with the capitalist system (even if it promotes technical development in
agriculture) and needs either small farmers working for themselves or the control of the
associated producers.671
Throughout Capital, Marx continually “draws attention to the irrational consequences” of the
unlimited impulses of the capitalist mode of production and its “relation to the finitude of
nature.”672 In developing his political ecology of capitalist society, Marx’s concerns ranged from
the problems of deforestation to water pollution, from composting to the diversion of waterways
for large-scale irrigation. As Burkett concludes from Marx's thoughts in the Grundrisse and
Capital,
the most influential prejudices against Marx and Engels among ecological thinkers—
that they ignored natural limits, championed human domination of nature, embraced an
anti-ecological industrialism, downplayed capitalism’s reliance on materials and energy,
and reduced wealth to labour— have all been thoroughly debunked.673
Burkett argues that the tendency is for ecological critiques of Marx to argue that he
adheres to an “‘industrialist’ ideology that is evidently not specific to capitalism.” By contrast,
Marx himself located the “ecological problem” within this “system’s class relations” and
regarded it as a by-product of the “social separation of workers and their communities from the
land and other necessary conditions of production”674 Fine and Saad-Filho complain that
“Marxism has been accused of privileging the social at the expense of the natural” because of an
670 Foster, John Bellamy, 'Marx’s Theory of Metabolic Rift: Classical Foundations for Environmental
Sociology', AJS Volume 105, Number 2 (September 1999), 386.
671 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, David Fernbach (trans.), Vol. III (Penguin Books:
London; 1991), 216.
672 McNally, David, 'Beyond the False Infinity of Capital: Dialectics and Self-Mediation in Marx's Theory of
Freedom', New Dialectics and Political Economy, Robert Albrighton and Joh Simoulidis (ed.), (Palgrave Macmillan:
New York; 2003), 15.
673 Burkett, Paul, Marxism and Ecological Economics: Toward a Red and Green Political Economy, (Brill:
London; 2006), 10.
674 Ibid., 155.
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“excessive preoccupation with the economic.” Unlike these critics, however, Marx does not
identify a “trans-historical conflict” between “the environment and the economy,” but, rather,
sees the ecological crisis exclusive to modern society as a process “driven” by the logic of the
capitalist system. He analyzed the problem of “environmental degradation” from the context of
these “environmental relations…characteristic of capitalism.” As long as the social relations of
individuals to one another and to nature continues to appear to them as merely external relations
between things, blindly operating ‘behind their backs’, the “corresponding tendencies to
appropriate and transform the environment” in destructive ways will also be perpetuated.675
In Marx’s definition of it, socialism certainly depends upon the “full development of [the]
human mastery over the forces of nature.”676 But this in no way implies continued ‘domination’,
as Adorno, Schmidt and Leiss suggest. The term 'mastery' also denotes a certain virtuosity, talent,
art, skill, or techne— e.g., in the sense that an excellent pianist can be said to have mastered the
piano. That Marx refers to the “mastery” not only “of so-called nature,” but also “of humanity's
own nature,” illustrates that the meaning which Frankfurt readings often ascribe to this concept is
inconsistent with his usage.677 As Ollman explains, Marx’s conception of “mastery” precludes
“domination” because it involves “becoming conscious of the internal relations” between human
society and nature.678 As Lichtheim reads Marx, communism is the struggle to “overcome the
alienation” produced by capitalism's “previous attempt to master nature” in such an external and
domineering way.679
Even Engels, since derided by many ecological critics for crowning socialist man as the
675 Saad-Filho, Alfredo, and Fine, Ben, Marx's Capital, (Pluto Press: London; 2004), 174-176.
676 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.),
(Penguin Books: London; 1993), 488.
677 Ibid., 488.
678 Ollman, Bertell, Marxism: An Uncommon Introduction, (Stirling Publishers: New Delhi; 1991), 79-86.
679 Lichtheim, George, Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study, (Praeger Publishing: New York; 1963), 47-
48.
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“conscious lord of nature,” emphasizes that this sort of “mastery” is inconsistent with the
environmental degradation of the planet. He cautions us that we should not “flatter ourselves
overmuch on account of our human conquest over nature.” History has shown that we can “by no
means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside
nature.” Rather, humanity must recognize that “we belong to nature” in “flesh, blood, and brain.”
In the past, societies had no “inkling” whatsoever that their irrational behaviour was destroying
the nature of which they were but a part. With “each such conquest,” nature took its so-called
“revenge on us” through “unforeseen effects.” With socialism, by contrast, the “conditions of life
which environ man, and which have hitherto ruled man, now comes under the dominion and
control of man.” He becomes the “lord over nature, his own master— free.” With this “ascent of
man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom,” with this transformation of
“animal conditions of existence into really human ones,” humankind would be “finally marked
off from the rest of the animal kingdom.” However, Engels also argued that this very 'mastery'
would allow us for the first time to foresee, mitigate, regulate, and/or eliminate even the most
“remote consequences” of our negative impact upon the planet. The “possibility is afforded us of
mastering and controlling these effects as well.” Able to “know and correctly apply its laws,” this
“mastery” would allow humanity not only to “feel, but to know, its unity with nature.” Socialism
would therefore do away with the “antinatural idea of a contradiction” between “man and
nature.”680
In a socialist society, Marx and Engels believed that the “laws of his own social action,
hitherto standing face-to-face with man as laws of Nature foreign to, and dominating him, will
then be used with full understanding, and so mastered by him.” Our own “social organization,”
680 Engels, Frederick, Dialectics of Nature, (Foreign Language Publishing: Moscow; 1971), 293-295. Engels,
Frederick, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Edward Aveling (trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 2008),
72-73.
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which has up until now appeared as a “necessity imposed by nature and history,” would for the
first time be determined by “free action.”681 But, in a capitalist society, the opposite is the case.
Although capitalism’s advancement of the technical and scientific capabilities formally subjects
nature to the command of social labour, the productive forces are themselves reflected back and
unleashed in such a way that they appear as erratic, unintelligible, and uncontrollable forces of
nature. The artificial natural necessity of the capitalist economy therefore takes approximatively
the same form for Marx as blind fate did for the ancient dramatists, i.e., it operates with a law-
like consistency and iron-clad rigidity, but seemingly without any higher purpose outside itself.
Individuals are “ruled” by unthinking economic tendencies just as they were originally by the
seemingly “blind forces of Nature.”682 Modern society is just the “Darwinian struggle of the
individual for existence transferred from Nature to society with intensified violence.”683
Our own social forces, having been mystified in this way, react back upon us almost as if
they were themselves natural and unconscious forces. As Novack and Mandel argue, this appeals
to Hegel’s critique of “industrial society as a 'vast system of mutual interdependence, a moving
life of the dead…[which] moves hither and yon in a blind elementary way'.”684 “Capitalist
society stands in the same relation towards its own economy” as the “savage does towards
thunder, lightning, and rain.”685 This is why Marx refers to the contradictory aspect of the
capitalist mastery over nature as the ideal, but not yet real, overcoming of all precapitalist
'nature-idolatry'. We now bow down before our own productive powers as if they were blind and
681 Engels, Frederick, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Edward Aveling (trans.), (International Publishers:
New York; 2008), 72-73.
682 See Marx, Karl, Capital, David McLellan (ed.), Abridged Edition, (Oxford University Press: Oxford; 2008),
470. Or see, Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, David Fernbach (trans.), Vol. III (Penguin Books:
London; 1991), 958-959.
683 Engels, Frederick, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Edward Aveling (trans.), (International Publishers:
New York; 2008), 59-60, 68-69.
684 Hegel quoted in Novack, George, and Mandel, Ernest, The Marxist Theory of Alienation: Three Essays,
(Pathfinder Press: New York; 1973), 65.
685 Thalheimer quoted in Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (New Left
Books: London; 1971), 42.
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wanton forces of nature, i.e., forces which require constant propitiation, appeasement and even
human sacrifice. Our own social history now occupies the role once played by natural history in
precapitalist life, except still in its initial semblance as just another form of natural history. This
is the meaning and significance of Marx's often quoted, but just as often misunderstood,
statement in the 'Preface' to Capital: viz., that the “economic formation of society is [to be]
viewed as a process of natural history” (emphasis added). In analyzing this economy, we must
regard individuals as being reduced to “personification[s] of economic categories”— a reflection
of the “objective process” of production in which they are precluded from consciously
controlling their own life-activity and relations with each other.686
What so many read here as proof of the mature Marx's economic determinism is
ultimately nothing else but a trenchant critique of alienation and mystification. While the
political economists treated the 'natural laws' of bourgeois society as eternal and inviolable laws
of nature, i.e., as if they belonged to the “final term of human development,” Marx’s critique
reveals their historical and transitory status.687 What the critique of political economy emphasizes
is not an economistic view of history, but the need to struggle against this fetishism which has
inverted the process of human history into one of natural history. Precisely because capitalist
686 “Intrinsically, it is not a question of the higher or lower degree of development of the social antagonisms
that result from the natural laws of capitalist production. It is a question of these laws themselves, of these
tendencies working with iron necessity towards inevitable results. The country that is more developed industrially
only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future...One nation can and should learn from others. And
even when a society has got upon the right track for the discovery of the natural laws of its movement— and it is the
ultimate aim of this work, to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society— it can neither clear by bold
leaps, nor remove by legal enactments, the obstacles offered by the successive phases of its normal development.
But it can shorten and lessen the birth-pangs...To prevent possible misunderstanding, a word. I paint the capitalist
and the landlord in no sense couleur de rose [or, as seen through rose-coloured glasses]. But here individuals are
dealt with only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class-
relations and class-interests. My standpoint, from which the evolution of the economic formation of society is
viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for relations whose
creature he socially remains, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them.” Marx, Karl, Capital: A
Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London; 1990), 90-93.
687 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books:
London; 1990), 174-175.
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society has not yet fully emerged from natural history, Marx also defines it as the “last
antagonistic” phase in the “prehistory of human society.”688 Only beyond it does truly human
history begin, because only then do individuals make history upon circumstances which are
within their control. As such, what the critique of political economy in Capital emphasizes in the
last instance is the agency of the estranged to overcome their own estrangement.
Although they fail to acknowledge its ecological implications for the metabolism with
nature, Adorno and Schmidt offer otherwise insightful interpretations of this idea in Marx.
Adorno argues that Marx understood that the “history of the progressing mastery of nature”
becomes, under the regime of capital, an extension of the “unconscious history of nature.”689
That these natural laws are disclosed by him as social laws in no way “rob[s] Marx's talk of
natural history of part of its truth content.”690 These “societal laws” really are “experienced in the
form of natural laws.” The “law [of capital] is natural,” so to speak, because its effects really do
appear “inevitable...under the prevailing conditions of production,” i.e., as if “inherent in its
being.”691As Cook explains of Adorno, he
interprets Marx's reference to [capitalism as] natural history as a reference to second—
rather than to “first” [nature]...To bolster this interpretation, Adorno cites a later passage
from Capital where Marx declared that “the law of capitalist accumulation...has been
mystified into a law of nature.”692
Schmidt expands upon Adorno's interpretation, noting that the “result of man's control
over nature has asserted itself as a natural force because of his inability to control society.”693
Since individuals are confronted by their own alienated forces, capitalist society has “not yet
688 Marx, Karl, 'A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy', Karl Marx: Early Writings, R.
Livingstone and G. Benton (trans.), (Vintage Books: New York; 1975), 426.
689 Adorno, Theodor, Negative Dialectics, (Taylor and Francis: Frankfurt; 2004), 355.
690 Ibid., 355.
691 Ibid., 354-355.
692 Cook, Deborah, Adorno on Nature, (Acumen Publishing: Durham; 2011), 8.
693 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (New Left Books: London; 1971),
139.
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emerged from natural history” in the truest sense.694 Schmidt suggests that when Hegel originally
made the distinction between “first nature” and “second nature,” he had in mind the contrast
between the “world of things existing outside of men” as a “blind conceptless occurrence,” and
the “manifested reason” of “objective Spirit” in the “state, law, society, and the economy.”695 But
Marx's critique of political economy “opposes to this” the notion that the “'second nature' is still
the 'first',” operating very much in the form of the “blind necessity” of market relations.696
Yet, as Schmidt is right to argue, Marxism as a political project is oriented towards
reversing this fetishism which has reduced human history to natural history. “If men learn not
only to see through the laws ruling their lives in theory, but also to control these laws in
practice,” then they can “transcend” this “process of natural history.”697 As Bloch defines Marx’s
view, socialism
posits liberation from blind fate, from unfathomed necessity, allied with a concrete act
of pushing back the barriers of nature. Since human beings here consciously make
history for the first time, the appearance vanishes of that fate which has been produced
by human beings themselves, in class society, and ignorantly made into a fetish. Fate is
unfathomed, uncontrolled necessity, freedom is controlled necessity, from which
alienation has vanished and real order emerges, precisely as the realm of freedom.698
In capitalist as much as in precapitalist society, the relation to others and to nature is mystified
into an incomprehensible or stochastic process of natural history. What are really social
determinations appear as the erratic sway of elemental forces. Communism thereby necessarily
“differs from all previous movements in that it overturns the basis of all earlier relations of
production and intercourse,” since it “for the first time consciously treats all naturally evolved
premises as the creation of hitherto existing men” and, so, “strips them of their natural character
694 Ibid., 134.
695 Ibid., 42-43.
696 Ibid., 43.
697 Ibid., 134.
698 Bloch, Ernst, The Principle of Hope, Vol. II, Plaice, Plaice and Knight (trans.), (MIT Press: Cambridge,
Mass; 1994), 624.
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and subjugates them to the power of the united individuals.”699
[E]very society based upon the production of commodities has this peculiarity: that the
producers have lost control over their own social inter-relations...Anarchy reigns in
socialized production. But the production of commodities, like every other form of
production, has it peculiar, inherent laws inseparable from it; and these laws work,
despite anarchy, in and through anarchy...They work themselves out, therefore,
independently of the producers, and in antagonism to them, as inexorable natural laws
of their particular form of production...Active social forces work exactly like natural
forces: blindly, forcibly, destructively, so long as we do not understand, and reckon with,
them. But, when once we understand them, when once we grasp their action, their
direction, their effects, it depends only upon ourselves to subject them more and more to
our own will, and, by means of them, to reach our own ends. And this holds quite
especially of the mighty productive forces of today. As long as we obstinately refuse to
understand the nature and the character of these social means of action— and this
understanding goes against the grain of the capitalist mode of production, and its
defenders— so long these forces are at work in spite of us, in opposition to us, so long
they master us...[W]hen once their nature is understood, they can...be transformed from
master demons into willing servants. The difference is as that between the destructive
force of electricity in the lightning in the storm, and electricity under command in the
telegraph and the voltaic arc; the difference between a conflagration, and fire working in
the service of man. With this recognition, at last, of the real nature of the productive
forces of today, the social anarchy of production gives place to a social regulation of
production upon a definite plan, according to the needs of the community and of each
individual. Then the capitalist mode of appropriation, in which the product enslaves first
the producer, and then the appropriator, is replaced by the mode of appropriation of the
products that is based upon the nature of the modern means of production; upon the one
hand, direct social appropriation, as means to the maintenance and extension of
production— on the other, direct individual appropriation, as means of subsistence and
of enjoyment.700
Engels develops the view here that natural necessity takes on the semblance of blind fate
only insofar as the necessary social relation between individuals and of individuals to nature is
unmastered, i.e., the conditions and relations of their life appear beyond their comprehension
and/or conscious control. He reveals in another work that this is a direct appropriation of Hegel’s
critique of Kant’s ‘third antinomy’.
Hegel was the first to state correctly the relation between freedom and necessity. To him,
freedom is the insight into necessity (die Einsicht in die Notwendigheit). “Necessity is
blind only in so far as it is not understood [begriffen].” Freedom does not consist in any
dreamt-of independence from natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in
the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite
ends...Freedom therefore consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature,
a control founded on knowledge of natural necessity; it is therefore necessarily a
699 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 89-90.
700 Engels, Frederick, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Edward Aveling (trans.), (International Publishers:
New York; 2008), 59-60, 68-69.
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product of historical development. The first men who separated themselves from the
animal kingdom were in all essentials as unfree as the animals themselves, but each step
forward in the field of culture was a step towards freedom….[The] immense productive
forces [of capitalism]…alone make possible a state of society in which there are no
longer class distinctions or anxiety over the means of subsistence for the individual, and
in which for the first time there can be talk of real human freedom, of an existence in
harmony with the laws of nature that have become known.701
The great insight of Hegel’s philosophy is that it recognizes the essential role of ‘labour’ in
history. As Engels puts it, all of the “planned action of all animals has never resulted in
impressing the stamp of their will upon nature.” The “animal merely uses external nature;” the
human being, by changing nature, “makes it serve his ends, masters it.” This is the “final,” and
most “essential distinction between man and other animals, and once again it is labour that brings
about this distinction.”702
Marx also claims that his own views on this question of the relationship between freedom
and necessity are based upon a radical appropriation of Hegel’s philosophy. He approves of the
Hegelian idea that the “cunning” of reason “consists principally in her mediating activity.”
Through this mediation, labour is capable of setting industrial and natural forces into motion so
that they operate independently of labour, and in the service its own ends. It is capable of
“causing objects to act and re-act on each other in accordance with their own nature, [so that] in
this way, without any direct interference in the process, carries out reason’s intentions.”703 As
Marx reiterates elsewhere, Hegel “correctly” recognized that when “man possesses the resolve to
use a part of the available natural objects directly as means of labour,” he “subsumes them under
his activity.”704 Not only does reason work through and with the forces of nature to realize its
own purposes, she applies and leverages the mastery over the laws of nature so as to redirect its
701 Engels, Frederick, Anti-Dühring: Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science, Works of Marxism—
Leninism, Vol XVIII, Emile Burns (trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1894), 100-101.
702 Engels, Frederick, Dialectics of Nature, Clemens Dutt (trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1976),
291.
703 See Hegel in Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin
Books: London; 1990), 283.
704 Ibid., 734.
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forces to work purposefully for her.
Marx interprets the emancipatory potential of the immense powers of production brought
into being by modern industry and natural science in the light of this Hegelian principle.
Industrialism, as a form of production, actually allows individuals to step back from the
immediate mode of labour. “No longer does the worker insert a modified natural thing
[Naturgegenstand] as middle link between the object [Objekt] and himself.” The individual
“steps to the side of the production process instead of being its chief actor.” The direct form of
labour disappears more and more as the labourer “no longer appears so much to be included
within the production process.” Acting as a “watchman and regulator,” labour would be able to
direct the process of production by scientifically regulating the total social power. Production is
determined here by “neither the direct human labour he performs, nor the time during which he
works;” instead, it is determined by the “appropriation of his own general productive power, his
understanding of nature and his mastery over it by virtue of his presence as a social body— it is,
in a word, the development of the social individual which appears as the great foundation-stone
of production and of wealth.”
With this sort of automation, work can be reduced more and more to the conscious
application and appropriation of the scientific powers of individuals— i.e., their mastery of the
knowledge of nature's laws, practical manipulation of the mechanical, chemical, physical, etc.,
forces and properties of things. At bottom, production in this sense involves the “analysis and
application of mechanical and chemical laws, arising directly out of science.” To the “degree that
large industry develops, the creation of real wealth comes to depend less on labour time and on
the amount of labour employed than on the power of the agencies set in motion during labour
time...[which] depends on the general state of science and on the progress of technology.”
Natural science would then be able to serve genuinely human ends in a socialist society. It would
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realize its essentially human function, and be re-constituted as a sort of ‘moral science’.
Production would involve the “application of the science of material metabolism,” and it would
be oriented toward the rational “regulation” of this relation for the “greatest advantage of the
entire body of society.” Here, “general social knowledge has become a direct force of
production.” The “conditions of the process of social life itself have come under the control of
the general intellect and been transformed in accordance with it”— all of which is present “not
only in the form of knowledge, but also as [the] immediate organs of social practice” in industry.
After all, concludes Marx in this passage from the Grundrisse, “Nature builds no
machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules, etc.” These are all
examples of “natural material transformed into organs of the human will over nature.” Like
Hegel, he treats these as “products of human industry,” i.e., “organs of the human brain, created
by the human hand.” They are the “power of knowledge, objectified.” These statements from the
Grundrisse have been interpreted as expressing deeply anti-ecological sentiments given that
Marx justifies the regulation of the metabolism through industrial means. The “watchman and
regulator…inserts the process of nature, transformed into an industrial process, as a means
between inorganic nature, mastering it.” However, Marx concludes at the end of all this that the
progressive mastery over the portions of nature with which we interact is itself an essential
aspect of the “human participation in nature.”705
If the human relation to nature and natural necessity is conceived of as an external
relation, then the relation to one’s own needs and necessary relations with others is also reduced
to an external affair. To relate to the nature transformed by labour, to previously objectified
labour, as an externality implies that labour also relates to the actual process of objectification, or
705 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.),
(Penguin Books: London; 1993), 704-706.
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the objective activity of labour, as a process of self-externalization and estrangement. But, in
Marx’s conception of socialist society, individuals do not stand in such an alien relation vis-a-vis
the objective moments and material conditions of their own life-activity. On the contrary, they
relate to both the inorganic body of nature, and the extended organs of the human brain or
organs of social practice, i.e., the objectified power of knowledge in machinery, technology, etc.,
as integral to their being, as part of their objective presence as individuals. Precisely because
nature is to be universally appropriated and mastered by a society of more fully-developed
individuals, it would no longer be dominated in the way in which it has been by capitalist society.
Marx’s conception of socialism does not envision such a society exploiting the world
recreated by its own revolutionary praxis. Instead, he believed that, in a higher society, this
relation would take on a ‘transparent’ form. Individuals would relate to the portions of nature
transformed by labour as what they are: viz., not mere objects of utility, but, rather, so many
objectifications of their own capacities, needs, and connections with one another. Production, and
the general intercourse with nature, would then appear as the development and application of
one’s own general intellectual, aesthetic, etc., capacities, as the appropriation of the total social
wealth of the individual and of the individual’s total social bond to others. It is the
“appropriation” of the universality and “productive power” of the individual: i.e., her own
“understanding of nature,” her own “mastery over it” as a “social individual” capable of
consciously directing and applying the developed capacities of the “general intellect.”
To be sure, when Marx and Engels wrote about the mastery over the material metabolism
with nature, they were primarily concerned with overcoming the blind necessity of capitalist
relations so as to secure the conditions and relations necessary for this free and full development
of all individuals. Yet, as registered in Part II of this dissertation as well as in this chapter, they
also acknowledged that the irrationality of the capitalist system of production entails negative
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environmental implications which would have to be resolved by such a higher society’s rational
regulation of the relation to nature. Nature’s so-called “revenge” upon society— I say ‘so-called’
because Engels really treats it not as an act of nature, but as one of the many 'anarchic' results of
our own economy— this revenge can only be exchanged for reconciliation by consciously
controlling the metabolism. Once it is no longer subject to the blind necessity of capital, Marx
believed it would be possible to repair the relation to nature in a social form also appropriate to
the full development of human beings. In the end, then, the Marx of the Grundrisse and Capital
stresses the same essential content that Adorno and Horkheimer's “critique of enlightenment”
claims to: viz., it seeks to “prepare the way for a positive notion of enlightenment which will
release it from the entanglement in blind domination,” including over nature.706 But Marx's
conception of nature is underpinned by philosophical assumptions quite different than those
which inform Frankfurt critiques of it. For Marx and Engels, only a society which has mastered
its metabolism with the earth, and overcome the artificial division specific to capitalist
production, will be able to free itself from dominating nature as if it were something 'external'.
The union with nature can be restored only in a higher society, i.e. one which has given the
greatest impetus to the realization of human nature and full development of the general
intellectual powers of the individual.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have seen that Adorno, Schmidt, Leiss and other critical theorists
extended their critiques of the instrumental and/or technological 'rationality' of capitalism into
criticisms of Marx's conception of the relation to nature in a higher society. They allege that, in
706 Adorno, Theodor W., and Horkheimer, Max, Dialectic of Enlightenment, John Cumming (trans.),
(Continuum: New York; 1972), xv-xvi.
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the sort of socialism which he envisages, all of the technical forces and apparatuses of control
developed by capital would simply be redirected by classless society towards the domination of
nature. According to this reading, Marx’s view of nature, and of the social relation to it, was
confined to a utilitarian perspective. However, far from endorsing utilitarianism, this chapter has
argued that his critique of political economy was explicitly anti-utilitarian well into the late
writings. The needs, pleasures, capabilities and activities of individuals, as well as their relations
with each other and with the earth itself, are not reducible to Bentham’s one-sided principle. And
where the lives of individuals are indeed whittled down to this narrow circle of utility, as in a
capitalist economy, it amounts to nothing less than what he referred to as a dehumanizing system
of universal prostitution. Utilitarianism is a doctrine which treats the total social wealth of the
human personality as an entirely accidental, external and commercial affair— and, hence, Marx
believed such a philosophy corresponded perfectly with the estranged appearances of modern life.
This chapter has also tried to demonstrate that Marx did not share the Frankfurters’
philosophic assumptions about the 'iron cage' of reason, nor is his theory of the metabolism
susceptible to their critiques of it. Rather, we found that his conception of 'rationally regulating'
the realm of necessity in no way corresponds with what they characterize as 'instrumental'
rationality. In fact, the latter is more consistent what Marx himself criticizes as the irrationality
of the bourgeois economy as a “system of general utility,” a system involving the “general
exploitation” of both natural forces and human qualities. His writings therefore present the
ecological problem as a product of the blind necessity of specifically capitalist relations. It is this
economy which results in the domination of nature precisely because individuals do not
rationally regulate and consciously control their own intercourse with it.
Adorno, Schmidt and others challenge that this conception of the ‘mastery’ of the
metabolism in socialism reproduces in theory capitalism’s 'domination' of nature. Yet, that Marx
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and Engels simultaneously refer to the ‘mastery’ of human nature suggests that they must have
meant something quite different by the term. I have elaborated and defended the reading that
Marx did not adhere to the view that the nature mediated, modified, and mastered by labour
would be reduced to an object of pure utility and exploitation. To do so would only reaffirm the
alienation which reduces one's own activities and relations with others to the same. The ethical
content of his critique of political economy is in fact oriented toward the undoing of this very
mystification. He grasped the nature transformed by human practice as the objectification of
human being— and, for that reason, no mere object of utility. In an emancipated society, these
working subjects would relate to the objective moments and material conditions of their reality
as belonging to their inorganic and objective body. As such, this chapter has argued that Marx’s
ontology of internal relations does not analyze the nature with which humans interact as
something external and necessarily alien, but, rather, as part of their being and presence as
socially-related individuals. In a freely-associated form of production, they would relate to nature
in labour through the appropriation of their own universal powers and general intellect, and as
something integral to the enjoyment of their own activities, needs and relations with each other.
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Freedom and Necessity:
From Marx to Marcuse and Schmidt
Introduction
In my judgement, grasping the internal connection between Marx’s political philosophy
and his philosophy of nature requires that we grasp the meaning of his distinction between the
realms of freedom and necessity in a much commented passage from Volume III of Capital.
Marcuse and Schmidt also emphasize the importance of this question as a way of coming to
terms with Marx’s understanding of the relation to nature in socialism. However, this chapter
argues that the interpretations which they offer are untenable.
In his final writings from 1967 onward, Marcuse reversed his previous interpretation of
the relevant passage from ‘The Trinity Formula’ chapter. During this late period of reassessment,
he claimed that, in this “classical” rendition given in Volume III, Marx defined the working-day
in a socialist society as a continued “realm of estrangement.” The time spent working would be
reduced, but the actual process of necessary work would remain inescapably “unfree.” However,
he also contends that the progress towards full automation during the 20th century has
undermined the validity of Marx’s distinction. Breaking with what he came to regard as an
“obsolete” division between work-time and free-time, Marcuse emphasized instead the
possibility for freedom to emerge within the realm of necessity. In the first portions of this
chapter, I will substantiate that, contrary to Marcuse’s claims, Marx envisioned the same
possibility. In fact, we will find that the relevant passage from Capital elaborates specific
conditions for such freedom within the realm of necessary work. The realization of freedom was
not reducible for Marx to the expansion of the free-time reserved for end-in-itself activity. Free-
time was not only form of freedom which he conceived of. Instead, he imagines the possibility of
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liberation within, and not merely beyond, necessary labour.
Schmidt interprets Marx’s remarks in Capital on what remains of necessary labour-time
in socialism as highlighting the ontological break in the development of his philosophy of nature.
The earlier and more “utopian” notion of the humanization of nature is allegedly exchanged in
the later and “more critical” writings for the insoluble “problem of non-identity.” Although he
acknowledges that it is mediated and transformed by human practice, Schmidt claims that the
insuperable non-identity of nature is merely confirmed by the continued necessity of labour in
socialism. The intransigent portions of nature were ostensibly represented by this mature Marx as
eternal limits to self-determination and self-realization, everlasting nature-given barriers to
praxis, freedom, and human happiness. Regardless of however much it is made into an object
for-us, says Schmidt, nature's objectivity remains in-itself indifferent and external to the progress
of civilization, just as humanity's relation to it through labour remains unalterably instrumental,
unfree, and alien. I will argue that all of these shortcomings in Schmidt’s interpretation of Marx
can be traced back to his uncritical relationship to Adorno. He actually re-reads elements of
Adorno's critique of Marx back into Marx's late writings. In the place of the dialectic of
negativity appropriated from Hegel, we find Adorno's 'negative dialectic'. The historical
materialist principle of the 'priority of external nature' is substituted with Adorno's neo-Kantian
notion of the 'preponderance of the object'. And Marx's statement about the convergence between
nature and history is replaced instead with Adorno's criticism of this hypothesis as
simultaneously true and false. Having projected Adorno into Marx's late writings in this way,
Schmidt can then refer us to the “dialectical duality” and “inextinguishable internal moment” of
antinomy in Marx's materialism!
Marcuse on the Relationship between Freedom and Necessity
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In my opinion, Marx’s late writings envisage the possibility of a radically new relation to
nature developing within socialism. We are given a glimpse into that vision in the
aforementioned passage from the ‘Trinity Formula’ chapter of Capital in which he distinguishes
between the realms of freedom and necessity. But the significance of this distinction, and its
implications for Marx’s philosophy of nature, have been completely misrepresented by historical
and contemporary secondary literature. Marcuse, who expended a considerable amount of effort
thinking through this question and Marx’s response to it, also defended the view that it was of the
greatest relevance to both an appreciation of Marx’s conception of nature, as well as to the
contemporary theory and practice of socialism. He believed, not without justice, that the very
idea of socialism— both in Marx’s time, and a century later— turned upon theorizing the
meaning of this distinction.707 However, while Marcuse was right to emphasize the theoretical
and practical importance of this question, his interpretation of the relevant passage from Volume
III of Capital is underpinned by a mistaken assumption about the character of work in socialism:
namely, the assumption that Marx characterizes the realm of necessity as a realm of non-freedom.
To be fair, Marcuse’s interpretation underwent considerable change between the 1940s
and 1970s. In his earlier writings, he had argued that Marx’s political philosophy is predicated
not only upon a rational reorganization of the forces of production toward the aim of satisfying
human needs, but also upon a radical remaking of the production process itself. From Reason
and Revolution to One Dimensional Man, he contends that Marx’s conception of socialism is
dependent not merely upon the reduction of the working-day to a minimum, but upon the
transformation of work into a form of free activity and mode of self-actualization. Yet, certain
tendencies within Marcuse’s own thought, which were present from Eros and Civilization
707 Marcuse, Herbert, 'The End of Utopia', Five Lectures: Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Utopia, Shapiro and
Weber (trans.), (Penguin Publishers: London; 1970), 62-66. Marcuse, Herbert, 'The Realm of Freedom and the
Realm of Necessity: A Reconsideration', Praxis: A Philosophical Journal, 5 (1969), 22-23.
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onward, eventually provoked him into a ‘reconsideration’ of this earlier reading. His increased
emphasis upon desublimated forms of play, turn toward the utopian socialism of Fourier, notion
of a fully automated society, as well as his critiques of technological rationality and of the
performance principle— all of these combine to lead him into a late period of reappraisal.
The decisive break occurs in 1967, when he begins to reinterpret the realm of necessity as
a realm of continued estrangement within socialism. While the time spent working may be
limited, the actual activity of working, he now insists of Marx’s view in Capital, remains
fundamentally unfree. As such, during this period of reassessment, he came to criticize the very
distinction between necessity and freedom as one which is still theoretically confined within the
contradictions of capitalism. The division which Capital establishes between work-time and free-
time is itself reflective of the division of labour and life within modern society. However, for
Marcuse, the course of the technological rationality of 20th century capitalism meant that this
division between labour-time and free-time had become obsolete, belonging to a now defunct
stage in the history of socialist theory. Total automation could abolish work by transforming it
into and/or substituting it with play, opening-up aesthetic horizons of human possibility
unimagined by the Marx of the ‘Trinity Formula’.
In his earlier works, such as Reason and Revolution, Marcuse had by contrast stressed the
philosophic continuities between the early and late Marx precisely with respect to the concepts of
labour and nature. Labour is a condition of existence in every form of society, but he suggests
that, in both the early and late texts, Marx envisioned an ‘abolition’ of labour in the dialectical
sense of the expression. The tendency toward the quantitative reduction of the time spent in
labour, although it has its absolute limits, would also be accompanied by a qualitative
transformation of the labour process itself. Given that this mode of production would so different
from what prevails in both precapitalist and capitalist societies, Marcuse contends that Marx was
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even reticent at times to refer to such activity as 'labour'. In other instances, however, Marcuse
notes that he places a wholly positive emphasis upon labour as a potentially and essentially free
form of self-realization.
Labor in its true form is a medium for man's true self-fulfillment, for the full
development of his potentialities; the conscious utilization of the forces of nature should
take place for his satisfaction and enjoyment. In its current form, however, it cripples all
human faculties and enjoins satisfaction...Marx's social practice embodies the negativity
as well as its overcoming. The negativity of capitalist society lies in its alienation of
labor; the negation of this negativity will come with the complete abolition of alienated
labor…Elsewhere, Marx says the same thing: 'The communistic revolution is directed
against the preceding mode of activity, does away with labor'. And again, 'the question
is not the liberation but the abolition of labor'...[L]abor has already been made 'free':
free labor is the achievement of capitalist society...These amazing formulations in
Marx's earliest writings all contain the Hegelian term Aufhebung, so that abolition also
carries the meaning that a content is restored to its true form. Marx, however,
envisioned the future mode of labor to be so different from the prevailing one that he
hesitated to use the same term 'labor' to designate alike the material process of capitalist
society...An 'association of free individuals' to Marx is a society wherein the material
process of production no longer determines the entire pattern of human life...He
contemplates a society that gives to each not according to his work but his needs.
Mankind becomes free only when the material perpetuation of life is a function of the
abilities and happiness of associated individuals...The early writings took labor to be the
general form of man's struggle with nature...basic to all forms of society...To be sure, the
struggle with the 'realm of necessity' will continue with man's passage to the stage of his
'actual history'...Nevertheless, when society has become the free subject of this struggle,
the latter will be waged in entirely different forms. For this reason, it is not permissible
to impose the dialectical structure of pre-history upon the future history of mankind.708
As noted in the previous chapter, although Marcuse accepted the critique of instrumental
reason elaborated by Horkheimer and Adorno, he nonetheless retained the radical hope that the
social revolution might restructure these productive forces so as to allow for the full flourishing
of human potential. In a capitalist society, of course, the immense productive forces are not
oriented toward human emancipation, but, instead, are used as a means of degrading man and
man's relation to nature. However, like Marx, Marcuse regarded the capitalist “progress in the
mastery of necessity” as a prerequisite phase of development. A higher form of society would
have to radically reorganize these forces of production for new ends, effectively redirecting this
social mastery over nature toward the aim of human liberation. In this respect, Marcuse believed
708 Marcuse, Herbert, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, (Vintage Books: New York;
1962), 276, 282-283, 292-293, 295, 316-317.
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that the upper “limits of technical possibility” were completely “incompatible” with capitalist
conditions, and could only become a “reality” with freely-associated labour as its basis.709 As he
writes in the Essays on Liberation, the “libertarian possibilities of technology and science are
effectively contained within the framework of given reality.”710 This essential content is
'contained' within capitalism in both senses of the term, i.e., in that it is both immanent to, and
yet limited by, the form which it currently assumes.
In the revised 1961 ‘Preface’ to Eros and Civilization, Marcuse argues that the utopian
implications of his earlier studies had led him to adopt the view that this technological rationality
of modern society is potentially self-superseding in a Marxian sense. The forces which have been
used up until now as a means of domination may find themselves being reoriented toward
emancipation and reconciliation. Marx too, he says, had recognized that the tendency to reduce
necessary work-time in order to expand its surplus form would, if completed, lead to its own
suspension— i.e., the passing over from “quantitative” into “qualitative change.” The “‘end’ of
technology rationality” in both senses of the expression (i.e., its “limit” and “goal”) is marked by
this dialectical “turn from quantity into quality” in the labour process. According to Marcuse, the
movement toward full automation within capitalist society has therefore opened-up undreamt of
horizons of human possibility. Through the constant marginalization of necessary labour-time
and elimination of direct forms of production, capital has created the concrete conditions for the
future “reversal” of the existing relation between free-time and work-time. Instead of working
full-time, the advanced contradictions of capitalist industry have produced the prospect of “free
time becoming full time” in socialism.711
709 Marcuse, Herbert, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society,
(Beacon Press: Boston; 1966), 35.
710 Marcuse, Herbert, An Essay on Liberation, (Beacon Press: Boston; 1969), 45.
711 “The very idea of a non-repressive civilization, conceived as a real possibility of the established
civilization at the present stage, appears frivolous. Even if one admits this possibility on theoretical grounds, as an
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The technological processes of mechanization and standardization might release
individual energy into a yet uncharted realm of freedom beyond necessity...[T]he
individual would be liberated from the work world's imposing upon him alien needs and
alien possibilities. The individual would be free to exert autonomy over a life that would
be his own...This is a goal within the capabilities of advanced industrial civilization, the
'end' of technological rationality…To the extent to which the work world is conceived
of as a machine and mechanized accordingly, it becomes the potential basis of a new
freedom for man...Here is the internal contradiction of this civilization: the irrational
element in its rationality. It is the token of its achievements. The industrial society
which makes technology and science its own is organized for the ever-more-effective
domination of man and nature...It becomes irrational when the success of these efforts
opens new dimensions of human realization...[Hence] the institutions which served the
struggle for existence [in capitalist society] cannot serve the pacification of existence [in
socialism]. Life as an end is qualitatively different from life as a means...To be sure,
labor must precede the reduction of labor, and industrialization must precede the
development of human needs and satisfactions. But as all freedom depends on the
conquest of alien necessity, the realization of freedom depends on the techniques of this
conquest...Advanced industrial society is approaching the stage where continued
progress would demand the radical subversion of the prevailing direction and
organization of progress. This stage would be reached when material production
(including the necessary services) becomes automated to the extent that all vital needs
can be satisfied while necessary labor time is reduced to marginal time. From this point
on, technical progress would transcend the realm of necessity, where it served as the
instrument of domination and exploitation which thereby limited its rationality;
technology would become subject to the free play of faculties in the struggle for the
pacification of nature and of society. Such a state is envisioned in Marx's notion of the
'abolition of labor'...Within the established societies, the continued application of
scientific rationality would have reached a terminal point with the mechanization of all
socially necessary but individually repressive labor...But this stage would also be the
end and limit of scientific rationality in its established structure and direction. Further
progress would mean the break, the turn of quantity into quality. It would open the
possibility of an essentially new human reality— namely, existence in free time on the
basis of fulfilled vital needs...In other words, the completion of the technological reality
would be not only the prerequisite, but also the rationale for transcending the
technological rationality...[T]he break in turn depends on the continued existence of the
technical base itself. For it is this base which has rendered possible the satisfaction of
needs and the reduction of toil— it remains the very base of all forms of human freedom.
The qualitative change rather lies in the reconstruction of this base— that is, in its
development with a view of different ends.712
In this passage from One Dimensional Man, and in the previous passage from Reason and
Revolution, Marcuse acknowledges something of great importance. Namely, again, that Marx
believed that the tendency toward the quantitative reduction of the working-day would reach a
extension of the achievements of science and technology, one must be aware of the fact that these same
achievements are being used to the contrary, namely, to serve the interests of domination...But, at the same time, the
capabilities of this society, and the need for an ever increasing productivity, engender forces which seem to
undermine the foundations of the system. These explosive forces find their most telling manifestation in automation.
Automation threatens to render possible the reversal of the relation between free time and working time on which
the established civilization rests: the possibility of working time becoming marginal, and free time becoming full
time.” Ibid., vi.
712 Marcuse, Herbert, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, (Beacon
Press: Boston; 1966), 2-3, 16-18, 230-231.
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point beyond which it would have to undergo distinctly qualitative change. Although he certainly
advocated for the minimalization of necessary labour, Marx also recognized that, apart from that,
labour itself would also have to be reconstructed as an ennobling, creative, and even enjoyable
form of activity. Not only is the time spent in work to be pressed down to a reasonable limit, but
the actual work itself must be totally transformed into a mode of self-actualization. This is the
meaning which we have seen Marcuse correctly ascribe to Marx’s conception of the ‘abolition’
of labour. Although necessary labour remains a function of every form of society, the activity of
freely associated producers would be so distinct from all previous forms of production that Marx
even characterized it as the disappearance of the direct form of labour and vanishing away of
unmastered necessity. It would be a form of production determined entirely by the individual’s
appropriation of the total social wealth of her own general powers and the comprehensiveness of
her own relations with others.
To be sure, in One Dimensional Man Marcuse’s reading also rightly places a great
emphasis upon the possibility which industrialization provides for expanding the realm of end-
in-itself freedom to its outermost limits in the future. The technological rationality of modern
society is self-superseding because the tendency of automation is to contract necessary labour-
time to a near vanishing-point. “Automation, once it becomes the basis of material production,
would revolutionize the whole society...Complete automation in the realm of necessity would
open the dimension of free time....This would be the historical transcendence toward a new
civilization.”713 However, notwithstanding this emphasis upon the marginalization of labour-time,
Marcuse can also be found arguing as late as 1964-65 that, in addition to the “[d]istribution of
the necessities of life regardless of work performance, reduction of working time to a minimum,
[and] universal all-sided education toward exchangeability of functions,” the mature Marx
713 Ibid., 36-37.
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understood “self-determination at the very base of human existence, namely in the dimension of
necessary labor,” as the “most radical and complete revolution.”714 Right up until One
Dimensional Man, Marcuse sees no contradiction whatsoever on this point between the Marx of
the Grundrisse and the Marx of Capital. In Marx’s conception of socialism, the “free play of
thought and imagination assumes a rational and directing function in the realization of a pacified
existence of man and nature...[through] the satisfaction of man's material needs, [and] the
rational organization of the realm of necessity.”715
However, Marcuse’s reading of Marx began to shift in 1965. In The Individual in the
'Great Society', written the year after the publication of One-Dimensional Man, he continues to
defend the view that freedom is what “links the two realms” for Marx because the “‘realm of
freedom’ presupposes a social organization of labor guided by the standards of utmost rationality
in the satisfaction of individual needs for the society as a whole.” With this rationally regulated
realm of necessity as its basis, free-time could expand proportionate to the degree that necessary
work-time is reduced. The increased time spent outside of work would be “free time in the literal
sense that it would be under the control of the individual.” At the same time, Marcuse still
continues to acknowledge that a certain liberation is possible within labour, and not merely
beyond it. In the “Marxian concept, man is free also in the realm of necessity.”
Yet, in The Individual in the ‘Great Society’, he starts to understate the full meaning of
this freedom, whittling it down to the simplest sense of 'self-determination'. The human being is
‘free’ in work, he concludes, only “to the extent to which he has organized it in accordance with
his human needs in transparent rationality.” But it “remains a ‘realm of necessity’”— which
Marcuse now understands to mean a form of alienation “imposed upon man by the continued
714 Ibid., 44.
715 Ibid., 234-235.
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struggle with nature, scarcity, and weakness.” The “time spent in this struggle would be greatly
reduced,” but, unfortunately, would likely “still take up much of the individual's existence.” At
most, this so-called 'freedom' in work-time resolves itself into something inescapably
instrumental for Marcuse: viz., freedom in this field is merely a means for creating the conditions
for end-in-itself freedom. According to this reading of Capital, liberation in labour amounts to
merely redirecting the existing capitalist mastery over the metabolism with nature toward the
ends of human emancipation. But these ends would continue to be enjoyed outside of any actual
time spent in work. In this interpretation of the late Marx, work is represented as a regrettable
sphere of irresolutely instrumental, unfree and unaesthetic activity.716
As we have seen, in Reason and Revolution Marcuse interpreted Marx as arguing that
labour in its “true form” is a mode of man’s “self-fulfillment” allowing for the “full development
of his potentialities.” The “struggle with the 'realm of necessity' will continue” in socialism, but
it would be “waged in entirely different forms.” In One Dimensional Man, he suggested that
Marx envisioned a form of production governed by the “free play of faculties in the struggle for
the pacification of nature”— a “most radical and complete revolution” indeed. However, in the
writings composed during the last half decade of his life, Marcuse reinterprets the relevant
passage from Capital in a completely different manner.
In the 1967 The End of Utopia, he claims that the ‘Trinity Formula’ represents work as
fundamentally “unfree” activity; the realm of necessity remains an ineradicable “realm of
alienated labour” even within a freer society.717 At the same time, as already noted, he also
challenged that this very distinction belongs to a now antiquated phase in the theoretical
716 Marcuse, Herbert, 'The Individual in the Great Society', Towards a Critical Theory of Society, Douglas
Kellner (trans.), (Routledge: New York; 2011), 28.
717 Marcuse, Herbert, 'The End of Utopia', Five Lectures: Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Utopia, Shapiro and
Weber (trans.), (Penguin Publishers: London; 1970), 62-66.
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development of socialism. The technological rationality of 20th century capitalism expanded the
practical possibilities for emancipation in ways which were either unanticipated, or deemed
utopian, by the Marx of Capital. This is why, in his 1969 The Realm of Freedom and the Realm
of Necessity: A Reconsideration, Marcuse goes so far as to contend that Marx’s distinction is
reflective of the bourgeois “division” between “work” and “happiness.” Marx, he claims
mistakenly, “seems to believe that free human activity is essentially different from socially
necessary work.”718 Marx assumes that “freedom cannot enter the realm of necessary labour,” at
least not in the “classical Marxian concept” found in Capital.719 This is why Marcuse began to
argue in the late 1960s that a 'return' to the Grundrisse was necessary inasmuch as it, but not
Capital, envisioned a “radical transformation of the labour process” which “could make possible
free activity in the realm of labour.”720
Nowhere, not even in the Reconsideration, does Marcuse offer us an explanation or
justification for his about-face. The question then becomes which of his interpretations is the
accurate one? Is it the Marcuse who suggests that Marx treated labour as a potentially creative
form of self-objectification involving the free development of the intellectual and aesthetic
energies of individuals, or, by contrast, the Marcuse who suggests that the Marx of Capital broke
with this view by treating the realm of necessity in socialism as a realm of continued
estrangement?
As Kellner notes, it is obvious that Marcuse “struggled with the concept of the relation
between the realms of freedom and necessity.” Eventually, he turned away from what he came to
718 Marcuse, Herbert, 'The Realm of Freedom and the Realm of Necessity: A Reconsideration', Praxis: A
Philosophical Journal, 5 (1969), 22-23.
719 Marcuse quoted in Kellner, Douglas, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism, (University of California
Press: Berkeley; 1984), 325.
720 Ibid., 325.
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see as the rigid dualism of Capital, returning to the more ‘utopian’ vision of the Grundrisse.721
Now, to his credit, “Marcuse was one of the first 'Western Marxists' to see the significance of the
Grundrisse for Marxian theory,” emphasizing its “model of liberated labour in several essays and
in ODM”— which is to say, before its general reception in the English-speaking world.722
However, Kellner glosses over the fact that One Dimensional Man does not identify any sort of
contradiction between the Grundrisse and Capital on this question of labour in socialism. Instead,
Marcuse repeatedly paraphrases Marx’s remark from the ‘Trinity Formula’ that freedom can also
exist within the realm of necessity. But, by 1967, Marcuse has completely “rejected” his
endorsement of this previous reading, abandoning what he now sees as Capital's “unbridgeable
gap between the realms of freedom and necessity.” Thereafter, “Marx's Grundrisse [alone] was
of utmost importance in helping Marcuse to envisage a Marxian notion of liberated labour and
the realm of freedom appearing within the realm of necessity”— in comparison to which the
“classical” conception elaborated in Volume III appears not only anachronistic, but, indeed,
symptomatic of the antitheses of capitalist society.723 In Capital, Marcuse now alleges in his new
reading, Marx merely speaks to the “reduction of the working day,” but not the “transformation
of work itself.”724
This period of reassessment reinforced Marcuse’s view that the technological rationality
of capitalist society is self-sublating in the sense that it would bring about the end of all
utopianism, i.e., the realization of the final goal of utopian socialism. The practical horizons
opened-up by the technical mastery over the metabolism has meant that the 'utopian' ideas are no
longer utopian, no longer a 'no-where', but real possibilities growing within the womb of the
721 Ibid., 325.
722 Ibid., 470.
723 Ibid., 324.
724 Marcuse, Herbert, 'The Realm of Freedom and the Realm of Necessity: A Reconsideration', Praxis: A
Philosophical Journal, 5 (1969), 22-23.
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present.725 He felt that these new possibilities compelled us to rethink and retheorize what has
ostensibly become an increasingly “obsolete” definition provided by the Marx of Volume III.
Today the notion of the end of utopia implies the necessity of at least discussing a new
definition of socialism. The discussion would be based on the question whether decisive
elements of the Marxian concept of socialism do not belong to a now obsolete stage in
the development of the forces of production. This obsolescence is expressed most
clearly, in my opinion, in the distinction between the realm of freedom and the realm of
necessity according to which the realm of freedom can be conceived of and can exist
only beyond the realm of necessity. This division implies that the realm of necessity
remains so in the sense of a realm of alienated labor, which means, as Marx says, that
the only thing that can happen within it is for labor to be organized as rationally as
possible and reduced as much as possible. But it remains labor in and of the realm of
necessity and thereby unfree. I believe that one of the new possibilities, which gives an
indication of the qualitative difference between the free and the unfree society, is that of
letting the realm of freedom appear within the realm of necessity— in labor and not
only beyond labor. To put this speculative idea in a provocative form, I would say that
we must face the possibility that the path to socialism may proceed from science to
utopia and not from utopia to science...What is at stake is the idea of a new theory of
man, not only as theory but also as a way of existence: the genesis and development of a
vital need for freedom and of the vital needs of freedom— of a freedom no longer based
on and limited by scarcity and the necessity of alienated labor...The progressive
reduction of physical labor power in the production process (the process of material
production) and its replacement to an increasing degree by mental labor concentrate
socially necessary labor in the class of technicians, scientists, engineers, etc. This
suggests possible liberation from alienated labor. It is of course a question only of
tendencies, but of tendencies that are grounded in the development and the continuing
existence of capitalist society...And if capitalism heeds this requirement and continues
automation regardless, it will come up against its own inner limit...In the Grundrisse
Marx showed that complete automation of socially necessary labor is incompatible with
the preservation of capitalism. Automation is only a catchword for this tendency,
through which necessary physical labor, alienated labor, is withdrawn to an ever greater
extent from the material process of production. This tendency, if freed from the fetters
of capitalist production, would lead to a creative experimentation with the productive
forces…[The] play with the potentialities of human and nonhuman nature would
become the content of social labor.726
He repeats this same point in his Reconsideration. The “New Left,” he suggests there,
could unlock possibilities which were dismissed as utopian by the Marx of Capital, but which
are nonetheless real potentialities developed only through the contradictions of 20th century
725 He claims that, earlier, social theory had been limited to calling for the “enlargement of the realm of
freedom.” The New Left of 1968 showed that “what is denounced as 'utopian' is no longer that which has 'no
place'...The more these technical capacities outgrow the framework of exploitation...the more they propel the drives
and aspirations of men to a point at which the necessities of life cease to demand aggressive performances....and the
'non-necessary' becomes a vital need...Marx and Engels refrained from developing concrete concepts of the possible
forms of freedom in a socialist society; today, such restrain is no longer justified. The growth of the productive
forces suggests possibilities of human liberty very different from, and beyond those envisaged at the earlier stage.”
See Marcuse, Herbert, An Essay on Liberation, (Beacon Press: Boston; 1969), 3, 5.
726 Marcuse, Herbert, 'The End of Utopia', Five Lectures: Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Utopia, Shapiro and
Weber (trans.), (Penguin Publishers: London; 1970), 62-66.
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capitalism. Again, he acknowledges once more that there was an earlier “Marxian conception of
the relation between freedom and necessity” to be found in the Grundrisse, except that he
reiterates that this “most advanced vision of a free society” was abandoned by, and is completely
inconsistent with, the “classical” conception found in Capital. The “content of socialism” as
found in Marx's critique of political economy must be therefore be
preserved,— aufheoben, in a more radical, a more 'utopian' and at the same time more
realistic concept of a free society, a vision of socialism which may perhaps be best
characterized by a new relationship between the realm of freedom and the realm of
necessity, which differs from the classical conception of this relationship in Marx's
Capital. I recall to you the classical Marxian conception. Human freedom in a true sense
is possible beyond the realm of necessity. The realm of necessity itself forever remains a
realm of unfreedom, and the optimum that can be achieved there is a significant
reduction of the working day, and a high degree of rationality...Now this conception
epitomizes the division of human existence into labor time and free time, the division
between reason, rationality on the one hand, and pleasure, joy, fulfillment on the other
hand, the division between alienated and non-alienated labor. According to this classical
Marxian concept, the realm of necessity would remain a realm of alienation, no matter
how much the working day is being reduced. Moreover this conception seems to imply
that free human activity is essentially different from socially necessary work. Nor does
the earlier Marxian notion of the all-around individual who can do one thing today and
another tomorrow seem applicable to a highly developed industrial society. I am aware
of the fact that there is still another Marxian conception of the relation between freedom
and necessity in the famous and often quoted passage from the Grundrisse...This
concept envisages conditions of full automation, where the immediate producer is
indeed; ‘dissociated' from the material process of production and become a free 'Subject'
in the sense that he can play with, experiment with the technical material, with the
possibilities of the machine and of the things produced and transformed by the machines.
But as far as I know this most advanced vision of a free society was apparently dropped
by Marx himself and no longer appears in Capital and the later writings.727
As Kellner notes, Marcuse came to feel during this late period in his intellectual
development that “Marxism is not utopian enough, for the technical-material possibilities at
hand” have developed far beyond Marx's wildest imaginations. The technological rationality of
advanced capitalism has made
possible [an] even more radical and emancipatory social transformation than Marx
envisaged. In describing the most advanced and emancipatory possibilities of a new
society, Marcuse now rejects the previous ontological dualisms in his thought between
the realm of necessity and freedom, and work and play. He formulates his critique of
these dichotomies as a critique of the Marxian concept which conceives of the real of
freedom only beyond the realm of necessity, which remains a realm of alienated labor,
727 Marcuse, Herbert, 'The Realm of Freedom and the Realm of Necessity: A Reconsideration', Praxis: A
Philosophical Journal, 5 (1969), 22-23.
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as if one could be free only in a realm beyond labor. Whereas in earlier work, Marcuse
seemed to maintain this distinction...[he later] posits the possibility of non-alienated
labor which can be genuinely self-fulfilling, and thus reduces the sharp division in his
theory between labor and play, as well as overcoming the excessively negative concept
of labor as inevitable necessity, unfreedom...In this Marcusian view, the “realm of
freedom” may perhaps appear in the work process itself, in the performance of socially
necessary labor...By the late 1960s, these reflections led Marcuse to criticize the concept
in Marx's Capital III which maintains “Human freedom in the true sense is possible
only beyond the realm of necessity.” Marcuse now argues that Marx's distinction
between the realm of freedom and necessity epitomizes the division of the human
existence into labor time and free time, the division between reason, rationality on the
one hand, and pleasure, joy, fulfillment on the other hand, the division between
alienated and non-alienated labor. According to the classical Marxian concept, the realm
of necessity would remain a realm of necessity, no matter how much the working day is
reduced...[F]ree human activity is essentially different, and must remain essentially
different from socially necessary work...Marcuse then argues that there is another
Marxian conception in the Grundrisse which posits the possibility of freedom and
creative activity within the realm of necessary labor, thus overcoming the dichotomy
between free creative activity and socially necessary labor in Capital III.728
During this late period of reappraisal, Marcuse argued that, in Marx’s division in Capital, the
“same subject lives a different life in the two realms”— it amounts to a division of the human
being itself. In the “Marxian conception,” the “realm of necessity would continue under
socialism to such an extent that real human freedom would prevail only outside the entire sphere
of socially necessary labour.” “Alienation” is thereby raised into a metaphysical, rather than a
historical, contradiction in Marcuse’s reading of Marx because it can only be “reduced with the
progressive reduction of the working day, but the latter would remain a day of unfreedom,
rational but not free.” However, as noted, Marcuse also felt that the productive powers developed
since Marx wrote Capital have created the “possibility of freedom within the realm of necessity.”
The “quantitative reduction of necessary labor could turn into quality (freedom), not in
proportion to the reduction but rather to the transformation of the working day, a transformation
in which the stupefying, enervating, psuedo-automatic jobs of capitalism would be abolished.”
He characterizes this “ingression of freedom into the realm of necessity” as culminating in the
728 Kellner, Douglas, 'Introduction', Marxism, Revolution and Utopia: Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse,
Vol. VI, Douglas Kellner (ed.), (Routledge: London; 2014), 45-47.
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“union between causality by necessity and causality by freedom.”729
Marx on the Possibilities for Freedom within the Realm of Necessity
This ‘Marcusian’ idea of freedom emerging within the realm of necessity would be a
substantive and original contribution to the theoretical development of socialism if the Marx of
Capital had not already formulated it a century earlier— and, indeed, been given credit for it at
one time by Marcuse. If Marcuse’s re-interpretation of Capital were only accurate, then, we
would be right to reject with him its ‘classical’ conception of socialism as an irrelevant one, and
embrace instead the more 'utopian' sentiments expressed in the Grundrisse. If the Marx of the
‘Trinity Formula’ really did conceive of work in a socialist society as an ineradicable form of
non-freedom, Marcuse would be right to retheorize the meaning of the distinction between
freedom and necessity in Marxism.
However, Marcuse is deeply mistaken about Marx’s conception of labour. By supposing
that Marx defines the realm of labour as a realm of estrangement, which can only be reduced but
never eliminated by socialism, I believe that Marcuse contributes to what Sayers calls the
“almost universally misunderstood distinction” between freedom and necessity in Capital. As he
suggests, “in distinguishing between a realm of 'freedom' from a realm of 'necessity'” in Volume
III, “Marx is not making a distinction between spheres of freedom and unfreedom.” It is a
“mistake— though a common one— to infer that the realm of necessity must therefore be a
realm of unfreedom,” but there is “no evidence that Marx makes this assumption, either here or
elsewhere” in Capital.730 Contrary to what Marcuse suggests in his writings from this late period,
nowhere in the relevant passage, nor in any of Marx’s other works for that matter, do we find
729 Marcuse, Herbert, An Essay on Liberation, (Beacon Press: Boston; 1969), 20-22.
730 Sayers, Sean, Marx and Alienation: Essays on Hegelian Themes, (Palgrave: Hampshire; 2011), 115.
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him characterizing work in socialism as “unfree” activity and the realm of necessity as a “realm
of alienation.” He is mistaken in interpreting Marx’s dialectical distinction as one still confined
within the antagonisms indicative of the capitalist economy. Instead, in Capital Marx argues that,
in contrast to the mental and moral degradation of wage-labour, freely associated producers
would regulate the entire production process through the application of their intellectual and
aesthetic faculties. Work would become a free form of action, no longer hindered by the
conditions of alienation.
At first glance, admittedly, Marcuse’s reading seems to find some confirmation in the
particular passage from the 'Trinity Formula'. It appears as if any notion of the humanization of
nature, and of the human relation to nature in work, has been abandoned by Marx. He states there
that, irrespective of however much it is radically reorganized and rationally regulated, this
sphere of instrumental activity “always remains a realm of necessity.” The truest “realm of
freedom,” he insists unequivocally, “really begins only where labour determined by necessity
and external expediency ends.” It “lies by its very nature beyond the sphere of material
production proper.” That “true realm of freedom, the development of human powers as an end in
itself, begins beyond it,” i.e., outside of the time spent performing work-related activities. This is
why Marx insists that the “reduction of the working day is the basic prerequisite” for the coming-
into-being of a higher society. The significance which he attached to this struggle over the length
of the working-day cannot be overstated. Capitalism’s contradictory tendency to increase surplus
labour by reducing its necessary form is, for the same reason, characterized as its “civilizing
influence” and great “historic justification.”731 Only by doing so does capital create the
presuppositions for its own suspension, and for the genesis of a form of production no longer
731 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, David Fernbach (trans.), Vol. III (Penguin Books:
London; 1991), 958-959.
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governed by socially-necessary labour-time.
At the same time, however, just as the capitalist impulse to extend the working-day
beyond its normal length reached its natural limits, so too did Marx believe that the tendency
toward the reduction of necessary labour-time in socialism had its absolute limits. For him, it was
tautological that production could never be 'abolished' (in the colloquial sense) by a particular
mode of production, including even the communist mode of production.732 This is an essential
premise of his theory of the metabolism. Since labour is the “appropriation of what exists in
nature for the requirements of man,” it is a “universal condition for the metabolic interaction
[Stoffwechsel] between man and nature, the everlasting nature-imposed condition of human
existence, and it is therefore independent of every form of that existence, or rather common to all
forms of society in which human beings live.”733 Marcuse is therefore correct that Capital only
foresees this sphere of instrumental activity being increasingly limited or shortened to a basic
“minimum” in the future.734 The absolute barriers to real human possibility in history are the
nature-prescribed universal-natural conditions of this necessary interchange with nature, i.e., the
eternal aspect of the natural necessity which mediates this metabolism in all of the historical and
possible forms of human life. This necessity can be mediated and mastered, e.g., manipulated to
serve to human needs, but it will never disappear altogether. It is only the form of this necessity
which can be abolished. Thus, in “all forms of society and under all possible modes of
production,” humans will have to “wrestle with nature” through labour in order to transform and
732 Marx, Karl, 'Marx to Kugelmann in Hanover: July 11, 1868', Marx and Engels: Selected Writings, Vol II,
(Progress Publishers: Moscow; 1977), 418-419.
733 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books:
London; 1990), 290.
734 See ibid., 133; also see Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, David Fernbach (trans.), Vol.
III (Penguin Books: London; 1991), 958-959; Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political
Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin Books: London; 1993), 706, 708, 770.
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appropriate its use-values and “satisfy” both their natural and socially-developed “needs.”735
Even when the productive powers of socialized labour have been maximized by a
communist society, this tendency toward the minimization of the realm of necessity would
eventually run-up against the outer limits of necessity and the laws of nature themselves. Marx
reaffirms this elsewhere in Capital when he claims that the tendency toward minimizing the
realm of necessity by developing the universal powers of labour pushes up against its “absolute
minimum limit”— which is to say, the “universality of labour” in the other sense of the
expression. Labour may be reduced to a minimum, but it remains a “necessity imposed by
nature.”
In capitalist society, free time is produced for one class by the conversion of the whole
lifetime of the masses into labour-time....The intensity and productivity of labour being
given [as the same in a socialist society], the part of the social working day necessarily
taken up with material production is shorter and, as a consequence, the time at society's
disposal for the free intellectual and social activity of the individual is greater, in
proportion as work is more and more evenly divided among all the able-bodied
members of society, and a particular social stratum is more and more deprived of the
ability to shift the burden of labour (which is a necessity imposed by nature) from its
own shoulders to those of another social stratum. The absolute minimum limit to the
shortening of the working day is, from this point of view, the universality [Allgemeinheit]
of labour.736
Labour can be contracted to occupy an increasingly smaller portion of the day, but there
would remain an irreducible limit to this process. Marx therefore accepted that the ‘struggle’ with
necessity would be extended into every phase of socialist society. However, Marcuse’s late
writings underemphasize the extent to which Marx also believed that it would then begin to take
place upon a completely transformed basis. The problem with Marcuse’s reinterpretation is that
he characterizes the realm of necessity as “forever remain[ing] a realm of unfreedom.” Even in
the most comprehensive social form possible, it would remain a “realm of alienation...no matter
735 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, David Fernbach (trans.), Vol. III (Penguin Books:
London; 1991), 958-959.
736 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books:
London; 1990), 667.
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how much the working day is reduced.”737 There is absolutely no evidence that Marx entertained
this view during any period in his intellectual development.
On the contrary, Marx (including the Marx of Capital) explicitly argued that necessary
labour could not only be reduced to a minimum in the future, but also completely transformed by
the revolution (and, indeed, by the further development of socialist society on its own continually
recreated foundations). Marcuse himself had earlier characterized this vision of Marx’s as the
passage from quantity to quality, and ‘abolition’ of labour. The remaining portions of a rationally
regulated and reduced realm of necessity would also have to be radically reorganized in such a
way as to allow for the most complete realization and freest possible expression of the
individual's intellectual, scientific, artistic, etc., abilities and needs. Indeed, the Marx of the
‘Trinity Formula’ states that the intercourse with nature would have to be carried out in a manner
both compatible with, and worthy of, the most complete development and enjoyment of our own
“human nature.”738 The work of material production in a free association would have to enable
the free development, practical application, creative experimentation, disciplining, combining
and appropriating of all of one's multifaceted capacities— including, e.g., the interdisciplinary
knowledge of the science of this metabolism itself.
In this necessary metabolism with the earth, Marx held that a fully socialized individual
would relate to the inorganic body of so-called 'external' nature as the laboratory of her own
labour powers. Nature would be recognized as the means and material in which she objectifies
herself, which she continually reshapes into a more human mode through the form-giving fires of
her own activity and in concert with others. It would then appear as what it really is: part of the
737 Marcuse, Herbert, 'The Realm of Freedom and the Realm of Necessity: A Reconsideration', Praxis: A
Philosophical Journal, 5 (1969), 22.
738 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, David Fernbach (trans.), Vol. III (Penguin Books:
London; 1991), 958-959.
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objective presence of the individual as an individual, but as a social individual made up of a
totality of needs, relations, activities, etc. For this reason, the totally developed individual of an
emancipated society would not only freely take-up the tasks required of her, but, at the same time,
would regard these as part of the necessary process of working-out of her vital powers to their
fullest degree, and as only so many ways of giving free breadth to the already developed
capacities of her 'general intellect'. Even though he marks off this realm of necessity from the
truest realm of freedom, nowhere in Marx's writings, including in Capital, will we find anything
resembling Marcuse's “realm of unfreedom” or “realm of alienation.” On the contrary, in Capital,
as well as in the Manuscripts, Grundrisse and all of Marx's other relevant texts on the subject,
labour is presented as an essentially positive form of creative activity and mode of self-
actualization— at most a different, but nonetheless very real, form of freedom.
The distinction which Marx draws in Capital between work-time and free-time in a
socialist society is not a distinction between freedom and unfreedom, as Marcuse suggests. A
closer reading of the relevant passage finds a more nuanced distinction between two different
forms of freedom. “Freedom” in this realm of necessary labour consists of associated individuals
“rationally regulating their interchange with Nature,” instead of being ruled by their own social
power as if it were among the “blind forces of Nature.”739 When we read Engels earlier referring
to the “ascent of man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom,” he had in mind
precisely this freedom within the realm of necessity. The “laws of his own social action,” which
have up until now confronted him as a “necessity imposed by Nature and History,” must become
the result of his own “free action.”740 In his Marx and Alienation, Sayers dispels the notion that
739 Marx, Karl, Capital, David McLellan (ed.), Abridged Edition, (Oxford University Press: Oxford; 2008),
470.
740 Engels, Frederick, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Edward Aveling (trans.), (International Publishers:
New York; 2008), 72-73.
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Marx was characterizing necessary work as unfree activity in Capital.
It is sometimes argued that there are two conflicting strands in Marx's thought on work
and freedom. In his early writings Marx maintains that, although work in contemporary
society is an alienated activity, it need not be so. Alienation can and will be overcome in
a future society. Potentially, work can be a fulfilling and liberating activity...In his later
work, however, some say he changes his outlook and that this is evident from the
following well-known passage from Capital [about the distinction between the “realm
of necessity” and the “true realm of freedom”]...He appears to say that economically
necessary labour is inescapably alienating and unfree...'True freedom' is attainable only
outside of work. The aim of a future society, therefore, is not humanise work but rather
to reduce it to the unavoidable minimum and to expand the 'realm of freedom'...It is a
mistake, I shall argue, to interpret Marx as opposing the realms of freedom and
necessity. Moreover, properly understood, this passage provides no grounds for thinking
that Marx's views on work and freedom changed significantly in his later writings...[I]t
is a mistake— though a common one— to infer that the realm of necessity must
therefore be a realm of unfreedom. This inference is predicated on the assumption that
economic labour is necessarily unfree. There is no evidence that Marx makes this
assumption, either here or elsewhere. Quite the contrary. In this passage, Marx explicitly
talks of freedom in the realm of necessity ('freedom in this field...') and spells out
conditions for it…[T]here can be freedom in the sphere of necessary work. Marx is
explicit on this score. He specifies two conditions for such freedom in the passage from
Capital that I am discussing.741
As Marx puts it in the passage in question:
Freedom, in this sphere, can consist only in this, that socialized man, the associated
producers, govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under
their collective control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing
it with the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate
for their human nature.742
Of course, the very possibility of a form of production capable of “regulating all the
forces of nature” is not given by the “merely natural, spontaneous form” of precapitalist labour—
which is itself “merely human exertion as a specifically harnessed natural force.” Such a society
is only really possible on the basis of a post-capitalist form of labour which has already
developed a more “social,” “scientific,” and “general character”— and, thus, is present in its
“exertion as subject.”743 In such a society, the process of working would therefore involve a “real
741 Sayers, Sean, Marx and Alienation: Essays on Hegelian Themes, (Palgrave: Hampshire; 2011), 65-74.
742 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, David Fernbach (trans.), Vol. III (Penguin Books:
London; 1991), 958-959.
743 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.),
(Penguin Books: London; 1993), 611-612.
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freedom, whose action is, precisely, labour.”744 Here, in the Grundrisse, Marx once again
describes the freedom in this field of necessity as a real freedom— not a realm of unfreedom or
realm of alienation. Contrary to Marcuse’s interpretative claims, the Grundrisse and Capital
complement, rather than contradict, one another on this question. In fact, we find the same
conception of labour reappearing again and again throughout Capital. No longer “conditioned by
a low stage of [precapitalist] development of the productive powers of labour” and, thus, “also
limited relations between man and nature,” the “practical relations of everyday life between man
and man, and man and nature,” would at last assume a “transparent and rational form,” i.e., the
“conscious and planned control” of “freely associated men.”745 In such a higher society, as he
states elsewhere in Capital, the direct “metabolism” with nature in work would be carried out in
a “form adequate to the full development of the human race.”746 The end-point to this process of
man's coming-into-being through labour is an emancipated society in which work itself appears
not merely as the objective development, but, what is more, as the free expression and positive
affirmation of the objectively developed needs, capacities, and relations of individuals to one
another and to nature. As such, Marx tells us in yet another instance in Capital that in a “fully
developed individual, fit for a variety of labours,” would freely take-up the various “functions”
and necessary tasks required of him, regarding them as only “so many modes of giving free
scope to his own natural and acquired powers.”747
Marx’s views on the possibilities for freedom within necessary labour in no way
contradict his views on the possibilities for freedom from labour which is unnecessary. But there
744 Ibid., 611-612.
745 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books:
London; 1990), 172-173.
746 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books:
London; 1990), 637-638.
747 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, David McLellan (ed.), Abridged Edition, (Oxford
University Press: Oxford; 2008), 292. Or, see Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes
(trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London; 1990), 618.
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is no doubt that an increase in free-time is also an essential aspect of his notion of a communist
society. An expansion of free time is integral to the sort of emancipatory project which Marx
outlines because he believes it would allow for the greatest degree of human flourishing and
facilitate unprecedented cultural achievements. And, of course, free-time can grow only
proportionate to the degree that the time spent in labour is diminished, e.g., by advances in the
productive powers or organization of social labour.
Real economy— saving— consists of the saving of labour time...but this saving
identical with development of the productive force. Hence in no way abstinence from
consumption, but rather the development of power, of capabilities of production, and
hence both of the capabilities as well as the means of consumption.748
Marx also held that such increases in free-time would have a compounding effect upon
the tendency toward the minimization of labour-time in socialism. The “more the productivity of
labour increases, the more the working day can be shortened, and the more the working day is
shortened, the more the intensity of labour can increase.”749 This is because he understood “free
time” as “both idle time and time for higher activity.” He conceived of the social individual of
the future spending their enlarged non-working day not merely in rest and recreation— which is
also essential to the revitalization of the labourer and, hence, her productive powers— but also
upon end-in-itself activities involving the creation and enjoyment of a diversity of aesthetic and
scientific capacities. An “increase of free time,” when used as “time for the full development of
the individual,” “in turn reacts back upon the productive power of labour” and is itself the
“greatest productive power.” Such “free time” has “naturally transformed its possessor into a
different subject, and he then enters into the direct production process as this different
748 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.),
(Penguin Books: London; 1993), 711.
749 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books:
London; 1990), 667.
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subject.”750
Under the regime of capital, of course, increases in the productivity of social labour take
on an “antagonistic form” allowing, e.g., for the luxury and “pure idleness of one section of
society.” In a socialist society, however, this “monopolization of social development (with its
material and intellectual advantages) by one section of society at the expense of another
disappears.” Capitalism’s own tendency toward contracting necessary labour-time to a minimum,
in order to enlarge its superfluous portion, provides the material foundation for the future
possibility of enlarging the free-time reserved for the end-in-itself development of individualities.
Although the needs of these more fully-developed individuals would be greater, Marx
nonetheless speculates that the revolutionary re-expropriation of surplus labour-time, as well as
the continued development of the productive powers within socialism, would enable an increase
in non-labour time for all. The expropriation of the expropriators would then “permit this surplus
labour to be combined, in a higher form of society, with a greater reduction of the overall time
devoted to material labour.”751
The creation of a large quantity of disposable time apart from necessary labour time for
society generally and each of its members (i.e., room for the development of the
individuals’ full productive forces, hence those of society also), this creation of not-
labour time appears in the stage of capital, as of all earlier ones, as not-labour time, free
time, for a few. What capital adds is that it increases the surplus labour time of the mass
by all the means of art and science, because its wealth consists directly in the
appropriation of surplus labour time…It is thus, despite itself, instrumental in creating
the means of social disposable time, in order to reduce labour time for the whole society
to a diminishing minimum, and thus to free everyone’s time for their own development.
But its tendency always, on the one side, to create disposable time, on the other, to
convert it into surplus labour…The more this contradiction develops, the more does it
become evident that the growth of the forces of production can no longer be bound up
with the appropriation of alien labour, but that the mass of workers must themselves
appropriate their own surplus labour. Once they have done so— and disposable time
thereby ceases to have an antithetical existence— then, on one side, necessary labour
time will be measured by the needs of the social individual, and, on the other, the
development of the power of social production will grow so rapidly that, even though
750 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.),
(Penguin Books: London; 1993), 711.
751 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, David Fernbach (trans.), Vol. III (Penguin Books:
London; 1991), 958-959.
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production is now calculated for the wealth of all, disposable time will grow for all. For
real wealth is the developed productive power of all individuals. The measure of wealth
is then not any longer, in any way, labour time, but rather disposable time. Labour time
as the measure of value posits wealth itself as founded on poverty, and disposable time
as existing in and because of the antithesis to surplus labour time; or, the positing of an
individual’s entire time as labour time, and his degradation therefore to mere
worker…Real wealth manifests itself, rather— and large industry reveals this— in the
monstrous disproportion between the labour time applied, and its product, as well as in
the qualitative imbalance between labour, reduced to a pure abstraction, and the power
of the production process it superintends…The theft of alien labour time, on which the
present wealth is based, appears a miserable foundation in face of this new one, created
by large-scale industry itself. As soon as labour in the direct form has ceased to be the
great well-spring of wealth, labour time ceases and must cease to be its measure, and
hence exchange value of use value. The surplus labour of the mass has ceased to be the
condition for the development of general wealth, just as the non-labour of the few, for
the development of the general powers of the human head. With that, production based
on exchange value breaks down, and the direct, material production process is stripped
of the form of penury and antithesis. The free development of individualities, and hence
not the reduction of necessary labour time so as to posit surplus labour, but rather the
general reduction of the necessary labour of society to a minimum, which then
corresponds to the artistic, scientific etc. development of the individuals in the time set
free, and with the means created, for all of them. Capital itself is the moving
contradiction, [in] that it presses to reduce labour time to a minimum, while it posits
labour time, on the other side, as sole measure and source of wealth. Hence it
diminishes labour time in the necessary form so as to increase it in the superfluous form;
hence posits the superfluous in growing measure as a condition— question of life or
death— for the necessary. On the one side, then, it calls to life all the powers of science
and of nature, as of social combination and of social intercourse, in order to make the
creation of wealth independent (relatively) of the labour time employed on it. On the
other side, it wants to use labour time as the measuring rod for the giant social forces
thereby created, and to confine them within the limits required to maintain the already
created value as value. Forces of production and social relations— two different sides of
the development of the social individual— appear to capital as mere means, and are
merely means for it to produce on its limited foundation. In fact, however, they are the
material conditions to blow this foundation sky-high. ‘Truly wealthy a nation, when the
working day is 6 rather than 12 hours. Wealth is not command over surplus labour time’
(real wealth), ‘but rather, disposable time outside that needed in direct production, for
every individual and the whole society.’ (The Source and Remedy etc. 1821, p. 6.).752
We see in this passage from the Grundrisse that the ethical substantiality of Marx’s
conception of an emancipated society depends very much upon the expansion of the realm of
end-in-itself activity, i.e., of the free-time reserved for the free development of the general
powers of all individuals. No longer would the surplus labour-time of the many stand in direct
antagonism to the free-time of the few. The producers would re-expropriate that surplus labour as
time for their own end-in-itself development. However, with the disappearance of the ‘direct’
752 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.),
(Penguin Books: London; 1993), 705-706.
324
form of labour, and the overcoming of the division between mental and manual labour, neither
would the process of production continue to stand in immediate antithesis to their own free-time.
Rather, work-time would also have to resolve itself into the appropriation of the universally-
developed powers of the individuals by the individuals themselves. The labour they perform
would be their mastery over the metabolism with nature and scientific command over their own
social intercourse with one another. Here, ‘general social knowledge’, i.e., the objectified ‘power
of knowledge’, the ‘organs of social practice’, becomes the ‘direct force of production’. Hence,
instead of ‘direct labour’ or even necessary labour-time, it is the free and full development of the
‘general intellect’ which would determine this mode of labour.
This is why I feel it is important to acknowledge that in Capital, as in the Grundrisse,
Marx’s vision of socialism includes both the reduction of necessary labour and the
transformation of the process of work. To be sure, the progressive marginalization of labour-time
is a presupposition for the coming-into-being of his conception of a free society. However, since
he believed that necessary work could only be limited, and never eliminated, the question also
turns upon what becomes of the remaining portions of labour. Marcuse’s interpretation is skewed
by the belief that Marx characterizes such activity as remaining unfree. As Hudis explains,
Marcuse is certainly correct that for Marx the realisation of freedom centres on the
problem of time. Marx repeatedly emphasizes throughout his work that in a new society,
time will become the space for human development. However, Marcuse also makes the
questionable claim that, for Marx, the problem of time revolves solely around the
reduction of the working day to an absolute minimum...Freedom defines -every phase of
the new society for Marx, even when that society still operates in accordance with
natural necessity.753
In my understanding, and in direct contrast to Marcuse’s, the same revolutionary process
through which the producers re-expropriate their surplus labour would also have to ensure that
the actual process of production, the activity of labour, is no longer posited in the abstract
753 Hudis, Peter, Marx’s Concept of the Alternative to Capitalism, (Haymarket Books: Chicago; 2003), 202-
203.
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antagonism in which currently exists vis-a-vis free-time. In other words, both free-time and
work-time would have to allow for the free and full development of the associated producers, the
cultivation of the total social wealth and personality of each and every individual. Work would
have to be transformed in such a way that it becomes the appropriation and application of these
multifaceted capacities, including the scientific mastery over the social body of nature and over
the objective organs of practice. In all spheres of human life, activities would be oriented toward
the free development and enjoyment of true social wealth— the capacities and needs and
relations of the individuals.
Marcuse is therefore mistaken in assuming that, for the Marx of Capital, it was a cruel
burden of nature that labour-time could not be dissolved completely into free-time for end-in-
itself activity. “Marcuse's position” on the meaning of labour in Marx’s later writings is
“premised upon the view that the 'toil' necessary involves 'anxiety'.”754 By contrast, I believe that
his view of labour remained fundamentally Promethean rather than Sisyphean in that, far from
simply representing suffering and drudgery, work embodies the civilizing impulse of human
history. Moreover, it is itself a potentially and essentially free form of activity. In Capital and the
later works more generally, Marx retained the view, developed from the Economic and
Philosophic Manuscripts to the Grundrisse, that work would be transformed by the revolution
into a form of free activity. Even though, in Capital, he presents the 'true' realm of freedom as
preferable to the freedom which exists within the realm of necessity, he does not in the least bit
present such labour as an unfortunate aspect of the crudity of human existence.755 This is because,
754 Ibid., 202-203.
755 Marx’s thoughts on surplus labour-time in a socialist society are underpinned by the same assumptions. In
the ‘Trinity Formula’, he states that, just as necessary labour will have to be performed “under all possible modes of
production,” so too, in all stages of society, will humans have to contribute surplus labour of one sort or another.
Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, he did not believe that, with socialism, all non-necessary labour time would
be re-expropriated as free-time. Indeed, he recognizes in several instances in Capital that the tendency toward
minimizing the time spent working will never lead to the abolition of the surplus (let alone necessary) component of
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in addition to free-time, Marx held that the labour process itself could be made congruent with
the most complete realization of the “real wealth of society,” viz., the full development of the
capabilities and needs of the human species.756
Schmidt on the Humanization of Nature in Marx’s Late Writings
In his earlier writings, Marx had presented history as the progressive revelation through
labour of the “human essence of nature” and genuine “natural existence” of humanity.757 This is
arguably the most important internal connection between his early anthropological conception of
the human species-being and his broader ontology of nature. The ‘young’ Marx entertained the
view that the “richness of man's essential being” could only be actualized through its self-
the working day. A rationally regulated form of the metabolism implies that a “certain quantum of surplus labour is
required as insurance against accidents.” Marx also offers what is, in my opinion, a more philosophically substantive
reason for the continued demand for surplus-labour in a socialist society. As we know, necessary labour-time is the
time required to satisfy the needs of individuals and reproduce them in their given state, whereas surplus-labour is
the labour expended to satisfy conditions “beyond the extent of given needs.” Yet, the 'natural' needs of individuals
are constantly transformed by the progress of civilization, just as distinctly social needs also emerge through the
same process of historical development. The old needs are reproduced and satisfied in a new form, while new needs
and the means for their satisfaction are created for the first time. This is why the “realm of natural necessity expands
with his development, because his needs do too.” A communist society would only enable this development of
human need to proceed more freely, placing its foundations for the first time on a truly human footing. Hence, in
addition to “insurance against accidents,” surplus-labour might also be required for the “progressive extension of the
reproduction process that is needed to keep pace with the development of needs and the progress of population.”
Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, David Fernbach (trans.), Vol. III (Penguin Books: London;
1991), 958-959. Marx makes a similar point elsewhere in Capital: “The minimum length of the working day is fixed
by this necessary component, which is however itself capable of further contraction. If the whole working day were
to shrink to the length of its necessary component, surplus labour would vanish, something which is impossible
under the regime of capital. Only the abolition of the capitalist form of production would permit the reduction of the
working day to the necessary labour-time. But even in that case the latter would expand to take up more of the day,
and for two reasons: first, because the worker's conditions of life would improve, and his aspirations become greater,
and second, because a part of what is now surplus labour would then count as necessary labour, namely the labour
which is necessary for the formation of a social fund for reserve and accumulation.” Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique
of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books: London; 1990), 667. Hence, no matter how
much the forces of production are developed, total labour-time can never be completely dissolved into 'free-time' for
end-in-itself activity. “Surplus labour in some form must always remain.” However, just as is the case with
necessary work, what matters here for Marx is precisely the form which this labour assumes. Everything turns on the
nature of the relation between the workers and the work which they accomplish.
756 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books:
London; 1990), 637-638.
757 Marx, Karl, 'Estranged Labor' , The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan
(trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 112. Marx, Karl, 'Private Property and
Communism', The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.),
(International Publishers: New York; 2009),135, 137, 141, 146.
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objectification in a “humanized nature.”758 The “nature which develops in human history” is
therefore synonymous for him with the “genesis of human society,” i.e., “man's real nature” or
“true anthropological nature”— except, at first, in its still “estranged form” of becoming.759 But
only in a form of society which has traversed through this phase of negativity, and which has
sublated for itself the positive wealth of these developments, did Marx believe we would
encounter “the naturalism of man and the humanism of nature both brought to fulfillment.” Only
in socialism would we find that “society is the unity of [the] being of man with nature— the true
resurrection of nature.”760 With this most total social movement, the Marx of the 1840s argued
that humanity would resolve at last the Hegelian “riddle of history:” communism is the real
reconciliation to the historically-arisen antitheses between “man and nature…existence and
essence, objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity.”761
Many Frankfurt critiques of Marx’s philosophy of nature interpret his later distinction
between the realms of freedom and necessity as a departure from this earlier conception of the
humanization of nature in socialism. For the late Marx, or so the tale is told, all of these
aforementioned antagonisms would remain unresolved even in the highest phases of an
emancipated society. He allegedly broke with his earlier ontology by recognizing that nature
retains its indifference to human civilization in all of its possible configurations. According to
this reading, the problem of nature's non-identity is one which cannot be transcended by history
and which, even in the final form to be given to human development, will prevail over the
transformative potential of praxis, labour, and reason.
[In the] early writings, communism overcomes the alienation of both humanity and
nature, bringing both their true being...When, through the abolition of private property
758 Marx, Karl, 'Private Property and Communism', The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,
Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 141.
759 Ibid., 143.
760 Ibid., 137.
761 Ibid., 135, 137, 146.
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and the overcoming of alienating work, humans become truly human, they will also
discover the human essence of nature...Marx himself had taken leave of the nature
philosophy visions of his early writings by the time of Das Kapital. In Das Kapital there
is no more talk of a “naturalization of humanity” or the “resurrection of nature”...For the
later Marx the conflict between humanity and nature remains. Despite all attempts at
mediation, [the contradictions between] nature's necessity and human freedom remain in
the end unresolved.762
The sort of reading elaborated here by Moltmann is actually quite commonplace among
critical theorists who question the ecological relevance of the later Marx’s philosophy of nature.
Schmidt’s The Concept of Nature in Marx is perhaps the best example of this tendency in the
historical secondary literature on the subject. In the early writings, Marx saw in “history,
stamped as it is with the imprint of human labour, a clearer and clearer equivalence between
naturalism and humanism.” But Schmidt claims that this youthful idea of the “progressive
humanization of nature” historically “coincid[ing]” with the “naturalization of man,” being still
“influence[d]” by “Feuerbach and Romanticism,” was abandoned by the “later, and more critical,
Marx.”763 In the 1840s, the 'ideological' “moment of the identity of man and nature” still
“dominate[d] Marx's thought.” By the 1860s, the metabolic “problem of non-identity” has
compelled him to relinquish certain elements of the theory of praxis which had led into the
allegedly naive Hegelo-Feuerbachian “equation of humanism and naturalism.”764
Capital is to be taken as the epitome of this supposed transition in Marx's philosophical
thought because there, according to Schmidt, the heteronomy of natural necessity is treated as an
ineradicable moment of antinomy within the dialectic.765 This is similar to the mistaken reading
which Marcuse adhered to, except that, with Schmidt, it is expressed in distinctly ontological
terms. In 'The Trinity Formula' chapter, “Marx's utopia[n]” dream about the endless expansion of
762 Moltmann, Jurgen, 'The Alienation and Liberation of Nature', On Nature, Leroy S. Rouner (ed.),
(University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame; 1984), 133, 136-137.
763 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (New Left Books: London; 1971),
176.
764 Ibid., 137.
765 Ibid., 76-78.
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free-time for end-in-itself activity within this “true realm of freedom” finds itself suddenly
“encumbered” by the irreducibility of this problem of “non-identity”— viz., by what “always
remains” of necessary labour-time within the “realm of necessity.”766 The earlier vision of the
confluence of humanism and naturalism at the end of history supposedly gives way at this
moment to a reluctant recognition that natural necessity could never be humanized. Marx’s
youthful Promethean emphasis upon the civilizing impulse of labour is thereafter replaced with
the notion that the Sisyphean “struggle of man with nature could be transformed but not
abolished.”767 This is the meaning which he mistakenly attributes to Marx's claims “at different
points in Capital that labour could never be abolished.”768
Here, Schmidt misunderstands the independent meanings of the early and late writings, as
well as the philosophic continuities between them. The Concept of Nature in Marx presents one-
sided caricatures of both the young and mature Marx's concepts of nature and labour. The Marx
of the manuscripts is said to have adhered to the utopian belief that labour would be abolished
outright in a higher form of society,769 whereas the Marx of the critique of political economy
acknowledged with regret that necessary work could only be limited.770 When we examine their
contexts, the sporadic references in the earlier writings to the ‘abolition’ of labour tend to refer
more specifically to the abolition of the division of labour, alienated labour, etc. In the few
instances when the young Marx or Engels speak in more general terms of the abolition of labour,
they seem to have in mind not so much the end of production per se, but, rather, its total
transformation into a form of free activity. They foresee the process of work being reorganized in
such a way as to make it a positive confirmation of all of one’s essential capacities and
766 Ibid., 37.
767 Ibid., 176.
768 Ibid., 36.
769 Ibid., 76.
770 Ibid., 69, 79-80, 97-98, 139.
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connections with others.
If anything, Marx’s middle and late writings move closer toward envisioning an abolition
of labour in the colloquial sense, but, even then, in a still quite qualified manner. For example,
the Grundrisse refers to the disappearance of the direct form of labour because it imagines the
individual acting more and more like a watchman and regulator over the industrial process and
forces of nature which have been brought under the command of the general intellect. Marx held
that this scientific power over the social organs of practice and metabolism with the inorganic
body of nature would completely transform the labour process so that it would no longer appear
as labour. He tells us that it would be neither direct labour, nor even the total labour-time
involved, which determines this mode of production, but the individual’s appropriation of her
own intellectual capacities, and the application, by freely-associated labourers, of their own total
social power to the mastery of the metabolism with nature. The same notion can be found in
Capital, especially in the chapter on machinery (as well as in the notes for the ‘Resultate’). There,
Marx places a similar emphasis upon the emancipatory potential of machinery, conceiving of a
form of automation which might allow workers to consciously direct the industrial forces set into
motion by socialized labour. This command over the industrialized metabolism with nature
would enable the producers to step back from the immediate process of production, and relate to
it more and more as a form of activity based upon the development and appropriation of their
own abilities, needs, and relations.
Schmidt’s thesis with respect to the question of the humanization of nature in the late
writings therefore rests upon a series of mistaken assumptions. One of those assumptions is that
the later Marx conceived of the productive relation to nature in socialism as antithetical to the
full development of human nature. Since natural necessity will never disappear, and necessary
work is a requirement of every type of society, Schmidt assumes that, in the sort of socialism
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which Marx envisions in the ‘Trinity Formula’, humans would continue to relate to the
conditions of their existence in an ‘external’ and ‘alien’ way.771 In this reading of Capital, “what
is essential is that historically the incompatibility of man and nature, i.e., in the last analysis the
necessity of labour, triumphs over the unity of man and nature”— precluding any possibility of a
humanization of nature.772 According to Schmidt, then, in the mature Marx’s materialism and
theory of the metabolism, the historical “horizons” of human praxis are bounded in an unfree
way by the unalterable “structure of matter itself.”773
But this would be to suggest that Marx adhered to the same ‘negative ontology’ as
Schmidt and Adorno. However, in both the early and late works, the connection between Marx’s
ontology and anthropology is underpinned by a doctrine of internal relations. He did not
conceive of the nature of which humanity is but a part of, and with which it interacts, as an
insuperable otherness. Instead, he wrote of the necessity of repairing the union with nature,
humanity’s own ‘inorganic body’, and of doing so in the only social form fit for the flourishing
of human nature. Schmidt takes Marx’s thoughts on the realm of necessity as evidence of his
view that the non-identity of nature erects external barriers to praxis which can never be
overcome, and which prevent any possibility of humanizing nature and the human relation to it.
But Marx had read his Aristotle: Aristotelian nature, just like Hegelian history, does nothing in
vain. Rather than grasping natural necessity as an eternal limit to the complete realization of
human nature, Marx presents human nature as a movement of absolute becoming in which
labour constantly overcomes nature’s given limits and attains an eventual mastery over its own
metabolism with it. The continued necessity of labour in socialism is not taken as an ontological
barrier to praxis, freedom, or happiness. Instead, just like the early writings, Marx’s later writings
771 Ibid., 157.
772 Ibid., 176.
773 Ibid., 69-70, 139, 159, 169.
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represent the relation to nature in work as a potentially life-affirming activity, as an essential
mode of one's objective presence as an individual, as the appropriation of one's total social
powers and total social bond with others.
To be sure, from the Grundrisse to Capital, he places a great emphasis upon the reduction
of necessary labour-time as I have noted. As we have also seen, however, the realization of
freedom was not reducible for him to an increase in free-time. Instead, his late works also place a
great emphasis upon the transformation of the labour process. Schmidt mistakenly claims that the
'Trinity Formula' chapter provides proof that Marx turned away from his youthful speculations,
becoming increasingly sceptical about whether the realm of necessity could ever be humanized.
Yet, far from highlighting the “incompatibility” of humanity and nature, as he suggests, the
relevant section from the ‘Trinity Formula’ is explicitly underpinned by the opposite assumption.
If the realm of necessity were a realm of dehumanization for Marx, it is unlikely that, in the same
passage, he would have referred to the activity of necessary work as “worthy” of “human
nature.”774 Contrary to the interpretation given by Schmidt, this notion that the relation to nature
in labour can be made congruent with the most complete realization of the human being implies
precisely what Marx had described earlier as the simultaneous humanization of nature and
naturalization of human society.
We find indications of a similar internal connection between Marx’s ontological
conception of nature and anthropological conception of human nature in key passages throughout
Capital. For instance, in the chapter on the labour process, he contends that by “changing” the
“material of nature” and giving it a “form” adequate to the progressive expansion of human
“need,” the human being not only realizes his own “purposes” in that so-called “external nature,”
774 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, David Fernbach (trans.), Vol. III (Penguin Books:
London; 1991), 958-959.
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but also “changes his own nature.”775 For the Marx of Capital, as for the Marx of the early
philosophic manuscripts, the history of humanity’s relation to nature is therefore synonymous
with the history of humanity’s own coming-into-being. The relation to nature through labour is a
metric by which he gauges humanity’s own level of development and the overall state of the
productive powers of society.776 The implications of this philosophic anthropology for his
conception of socialism are clarified not only in the cited passage from Volume III, which insists
that work can be made fully congruent with human nature, but also throughout Volume I. For
example, in the section on machinery and agriculture, we have read him explicitly state that
socialism would have to bring about the “systematic restoration” of the “metabolism” with
nature in a “form adequate to the full development of the human race.”777
However, some of the most damning indictments of Schmidt’s thesis on the humanization
of nature are found not in Capital, but throughout The Concept of Nature in Marx itself.
Suddenly, while commenting on a passage from Capital— the one in which Marx writes that, by
“changing” nature, the human being “changes his own nature”— Schmidt states quite clearly the
meaning of this expression: viz., that the “content of this metabolic interaction is that nature is
humanized while men are naturalized.”778 This inconsistent claim appears only a few pages after
he insists that the “later, and more critical, Marx” of Capital abandoned any notion of the
“progressive humanization of nature” and “naturalization of man.”779 In the next chapter,
Schmidt acknowledges quite correctly once more, but again without registering its implications
775 .Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books:
London; 1990), 283-284.
776 Marx, Karl, 'Private Property and Communism', The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,
Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 142-143, 145.
777 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books:
London; 1990), 637-638.
778 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (New Left Books: London; 1971),
78.
779 Ibid., 76.
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for his central thesis, that it also “clearly appears from the Grundrisse that the surviving,
humanized realm of necessity can just as well become a sphere of man's self-realization as the
realm of freedom.” This is because Marx followed Hegel in grasping “labour” as that which
“signifies man's fulfilment as well as his suffering.”780 However, in that same chapter, Schmidt
also returns once more to the other trope of a 'break' between Marx's early and late philosophies
of nature. The “mature Marx withdrew from the theses expounded in his early writings” in
relation to the question of whether a “more human society might also enter into a new relation
with extra-human nature.” The “young Marx's dream of a humanization of nature, which would
at the same time include the naturalization of man,” is exchanged for a recognition that the
exploitative and external relation to nature would be extended into socialist society.781
Backtracking yet again from this thesis, Schmidt wrote of how the
'[r]esurrection of nature', 'humanization of humanity'— today, these are no longer the
product of [Marx’s] eschatological fantasy. Their achievement is the prerequisite for
whether humanity enters into a more reasonable state of existence, indeed for whether it
even survives.782
The Concept of Nature in Marx was the outcome of Schmidt's doctoral work, which was
carried out under the supervision of Adorno. This is relevant because, in my judgement, his
interpretation projects elements of Adorno's critique of Marx back onto Marx's late writings.
Adorno had repudiated what he regarded as the self-idolatrous conception of the humanization of
nature. As noted earlier, he felt that the problem with Marxism as an ‘identity philosophy’ is that
it tries to make the objects of nature, which are unlike the human subject, into the subject— but
that doing so only reduces the individual, who is unlike a thing, into a mere thing. In other words,
Adorno believes that “human beings are already natural, all too natural, and nature unavoidably
780 Ibid., 143-144.
781 Ibid., 155-156.
782 Schmidt quoted in Moltmann, Jurgen, 'The Alienation and Liberation of Nature', On Nature, Leroy S.
Rouner (ed.), (University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame; 1984), 137.
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human, all too human.”783 He therefore sought to reverse the goal of the young Marx: viz., as
Cook puts it, to “dehumanize nature and denaturalize humanity,” recognizing the absolute “non-
identity of nature and human history.”784 Having projected Adorno’s idea of non-identity into his
reading of Capital, it is no wonder that Schmidt then concludes that the realization of the later
Marx's conception of socialism would be more likely to realize the “prophecy of the Dialektik
der Anfklarung” rather than the “young Marx's dream of a humanization of nature.”
In Negative Dialectics, Adorno claims that the pre-Frankfurt dialectic of Marx’s
philosophy could not recognize that the “antithesis of nature and history is both true and
false.”785 Cook explains why the “traditional antithesis between nature and history is true in one
respect true and false in another” for Adorno's philosophy.786 The antithesis is true because
Marx's conception of the internal connection between humanism and naturalism is the
ideological result of “deifying history” in a Hegelian way.787 However, the antithesis also appears
as false because, like Marx, Adorno also refers to a certain convergence between natural and
human history— except, with the caveat in mind that in the alienated “vanishing point” of this
negative unity these two poles are not made “identical.”788 Hence, even when Adorno places an
“emphasis” upon the confluence of human and “natural history,” it “does not mean that he adopts
Marx's early goal:” viz., “of 'naturalizing' human beings and 'humanizing' nature.” The problem
with The Concept of Nature in Marx, as Cook explains, is that
Adorno's former student, Alfred Schmidt, believes that Marx had a similar conception of
the relationship between nature and history. Although Schmidt seems to ignore that
society's goal is “the true resurrection of nature— the naturalism of man and the
humanism of nature both brought to fulfilment,” he accurately captures Adorno's view
[in his re-reading of Marx!] of the relationship when he remarks that “Natural and
human history together constitute...a differentiated history...[H]uman history is not
783 Adorno quoted in Cook, Deborah, Adorno on Nature, (Acumen: Durham; 2011), 23-24, 26.
784 Ibid., 23-24, 26.
785 Adorno, Theodor W., Negative Dialectics, E.B. Ashton (trans.), (Continuum: New York; 1973), 357.
786 Cook, Deborah, Adorno on Nature, (Acumen: Durham; 2011), 9.
787 Adorno, Theodor W., Negative Dialectics, E.B. Ashton (trans.), (Continuum: New York; 1973), 321.
788 Cook, Deborah, Adorno on Nature, (Acumen: Durham; 2011), 16-17.
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merged in pure natural history; natural history is not merged in human
history”...Contrasting Marx's account of mediation with Hegel's, Schmidt observed that,
in Marx, “it is nonidentity which is victorious.”789
Like Cook, Brown seems to suspect that Schmidt's dissertation re-reads Adorno back into Marx.
Schmidt's characterization of Marx's understanding of the “relation to nature in a post-capitalist
society is problematic,” Brown concludes, because it is “not clear that Marx separated nature and
society” in the specifically Adorno-like “way Schmidt describes.” “[S]uch a separation does not
appear in Capital.”790
Schmidt on the Dialectical Duality of Marx’s Materialism
Notwithstanding the fact that The Concept of Nature in Marx remains the starting-point
for any consideration of the secondary literature on Marx’s philosophy of nature, the great
shortcoming of Schmidt’s work is that he reads Marx’s Capital as if it were really written by
Adorno. It is anachronistic to re-interepret the meaning of his writings in this way. The outcome
of such an interpretative approach is both foreseeable and inevitable. Instead of a 'dialectic of
negativity', Schmidt presents Marx as having adhered to something resembling a 'negative
dialectic'. In the place of Marx’s ontology of nature, informed as it was by Hegel, we find a
negative ontology shaped by the critical theory of the Frankfurt School. In Adorno’s philosophy,
the non-identity of humanity and nature, freedom and necessity, etc., prevails over the
789 Ibid., 23-24, 26.
790 Brown, Heather A., Marx on Gender and the Family: A Critical Study, (Brill: Leiden;2007), 62. When we
see these continuities between Adorno and Schmidt, it is hard to agree with Foster that Schmidt recognized the
ecological dimensions of Capital and that he moved away from Adorno’s critique of Marx: “To be sure, when
Western Marxism had first emerged as a distinct tradition in the 1920s and 1930s, one of the major influences was
the Frankfurt School, which developed an ecological critique (Horkheimer and Adorno 1972). But this critique was
largely philosophical, and while it recognized the ecological insights in Marx's Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts, it lost sight of the ecological argument embedded in Capital. Hence, it generally concluded that
classical Marxism (beginning with the later Marx) supported a 'Promethean' philosophy of the straightforward
domination of nature. Not until the 1960s and 1970s did a more complex interpretation begin to emerge in the
writings of the thinkers influenced by the Frankfurt tradition (Schmidt 1971; Leiss 1974).” Foster, John Bellamy,
'Marx’s Theory of Metabolic Rift: Classical Foundations for Environmental Sociology', AJS Volume 105, Number 2
(September 1999), 395.
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transformative potential of praxis. This is what he refers to as the doctrine of the
“preponderance” or “primacy of the object.”791 In this anti-system or negative ontology, the
primacy of the objective content of nature places irrevocable limits upon the freedom of the
human subject. Nature sets external barriers to human activity which likely preclude any
possibility of a reconciliation with it, now or in the future. As we have seen, the same is true of
Schmidt's reading of the late Marx's writings. This is why Schmidt regards the ostensible
“problem of non-identity” in Capital as the pinnacle of the mature Marx's thoughts on nature.
“[W]hat is essential [in Capital] is that historically the incompatibility of man and nature, i.e., in
the last analysis the necessity of labour, triumphs over the unity of man and nature.”792
To be sure, Schmidt is right that the 'struggle' with nature through labour cannot possibly
be 'abolished' altogether. However, the meaning which he and others attach to this expression is
in no way consistent with the significance which Marx's materialism ascribes to it. Schmidt
interprets what “always remains” of necessary labour-time as an “inextinguishable internal
moment” of antinomy within communism. According to this view, work is no longer the agency
which brings about the identity of society and nature, as it had been for the early Marx; instead,
labour is a form of mediation which merely confirms that an “indestructible boundary” separates
the subject from the object in the Marxian dialectic. Marx allegedly recognized more and more in
the late writings that this “dialectical duality” or “problem of non-identity” could not be
overcome by his political theory precisely because it could never be overcome by human
practice.793 Under the influence of Adorno, these are what Schmidt’s interpretation spells out as
the heteronomous “'natural' limits of all historical dialectics: the fact that it is the 'concrete', not
791 Adorno, Theodor, 'Subject and Object', The Adorno Reader, Brian O'Connor (ed.), (Blackwell
Publishing:Oxford; 2000), 143. See Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (New
Left Books: London; 1971), 76.
792 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (New Left Books: London; 1971),
30.
793 Ibid., 10-11, 134-135, 176.
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the 'abstract' form of human work, which cannot be superseded.” He states right at the outset of
his work that this “contradiction,” this “dialectical duality,” is not the result of “logical
inconsistency” in his reading of Marx; rather, it is an “error” which cannot be “eliminated” by
the contortions of dialectical reasoning because Marx, like Adorno, recognized that it could not
be “eliminated” as a “contradiction within the facts” of nature.794
However, it should be noted that while Marx’s views on the question of the relationship
between freedom and necessity were based upon a direct appropriation of Hegel’s philosophy,
Adorno’s materialism proceeds instead from Kant. Adorno’s aforementioned principle of the
primacy of objectivity reformulates the antithesis first raised by the third antinomy in the
Critique of Pure Reason. His negative ontology treats the practically unmastered ‘in-itselfness’
of nature as an irremovable barrier to the historical development of freedom. As such, Schmidt’s
reading not only anachronistically projects elements of Adorno’s philosophy back into Capital, it
at the same time misstates the historical genealogy of Marx’s ideas by substituting Kant in the
place of Hegel. Indeed, he claims that Marx’s “materialist critique of Hegel’s identity of Subject
and Object led him back to Kant” in the sense that historical materialism “retained Kant's thesis
of the non-identity of Subject and Object” in a modified form.795 This is the meaning behind
Schmidt's thesis that the “mature Marx['s]” concept of self-objectification never “restores the
Hegelian identity of Subject and Object,” or any sort of “unity of man and nature,” arguing,
instead, that the “moment of non-identity” is “retained under all social conditions.”796
[U]ltimately, the result of Schmidt's philosophical pedantry is a vision of nature quite
opposite to the spirit and practical intent of Marx's later work…[It is a] nature-
philosophy that is wholly Schmidtian. There are in Schmidt two concepts of
nature…[T]his duality results from the particular philosophical lenses through which
Schmidt interprets Marx...Whereas much has been made of Marx's debt to
Hegel…much less has been made of his debt to Kant. Schmidt's work was meant to help
794 Ibid., 10-11.
795 Ibid., 121.
796 Ibid., 74.
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redress this omission. Hence he suggests that Marx adopted ‘an intermediate position’
between Kant and Hegel…The unity of Subject and Object he maintains against Kant,
their absolute non-identity against Hegel…It is no accident, therefore, that Schmidt
views 'Marxist materialism' as embodying a 'dialectical duality' (p. 136) rather than a
dialectical unity…Nature is less a differentiated unity than a differentiation on the one
hand and a unity on the other. In his attempt to define Marx's concept of nature in
opposition to both Kant and Hegel, Schmidt shuttles from Hegel to Kant and back again
without ever breaking free. He remains firmly within their problematic…Schmidt has
done exactly as he intended: he has placed Marx wholly between Kant and Hegel, not
beyond them.797
In this way, Schmidt's reading of Marx mythologizes along with Kant and Adorno the
unannexed portions of nature. He treats the unmasterable limits of everlasting necessity as an
insoluble barrier to nature's humanization and, ipso facto, to the full realization of our own
human nature. In his philosophic calculus, the minimized realm of work that Marx writes of in
'The Trinity Formula' is 'ontologized' into an inevitable remainder from the imperfect equation
between human freedom and natural necessity.798 Ironically, it is precisely here where Schmidt's
“negative ontology” tries to drive a wedge between what he dismisses as Engels' (positive)
“ontology” of nature and Marx's materialist conception of it. Engels, he suggests mistakenly,
regarded the dialectic as dissolving the distinction between human-as-subject and nature-as-
object into a homogeneous identity, whereas the late Marx, he suggests just as mistakenly, was
much “more dialectical in seeing that the realm of freedom does not simply replace the realm of
necessity,” but “retains it as an inextinguishable internal moment” of a nature-given
heteronomy.799
In Schmidt’s interpretation of Marx, the continued necessity of labour in socialism
“completely confirms nature's independence,” “externality,” and irreducible “non-identity.”800
The “social mediation of nature” by labour will always reaffirm its insoluble “dialectical
797 Smith, Neil, Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space, (Athens, GA: University
of Georgia Press), 40-44.
798 Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (New Left Books: London;
1971),135-136.
799 Ibid., 135-136.
800 Ibid., 64-76.
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duality.”801 He acknowledges that the earlier concept of praxis still continues to play an essential
role in Marx's late works, except with the reservation in mind that it does so in a way which now
comes to confirm, rather than negate, this insuperable otherness of nature's objectivity.802
Regardless of however much we make nature “for-us,” its objective status always remains
“external” to that mediating activity.803 Even in “socialism,” the “highest form of the real
mediation between man and nature,” “nature's objectivity...remains something external.”804 In
these statements, Schmidt’s negative ontology conflates objectivity and estrangement, whereas,
in Marx’s materialism, the objectification of labour is identical with its alienation only within the
context of the contradictions of capitalism. Marx might even accuse Schmidt's treatment of the
'externality' of nature here of forgetting along with Feuerbachian naturalism that the “difference
between the individual as a person and whatever is extraneous to him is not a conceptual
difference but a historical fact” and that, as a historical fact, this “distinction has a different
significance at different times.”805
Hence, Marx did not grasp nature, nor the human interaction with it through work, in the
Adorno-like way that Schmidt quite often lapses into. While Schmidt is right that the Marxian
dialectic retains necessity, it preserves it in the sense that it sublates it. Others seem to have
arrived at comparable conclusions about Schmidt's reading. For instance, Brown argues that
“necessity is sublated, not transcended,” in Marx's philosophy of nature. While Schmidt makes a
good case for why “labour, and thus humanity's relation to nature, can never be fully
transcended,” his interpretation of the “relation to nature” in a “post-capitalist society is
801 Ibid., 96.
802 Ibid., 31.
803 Ibid., 159.
804 Ibid., 71.
805 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and the
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, C.J. Arthur (trans.), (Prometheus Books: New York; 1998), 90-91.
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problematic” because it ignores Marx’s emphasis upon the transformation of necessary work.806
Freely associated producers will certainly have to continue to 'wrestle' with nature, but, as Engels
claims, the “struggle for individual existence disappears” because society “emerges from mere
animal conditions of existence into really human ones.”807 In this respect, Marx tells us that
necessity, in its 'direct form', vanishes with the further development of socialism. The mere
expediency of animal need has been replaced by a higher necessity— one which includes within
it the need for freedom and self-realization even in the activity of work.
In Marx’s view, then, the continued necessity of labour in socialism in no way proves the
disunity and incompatibility between society and nature as The Concept of Nature in Marx
alleges. Rather, it affirms the very opposite of Schmidt's intended thesis: viz., it confirms the
integral connection in Marx's late writings between the possibility of the coming-into-being of
human society, and the requirement of simultaneously humanizing nature and man's direct
relation to it through work. The direct metabolism with nature, he believed, would have to be
transformed in such a way as to make it consistent with a good life for all.
Had he thought otherwise and regarded labour as unfree by nature, Marx would only have
fallen into the fallacy which he wrongly accused Hegel of lapsing into: viz., of conflating
labour’s objectification with its alienation.808 Indeed, he also accused the economists of the same
in his later writings: the economists treat a “process of production [which] has mastery over man,
instead of the opposite,” as just as much a “nature-imposed necessity as productive labour
itself.”809 These “bourgeois economists are so much cooped up within the notions belonging to a
806 Brown, Heather A., Marx on Gender and the Family: A Critical Study, (Brill: Leiden;2007), 62.
807 Engels, Frederick, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Edward Aveling (trans.), (International Publishers:
New York; 2008), 72-73.
808 Marx, Karl, 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole', The Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 177-
178.
809 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Vol. I, (Penguin Books:
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specific historic stage of social development that the necessity of the objectification of the
powers of social labour appears to them as inseparable from the necessity of their alienation vis-
à-vis living labour.”810 But for Marx it is not the objectivity of nature (including the human
dependence upon it in labour, need, etc.) which must be abolished, but merely the estranged
mode of nature's objectivity in a capitalist society.811 Only in this form of economy is the
realization of labour its de-realization, is its objectification the creation of an alien objectivity.812
Of course, this is what the revolution would destroy according to Marx’s view. It would put an
end not to production in general, but to a form in which the products, means, relations and
process of production appear to the producers themselves as something alienating and unfree.
The revolutionary praxis required to usher in a higher society would have to create for itself the
subjective and objective conditions (already partly created by the dissolution of capital) for the
freer and fuller development of each and every individual not merely outside of, but within, the
activity of work.
Clearly, Marx did not share Schmidt’s philosophical assumptions about the externality of
nature, and non-identity between nature and society. Instead, he analyzed this relationship as an
organic complex or totality in which internal relations persist between the various elements. If
there really were an “indestructible boundary between the Subject and the Object” in Marx's
mature writings, what does it mean to say that, by “grasping...history as a process,” man can
eventually come to the “recognition of nature (equally present as [his] practical power over
London; 1990), 174-175.
810 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (tr.), (Penguin
Books: London; 1993), 831-832.
811 Marx, Karl, 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole', The Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan (trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 180-
182.
812 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.),
(Penguin Books: London; 1993), 454.
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nature) as his real body,” i.e., as his own inorganic and objective social body?813 If this “social
mediation of nature” by labour only “confirms” Adorno's “primacy of the object” and Schmidt's
“natural limits” to freedom, praxis, and reason, then why does Marx refer to the rational
regulation and freedom of this field of work as completely worthy of our human nature?814 If the
“problem of non-identity” was “inextinguishable” for Marx in the way that Schmidt presents it,
then why did he call for the restoration of the old metabolic union with nature in a higher
society— namely, one for the first time congruent with the full development of the new species?
Marx's conception of nature as an extension of the human “body,” as mediated by the “organs of
its social practice,” as the “objectification of the subject,” etc.— all of this seems to presuppose
the 'identity-in-difference' made possible by praxis, and not, as Schmidt preferred, some sort of
ontological divide.
Conclusion
The notion that Marx represented necessary labour in a socialist society as unfree activity
is an absolutely untenable interpretation of both his political philosophy and his philosophy of
nature. Adhering to this view requires that we misunderstand his concept of labour, and, indeed,
that we go so far as to conflate the objectification of labour with its alienation. Contrary to what
Marcuse suggests in his later writings on the subject, the passage from the ‘Trinity Formula’
explicitly refers to the possibility of freedom within the realm of necessity, and not merely
beyond it. This would be realized when a community of freely and fully developed individuals
master their metabolism with nature in a form appropriate to the expression and enjoyment of
813 Ibid., 540-542.
814 See Adorno, Theodor, 'Subject and Object', The Adorno Reader, Brian O'Connor (ed.), (Blackwell
Publishing:Oxford; 2000), 143; Schmidt, Alfred, The Concept of Nature in Marx, Ben Fowkes (trans.), (New Left
Books: London; 1971), 64-76, 96.
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their own human nature. I have argued that Marcuse is therefore mistaken in believing that
Marx’s notion of emancipation was restricted to the expansion of the realm of end-in-itself
activity. Although he placed a great emphasis upon the reduction of the working-day and
corresponding increase in free-time, he also placed a great emphasis upon the transformation of
the labour process into a form of free activity.
For the same reason, I argued that Schmidt is also mistaken when he interprets Marx’s
comments on necessary labour as underlining an “inextinguishable internal moment” of
unfreedom, “externality,” and “non-identity” in socialism. Marx’s philosophy of nature is not
underpinned by a “negative ontology,” his dialectic is not confined within the “indestructible
boundary” between subject and object, and his materialism is not determined by the “dialectical
duality” between freedom and necessity. In all these instances, Schmidt proceeds from Adorno,
not Marx. His interpretation of Marx begins from and ends with Adorno in all but name. The
dialectic between freedom and necessity in the writings of Marx and Engels is indebted to
Hegel’s critique of Kant’s third antinomy. In Schmidt’s interpretation, however, Kant’s doctrine
of the irreducible heteronomy of nature is re-read back into the mature Marx’s materialism
through the mediation of Adorno. He projects Adorno’s ‘negative dialectic’ onto Marx’s dialectic
of negativity, and, in the place of Marx’s conception of objectification substitutes Adorno’s
principle of the primacy of the object.
But far from affirming Adorno’s anti-system and philosophy of non-identity, Marx
characterized the nature with which humans interact as their inorganic body. In the Grundrisse
and Capital, he speculated about the possibility of a reconciliation with nature, of re-establishing
the unity with nature in a higher form of production, i.e., the only one compatible with and
worthy of human nature. Thus, even into the later writings, Marx continued to speculate about
something like the ‘humanization of nature’ and the human relation to it. The evidence explored
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in this chapter suggests that he believed that the direct metabolism with nature in work could be
carried-out in a way consistent with the full development and enjoyment of our own human
potential, with the free creation and appropriation of a totality of needs and capacities.
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The Vanishing Away of Direct Necessity:
Marx’s Speculations on the Highest Phases of Socialism
Introduction
In contrast to Marcuse, who sees a contradiction between Capital’s conception of the
realm of necessity and the Grundrisse’s notion of liberation within labour, I argued in the
previous chapter that both writings present work in socialism as a mode of free activity. There is
a great deal of continuity in Marx’s thoughts on this issue across all of his relevant writings.
Occasionally, however, the Grundrisse and, still more, the Critique of the Gotha Programme go
beyond the views presented in Capital. In a few notable instances, these writings even
problematize the distinction drawn in the ‘Trinity Formula’. Appealing to these primary texts, as
well as to commentaries by Sayers and Hudis, this chapter defends the interpretation that Marx
also speculated about the possibility of work being taken-up less and less as a mere means-to-an-
end activity, and more and more for its own sake in the highest stages of human society.
In the Grundrisse, for example, we discover that he not only conceives of work being
transformed into a creative form of self-objectification, but, moreover, of being transformed to
such a degree that the “abstract antithesis” between free-time and labour-time would be done
away with. The labour process could shed its semblance as externality and instrumentality, so
that work becomes something that is no longer work. This is the moment in which natural
necessity vanishes because it is replaced with a higher necessity, viz., the need for the most
complete freedom within work, as well as outside of it. Transformed in such a way, the necessary
relation to nature in work would become subject to the free articulation and enjoyment of the
intellectual, aesthetic and moral faculties of individuals. In the Gotha critique, I will argue that
these tendencies in Marx’s thought are pushed to their limits when he speculates that in the
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highest possible stage of human development— with all other needs satisfied and human powers
maximized— humanized work of this sort would be transformed from a mere means of
satisfying need into the highest of all needs.
Overcoming the Antithesis between Free-Time and Labour-Time
We have seen that Marx conceived of work as a potentially free and creative form of
activity, one involving the combination, experimentation, development and appropriation of a
range of essential powers. In Capital, he did not treat necessary labour as necessarily alienating.
He did not characterize the time spent outside of labour, i.e., free-time for 'higher activity', as the
only form of 'free activity'. In fact, according to the view which he elaborates in the Grundrisse,
such an “abstract antithesis” between free-time and work-time would have to disappear in a
higher social formation, as it only appears to be true from the narrow standpoint offered by the
“bourgeois economy.”815 The speculative significance of this notion is pushed to its outer limits
in the Critique of the Gotha Programme, which refers to work in the highest phases of socialism
as an activity transformed from a mere “means of life” into “life's prime want.”816 As such, to
differing degrees in the Grundrisse and Gotha critique, Marx imagines the possibility of work
being performed less and less as a purely instrumental activity, and more and more for its own
sake as well. This shedding of mere instrumentality, together with the vanishing-away of direct
necessity and direct form of labour, is the moment when work would no longer be recognized as
work. Although these texts sometimes create points of philosophical tension with his
formulations in Capital, more often than not they complement, rather than contradict, what Marx
has to say in the ‘Trinity Formula’. But they definitely cast a different light upon the usual
815 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin Books: London; 1993), 611-612.
816 Marx, Karl, 'Critique of the Gotha Programme', Selected Writings, Lawrence H. Simon (ed.), (Hackett
Publishing Company: Indianapolis; 1994), 321.
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meaning given to its distinction between the realms of freedom and necessity, undermining even
further the sharp division imputed into it by Marcuse and Schmidt.
In the Grundrisse, for instance, Marx criticizes Smith and Fourier because the “repulsive”
appearance which they attribute to work only “holds” true for “contradictory labour” in its
“historic forms as slave-labour, serf-labour, and wage-labour”— “A. Smith, by the way, has only
the slaves of capital in mind.” Smith is “right” that work is drudgery in these historic examples
of “external forced labour,” and that, given such undignified circumstances, only in “not-labour”
do humans find “freedom and happiness.” Yet, this simply implied for Marx that labour has “not
yet created the subjective and objective conditions for itself.” In other words, in a free
association, he supposed that it would be possible for individuals to find freedom in necessity and
not merely beyond it, happiness within work as well as outside of it.
In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou labour! was Jehovah’s curse on Adam. And this is
labour for Smith, a curse. ‘Tranquillity’ appears as the adequate state, as identical with
‘freedom’ and ‘happiness’. It seems quite far from Smith’s mind that the individual, ‘in
his normal state of health, strength, activity, skill, facility’, also needs a normal portion
of work, and of the suspension of tranquillity....The sacrifice of tranquillity can also be
called the sacrifice of laziness, unfreedom, unhappiness, i.e. negation of a negative state
[although, Marx in no way conceived of 'free-time' in this way either as we have
seen].817
In Marx's opinion, Smith's “definition” of labour as a “curse” is not even consistent with
the “pastoral, etc., state, which it has lost,” and neither is it applicable to the “semi-artistic
worker of the Middle Ages.”818 In the latter form of labour, he tells us elsewhere, the producer
related to production not as a mere means but as “half artistic, half end-in-itself.”819 If Marx
believed this to be true even of such one-sided forms of precapitalist labour, based ultimately
upon the incomplete development of human beings, then we have no reason to suspect along
with Marcuse or Schmidt that the more all-around and fully-developed individuals of a socialist
817 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin Books: London; 1993), 611-612.
818 Ibid., 611-612.
819 Ibid., 497.
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society would relate in an unartistic, unfree, and purely instrumental way to the necessary tasks
of production. On the contrary, Marx criticizes Smith and Fourier in the Grundrisse precisely
because they both forget that the worker develops a “definite relation by his own self to the thing
he works on, and to his own working capabilities.” The “work of material production” is
therefore potentially and essentially “positive, creative activity.” In a higher society, “labour
becomes attractive work, the individual’s self-realization.”820
Marx can claim in this same passage from the Grundrisse, without contradicting himself
later in Capital, that work in a higher society will shed its appearance as mere 'instrumentality'.
To be sure, it still remains the case that labour “obtains its measure from the outside, through the
aim to be attained and the obstacles to be overcome in attaining it.” But not only does Smith’s
definition of labour give us “no inkling” that the “overcoming of obstacles is in itself a liberating
activity,” it also forgets that necessary work can become a form of liberated activity: viz., it can
be a “real freedom, whose action is, precisely, labour.” While necessary work would obviously
still satisfy needs of this or that sort, which are external to the activity itself, Marx suggests that it
could be taken-up less and less as a mere means-to-an-end because, when transformed, the
activity itself may also provide satisfaction. Hence, we find the peculiar Hegelese expression in
this passage that the “external aims become stripped of the semblance of merely external natural
urgencies,” and become transformed more and more into “aims which the individual himself
posits.”821 In this sense, although Marx claims in Capital that the true “realm of freedom really
begins only where labour determined by necessity and external expediency ends,” here we see
that even necessary labour in a socialist society would be “determined” less and less by external
820 Ibid., 611-612.
821 Ibid., 611-612.
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expediency and natural necessity.822 Expressed in speculative terms, it is the vanishing-away of
necessity, or its subsumption from within by the realm of freedom. As Hudis points out,
Marx states in Volume III of Capital, 'The realm of freedom really begins only when
labour determined by necessity and external expediency ends; it lies by its very nature
beyond the sphere of material production proper'...If such a principle prevailed, human
relations would still be governed by natural necessity and external expediency. Society
would still be governed by material production. But the true realm of freedom lies
beyond all this…In a truly free society, however, human life-activity [in labour] is no
longer defined by labour estranged in material production. It is not defined by external
or natural necessity. According to Marx, the amount of time engaged in material
production would be drastically reduced in the new society, thanks to technological
innovation and the development of the forces of production. At the same time, labour,
like all forms of human activity, would become freely associated.823
Marx argues that the work-related activity which satisfies these so-called “external
natural” ends can become gradually stripped of its initial appearance as merely means-to-an-end
activity— just as the “external aims” themselves are no longer confined within the small circle of
unmediated necessity, but have become posited as human needs. Instead of relating to work as
something entirely undesirable, the tasks of a humanized realm of labour would then be
increasingly regarded as free forms in the “objectification of the subject.” Not only would the
individual realize her own purposes in the materials, the activity itself can become a mode of
“self-realization.”824 This is why Marx goes so far as to claim that, in a socialist society, “labour
also no longer appears as labour, but as the full development of activity.” Here, “natural necessity
in its direct form has disappeared” and a “historically created need has replaced a natural one”—
viz., including the need for fully free activity in work.825 This is what freedom within the realm of
necessity makes of means-to-an-end activity: namely, it transforms it into something more than a
mere means. As Sayers puts it, the labour required to “satisfy” our “needs becomes free activity,”
and “free activity [in labour] become a need.” In this sense, “Marx seems to envisage that not
822 Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, David Fernbach (trans.), Vol. III (Penguin Books:
London; 1991), 958-959.
823 Hudis, Peter, Marx’s Concept of the Alternative to Capitalism, (Haymarket Books: Chicago; 2003), 181-
182, 198-200.
824 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin Books: London; 1993), 611-612.
825 Ibid., 325.
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only the antagonism but ultimately even the distinction between the realms of necessity and
freedom will eventually be overcome.” Marx will stress not simply the “reduction” of labour-
time so as to expand free-time, but, at other times, also the “ultimate overcoming of the very
distinction between these realms.”826
Although Marx refers positively here and elsewhere to the withering away of the “direct
form” of labour and “direct form” of necessity, this does not mean that he regarded direct forms
of necessary labour as necessarily alienating. Insofar as freely-associated production still
“requires practical use of the hands and free bodily movement, as in agriculture,” it may even be
reduced to a healthy form of “exercise”— in addition to requiring the scientific knowledge of the
biology of plants, soil, meteorology, organic chemistry, etc., and, perhaps, performing an
aesthetic function as well.827 It is not difficult to see why, based upon such a lofty conception,
Marx speculates about the necessary tasks of work being performed partly for their own sake
inasmuch as they allow for both the creation and enjoyment of one’s own abilities and relations
with others. Transformed in such a way that it exhibits many of the same desirable qualities
which we find in the end-in-itself activity of the true realm of freedom (e.g., art, science), a
“healthy” and “normal portion” of humanized work would be taken-up as a practical activity
which gives free scope to scientific experimentation, aesthetic and intellectual creativity, or, more
generally, to the application, exercising and combining of a whole array of capacities.
This process is then both discipline, as regards the human being in the process of
becoming; and, at the same time, practice [Ausübung], experimental science, materially
creative and objectifying science, as regards the human being who has become, in
whose head exists the accumulated knowledge of society.828
“Really free working,” writes Marx in his Grundrisse-critique of Smith and Fourier,
involves an “intense exertion” of one's essential powers— for which he gives us an example of
826 Sayers, Sean, Marx and Alienation: Essays on Hegelian Themes, (Palgrave: Hampshire; 2011), 65-74.
827 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), (Penguin Books: London; 1993), 711.
828 Ibid., 712.
352
an end-in-itself activity, “e.g. composing.” Yet, because labour can shed its appearance as a
purely instrumental activity— because it can assume the form of “creative activity,” as
“enjoyable” and “attractive work,” and be transformed into a mode of “self-realization,” “real
freedom,” and the “objectification of the subject,” etc.— he concludes that the “work of material
production can achieve this character,” i.e., the same character as end-in-itself activities such as
“composing,”
(1) when its social character is posited, (2) when it is of a scientific and at the same time
general character, not merely human exertion as a specifically harnessed natural force,
but exertion as subject, which appears in the production process not in a merely natural,
spontaneous form, but as an activity regulating all the forces of nature.829
As Sayers notes, Marx is really speculating in the Grundrisse and other works about the
possibility that, in the highest stages of socialist society, labour would no longer be a mere means
of life, but might “become an end-in-itself.”830 Hudis agrees: Marx argues, in several instances,
that labour can be “radically transformed as compared with capitalism, since it serves not as a
means to an end but as an end in itself.”831
We have seen that Capital adheres to the view that in “all forms of society” the realm of
necessity “remains a realm of necessity,” whereas the Grundrisse, by contrast, contends that
“necessity in its direct form has disappeared” and is replaced with a higher necessity in a free
society. In the final form given to the critique of political economy, Marx asserts that the “realm
of freedom really begins only when labour determined by necessity and external expediency
ends,” whereas, in the ‘Rough Draft’ for that critique, he claims that the “external aims [of labour]
become stripped of the semblance of merely external natural urgencies.” The earlier work
presents labour as a form of “real freedom” whose “abstract antithesis” vis-a-vis “free time”
829 Ibid., 611-612.
830 Sayers, Sean, Marx and Alienation: Essays on Hegelian Themes, (Palgrave: Hampshire; 2011), 115.
831 Hudis, Peter, Marx’s Concept of the Alternative to Capitalism, (Haymarket Books: Chicago; 2003), 198-
201, 204, 210.
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would have to be destroyed by socialism. The magnum opus, however, defines labour as
something distinct from the “true realm of freedom.” Now, either Marx’s views on this question
changed considerably in the half decade between the writing of the Grundrisse and the Economic
Manuscripts of 1863-64 (which became Volume III of Capital), as Schmidt and Marcuse suggest,
or, the meanings which they attach to these terms are different from the ones which Marx
ascribed to them.
If Marx’s thoughts on freedom and necessity in the Grundrisse and Capital are largely
consistent with one another, as I believe they are, then the relation between these two realms
must be interpreted in a much more nuanced manner than is commonly accepted in secondary
literature. Since he felt that production in general could never be abolished by a particular mode
of production, Marx also never speculated about the complete dissolution of labour-time into
free-time. Once we have accepted the metabolic premise that labour can only be reduced to a
healthy and normal limit, the whole matter turns on the form which that activity assumes. In
some works, such as the Grundrisse and still more the Gotha Programme, he argues that the
further development of socialist society would eliminate not only the “abstract antithesis,” but
perhaps even the very distinction, between free-time and work-time. Yet, even if, as Marx claims
in Capital, the truest freedom afforded by pure end-in-itself activity remains preferable to the
nonetheless quite real freedom which might exist within the realm of necessity, this does not
imply that he envisioned work as completely undesirable and/or entirely instrumental. On the
contrary, he asserts in Capital that a society of more fully developed individuals would assume
the necessary demands of labour as something which allows for the free play of their mental
faculties, which affords them free space for the expression of their aesthetic and even moral
powers. Although these necessary tasks would continue to satisfy needs of this or that sort, they
would also satisfy the need for freedom and self-realization in work.
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Elsewhere he asserts that labour can be 'self-realization, objectification of the
subject...real freedom”…The idea that economically necessary work can be free and
fulfilling is a fundamental idea in Marx's outlook, both here and throughout his
work...In his early writings Marx describes work as the 'vital activity' of human beings,
their 'species activity', the 'essential activity' by which human beings are distinguished
from animals...He maintains these views throughout his life. In the Grundrisse he
describes labour as potentially a 'free' activity; in the 'Critique of the Gotha Programme'
he envisions that it may become 'life's prime want'...By objectifying ourselves in our
products, we come to recognize our powers and capacities as real and objective, and
thus we develop a consciousness of self. Moreover, by humanising the world we come
to feel increasingly at home in it...[and] it is through the productive activity of work that
we overcome our alienation from nature and develop and recognize our distinctive
powers...Thus for both Hegel and for Marx work is not only a means to satisfying needs,
it is also an activity of self-development and self-realisation. Moreover, this process of
objectification and self-realisation is present in other forms of practical activity as well.
Marx also insists that time devoted to necessary labour must be reduced so that
“disposable time” for free activity, the “realm of freedom,” can be increased. Is there not
a contradiction here? If activity in the realm of necessity can be free, as I have been
arguing is Marx's view, why should it be reduced? Does this passage from Capital not
imply after all that, for Marx, work in the realm of necessity is a regrettable necessity as
writers like Berki and Cohen assert?...To maintain that economic work can be a
liberating and fulfilling activity is not to say that it is the only such activity or that it
should be our sole activity. Yet in industrial society, particularly when Marx was writing
in the middle of the nineteenth century, working hours had been extended to extreme
lengths...Marx wants work time to be reduced to what he calls a “normal length”...not
because he thinks that in ideal conditions necessary work should be eliminated
altogether, but so that people can have the time and energy for other activities as well,
and fulfill themselves in a variety of ways...Work and free time have stood in
antagonistic opposition to each other [up until now]. To be free has meant not working,
and to work has meant being unfree. Neither condition has been satisfactory...In a
society of the future, Marx envisages that the antagonism which has hitherto prevailed
between these aspects can be transcended. The purpose of limiting the working day is
not to minimise or eliminate work in the “realm of necessity” as such, but rather to
overcome the antagonistic relation which has existed historically between work and
freedom...Will the aim of the society continue to be to minimise necessary labour in
order to maximise free time? Will the distinction between the realms of necessity and
freedom persist even when the antagonism between these two realms are
overcome?...[Marx sometimes] seems to imply that the distinction between the realms
of necessity and freedom must continue to exist in any future society...However, other
themes in Marx's thought point in a different direction, towards the reduction and
ultimate overcoming of the very distinction between these realms. Fundamental to
Marx's outlook is the view that human needs develop and change historically. As Marx
puts it in the passage from Capital under discussion, the realm of necessity “expands,”
needs become more developed and differentiated...Conversely, as needs develop, free
activity itself becomes a need...Marx foresees the emergence of the person “rich in
needs” who is “simultaneously the man in need of a totality of vital human
expressions...the man in whom his own realization exists as inner necessity, as
need”...Work to satisfy basic needs becomes free activity and free activity becomes a
need. In this way, Marx seems to envisage that not only the antagonism but ultimately
even the distinction between the realms of necessity and freedom will eventually be
overcome...However, even if his view is that the distinction persists, this goes no way
towards vindicating the accounts of writers like Berki and Cohen. For, as I have argued,
in distinguishing between a realm of “freedom” from a realm of “necessity,” Marx is not
making a distinction between spheres of freedom and unfreedom.832
832 Sayers, Sean, Marx and Alienation: Essays on Hegelian Themes, (Palgrave: Hampshire; 2011), 65-74.
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Sayers is right that Marx pointed to the possibility of labour becoming more than a mere
means-to-an-end. As work is transformed, it could take on attributes similar to the realm of end-
in-itself activity, and, hence, become something done at least partially for its own sake. Perhaps
these possibilities were ones which he believed could only be actualized in the most advanced
stages of a socialist society. Without falling into the schematic view which insists that there will
have to be one, two, or twelve stages to communism, Marx was right to postulate that, in the
immediate phases of the revolution, we would find “communist society, not as it has developed
on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, just as it emerges from capitalist society; which is
thus in every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks
of the old society from whose womb it emerges.”833 Hence, just as the “system of bourgeois
economy has developed for us only by degrees, so too [will] its negation.”834 Ultimately,
however, we can find Marx conjecturing in the Critique of the Gotha Programme that in the
highest rungs of human possibility— i.e., with all other needs satisfied and human powers
maximized— the new species of individual will even relate to the need for such meaningful work
“not only a means of life but [as] life's prime want.”835
This passage in question from the Gotha critique is highly qualified. Only after natural
necessity in its direct form has disappeared and all other needs have been satisfied does fully free
work become posited as a need, as the highest necessity. Once the universally-developed
individual has completely transcended the division of labour, then the last division of activity—
the very division between activity in the realms of necessity and freedom— might need to be
833 Marx, Karl, 'Critique of the Gotha Programme', Selected Writings, Lawrence H. Simon (ed.), (Hackett
Publishing Company: Indianapolis; 1994), 320.
834 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Martin Nicolaus (trans.),
(Penguin Books: London; 1993), 712.
835 Marx, Karl, 'Critique of the Gotha Programme', Selected Writings, Lawrence H. Simon (ed.), (Hackett
Publishing Company: Indianapolis; 1994), 321.
356
transcended too. As Hudis suggests, Marx indicates that this process of stripping away labour's
pure instrumentality to the point of it becoming life's 'prime want' is only really possible in the
highest reaches of a communist society.
There is, however, an important difference between the Critique of the Goth Programme
and these earlier writings, in that the Critique suggests for the first time that the
postcapitalist relations under discussion thus far in Marx's work had pertained to the
initial phase of the new society, which is still defective from the vantage-point of what
eventually follows it...Marx discusses the radically different distributive principle that
governs a higher phase of communism as follows: 'From each according to their
abilities, to each according to their needs!'...This does not mean that labour as such
vanishes in a higher phase of socialism or communism. Marx explicitly states that in
such a higher phase, labour would no longer be 'only a means of life but life's prime
want'. Labour is now radically transformed as compared with capitalism, since it serves
not as a means to an end but as an end in itself...It is not hard to see that Marx's vision of
higher phase of socialism or communism requires a momentous material and
intellectual transformation. It certainly does not emerge overnight!...These include an
end of the separation between mental and manual labour; the transformation of labour
from a mere means to an end in itself; a dramatic increase of the productive forces such
as to alleviate the possibility of poverty and want; and 'the all-around development of
the individual'...He is not pushing off the realm of freedom to some far horizon. The
realm of freedom emerges simultaneously with the elimination of capitalism. Marx is
realistic to understand, however, that a free society itself undergoes development. There
would be no necessity for it to undergo further self-development if it did not contain
some kind of internal defect [carried over from capitalism] that impels the forward
movement...The fact remains, however, that conditions in the lower phase of socialism
or communism are defective and limited as compared to those that follow in a higher
phase...Marx conceives of this phase as the passing-beyond of natural necessity— not in
the sense that labour as such would come to an end, but rather that society would no
longer be governed by the need for material production and reproduction.836
One thing is for certain about Marx's famous claim that work would no longer be
performed as a mere means in the highest phases of communism. If one were to uncritically
accept the interpretation which is usually given to the distinction between freedom and necessity
in Capital, then this would be a startlingly anti-Marxist statement. For example, Cohen claims
that, in comparison to the Marx of the Gotha Programme who believes work can be transformed
into “life's prime want,” the Marx of the 'Trinity Formula' believes that, “being a means of life, it
cannot be wanted” at all! According to this standpoint, “freedom” in a socialist society is
836 Hudis, Peter, Marx’s Concept of the Alternative to Capitalism, (Haymarket Books: Chicago; 2003), 198-
201, 204, 210
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“regrettably limited” for the Marx of Capital to free-time.837 It is true that, in Capital, life’s
prime want is the end-in-itself activity of the truest realm of freedom, whereas, in the Critique of
the Gotha Programme, the truest freedom also arises within a realm of necessity which no longer
appears as a realm of necessity. In the Critique of the Gotha Programme, which is the only real
outlier in all of Marx’s relevant works on the subject, tendencies in his thought which we also
find in his early and middle writings are pushed to their outer limits. In the Critique, but also to a
lesser extent in the Grundrisse, Marx questions and even problematizes the division between
freedom and necessity in ways which are not pursued in Capital.
However, even if Marxists choose to adopt the view in Capital that the “distinction
persists, this goes no way towards vindicating the accounts” which characterize Marx as making
a “distinction between spheres of freedom and unfreedom.”838 As I have argued in my critiques
of Marcuse and Schmidt, and as Sayers reaffirms in his critique of Cohen, nowhere in Capital
does Marx characterize labour in a higher society as undesirable or unfree, alienated or
dehumanizing. To suggest that is to misunderstand the philosophy underpinning his distinction
between freedom and necessity.839 Insofar as the distinction between the realms of freedom and
necessity is maintained in socialism, the more appropriate way to interpret it is as a distinction
between two forms of freedom. Both spheres of freedom would have to be reorganized so as to
allow for the full development and free application of essential human capacities. But, according
to the Marx of the Grundrisse and Gotha Programme, the outer limits of the revolutionary
process and of the transformation of the direct relation to nature in work would be reached when
labour is stripped of the appearance of simple externality and taken on no longer as a mere
837 Cohen, Gerald Allen, Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence, (Oxford University Press: Oxford; 2004),
234.
838 See Sayers, Sean, Marx and Alienation: Essays on Hegelian Themes, (Palgrave: Hampshire; 2011), 65-75.
839 Ibid., 115.
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means— even if we should choose to qualify in the spirit of Capital that, unlike the pure end-in-
itself activity of the “true” realm of freedom, it could never become transformed into the “prime
want” of life.
Hence, although points of difference certainly exist between the Grundrisse, Capital and
the Critique of the Gotha Programme, I believe that, aside from these few exceptions, they
complement rather than contradict one another. Marx’s different formulations show no signs of
an ontological break in his conception of nature and the human relation to it in work. In fact, far
from changing his mind in any substantive way on this matter, a direct line of continuity can be
drawn from his dissertation on Epicurus to his critique of political economy. We find a similar
conception of the relationship between freedom and necessity, and a similar notion of labour and
its relation to nature, in early works such as The Holy Family, Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts, The Paris Notebooks, and The German Ideology. From the mid-1840s onward,
Marx distinguished the alienation of labour from its objectification— which is to say, he
envisioned the possibility of non-alienating forms of labour. His earlier idea of a universal
species-being affirming its universality in the objective activity of work, in its transformation of
nature, is enriched by and finds its complement in the later conception of universal development
in the Grundrisse and Capital. There, too, Marx foresees the possibility of universally-developed
individuals interacting with nature in such a way as it make work actually worthy of that human
nature.
Vuillemin once argued that labour “springs apparently from necessity,” but ultimately
“realizes the work of liberty and affirms our power.” As he explains of Marx’s views, “necessity
expresses (for man) a hidden freedom.” Arendt had actually ridiculed this approach as an attempt
to reconcile the “flagrant contradictions” in Marx's writings through a “sophisticated
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vulgarization.”840 However, any primer on Hegel could have taught her what happens to
‘contradictions’ in the dialectic. Freedom can flourish within necessity, and not merely beyond it.
Means-to-an-end activity can be transformed into something more like end-in-itself activity.
Necessity can disappear because its direct form is replaced with a higher necessity, including, the
need for self-realization in the whole of one’s life. Marxism as a political project is oriented
toward creating the conditions for happiness inside (and not merely outside) of work.
As I have suggested, this way of interpreting Marx is actually more consistent not only
with the late works examined in this chapter, but also with his writings going back to the 1840s.
In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, we find him elaborating the view that
“productive life…appears to man in the first place merely as a means of satisfying a need.” Yet,
the “whole character of a species, its species-character, is contained in the character of its life
activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s species-character.” Thus, the young Marx does not
speak of abolishing labour per se, as is sometimes claimed; rather, he argues that we need only to
radically reverse the condition of “[e]stranged labor:” i.e., the situation which “makes his life
activity, his essential being, a mere means to his existence.” Unlike the other animals, “man
produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom
therefrom.” Indeed, he argues that, under emancipated conditions, “work” would be carried out
according to the “laws of beauty.”841 It is in work, he says, that man confirms himself as man, in
work that he raises himself above the rest of nature and distinguishes himself from the rest of the
animal kingdom— even if the immediate result of wage-labour has meant just the opposite: i.e.,
complete dehumanization and the reduction of the human to an animal existence.
In creating a world of objects by his personal activity, in his work upon inorganic nature,
man proves himself a conscious species-being...It is just in his work upon the objective
840 Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition, (University of Chicago Press: Chicago; 1998), 104.
841 Marx, Karl, 'Estranged Labor', The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Martin Milligan
(trans.), Dirk J. Struik (ed.), (International Publishers: New York; 2009), 113.
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world, therefore, that man really proves himself to be a species-being. This production
is his active species-life. Through this production, nature appears as his work and his
reality. The object of labor is, therefore, the objectification of man’s species-life: for he
duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in
reality, and therefore he sees himself in a world that he has created.842
This way of rendering the relationship between freedom and necessity is not only a more
sophisticated way of interpreting the relevant passage from Volume III of Capital, and its
connection to Marx's oeuvre as a whole, it is also more consistent with the philosophic tradition
from which his thought descends. To suggest otherwise is to ignore, like Schmidt, the Hegelian
origins of Marx’s ideas. Hegel repudiated Kant’s third antinomy. Rejecting the abstract
independence which Critical Philosophy afforded to these two principles, Hegel conceived of
these fixated terms as but “moments” in the coming-into-being of “the true freedom and the true
necessity.”
Take, for example, the antinomy of freedom and necessity. The main gist of it is that
freedom and necessity as understood by abstract thinkers are not independently real, as
these thinkers suppose, but merely ideal factors (moments) of the true freedom and the
true necessity, and that to abstract and isolate either conception is to make it false...In
every dualistic system, and especially in that of Kant, the fundamental defect makes
itself visible in the inconsistency of unifying at one moment what a moment before had
been explained to be independent and therefore incapable of unification. And then, at
the very moment after unification has been alleged to be the truth, we suddenly come
upon the doctrine that the two elements, which, in their true status of unification, had
been refused all independent subsistence, are only true and actual in their state of
separation. Philosophising of this kind wants the little penetration needed to discover,
that this shuffling only evidences how unsatisfactory each one of the two terms is. And
it fails simply because it is incapable of bringing two thoughts together...It argues an
utter want of consistency to say, on the one hand, that the understanding only knows
phenomena, and, on the other, assert the absolute character of this knowledge, by such
statements as ‘Cognition can go no further’; ‘Here is the natural and absolute limit of
human knowledge.’ But ‘natural’ is the wrong word here. The things of nature are
limited and are natural things only to such extent as they are not aware of their universal
limit, or to such extent as their mode or quality is a limit from our point of view, and not
from their own. No one knows, or even feels, that anything is a limit or defect, until he
is at the same time above and beyond it...For living beings as such possess within them
a universal vitality, which overpasses and includes the single mode; and thus, as they
maintain themselves in the negative of themselves, they feel the contradiction to exist
within them...This illustration will show...that our knowledge of a limit can only be
when the unlimited is on this side in consciousness.843
Appropriating this Hegelian conception, we have already read Engels argue that the
842 Ibid., 114.
843 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences and Other Critical Writings,
Ernst Behler (ed.), (Continuum: New York;1990), §§ 28, 48.
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“freedom” to be gained in this field of natural necessity is not to be sought in the “dream of
independence [from] natural laws,” but only through the very mastery of the “knowledge of
those laws.”844 The 'cunning of reason', Marx references Hegel in Capital, consists of the fact
that it realizes its own ends by redirecting the forces of nature to work for itself. The human
being is capable of radically reversing the determinative power of natural necessity when she sets
into motion the forces of nature and industry to operate independently of her own direct labour.
Reason works through these means, but it realizes its own ends— ends which, in a higher society,
fall outside the immediacy of external necessity and are posited in a truly human form. In the
Philosophy of Religion, Hegel's archetype for this conception of labour as liberating activity is
Hercules. As Hegel remarked there of the twelve labours, it was through his struggle with
natural necessity (i.e., with lions, bull and monsters) that Hercules elevated himself above natural
immediacy and raised himself into spiritual self-certainty.845
This more Hegelian way of understanding the relationship between freedom and
necessity in Marx’s writings allows us to follow the definite threads of continuity which weave
together the various phases of his intellectual development. Even as early as his doctoral
dissertation on ancient materialist philosophies of nature, he preferred the Epicurean cosmology
844 Engels, Frederick, Anti-Dühring: Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science, Works of Marxism—
Leninism, Vol XVIII, Emile Burns (trans.), (International Publishers: New York; 1894), 157.
845 Marx, Karl, The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature, (Progress
Publishers: Moscow; 1902), <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1841/dr-theses/ch03.htm>. “Hercules is
principally represented as having lived and died as a human being who was then raised up among the gods. He
possesses human individuality, and he worked like a slave...This spiritual individuality of human beings is on a
higher level than that of Zeus and Apollo, for human spirituality is a singular, free, pure, abstract subjectivity,
undetermined by nature. Hercules too is a singular subject, with his own natural life, within which his labours and
his virtues lie. But this natural life, this conditionedness, this dependence, upon natural life is precisely finitude. At
the same time it is (only) abstract finitude, the point of singularity, that has comprehended all natural content within
itself, but which, as a spiritual subject, both can break free from it and has done so. The other gods are not free is
this way; they still have in their essence a natural content...There is much evidence to show that the Greeks saw this
distinction and were quite aware of it. For instance, they assign to Hercules a very high place indeed. Aeschylus
makes Prometheus say that what comforts him in his defiance is the fact that Zeus will have a son who will cast him
down off his throne; by this he means Hercules [as the representative of human nature].” Hegel, Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. II, Peter C. Hodgson (ed.),(University of California Press:
Berkeley; 1995), 467-468.
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of 'chance' to the Democritean principle of natural necessity. Epicurus had recognized that
freedom could be found within necessity, that the determinations of nature did not preclude the
possibility of self-determination. Democritean materialism, however, “traces everything back to
necessity,” i.e., an “inexorable necessity” which “cannot be persuaded.” Democritus' thinking is
therefore a “slave” to the “destiny” and blind “necessity” entertained by the pre-Socratic
“physicists” before him. By contrast, Epicurus was commended by Marx for recognizing that
“chance is unstable.” In “Epicurus we have been redeemed, set free,” Marx writes quoting
Cicero. “It is a misfortune to live in necessity,” but Epicurus shows us that to “live in necessity is
not a necessity. On all sides many short and easy paths to freedom are open.” It is even
“permitted to subdue necessity itself.”846
In the early 1840s, when Marx appealed to the philosophies of Holbach and Helvetius, he
credited them for arriving at the same essential insight as Epicurus and Hegel. Since their views
were premised upon the notion that “Man is subject to the same laws as nature,” their
materialisms led them to conclude that “[p]ower and freedom are identical.”847 Marx’s vision of
the freedom within the realm of necessity therefore involves precisely what Marcuse refers to as
the unity of causation by necessity and causation by freedom. Self-determination within the
realm of necessity works through the determinations of nature in order to realize its own ends,
ends beyond those determined by necessity itself and which include the need for freedom in
work. Hence, this freedom presupposes the universally-developed powers of socialized labour
and the scientific mastery of the laws of nature made possible by general social knowledge— in
presupposes, in a word, socialism.
846 Marx, Karl, The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature, (Progress
Publishers: Moscow; 1902), <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1841/dr-theses/ch03.htm>.
847 Engels, Friedrich, and Marx, Karl, The Holy Family: Or, Critique of Critical Critique, (Foreign Languages
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Conclusion
In the previous chapter, I argued that Marcuse and Schmidt were mistaken in their
interpretations of Marx’s distinction between freedom and necessity in the ‘Trinity Formula’.
Freedom is possible within the realm of necessity, as well as beyond it. Marx claims in several
instances throughout Capital that the relation to nature in work can be made congruent with the
most complete development of human nature. It becomes consistent with the full realization and
enjoyment of that human potential not merely by reducing the time spent in labour to a healthy
and normal limit, but by transforming the activity itself into a form of free activity and self-
actualization. Even in Capital, he speculates about the possibility of a form of labour which
would be taken-up freely as an expression and enjoyment of the multifaceted needs and
capacities of individuals. This is a view which he maintained in his early works from the 1840s,
in his preparatory manuscripts for the critique of political economy, as well as in the writings
composed after the Paris Commune. Far from being a “sophisticated vulgarization” of the
“flagrant contradictions” in Marx's writings, as Arendt suggests, we have seen that this way of
treating necessity is not only more consistent with his oeuvre as a whole, but also with the
philosophic tradition to which he belonged.
More often than not, Marx’s other works complement, rather than contradict, what he has
to say in the ‘Trinity Formula’. However, despite a great degree of consistency, this chapter has
argued that in a few noteworthy instances his speculations in the Grundrisse and, especially, in
the Critique of the Gotha Programme go beyond those of Capital. In these works, he complicates
and even problematizes the sort of distinction between free-time and labour-time which he sets
up in the critique of political economy. In the critique of political economy, activity within the
realm of necessity is represented as activity within the realm of necessity, whereas, in the ‘Rough
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Draft’, emphasis is placed upon the vanishing away of direct necessity. At the very least, this
would mean overcoming the “abstract antithesis” between free-time and work-time. On this
point, the view which Marx elaborates in Capital is not necessarily incongruous with the
Grundrisse if one interprets the passage from the ‘Trinity Formula’ in a more appropriate and
sophisticated manner.
However, other differences point to real divergences in his thinking. In Capital, the truest
freedom lies beyond labour because labour is said to be still determined by necessity and
expediency; in the Grundrisse, though, Marx imagines the possibility of a form of necessary
work no longer determined by necessity and expediency, a form of labour which is no longer
recognized as labour. In Capital, life’s prime want is the expansion of free-time for end-in-itself
activity, whereas, in the Gotha critique, he envisions necessary work becoming more than a mere
means-to-an-end activity. With all other needs satisfied, the need for the fullest freedom within
this sphere of necessity would be reposited as the highest of needs, the primary want. In these
other works, then, Marx speculates about the possibility of transcending to some degree or
another the distinction between freedom and necessity, labour-time and free-time, means-to-an-
end and end-in-itself activity, etc., in the highest phases of human development. Once individuals
have developed their powers universally, satisfied all of their other needs, and radically reduced
the time spent in the rationally reorganized realm of labour, the only goal left would be to realize
the truest type of freedom within necessary labour. Once the division of labour is completely
eliminated, then this last division of activity— the distinction between activity in the realms of
freedom and necessity— might have to be eliminated.
But even if, as Capital suggests, the distinction would remain, Sayers is right that this
does not lend itself to substantiating the views of those who interpret the realm of necessity as a
dehumanizing realm of continued estrangement within socialism. Rather, Marx believed that the
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distinction, insofar as it would be retained by a free society, would be a distinction between two
different forms of freedom. In short, the Grundrisse, Capital, and Critique of the Gotha
Programme offer us three different visions of free activity within the labour process, but all of
them consistently characterize work in socialism as a form of free activity. In all of these
writings, and in all of his other relevant writings on the subject, Marx treats work in communism
as a form of self-realization and self-development, as an activity which gives room to the free
expression and enjoyment of one’s own scientific and aesthetic powers, the creation and
appropriation of a totality of needs. To understand Marx’s conception of necessary work in
socialism in this way is to understand it as the point of connection between his political
philosophy and his philosophy of nature, between his conception of nature and of human nature.
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Conclusion
Part III of this dissertation considered Frankfurt School critiques of Marx's conception of
nature in a socialist society, as well as their critiques of his distinction between the realms of
freedom and necessity in such a social formation. The first chapter argued that Marx's notion of
rationally regulating the intercourse with nature is not based upon the same philosophic
assumptions as the tradition of instrumental rationality extending from Bacon and Descartes to
Bentham and Mill, nor is it susceptible to the Frankfurt critique of such 'rationality'. Marx
explicitly criticized the blind necessity of the capitalist exploitation of nature and labour as a
system of general utility. This is the society where individuals do not rationally regulate their
interchange with the earth. When he uses the term 'mastery', it therefore means something quite
different than the 'domination' of nature characteristic of capitalism. Marx, after all, speaks in the
same breath of the 'mastery' of the powers of “human nature,” not just those of “so-called
external nature.” He certainly conceives of a socialist society as one which is able to mediate,
regulate, and appropriate all the forces of nature by harnessing the collective forces of the
general intellect and general industriousness of individuals. But only in this form of society did
he believe that individuals would be able to prevent, mitigate, and eliminate humanity's
detrimental impact upon the planet, healing the rift which appears irreparable from the standpoint
of capital, and restoring, once and for all, the everlasting bond with our own inorganic body.
In order to fully appreciate the role which nature plays in Marx's representations of such a
higher social formation, I argued in Chapter Two that readers have to appreciate the
relation/distinction between the realms of freedom and necessity— both when socialism is still
stamped by the old society, and as it might develop anew upon its own continually recreated
basis. One thing is constant throughout Marx's writings on this subject. He never represented the
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realm of necessity in socialism as a realm of unfreedom, as both Schmidt and Marcuse suggest.
Work was always regarded by him as a potentially creative and free form of activity. When the
direct form of labour has been replaced with a fully socialized individual capable of regulating
the forces of nature through the application of her own general powers, and through the
appropriation of her total social relation to others, the labourer would take on more of a directive
and scientific function as a watchman and regulator. However, even where the direct form of
labour persists, Marx speculates that a healthy and minimal portion of it could also be
transformed into a form of self-development and self-expression. Even for the late Marx, nature
could be humanized and the necessary relation to it through work transformed (so as to be
consistent with the complete actualization of human nature).
Just as the direct form of labour disappears more and more, so too does the direct form of
necessity. Even though the social struggle with nature continues, the animal expediency and
artificial natural necessity of capitalist society is abolished, and free activity in the realm of
necessity becomes posited as a need, as a higher necessity. This implies dissolving to some
degree the purely instrumental and wholly external 'semblance' of work as a mere means-to-an-
end activity. It implies overcoming the 'abstract antithesis' between free- and labour-time. As I
have suggested in Chapter Three, the outer limits to this process of shedding instrumentality and
inverting necessity would involve the transformation work into life's prime want. Once
appropriation is carried out according to need and all needs gratified, this sort of work would
become posited as a need. Once the partially developed individual stamped by the division of
labour has given way entirely to the most totally developed social being, a whole new species of
person, then the very last division of activity might need to be abolished— the division between
activity in the realms of freedom and necessity. But, as Sayers argues, even if Marx was of the
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mind that work could never become a pure end-in-itself, and even if he assumed (as he does in
Capital) that the distinction between these realms would remain in some form, this in no way
vindicates the views of those like Schmidt and Marcuse who claim that he defined this realm as
one of estrangement.
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Afterword
Marx's early philosophical writings, economic interpretation of history, political theory,
anthropology, sociology and critique of political economy were all connected in one way or
another to his historical conception of nature and the human interaction with it. Far from being
uninterested in questions about nature, such questions dominated his thinking from the earliest to
the last of his writings. From his doctoral dissertation on the Epicurean philosophy of nature to
his analysis of precapitalist forms of the metabolism, from his critique of Hegel's philosophy of
nature and Feuerbach's naturalism to his critique of the metabolic rift, Marx grappled with these
concerns in thoughtful, original, and critical ways.
Far from invalidating Marx, the history of the 20th century only confirmed the ecological
dimensions to his critique of capitalism. The 'natural law' and 'blind necessity' of the capitalist
economy continued to undermine the universal-natural conditions and actual natural laws of life
necessary for human society in all of its possible forms— and it accomplished this task on a far
greater scale than even Marx had foreseen. These advanced environmental contradictions of
contemporary capitalism compel us to rethink the meaning of nature not merely in Marxist
theory, but, more importantly, in our own social practice. If the history of the 20th century only
confirmed these contradictions first identified by Marx's critique, then it will be up to the first
century of this new millennium to resolve these antagonisms, preventing the mutually assured
destruction of both the human species and the ecosystem to which we belong.
This general exploitation of both ‘external’ nature and of human nature must be abolished.
As a system which saps the original sources of all wealth— labour and nature— capitalism must
be destroyed. These statements are as true today as the day Marx first wrote them. Capitalism is
not only absolutely inconsistent with the full development of individuals, it is inconsistent with
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any notion of a lasting form of the metabolism with nature. Neither nature nor society can afford
to let capitalism 'wither away' on the vine. The rift which appears irreparable from the capitalist
stage of development, and which continues to violate the everlasting laws of human life, can
only be healed by radically reconstituting the connection between labour and its inorganic body
in the earth. Then, and only then, might humankind finally proclaim together with Marx:
socialism is the completed unity of nature and humanity.
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